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On April 15, 1924, in his testimony to Congress in favor of immigration restriction, 
Senator Matthew Neely of West Virginia warned ominously: 
It is our duty to defend not only against enemies in arms but against the millions of 
physically, mentally, and morally inferior men and women scattered over Europe, Asia, 
Africa, Mexico, and the islands of the sea, who, as prospective immigrants, are awaiting 
their opportunity to rush to our shores.  [If they are successful] we shall have justifid the 
following words of Isaiah: "Your land, strangers devour it in your presence, and it is 
desolate."1  
In 1924, Senator Neely's arguments over restriction and exclusion had become familiar and part 
of popular knowledge.  The debate was not really over whether the quota system would become 
law, but rather over the most 'scientific' criteria to adopt to exclude and restrict prospective 
immigrants.  The adoption of the 1924 Immigration Act represented the climax of a long battle 
over the legitimacy of exclusion and restriction and the desirability of selecting specific people to 
enter the country.  The country's first comprehensive immigration law drastically limited 
immigration from Europe, barred immigration from Asia, and strictly regulated immigration 
from Mexico.2  The passage of the 1924 Immigration Act also concluded a period of immigrant 
mobilization begun in the 1880s with Chinese immigrants' opposition to exclusion and ended 
with Southern and Eastern Europeans' resistance against restriction. 
This study explores how Italian and Jewish immigrants mobilized against U.S. 
immigration restriction policy and, in the process, altered their identity and their place in 
American society and politics.3  Like specialists in Asian and Mexican migration, I shift the 
                                                
1 Quoted in Cheryl Shanks, Immigration and the Politics of American Sovereignty, 1890-1990 (Ann Harbor, MI: 
Rutgers University Press, 2001), 56. 
2 For a more detailed account of the 1924 debate on immigration and the law itself, see Mae Ngai, Impossible 
Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); and 
Shanks, Immigration and the Politics of American Sovereignty.  
3 Throughout this dissertation I use Italian Americans nd American Jews to identify the two groups I study in order 
to avoid confusion with Jewish and Italian immigrants in general and to highlight the distinction betwen how they 
constructed their identity, rooting it in ethnicity and religion respectively. 
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focus from the restrictionists to the restricted to shed light on how these two groups responded to 
the defamatory campaign against them and to the laws that restricted immigration from their 
countries of origin.4  While we have learned a lot about how exclusion has affected Asian 
immigrants and Asian communities in the United States and how repatriation, workers programs, 
and illegality have shaped Mexican immigration to this country, we still know very little about 
how restriction changed the lives of Southern and Eastern Europeans.   The assumption is tha 
restriction barely affected Southern and Eastern European migrants because they w re "white on 
arrival" and could benefit of the advantages that naturalization affords.  Yet, although t ey were 
technically white, in practice they were ascribed "a whiteness of a different color."5   The entire 
campaign to limit new arrivals from Eastern and Southern Europe revolved around the 
construction of a different kind of whiteness that made undesirable.6 
The campaign to restrict immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe began as early 
as 1882 in concomitance with the campaign to exclude Chinese and Japanese immigrants.  The 
two movements coexisted and overlapped often, as their proponents used similar arguments to 
mark Italian, Jewish, Chinese, and Japanese immigrants as undesirable.  All four groups were 
attacked on the basis of their race, ethnicity, class, religion, gender, sexuality, moral standing, 
health, and political affiliation, among other factors.  Yet, while the argument for Chinese and 
Japanese exclusion quickly gained momentum and led to immediate legislative action, the 
                                                
4 Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects; Erika Lee, At America’s Gates. Chinese Immigration During the Exclusion Era, 
1882-1943 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Lucy Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers – 
Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995); George Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano 
Los Angeles, 1900-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Fanscisco E. Balderrama and Raymond 
Rodriguez, Decade of Betrayal (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press: 1995). 
5 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
6 For a more in-depth discussion of the changing meaning of whiteness for Italian and Jewish immigrants, see Karen 
Brodkin, How Jews Became White Folks (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), Jennifer Guglielmo 
and Salvatore Salerno, Are Italians White? (New York: Routledge, 2003), and Thomas Guglielmo, White on 
Arrival: Italians, Race, Color and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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campaign to exclude Southern and Eastern Europeans took longer, in part because the argument
to restrict them was more difficult to build as it required justification to reject white immigrants. 
In the late 1890s, the debate surrounding the Lodge bill, the first to propose a literacy test to limit 
immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, helped critics to identify their major tenets more 
clearly.  For the first time nativists distinguished between "old" and "new" European immigrants 
and considered Southern and Eastern Europeans as a collective entity posing a seriousthr at to 
the survival of American society.  Slavs, Italians, and Jews came increasingly to be associated 
with disorder, violent crime, and avarice respectively.  The new form of nativism incorporated 
the older anti-Catholicism and anti-radicalism, borrowed from contemporary Darwini n and 
Spencerian theories, and embraced the country's new bombastic nationalism.  
Attacks against the two groups came from everywhere:  academia, public intellectuals, 
'experts' on immigration, and the media.  Starting from the late years of the 1890s, a flood of 
publications on the new immigrants' inferiority entered mainstream America.  The most popular 
titles included Edward A. Ross's The Old World in the New, Frank J. Warne's The Immigrant 
Invasion, and Madison Grant's bestseller The Passing Great Race, the book that officially 
sanctioned scientific racism.  Italians and Eastern European Jews' moral and intellectual 
deficiencies, Ross argued, would dilute Americans' superior Anglo-Saxon stock. He condemned 
Eastern European Jews for their inborn love of money but feared southern Italians for their 
volatility, instability, and unreliability.  Letting more Italians into the country would be to 
consent to incorporate "great numbers of wavering, excitable, impulsive persons who cannot 
organize themselves," and it would in the end force Americans to accept "less efficiency, less 
democracy, or both."  With more Jews, Ross wrote, the nation's moral values would be in danger 
since working-class Eastern European Jews were "moral cripples, their souls warped and 
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dwarfed by iron circumstance […] Life amid a bigoted and hostile population has left them aloof 
and thick-skinned."7  Echoing Ross, Warne insisted that the new immigrants had "been reduced 
to the qualities similar to those of an inferior race that favor despotism and oligarchy rather than 
democracy."8  Reinforcing another common stereotype, Warne also contended that history had 
transformed southern Italians and Slavs, in particular, into individuals very similar to the already 
excluded Chinese immigrants.  Finally, Grant warned that America was spiraling toward a 
"racial abyss."  Inferior Europeans such as the Alpines, the Mediterranean, and the Jews were 
mongrelizing the American stock.  Inevitably, he decried, the mixing of any of these inferior 
races with the American one would produce "a race reverting to the more ancient, generalized 
and lower type."  Besides, he added, "the cross between any of the three European races d a 
Jew is always a Jew."9  
These racial arguments soon spread into daily life and became part of day-to-day 
interactions and conversations.  To debase them in popular imagery, Italians were repeat dly 
compared to Chinese immigrants and African Americans.  Italians were oft n called "the 
Chinese of Europe" because the two groups "occupied an ambiguous, overlapping and 
intermediary position in the binary racial schema," neither black nor white but 'yellow,' 'olive,' or 
'swarthy.'10  Woodrow Wilson, in his 1902 History of the American People, gave this view the 
status of academic validity.  These immigrants, he explained, came from "the lowest class from 
the South of Italy."  They had neither skill, nor energy, nor initiative, nor quick intelligence, and, 
                                                
7 Edward A. Ross, The Old World in the New: The Significance of Past and Present Immigration to the American 
People (New York: The Century Co., 1914), 287, 119, and 154. 
8 Frank Julian Warne, The Immigrant Invasion (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1913), 267. 
9 Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919), 18. 
10 Gabaccia, "The 'Yellow Peril' and the 'Chinese of Europe:' Global Perspectives on Race and Labor, 1815- 930," 
in Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, Migration, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives 
(Bern, NY: Peter Lang, 1999)," 177-79. 
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ultimately, "the Chinese were more to be desired."11  Moreover, as John Higham shows, all 
around the country, native-born and Northern European workers called themselves white to
distinguish themselves from the Southern Europeans with whom they worked side by side.12  
The popular imagination also racialized Jews. Widespread opinion contended that Jews had 
visible physical characteristics that made them distinctively "look Jewish."  As Barrett and 
Roediger explain, "While racist jokes mocked the black servant who thought her child, fatered 
by a Chinese man, would be a Jew, racist folklore held that Jews, inside-out, were 'niggers'."13  
Italian and Jewish immigrants were restrictionists' primary targets, as they represented 
the two largest groups among the new immigrants.  Yet, my choice to write a comparative 
history of these two specific groups' mobilization against restriction stemmed from other 
considerations as well.  Italian and Jewish emigrants to the United States followed two distinct 
patterns of migration and had a different relationship with the countries from which they 
emigrated.  Eastern European Jews left Europe as entire families to escape religious persecution 
and discrimination to settle permanently in the United States.  Although some of them eventually 
returned to Europe, the majority never went back and had no desire or opportunity to maintain 
any ties with the countries from which they arrived aside from the Jewish communities there.14  
Italian immigrants, on the other hand, were predominately men who traveled back and forth 
between Europe and the United States several times over their lifetime to escape economic 
stagnation and social subjugation.  At least until the beginning of the twentieth century, they 
arrived in the United States in search of better job opportunities, hoping to set aside enough 
                                                
11 Quoted in Alexander DeConde, Half Bitter, Half Sweet (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 101. 
12 Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925. 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2002), 173.   
13 James Barrett and David Roediger, "Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the New 'Immigrant' Working 
Class."  Journal of American Ethnic History 16, no. 3 (Spring 1997), 9. 
14 Jonathan D. Sarna, "The Myth of No Return: Jewish Return Migration to Eastern Europe, 1881-1914," American 
Jewish History 71, no. 2 (December 1981): 256-68. 
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money to return to their village as soon as possible, to settle their debts, or to start a new life.  
Unlike Jewish immigrants, Italian immigrants, even after they began to settle permanently and 
send for their families, retained strong ties with their ancestral home. 
As I began to study how these two groups reacted to the first calls to limit im igration 
from Southern and Eastern Europe, I soon discovered that I was in reality dealing with three 
rather than two groups.  Restriction, in fact, affected German Jews as much as Eastern uropean 
Jews in the United States.  German Jews had arrived in the United States during an earlier wave 
of immigration from Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century.  A significantly smaller and 
less conspicuous group, German Jews, in spite of sporadic episodes of anti-Semitism, had 
quickly created a wealthy and well-connected community that included prominent professionals, 
politicians, and financiers.  As the campaign to restrict immigration from Southern and Eastern 
Europe began, German Jews considered the attacks and the stereotyping against Easter  
European Jews as an affront to their own image and achievements as well.  As the older and 
more successful community, many German Jews believed that it was their duty to efend and 
provide assistance to Eastern European Jews.  To this end, they founded the American Jewish 
Committee (AJC) specifically to deal with immigration laws and other legal aspects of Jewish 
life in America.  The AJC quickly became the principal voice and face of the mobilization 
against restriction in court, in Congress, and in the media.   
Eastern European Jews often resented German Jews' intervention, as they perceived it as 
condescending and presumptuous.  This often represented a source of tension and discord 
between the groups, but the fight against immigration restriction was one of the few issu s on 
which they often joined forces, especially after both groups discovered what European Jews were 
experiencing under Hitler's regime.  Eastern European Jews achieved more visibility within the 
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entire Jewish community, not only because they outnumbered German Jews but also because 
they began succeeding in their lives.  Ironically, restriction was another factor that brought the 
two groups closer together.  The arrest of immigration from Europe left both groups to deal with 
how to preserve their Old World culture, and Eastern European Jews, being more numerous, 
influenced how they began to envision their life and identity under restriction.  Despite their 
internal disagreements, the presence of German Jews provided Eastern European Jews with the 
resources, connections, and knowledge of American society that Italian immigrants sorely 
lacked. 
As the calls for restriction began, in fact, Italians were still transitory migrants.  The 
almost complete absence of response to the attacks they suffered reflected th  fragility of the 
Italian community in the United States at the turn of the nineteenth century.  Their mobilization 
occurred at a slower pace because they first had to build the resources, acquire the knowledge of 
the system, and build the connections necessary to make their voices heard.  Yet this was not the 
only reason why their path to mobilization against immigration restriction was different from 
American Jews'.  Similar to the Eastern European Jewish case, Italian mobilization included 
another actor as well:  the Italian government.  Unlike German Jews, however, the Italian 
government often represented a hindrance to Italian Americans' efforts to opposerestrictive 
legislation or to attenuate the impact of the existing immigration laws.  The evolving relationship 
between Italian Americans and the Italian government is part of this story as well.   
The constant meddling and interference of Italian governmental officials in the United 
States in Italian American affairs profoundly shaped how Italian Americans responded to 
restriction.  Regarding them as a mass of ignorant, poor, and civically uneducated people, the 
Italian government repeatedly intervened to protect its interest in keeping the Italian emigration 
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to the United States going.  At least until the middle of the 1920s, Italian government officials 
condescendingly refused to collaborate with Italian Americans on pushing for more lenient 
immigration legislation.  Their intervention often derailed Italian Americans' efforts to mobilize 
against restriction and only managed to convince restrictionists of the wisdom of their calls for 
restriction against Italian immigration.  As the Italian American community gained influence in 
American society and began to carve a space for itself in the political sphere, the tables turned, 
and the Italian government increasingly came to depend on Italian Americans as its most 
powerful non-state actors in the United States to protect Italy's economic and international 
interests.  Yet this would not be the case until the late 1940s when, facing a serious economic 
and unemployment crisis, the Italian government found itself dependent on Italian Americans' 
efforts to convince American lawmakers to provide financial assistance to Italy and to soften the 
country's draconian immigration policy to alleviate Italy's financial and overp pulation 
problems. 
The presence of the Italian government had another effect on Italian Americans' response 
to immigration restriction.  In addition to complicating Italian Americans' strategy to oppose the 
quota system, the Italian government also worked hard to keep alive the ties thecommunity had 
with Italy.  These efforts to cultivate spiritual ties to Italy within the Italian American community 
was part of a larger project to create what Mark Choate calls a Greater Italy, whose members still 
felt a connection with their ancestral home and were committed to protect Italy's interests.15  
Especially after Mussolini's rise to power, the Italian government systematically worked to create 
a bond with Italian Americans by increasing the number of consulates in the country, rganizing 
cultural events to foster a sense of italianità, arranging for Italian culture and language courses 
and trips to Italy, and honoring in ostentatious official ceremonies Italian Americans' 
                                                
15 Mark Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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contributions to the welfare of the mother country.  The Italian government also allied itself with 
organizations that were influential in the community, anointing them as its spokesmen and 
representatives in the United States.  These efforts, however, also contributed to delay Italian 
Americans' full integration into American society, as they were stuck between two communities 
to which they were equally committed. 
If Italian Americans had to negotiate their presence in American society w th the 
interference of the Italian government, American Jews were essentially stateless but with strong 
ties with the Jewish community around the world.  Their statelessness pushed American Jews to 
mobilize to protect their interests, to found organizations for the advancement of their 
community, and to create the financial, political, and intellectual resources necsary to pursue 
their political goals and to assist Jewish immigrants from the very moment they arrived in the 
United States.  The lack of a national government that could assist them in their fight against 
restriction and discrimination forced them to be self-reliant, so they took it upon themselv s to 
found resettlement organizations with offices around the world to provide assistance to Jewish 
emigration, protect Jewish migrants from abuse, and establish a network of connections to help 
Jewish communities whenever a problem arose.  Their statelessness also pushed them to try to 
maintain their ethno-religious culture and traditions as an integral element of their identity.  
These efforts, however, often clashed with the calls for assimilation and homogenization to 
which they were exposed in American society and forced them to find a middle ground that 
would allow them to participate without repudiating their identity.  
As relevant as the choice to focus on two very unique immigrant groups was my decision 
to study their story over the longue durée.  Following their experience from 1882, when 
Congress passed the first ineffective law to limit immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, 
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to 1965, when Congress repealed the national origins quota system, which had effectively 
reduced Italian and Jewish immigration to a trickle, this study follows the evolution of their 
strategies to oppose immigration restriction and of their responses to the impact of the quota 
system on their communities at home and abroad.  This approach allowed me to identify what 
they shared with other immigrant groups who had to deal with immigration laws th t regulated 
their admission to the United States.  Both groups initially looked at how Chinese and Japaese 
had mobilized against the immigration laws that targeted them.  Similarly to Chinese and 
Japanese activists, Italian and Jewish anti-restrictionists initially went to court to challenge some 
of the provisions of the 1917 Immigration Act and the 1921 Immigration Act, and similarly to 
the two Asian groups, they soon realized that legal battles were an expensive a d uncertain 
strategy.  Like Chinese and Japanese immigrants, they soon realized that Congress was one of 
the main sites of struggle.  However, unlike their predecessors, although they were “racially 
distinct from other whites” in every other context, they were “white by law” and thus could 
naturalize and vote.   
The shift to the political sphere represented a major turning point for both groups, as they
began to push legislators in their districts to listen to their concerns.  This was not lways easy to 
accomplish, and, more often than not, their pleas were ignored.  Nonetheless, their efforts to 
emerge as a potent political force eventually gave them enough leverage to participate in the 
discussion for immigration reform in the early 1960s.  Before achieving visibility in the political 
arena, both groups underwent a major transformation in the 1930s, when they had to learn to live 
under restriction and negotiate their place within American society.  Both grups sought to 
define how they fit in a society that had officially rejected them as undesirable.  Along the way, 
they developed two distinct approaches to their fight against restriction.  In the 1930s, the 
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solidification of Jewish Liberalism and American Jews' embrace of New Deal's emphasis on 
social justice paved the way to the American Jewish community's commitment to immigration as 
a social justice issue in the 1950s and 1960s.  The emphasis on immigration as a right for all ad 
been present from the very beginning, but it emerged more forcefully after the American Jewish 
community's battle for legislation to assist refugees and displaced persons stranded in Europe at 
the end of World War Two.  The shift also represented a conscious effort to avoid the repeat d 
criticism that the immigration problem was a Jewish problem, as American Jews were often the 
most visible voice of dissent that put forth the loudest opposition.  To this end, many prominent 
Jewish organizations consciously tried to deny this accusation by seeking allia ces with non-
Jewish anti-restrictionists.   
As the 1930s wore on, Italians became very pragmatic in their mobilization against 
restriction.  Aware of their precarious status within American society and, after 1929, faced with 
continuous disparaging attacks for their ties with Fascist Italy, Italian Americans focused their 
energy almost exclusively on Italian immigrants and Italian emigration.  The obstacles they faced 
in their battle for amnesty for the large contingent of Italian illegal immigrants in the United 
States further convinced them that they needed to target their mobilization on Italian immigrants 
only.  To this end, during the 1950s and 1960s they usually joined forces with other groups only 
when the collaboration could directly affect Italian immigrants, even when they finally had an 
organization, the American Committee on Italian Migration, that was as visible and influential as 
any of the older and more established Jewish advocacy organizations. 
Among the most effective strategies the two groups adopted was the creation of 
organizations that focused specifically on immigration matters and had strong leadership, 
internal cohesion, well-funded programs, sophisticated lobbying techniques, and well-chos n 
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allies.16  Jewish and Italian organizations were at the forefront of the struggle against 
immigration restriction from the very beginning but did not have a prominent role in American 
foreign policy until the Truman Directive of December 1945.  Conceived as an emergency action 
to assist Displaced Persons and refugees from war-torn Europe, the directive also assigned a 
prominent role to voluntary agencies in the administration of immigration policy, effectively 
turning them into powerful advocates for immigration reform.  Congress later put its imprimatur 
on the Truman Directive when it passed the 1948 Displaced Persons Act and allowe ethnic and 
religious groups to sponsor applicants and assist them in their resettlement.  Th se two laws 
effectively turned voluntary agencies (VOLAGS) into the major nongovernmental groups 
influencing American immigration policy.17  Italian and Jewish organizations were at the 
forefront of both the relocation and advocacy efforts.  As the United States emerged as the leader 
of the new postwar world, these organizations became powerful players in the new geo-political 
order and, because of their participation in the administration of American immigration policy, 
they now received Cold War administrations' full attention.  These organizatio s' transnational 
networks were now a powerful asset to the United States Cold War objectives.  At a time when 
the country was still reluctant to reform its immigration policy, these Italian nd Jewish 
organizations used their new role and Cold War logic to persuade legislators to undermine the 
quota system by weakening it one provision at a time. 
The Cold War brought yet another crucial character into Italian Americans' mobilization 
against immigration restriction:  the Catholic Church.  Until the beginning of the Cold War, 
Italian Americans rarely joined forces with the American Catholic Church.  During the mass 
                                                
16 Judith S. Goldstein, The Politics of Ethnic Pressure quoted in Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique An 
Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Westport, 
CT: Prager, 1998), 248. 
17 David M. Reimers, Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America, 2nd Ed. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1992), 12. 
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meetings that Italian immigrants organized to oppose the passage of restrictionist laws earlier in 
the century, Catholic Church high-ranking members would often send messages of support for 
their cause, but the collaboration between the two groups would usually end there.  As Evelyn 
Savidge Sterne points out, "It took some time for the Catholic Church to assume the prominence 
in Italian neighborhoods that it enjoyed in other ethnic communities, for many immigrants 
arrived with a strained relationship to the church."18  Largely dominated by clergy members of 
Irish ancestry, the American Catholic Church initially had little to do with Italian immigrants and 
perceived them as a threat to its standing in American society.19  In the 1950s, however, the 
Catholic Church became Italian Americans' most powerful ally in its struggle against the quota 
system, especially after it pushed for the creation of the American Committee on Italian 
Migration under the auspices of the National Catholic Resettlement Council. 
In addition to shedding light on how Italian Americans and American Jews' strategies and 
agenda evolved over their time, this study's emphasis on the long term also helped me uncover 
the reasons why neither group ever asked for the complete abolition of the immigration ceiling 
from American immigration policy.  First introduced in the 1921 Emergency Immigration Act, 
the notion of a cap limiting the total number of admissible immigrants in a year still exi ts to this 
day.  Mae Ngai argues that Euro-Americans purposefully refused to further a truly liberal 
immigration policy and ask for the repeal of any immigration ceiling in order to protect their 
standing in American society and preserve a system that centered on the importance f 
                                                
18 Evelyn Savidge Sterne, Ballots and Bibles. Ethnic Politics and the Catholic Church in Providence (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004), 52. 
19 The Catholic World well exemplified the attitude that most members of the American Catholic hierarchy had 
towards the presence of these new Catholics in America.  Southern Italians had no sense of respectability or spirit.  
Unlike an American or an Irishman who "will almost starve before asking charity and often really does starve," 
Italian immigrants shamefully accepted charity while returning little to the community.  Yet, besides their poverty, 
their customs, and their habits, Italian immigrants were "the worst of all in religious equipment."  Bernard J. Linch, 
"The Italian in New York," Catholic World 47, issue 277 (April 1888). 
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citizenship.20  Yet, a look at the long struggle Italian Americans and American Jews waged for 
the repeal of the national origins quota system reveals this not to be the case.  Even before the 
passage of the first quota system in 1921, both groups had come to believe that quantitative 
restriction was inevitable.  In response, they began to declare themselves in favor of immigration 
regulation in order to plea for the benefits of qualitative rather than quantitative mmigration 
laws, as the former were decidedly less harsh.  Ngai mistakes their realism for racism.   
By the 1960s, the existence of an immigration ceiling could hardly be questioned, 
especially considering that most of the country still did not want the repeal of the quota system.  
In spite of the country's commitment to a quantitative immigration policy, both Italian 
Americans and American Jews nonetheless argued for a more liberal immigration policy for all 
immigrant groups and collaborated with non-European immigrant organizations in the final push 
for the 1965 Immigration Act.  Moreover, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, both groups also 
sought to undermine the quota system to favor Italian and Jewish immigrants living outside 
Europe, especially as the movement for decolonization began.  Finally, although both groups 
contributed to the eventual repeal of the quota system and of the Asiatic Barred Zone, the 
crafting of the legislation and its passage ultimately rested in the hands of Congress and the 
Johnson administration.  
                                                




From Unwanted to Restricted (1890-1921) 
On March 11, 1910, the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization granted a 
hearing to those who opposed any further restriction of immigration.  Commenting on the 
absurdity of proposing yet other restrictive bills, Louis Marshall, the face of J wish mobilization 
against restriction since 1905, when he helped found the American Jewish Committee, to 1929, 
the year he died, bluntly said:  
All this talk about immigrants is, to me, very amusing, when we consider that we are all
immigrants—every one of us.  Beyond that, there are very few who are in any way, in 
this community, descendants of the Pilgrims, or of the original settlers of the South, who 
arrived in the country prior to the Revolution. […] You will find that the great bulk of our 
population is descended from people who have been on this continent not longer than one 
century.  What is to be gained by all this talk about difficulty with immigrants, when e 
are all either immigrants ourselves or the sons and grandsons of immigrants?21  
 
Marshall's words encapsulate the shock that many within the Jewish community felt when 
attacks on their undesirability and on immigration from Europe continued even after Cong ess 
had passed laws restricting the entry of contract laborers, convicts, lunatics, idiots, and those 
likely to become a public charge.  The existing laws, they repeated ad nauseam, alr dy weeded 
out the undesirables.   
The persistence of the virulent attacks against them took many Southern and Eastern 
Europeans by surprise.  Convinced that the attacks and the restrictive immigration bills were 
transitory, they initially struggled to voice their discontent.  Until 1896, when Congress seriously 
considered passing a literacy test to administer to all arriving immigrants, few believed that the 
flow of Eastern and Southern Europeans could be stopped.  The different impact of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Immigration Act of 1882 in part justified their confidence.  
Although both laws marked a significant turning point in the legislation of immigration policy in 
                                                
21 "In Defense of the Immigrant," American Jewish Year Book vol. 12 (1910-1911). 
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the United States and set the tone for the racialized treatment of immigrants in the country, the 
provisions of the two laws also epitomized the different treatment that the United Sta s would 
reserve for Asian and Southern and Eastern European immigrants.22  Despite the limited number 
of Chinese immigrants in the country, the Chinese Exclusion Act was a drastic provision that 
excluded Chinese immigrants from the United States—except for diplomats, merchants, and 
students—and barred those already in the United States from naturalization.  The Immigration 
Act of 1882, on the other hand, barred "convicts, lunatics, idiots, and those likely to become a 
public charge" but barely altered the flow of 'new' immigrants from Southern and E stern 
Europe.  While the Chinese Exclusion Act led to an all-time low in 1887 of ten Chinese 
immigrants admitted to the United States in a single year, the Immigration Acts of 1882, 1885, 
and 1891 barely affected the five million immigrants who reached the United States under their 
aegis. 23  Despite their different outcome, these laws were a watershed in the country's 
immigration policy and symbolized new ideas of sovereignty and national identity.24  It soon 
became apparent to Italians and Jews in the United States that they were hardly immune to the 
rhetoric of exclusion and restriction. 
After years of timid efforts to oppose restrictive immigration legislation, Southern and 
Eastern Europeans realized that the issue would not simply disappear, so they needed to mobilize 
against immigration restriction proposals.  Between 1882, when Congress passed the first 
ineffective law to regulate the immigration flow from Southern and Eastern Europe, and 1921, 
when the passage of the 1921 Emergency Immigration Act officially marked them as 
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undesirable, the Jewish and Italian communities tried to build strategies to oppose the calls for 
restriction, but they embarked upon two different paths.  The conditions under which they lived 
at the turn of the nineteenth century shaped their mobilization strategies and identities in ways 
that would characterize their responses to restriction until 1965, when Congress repealed the 
national origins quota system.   
For the Jewish community, the call for restriction represented a serious complication.  
The older and well established German Jewish community saw the attacks against the recently 
arrived Eastern European Jews as a reflection on their standing and their reputation as well; 
hence they felt compelled to intervene on their co-religionists' behalf.  In addition to these selfish 
motives, German Jews also worried that unless they intervened, Eastern European Jews would 
have to fend for themselves against the same kind of violence and discrimination they had faced 
in Europe.  Although not a perfect society, many of them felt that the United Stateswas a safer 
haven for Jews.  The imperative to help and defend Eastern European Jews compelled German 
Jews to organize and create organizations that could help them relocate and defend their rights 
on both sides of the Atlantic.  As they considered their options, they realized that they should 
pressure the administration and politicians into action but also that they needed to take the lead in 
creating their own organizations that could help Eastern European Jews.  Citing his own 
experience as a Russian refugee, Judge Leon Sanders told the House Committee on Immigration 
and Naturalization in March, 1910, that "the Jews welcomed increased immigration; and though 
it imposed a burden upon them, they were willing to assume it and see to it that the Jewis  
immigrants did not become charges upon the charitable institutions."25 
To a certain extent, Italians in the United States had a response similar to German and 
Eastern European Jews.  They too created an organization that could defend and facilitate the 
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arrival of Italian immigrants, oppose immigration restriction proposals, and help Italians in the 
United States deal with their daily ordeals and discrimination.  However, unlike Jewish 
immigrants, Italians created one major organization in charge of all these tasks rather than the 
discrete ones that Jews founded and did not benefit from the experience, the connections, and 
resources that the German Jewish community enjoyed.  Part of the problem resided in the fact 
that Italian immigrants, unlike Jewish immigrants, were still birds of passage by the beginning of 
the twentieth century, or they returned to Italy permanently after years in the United States.  This 
compelled them to create an infrastructure for their community and come up with strategies to 
mobilize against restriction at the same time.  The ambivalent relationship Italian immigrants had 
with the representatives of the Italian government in the United States further complicated their 
response.  Unlike Jews, who felt no connection to the countries from which they migrated and 
severed any relations with their representatives in the United States, Ilians had strong ties with 
their ancestral home and a complex rapport with Italian authorities.  The lack of an older 
community, like that of the German Jews for Eastern European Jews, in a way compelled Italian 
Americans to turn to the Italian government for help. 
  
Reacting to "The Necessity of Restricting Immigration to Our Shores" (1882 to 1917)26 
Calls for restriction against Southern and Eastern European immigrants began in earnest 
in the mid-1880s when it became clear that the laws passed by Congress up to that point were 
ineffective.  In 1885, Josiah Strong published Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present 
Crisis, in which he warned against the seven perils facing the country, namely Catholicism, 
Mormonism, socialism, intemperance, wealth, urbanization, and immigration.  Tapping into 
                                                




unsophisticated versions of Darwinism, eugenics, and nativism, he presented recent European 
immigrants as the main source of crime, immorality, corruption, religious extremism, and 
political radicalism.27  Amid industrial strife, economic crises, and the passing of the frontier 
adventure, his calls for immigration restriction resonated with many Americans concerned about 
the country's future and contributed to create a sense of national claustrophobia that regarded 
immigration restriction as a vehicle to foster social and cultural uniformity.  The 1886 bombing 
of Haymarket Square in Chicago during a national strike of the Knights of Laborfurther fueled 
the Nativist frenzy.  In the midst of national hysteria, the bombing was hastily attributed to a 
group of seven anarchists, six of whom were immigrants.28  The frenzy that ensued from the 
bombing led to violent outbursts against immigrants and the creation, among other Nativist 
organizations, of the Immigration Restriction League (IRL).  The IRL was an intellectual and 
professional organization whose policy activism set the tone, the goals, and the argumnts for the 
anti-immigrant campaign and provided congressional immigration committees with the 
expertise, agenda, and support to limit immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.29    
After the Republican victory in the 1894 midterm election, the IRL waged its first large-
scale campaign to restrict immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.  The organization 
decided to support economist Edward Bemis's proposal that all immigrants must pass a literacy 
test to be admitted into the country.  Bemis argued that the literacy test represented a powerful 
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mechanism to weed out those immigrants who were naturally inferior and guarantee the 
admittance of immigrants from the traditional source countries.  Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the 
voice in Congress of the IRL, led the battle for the committee's literacy test bill on the Senate 
floor: 
[O]ther races of totally different race origin, with whom the English-speaking people 
have never hitherto been assimilated or brought in contact, have suddenly begun to 
immigrate to the United States in large numbers—Russians, Hungarians, Poles, 
Bohemians, Italians, Greeks, and, even, Asiatics […] It involves nothing less than the 
possibility of a great and perilous change in the fabric of our race.30 
 
In late 1896, Lodge's literacy test bill, which required immigrants be able to read 40 words in any 
language, passed with strong Republican backing, but outgoing president Grover Cleveland 
vetoed the bill in early 1897, following the Democratic Party's long-standing commitment to 
endorse European immigration and listen to immigrant voters.31  This defeat hardly deterred the 
IRL and its supporters, but it sent a powerful message to Southern and Eastern Europeans in th  
country and abroad.  The temporary success of the bill, in fact, alarmed pro-immigration roups 
and convinced them to organize against any further action on the literacy test.  
 The 1896 Lodge Bill took Italian and Jewish immigrants by surprise, but their failure to 
react promptly taught them the value of numbers and organization.  In 1897, while Italians in the 
country remained silent on the subject, the Socialist United Hebrew Trades organized a mass 
meeting at the Cooper Union in New York City to urge President Cleveland against signing the 
Lodge Bill.  The protesters denounced the bill "as vicious, demagogic, and fatuous, and, while it 
appeared to be in the interest of the working people, [it] was really in the interest of capital."32  
This mass meeting, however, hardly had any impact on the national debate on restriction.  In 
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1898, when Lodge proposed a new version of his 1896 literacy test bill, ethnic groups and pro-
immigration groups,  this time including Italian immigrants, quickly realizd that isolated forms 
of protests were not effective and that they needed to rally together to have any imp ct on the 
debate.  Once again New York City immigrant groups led the way.  Early in 1898, W. Bourke 
Cockran, former representative of the state of New York, J.H. Senner, former United States 
Commissioner of Immigration for New York, and Oscar Straus, United States Mini ter to the 
Ottoman Empire and future Secretary of Commerce and Labor, met with prominent members of 
different ethnic organizations from across the country to create the Immigration Protective 
League (IPL) and protest the incumbent Lodge bill.  Business groups, steamship companies, and 
northern and southern industrialists joined the IPL in its campaign in favor of unrestricted 
European immigration.33   
 On March 8, 1898, the IPL teamed up with the New York Chamber of Commerce and 
various captains of industry in a mass meeting organized to oppose the Lodge bill.34  The 
speakers presented objections to the passage of the bill that would soon become integral to the 
anti-restrictionist agenda.  They criticized the literacy test as a superfluous addition to the 
existing laws regulating immigration to the United States and proposed to use it for 
naturalization not for admission.  They also condemned the test because it would separate 
families and mislead American workers who believed that the competition from immigrant 
workers would cease, while skilled workers would undoubtedly pass the test.  The speakers also 
emphasized the role of the ethnic vote in McKinley's recent victory and warned Republican 
leaders of the serious risk of losing any support among restricted immigrants.35  More 
importantly, some of the speeches reflected a rising awareness that some form of restriction was 
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most likely inevitable.  Among them, Carl Schurtz, the German-born Republican who had 
contributed to purge the Know-Nothings from the party in 1860, sent a letter that read:  "That 
this country should not be a dumping ground for the criminals and the cripples of the Old World, 
we all readily admit; but existing legislation had proved itself amply sufficient to prevent this."36  
 Carl Schurz's criticism of the Lodge bill spurred criticisms of the bill among Republican 
leaders themselves.  Later in the year, Representative McCall informed the IRL and its 
supporters that the chances of passing the literacy test were scarce.  Many congressional leaders, 
he continued, worried that they would lose the support of their ethnic voters, especially after the 
triumph of the 1896 elections when McKinley had won by a margin of 202 to 1 in the twelve 
states with the country's largest foreign-born voters.37  As opposition to restrictive legislation 
mounted, pro-immigration representatives proposed to delay any legislation on immigration until 
after a non-partisan immigration committee studied the impact of the new immigrants on labor, 
agriculture, and capital.  As the country recovered from another economic depression, immersed 
itself in its imperialistic ventures, and regained confidence in its power of assimilation, the 
creation of the Industrial Commission on Immigration in June 1898 momentarily placated 
restrictionists.   
 The hiatus was short lived, and Southern and Eastern European immigrants found 
themselves at the center of new attacks against their presence in the country.  The 1901 
assassination of President McKinley at the hands of Leon Czolgosz, an American-born anarchist 
with a foreign-sounding name, brought immigration restriction back to the fore.  In 1903, at the 
urging of President Theodore Roosevelt, Congress passed a new immigration act and expanded 
the already long list of undesirable to include epileptics, beggars, anarchists, and all those who 
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believed in the forceful overthrow of the government.  The mounting attacks that followed 
McKinley's assassination did not catch pro-immigration groups unprepared.  After 1898, pro-
immigrationists realized that restriction had become a concrete scenario in America and that they 
needed to be more proactive, organize themselves more effectively, and seek a wide b se of 
support.  Their mobilization against restriction also forced them to reconsider their presence in 
American society.  Italians had to confront and also had to negotiate the challenge of organizing 
a community that was still searching for a common sense of identity and had to nego iate their 
relationship with Italy and Italian diplomats.  Eastern European Jews, on the other hand, had to 
negotiate their alliance in their fight against restrictive legislation with the older and more 
affluent German Jewish community and grapple with how to maintain their etno-religious 
identity.   
 Significantly, both groups came to the conclusion that they needed to create institutio  
that could safeguard their immigration rights and represent them at the national level in times of 
need.  A year apart from one another, this shift from isolated protests to organized struggle 
produced two of the most important ethnic organizations that led the opposition against 
restriction until 1965.  In 1905, Italians created the Order Sons of Italy in America (OSIA) "to 
reunite in one single family" all the Italians scattered throughout the United States and Canada. 38  
Only a year later, a group of influential American Jews of German descent founded the 
American Jewish Committee (AJC).   Marking the epicenter of the battle against immigration 
restriction for the rest of the century, both organizations were born in New York City and relied 
on well-connected professionals.  Although OSIA and AJC emerged in response to similar 
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problems, the two organizations developed a completely different understanding of their role.  
While the American Jewish Committee focused exclusively on the legal component of 
immigration to avoid any conflict or overlap with other Jewish organizations working on 
immigration, OSIA was conceived as an organization that needed to address all issues related to 
immigration.39  Although American Jews subsequently fought over matters of competence and 
complained about the excessive fragmentation of their organizations, the initial 
compartmentalization ultimately helped their strategy and prevented any dispersal of energy, 
money, and efforts.  OSIA, on the other hand, simultaneously opposed immigration legislation, 
sponsored publications that challenged stereotypes of Italian immigrants, organized classes to 
help its reluctant members naturalize and Americanize, worked to cement relationships between 
Italy and the United States, and contributed "to keeping alive the flame of the cult of the native 
land [...] without thereby falling short of the respect due to the country which has accorded us 
welcome."40   
As Italians began to organize their community to oppose restriction, they had to negotiate 
their strategies with the presence of Italian government officials in the country.  Initially, the 
Italian government paid little attention to the masses of Southern Italians le ving the country.  
Convinced that emigration was the perfect safety valve to the country's economic problems and 
profiting from the emigrants' remittances, the Italian government hardly oversaw the robust 
emigration flow to the Americas and left Italian migrants virtually unprotected in their country of 
destination.  The situation changed in 1901, when the Italian government instituted the 
Commissariato Generale per l'Emigrazione, an office that provided migrants with information on 
the job market, assistance with their trip to the country of destination, and legal counsel.  In 
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1906, after an investigation had revealed that the majority of workers injured on the job were 
Italian, the Commissariato ordered the creation of Investigation Bureaus for Italian Immigrants at 
the Italian consulates in New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Denver, and San 
Francisco to offer legal advice to Italians in the United States.41  Yet, as early as 1912, 
overloaded investigation bureaus, lacking political and financial support from the Italian 
government, struggled to bring their clients' cases to court.   
 Despite the infrastructure it created in the United States, the Comissariato and the Italian 
government appeared more concerned with how the immigration restriction proposals would 
affect Italy's sovereignty and its jurisdiction over its immigrants than on the impact it would have 
on the immigrants.42  Moreover, aware of the hostility towards Italian immigrants and the limited 
leverage Italy had, Italian government representatives usually refused to collaborate with Italians 
and opted for negotiating privately with American authorities over legislative issues or specific 
immigration cases.  As correspondence between Italian authorities in Italy and the United States 
reveals, their reluctance to join forces with Italians in the United States stemmed from their 
contempt of Italian immigrants' illiteracy.  Gallina, head of the Commissariato at the time, wrote 
that, "if many of our emigrants will not be able to go to the United States, unless they overcome 
this serious lacuna in their education, it is their fault because they had plenty of opportunities to 
earn that education that they now need to enter the United States" at the new night and Sunday 
schools that the government had created in the years 1911 to 1913.43  A letter that Gallina 
received from Serrati, the director of Italian immigration in the United States, went further and 
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explained that while the Italian community's protest against restriction remain d inconsequential, 
the Jews had finally decided to intervene and oppose the legislation, thus improving the chanc s 
for the president's veto.  While praising the efforts of the Italian community in Philadelphia to 
organize a committee to voice their concern over the pending legislation, Serrati blamed the New 
York colony for the entire Italian community's inability to have any impact among the ranks of 
the pro-immigrationists.  Italians living in New York, according to him, did not "enjoy a good 
reputation in the American press […] because of the local Italian press."44  The constant 
interference of Italian government representatives and their contempt for Italian anti-
restrictionists caused confusion within the Italian community and annoyed Amrican legislators 
who considered the letters they received from Italian consuls further evidence of the need for 
restrictive legislation. 
 If Italians had to deal with the interference of the Italian government, Eas ern European 
Jews had to negotiate their space within the older and more prominent German Jewish 
community.  The relationship between the two groups was problematic and complex from the 
beginning.  The arrival of thousands of Jewish immigrants from Russia initially st rtled the 
already established German Jewish community in the United States.  The older community was 
initially detached and aloof from the poor, illiterate, and culturally different Eastern European 
Jews.  The newcomers, in turn, resented the patronization of the more affluent and acculturated 
Germans, challenged their assumption of leadership, and questioned the values according to 
which they sought to shape American Jewry.45  Yet after these initial disagreements, German and 
Eastern European Jews in America began to dialogue and try to find common ground.  A 
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significant turning point came between 1903 and 1906, when approximately three hundred 
pogroms in Russia forced hundreds of thousands of Jews to leave Eastern Europe.  News of the 
pogroms changed the American Jewish community significantly: 
The Old World has for many years been setting the Jews of the New World difficult 
problems to solve. They must try to remedy in detail what the civilization of Europe 
perpetrates in the wholesale. Arduous as is the task, it has its compensations. There can 
be no doubt that the questions raised by the Russian immigration have placed the Jewish 
community of the United States in the vanguard of the best charitable and philanthropic 
endeavor of the day.46 
 
With the outbreak of the pogroms, the unofficial American Jewish leaders assumed the 
obligation of giving philanthropic aid to the victims as well as exerting pressur on the Russian 
Government to change its anti-Semitic policies.  Frustration over the inability to convince 
Roosevelt to change his Russian policies through personal connections as well as the suspicion 
that more pogroms against Russian Jews would soon follow convinced the Jewish community in 
America to organize more effectively to act on its concerns. 47   
 It was the Russian pogroms that spurred the creation of the American Jewish Committee 
and the web of organizations and networks that later became fundamental to American J wish 
mobilization against restriction once the quota system went into effect.    For the firs  time, an 
immigrant group "in the United States [...] organized for the sole purpose of defending its rights 
and those of its brethren outside America."48  After a long series of meetings and fierce 
opposition from B'nai B'rith and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, the AJC came 
to life, and its members decided that its principal concerns were to protect the civil and religious 
rights of Jews, to watch closely the legislative and diplomatic developments concerning Jews 
living in the United States and abroad, and to provide the president, State Department, and 
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Congress with information pertinent to these issues.  The prevalence of German Jews i  the 
newly born organization did not go unnoticed among Eastern European Jews.  The organization 
openly manifested an elitist penchant that would characterize it at least until1929, when its 
president, Louis Marshall, died.  Embedded in their American education and stories of success, 
Marshall and his colleagues believed that Russian Jews deserved a chance at a bett r life, but 
they also believed that it was their responsibility to offer them one and act on their behalf.49  
Both OSIA and the AJC did not have to wait long before they had to mobilize to oppose 
new calls to limit immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.  In 1907, restrictionists waged 
a new campaign calling for a literacy test.  In response, Congress created the Dillingham 
Commission and instructed it to investigate the immigration problem and suggest proposals for 
future legislation.  Among its first initiatives, the AJC immediately wrote a letter to Senator 
William P. Dillingham, Chairman of the Immigration Commission, to express its interest in 
testifying on the conditions of Eastern European immigration and to offer to provide any 
information the commission might need on the subject.  The committee articulated a particular 
interest in protecting Russian Jews from accusations leveled against them by people prejudiced 
against them: 
It is a matter of common knowledge that in many European countries political parties are 
organized, whose platform contains a plank inculcating hatred of Jews as such. That 
prejudices so promulgated color the minds of many well-meaning persons in such 
environment is inevitable, and [that] these prejudices tend to be reflected in testimony 
that may be offered before you is highly probable. We deem it our duty to offer you our 
best services in avoiding this kind of error or indeed any kind of error which maybe 
impede the objects of your Commission. 50 
Following a pattern that would soon become convention, the letter concluded that the AJC was 
aware of the "right and duty of every government to protect its people against the incursion of 
                                                
49 Besides Marshall, the self-appointed leaders who dominated the AJC for the first twenty years of its existence 
included Cyrus Adler, Jacob Schiff, Oscar Straus, and Cyrus Sulzberger. 
50 "Immigration, Legislation, Etc.," American Jewish Year Book vol. 10 (1908-1909). 
32 
 
criminals, paupers, lunatics, and other persons who would be public charges," but they urged the 
commission to do so "without violating our national traditions and the dictates of common 
humanity, or depriving our country of a natural and healthy means of increasing its population 
and prosperity."51  Many AJC members reiterated these arguments when they testified at th  
hearing that the Dillingham Commission held on March 11, 1910, but their appeals and 
testimonies were to no avail.52 
 The forty-two volumes the Dillingham Commission issued in 1911 struck the final blow 
to any alternative to restrictive immigration policy.  Adopting a Nativist and Anglo-American 
conception of American citizenship, the commission confirmed all the stereotypes that 
mainstream America had of the new immigrants and deemed them unfit for American cit zenship 
and unassimilable.  The report presented the new immigrants as intellectually inferior, politically 
subversive, and physically weak.  The committee concluded that these traits, along with their 
lack of skills, their large presence in the asylums, their inability to appreciate American culture 
and traditions, made Southern and Eastern European immigrants unable to assimilate and 
Americanize.  Politically, the commission's conclusions set the stage for immediate restrictive 
legislation and provided the foundation for the establishment of a quota system based on national 
origin.53  
Both Italians and Jews immediately mobilized to challenge the recommendations of the 
Dillingham Commission and limit its impact on the treatment of immigrants around the country.  
In 1911, in response to the spike in rejections of Italian immigrants for health reasons that 
followed the publication of the Dillingham Commission Report, OSIA placed one of its 
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representatives on Ellis Island to assist arriving immigrants.54  In 1912, the New York Jewish 
community participated in a crowded mass meeting organized to condemn the literacy test.  The 
meeting led the New York Times to write that the event was "one of the stormiest meetings that 
Cooper Union had ever seen, and the sentiment appeared to be all one way."  The speakers 
included many prominent members of the Jewish community, namely Oscar Straus, 
Congressmen Sulzer and Godlfogle, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise.  Labeling the new wave of 
nativism as a resurgence of Know-Nothingism, Straus declared that Senator Dillingham himself 
had openly admitted that the literacy test was a pretext and that restrictionists hoped "to exclude 
by this bill 36 per cent of the immigrants who are now free to enter.  It is a sham, a fraud, and a 
pretext for accomplishing an end indirectly."55  A letter from AJC member Jacob Schiff echoed 
the frustration that the anti-restrictionists felt about the discriminatory nature of the literacy test: 
The immigrant who comes here to find actual work by which to support himself and his 
family, and who possesses good health and physical strength, is likely, even if he cannot 
read or write, to become a better citizen and greater asset to this country tha  he who is 
highly trained and educated and who, because of this, assumes that the world owes him a 
living, and who becomes a danger to society if that be not granted him in the manner he 
expects.56  
Jacob Schiff's claims about the willingness of the poor and the illiterate to integrate and become 
better citizens than more skilled immigrants resonated deeply among Eastern European Jews.  
The stress on the advantages of favoring the immigration of this particular ype of immigrants 
was especially important for Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe because they, unlike 
Italians, did not have a home country to which they could return if they were rejected because 
they failed the literacy test.57 
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In 1913, OSIA organized a mass meeting to voice its dissent and support free 
immigration.  This was one of the rare instances in which Italians initiated a protest.  They 
widely publicized the event in several immigrant newspapers and urged as many people and 
ethnic organizations as possible to participate.  For a community that was still caught between 
permanent and temporary immigration, this protest represented an encouraging begin ing of 
their political activism.  Yet their criticisms of the literacy revealed some of the obstacles they 
faced in creating a strong presence in the debate: 
This law, besides being an insult to the ever-praised American freedom, would seriously 
damage our home country's economic, industrial, and commercial relationship with the 
United States.  The Order Sons of Italy in America—created for the tutelage of such 
interests—has resolved to organize a vibrant protest, with the most appropriate ways and 
means, in the name of its 145 lodges and of its 45 thousands affiliates.58 
The emphasis in the message of the impact that the administration of the test would have on the 
relationship between the two countries sheds light on the influence that the Italian government 
had on their agenda.  The intrusive  presence of the Italian government to protect its interests 
abroad effectively  delayed the maturation of Italian Americans' political consciousness and 
complicated how, when, and why Italian Americans mobilized.  This complex relationship 
delayed Italian Americans' full integration into American society and contributed to prolong the 
sense of foreignness that Americans had of Italian communities in America.  
The outbreak of the World War One further complicated any possibility to limit the 
passage of restrictive immigration legislation.  Anti-restrictionists pleaded with Congress to 
adopt a wait-and-see approach since the sharp decline in immigration during the war years made 
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it difficult to predict what would happen at the end of the war.  Congress, however, sided with 
the restrictionists and began new proceedings to pass an immigration law that stipul ted a 
literacy test for admission.  The war provided the perfect opportunity for restrictionists to argue 
for the passage of a literacy test to restrict immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.  They 
apocalyptically warned that the end of the war could only bring hordes of destitute, inferior, and 
radical refugees to the already unruly and unreliable immigrant communities in the United 
States.  To support their accusations further, restrictionists pointed to the inability of Southern 
and Eastern Europeans in the United States to be loyal to the country that provided them a new 
home and cited immigrants' use of the vote to advance group interest over American interests.  
Despite that both groups participated in large numbers in the American war effort to prove that 
they were "good Americans," Italians and Jews in the United States found themselv s on the 
defensive again.59   
Restrictionists cast their arguments for the two groups' disloyalty in completely different 
terms.  While Jews were disloyal because of their statelessness, Italians were disloyal because of 
their persistently strong ties to their homeland and their constant efforts to cement and improve 
the relations between the two countries.  Following these diametrically opposed reasons, 
restrictionists complained that the high rate of naturalization among Eastern European Jews was 
more a testimony to the greatness of America as a promised land than to their lyalty to their 
new country.  In 1920, a consular agent in Rotterdam, Netherlands, reporting to the Department 
of State about pending emigration to the United States, lamented that most of the Polis  Jews at 
the port were "largely without any political principles or convictions, [were] ntirely without 
patriotism, and [were] usually evasive, dishonest, and incapable of appreciating any 
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responsibility towards any government."60  A clear sign of Italian immigrants' disloyalty, instead, 
was the extremely low rates of naturalization among them and their isolation in ghettoes.  
"Taking into account the innumerable 'birds of passage' without family or future in this country" 
inveighed Edward Ross, professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin, "it would be safe 
to say that half, perhaps two-thirds, of our Italian immigrants are und r America, not of it."61  
Clearly, what the new immigrants did or did not mattered little in the eyes of rtrictionists. 
Italian and Jewish leaders' efforts to challenge these accusations often dispersed their 
energy to oppose the legislation itself.  Repeatedly, during testimony in Congress, during public 
ceremonies celebrating Jewish achievements in America, and in open denunciations of 
discrimination, Jewish representatives reminded the public of the Jewish soldiers, most of them 
still not naturalized, who had served and died for the United States.  In a response to an article 
that appeared in Life Magazine on Jews' lack of any national feelings, Marshall insisted that they 
"by deed and word […] have loyally supported the Government in every measure undertaken for 
the national defense.  Their love for America is the more intense because of whatAmerica has 
been to them.  It opened to them the gates of hope and bestowed the sweets of Liberty."62  
Similarly, during the congressional debates on the United States' entry into the war, New York 
Representative Fiorello La Guardia told his fellow Congressmen that he could "vouch for the 
Italian residents of this country" that they were "are eager, willing, and anxious to fight […] 
under the American flag."63  In the same debate, La Guardia also pointed out to his colleagues 
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that Italian voters were no longer to be taken for granted on the floor of the House, denying 
insinuations that Italians in America were hiding to avoid the draft in Italy.   
Italians and Jews' ability to vote also drew criticisms.   One of the most vigorous attacks 
on immigrant politics came directly from a once leading member of the Italian community.  In 
the early nineteen-tens, Gino Speranza switched from being a defender of immigrants to a 
supporter of Anglo-Saxonism.  In his Race and Nation, Speranza ferociously attacked the power 
of the immigrant vote: 
The essential danger in that race issue, lies in the fact that we have armed these 
heterogeneous non-American stocks with a political weapon which many of them are 
congenially unprepared to use, and by legislative fiat clothed legions of them with an 
"equality" which flies in the face of nature and of their history.64 
In his book, Speranza tied Eastern and Southern Europeans' inability to appreciate the Am rican 
political process to their "abysmal ethnic, cultural and historic differencs" and to racial 
characteristics that never died out and were transmitted from generation to generation practically 
unchanged.  In addition to this, he concluded, "Consider that the easy and rapid means of 
international communication to-day powerfully tend to keep the alien under the influences of his 
original civilization; and the conclusion seems unavoidable that the possibility of even an 
approximation to real national absorption is practically nullified."65  For him, the war represented 
the best example of the persistence and force of pre-natal, racial ideas an  mental outlook.66  
Soon after the war ended, in fact, many anti-restrictionists denounced the "intrusio " of Jewish 
politicians as part of an international Jewish conspiracy to take over the world.   
 The attacks on their use of the vote was particularly distressing for Italian Americans, 
who had only recently entered the political sphere.  Before the outbreak of the war, very few 
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Italian American politicians could be found in office, yet in 1917, New York Republicans h d 
fifteen Italian candidates for the New York Assembly.  Italian voters were so eager to have a 
voice in the political arena that they often voted for Italian candidates indepently of their 
affiliation.  "The differences of the political [parties]," wrote the Bollettino della Sera during the 
1917 elections, "should not hinder Italian voters from voting for their countrymen […] the need 
to make our reputation and to win greater prestige are more urgent than the differences of the 
parties."67  Despite their efforts to seek election, Italian politicians still remained few and far 
between.  Fiorello La Guardia's extraordinary ascent to power represented the exception rather 
than the norm.  
The bitterness of the attacks against the Jewish vote created a rift within the Jewish 
community as well.  Affluent Jewish leaders of German descent, including Louis Marshall, 
Oscar Straus, and Simon Wolf, repeatedly insisted in public that there was no such thing as a 
Jewish vote and cautioned the rest of the community that Jewish bloc-voting could have 
dangerous ramifications by stimulating anti-Jewish counter-voting.  Always in favor of silent 
diplomacy rather than open attacks, they preferred to use the specter of the Jewish vote in private 
conversations or in private correspondence to bring pressure in favor of issues relevantto the 
Jewish community.  In a remark to President Coolidge's secretary, Louis Marshall, aware of his 
influence within his community, observed:  "I am not a politician, but you are possibly aware 
that a man's political influence is not to be measured by his blatancy or by his activ ty in seeking 
office."68  Eastern European Jews, on the other hand, tended to be more outspoken and endorsed 
people like Israel Zangwill who, during a speech at Carnegie Hall, caustilly remarked:  "If 
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there is no Jewish vote today […] it is a disgrace, not a policy to be commended.  If Jews will 
neither use their vote to protect themselves nor to express their ethical concepti s, then they do 
but cumber the ground."69  While Marshall and his colleagues at the American Jewish 
Committee rejected Zangwill's remarks and warned that they could only fuel mor  anti-
Semitism, other prominent Jewish leaders, including Stephen Wise, applauded his appeal. 
Despite the differences in the criticisms about their loyalty, the two groups responded in 
exactly the same way.  Both communities deemed ignorance of their cultures and lack of 
integration into the fabric of social and communal life as the source of their problems.  Thus, 
starting in the late 1910s through the vehement and corrosive attacks against them in the 1920s, 
Italian and Jewish elites "interpreted" their culture, their traditions, a d their origins to a wider 
American audience to explain how they reconciled their Jewishness and their Italianità with their 
loyalty to America.  At the same time, many of these leaders recognized that government-
sponsored Americanization programs were often characterized by a veiled racism, so they began 
to promote naturalization and Americanization programs sponsored by their own communities to 
press them to become the epitome of patriotic, virtuous, and exemplary Americans.  Cotillo, La 
Guardia, Marshall, and Straus all publicly appealed to their communities to make a greater effort 
to reconcile their traditions with their life in the new world, but they also argued that it was 
Americans' unwillingness to know the new immigrants better and appreciate their role in 
American society that created prejudice and discrimination.  "The cure for this astonishing 
ignorance and indifference toward the immigrant," wrote Congregationalist p stor and president 
of the United Societies of Christian Endeavor Francis E. Clark about Italians in the United 
States, "is simply larger information and better acquaintance."  More in-depth knowledge and 
acquaintance with the new immigrants, he insisted, would refute many biases against them and 
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show that "he is a human being of like passions with ourselves."70  In a similar vein, when the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Immigration and Naturalization asked Marshall to comment on the 
allegedly weak Americanization among Jewish immigrants, Marshall replied, "A man is not 
assimilated because he wears certain clothes or cuts his beard just the wayaverage man does, 
or even because he speaks the same language; assimilation is after all a matter of the heart and of 
the mind."71   
The attacks on their loyalty and their voting complicated Italian and Jewish attempts to 
counteract the calls for immigration restriction.  As the hearings for the literacy test bill began, 
American Jews decided to change their tactics and focus on containing the damage that the 
passage of the law could cause to future Jewish immigrants.  Marshall decided to try "to gain 
Congressional acceptance of his proposed exemption clause to the literacy test, providing for the 
entry of illiterate immigrants who were fleeing religious persecution."72  Representative John 
Burnett of Alabama, Chairman of the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee, 
declared he was willing to negotiate with Marshall.  He hoped that complying with Marshall's 
proposal would weaken the anti-restrictionists' protests and rally enough support from Congress 
to override President Wilson's expected veto on the bill.  Burnett and the AJC leaders nev r 
formally reached an agreement, but in January 1916, the House Committee made a major 
concession to the Jewish lobbyists when it conceded that people seeking admission into the 
country because of religious persecution could be exempted from taking the literacy t st.  
Marshall was hoping the exclusion would include people persecuted for political reasons s well, 
but Congress rejected the proposal because it feared an influx of Mexican revolutionaries.  While 
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Marshall appreciated Congress's concession, Schiff advocated that AJC should still oppose the 
Burnett bill and fight for a more liberal exclusion clause that would include political persecution 
as well.  Yet they ultimately decided to stay away from the debates in Congress so a  not to 
jeopardize the concession they had obtained.73  
The inclusion of the religious exemption clause in the Burnett bill made the debate even 
more contentious.  Many of the restrictionists who testified in Congress and the press argued that 
Jewish lobbyists were gaining special favors and considered the inclusion of the religious 
persecution exemption further reason to restrict immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.  
Worried that Burnett might take out the provision, Marshall wrote to him to point out that the 
clause would not benefit just Russian Jews but also Finns, Letts, and Armenians.  After the 
House and the Senate passed the law, Marshall mobilized to muster support for President 
Wilson's veto.  He asked Adolph Ochs to write an editorial in the New York Times endorsing the 
president's probable action; asked for the support of Cardinal Gibbons; secured the names of 
doubtful representatives to apply pressure on them; and, finally, sent a letter to all AJC members 
urging them to write to their congressmen.  The House voted 287 to 106 to override President 
Wilson's veto on the bill, which in its final version still included the exemption for religious 
persecution.  For the Jewish lobbyists, the clause represented a small victory w thin a larger 
defeat.74 
Only isolated voices represented the Italian community during the mobilization against 
the literacy test.  Their two major spokespersons were Fiorello La Guardia and New York State 
Senator Salvatore Cotillo.  Both politicians vehemently criticized the calls for a literacy test to 
restrict immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.  Their efforts came to a halt after the 
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Austro-Hungarian forces defeated the Italian army in the Battle of Caporetto in the fall of 1917.  
The widespread disaffection among Italians after Caporetto convinced the United States 
government that this could seriously harm the final outcome of the war.  Italians in Italy, in fact, 
blamed the tragic defeat of Caporetto less on the weakness of Italian leadership than on the 
Allies.  In their opinion, the United States had failed to provide Italy with the sorely ne ded 
supplies and obstinately opposed the creation of a war council.  The disillusionment that 
followed Caporetto led many to consider the possibility of a separate peace or even of surrender.   
The Axis powers encouraged these frustrations by telling Italians that Italy was "the forgotten 
ally" of the Entente and that the United States supplied the bulk of its assistance and provisions 
to England and France.75  To remedy this crisis of credibility the United States government 
recruited Cotillo and La Guardia to travel to Italy and convince Italians of the undivided support 
of the United States in their war effort.76  Putting Italy's interests first, Cotillo and La Guardia's 
missions to Italy effectively concluded Italians' opposition to the literacy. 
The end of World War One marked the end of any hope for success for anti-
restrictionists.  The fear of an imminent invasion from Southern and Eastern Europe and th
obsession with the infiltration of radical ideologies in the United States unleashed  new and 
more aggressive restrictionist campaign.  The post-war calls for restriction left little room for 
compromises:  
A change has occurred since the armistice.  Chauvinistic nationalism is rapant.  The 
hatred of everything that is foreign has become an obsession.  The labor conditions 
accentuate this extraordinary phenomenon, and it requires unusual courage for a member 
of Congress to withstand the pressure that is brought to bear upon him to bring about a 
cessation of immigration.  This has led to a virtual stampede.77   
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The passage of the Immigration Act of 1917 with its literacy test, which limited immigration 
from Southern and Eastern Europe, and its creation of the "Asiatic Barred Zone," which banned 
immigration from Eastern Asia and the Pacific Islands, galvanized restrictionist groups.  Starting 
in 1918, restrictionists, taking advantage of the mood of the nation, strongly pushed for 
emergency legislation to halt immigration.78   
 
From the Literacy Test to the First Quota System 
The Immigration Act of 1917 did not satisfy restrictionists.  Although the literacy test 
effectively reduced the number of Italian and Polish immigrants that entered the United States, it 
barely curtailed the flow of Russian Jews, who tended to be more literate but also benefited more 
from the exemption clause for religiously persecuted migrants for which the American Jewish 
Committee had lobbied during the debate on the new immigration bill.  Restrictionists also 
complained that, contrary to what they had anticipated, the test hardly discouraged immigrants 
from leaving their countries because of their illiteracy.  As early as 1918, many restrictionists 
lamented the failure of the Immigration Act of 1917 to limit the arrivals of Southern and Eastern 
European immigrants.  Many critics complained that it was "a big joke" becaus  it was 
"qualitative and fixed no numerical limit to immigration."79  Emboldened by their victory in 
1917, as soon as the war ended, restrictionists declared that the state of emergency that followed 
the end of the war called for unprecedented measures:  
It was evident that fully two millions would be willing and able to come each year for 
several years against which the literacy and other tests would afford only a frail barrier.  
Here was an emergency.  There was little or no time for an intelligent or logical study of 
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the question.  It would take several years to do that; but in the meantime drastic 
numerical or quantitative restrictions were necessary.80 
 
The unfounded fear that a disproportionate number of immigrants would soon arrive in the 
United States and the virulence of the attacks against Southern and Eastern European 
communities already in the country defeated any rational argument that anti-restrictionist groups 
presented.  Italian and Jewish groups, along with their supporters, began to fear early on that 
further restriction was inevitable.  
Although both sides published books supporting their position, spoke in public to 
champion their agenda, and defended their stance in newspapers columns, ultimately, the battle 
over the first quota system unfolded in the halls of Congress during congressional heari gs.  A 
comparison between the Italian and the Jewish participation at the hearings that the U.S. Senate 
Committee held on the quota system bill from January 3 to January 26, 1921, reveals a strikingly 
different degree of organization and cohesiveness between the two groups.  Whereas Italians had 
only Louis J. Scaramelli, president of the Italian Chamber of Commerce in New York City, to 
defend their points of views and voice their concerns, the Jewish community had Louis Marshall 
representing the American Jewish Committee, Judge Leon Sanders for the Hebrew Sheltering 
and Immigrant Aid Society of America, Max Pine representing the United Hebrew Trades-Union 
Immigration Bureau and the United Hebrew Trade, John Bernstein on behalf of the Hebrew 
Sheltering Aid Society, and Morris Rothenberg representing the American Jewish Congress.  
The substantial numerical difference of testimonies in Congress ultimately d maged both groups.  
If it perhaps revealed the political inexperience or lack of leadership on the par  of the Italian 
front, it also confirmed to many restrictionists that the fight against restriction was essentially a 
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"Jewish cause" paid by "Hebrew money" "to control the immigration policy of the United States" 
as part of an international Jewish conspiracy.81 
During the hearings, Italian and Jewish witnesses questioned the existence of a  
immigration emergency from Europe.  As Louis Marshall pointed out in his testimony, by 1921 
it was time to declare over the emergency connected to the war and to focus on "our ld-
fashioned way of thinking on constitutional questions and on questions of human rights and on 
questions of public policy."82   The most recent statistics, Marshall and his colleagues pointed 
out, showed that the number of immigrants leaving the country was higher than the number of 
immigrants entering the country, thus disproving the existence of an immigration emergency.  
Statistics in hand, Judge Leon Sanders told the committee that between January1, 1920 and 
November 30, 1920, 439,653 immigrants arrived and 280,165 left the United States:83   
The present flow of immigration is by no means abnormal.  It is but deferred or 
postponed immigration.  The immigrants who are coming here now would have come 
during the last six years had traveling conditions between Europe and this country been 
normal.84   
Italian and Jewish witnesses told the senators on the committee that many of the recently arrived 
immigrants were simply people who had planned to leave Europe before the war, as many of 
them had pre-paid tickets or declared that their relatives already in the United States had sent for 
them before the war made their trip impossible.  "The present immigration," Judge Sanders 
noted, was "a reunion of families, a rehabilitation of broken-up homes, and, hence, the grea est 
case of constructive relief work."85  Moreover, he added, the large presence among the recent 
arrivals of women and children who arrived in the United States to join their fathes or husbands 
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who were American citizens or had declared their intention to naturalize further challenged any 
claims of an imminent immigrant invasion.   
The witnesses' emphasis on family reunification in the postwar wave of immigration was 
also meant to assuage American labor's fear of competition.  As during previous debates on 
immigration restriction and exclusion, the American Federation of Labor once again contended 
that restriction was necessary because it was the only way to stop the new immigrants from 
displacing American workers.  In response to the AFL's concerns, Italian and Jewish witnesses in 
Congress testified that immigrants arriving from Europe could not have any other reason but to 
join their relatives in the United States since the American economy was experiencing an 
impasse.  "An oversupplied labor market here," Scaramelli noted, automatically stopped "further 
emigration.  This has been illustrated in more than one occasion."86  The AFL's outcry, Marshall, 
Scaramelli, Sanders and the others argued, only confirmed this was the case.  Whenever there 
were periods of economic depression, Marshall observed, "there was more or less of an outcry 
against the immigrants."87  Family reunification, not the attractiveness of the American economy, 
was behind the current immigration to the United States.   
If numbers and statistics could not convince the Senate Committee that an immigration 
emergency did not exist, the witnesses hoped that history could.  During their statements, they all 
pointed to the inconsistencies that a restrictive immigration policy would entailwhen considered 
in light of the United States' immigrant past and its tradition as a haven of the downtrodden.  
Observing that during the last presidential elections, both Wilson and Hughes had at least one 
immigrant parent, Marshall insisted that the same people who in 1921 cried that a flood of 
destructive aliens was about to descend upon the United States to ruin its well-being forgot "that 
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in the last century probably 75 per cent of the population of this country has descended from 
immigrants."88  Moreover, Scaramelli observed, these critics intentionally chose to overlook the 
contributions that these immigrants had made to the growth of the United States:  
Let us not lose sight of the fact that [...] the remarkable progress of the past f w decades 
could not have been accomplished but for the vast army of toilers who came to this 
country looking for opportunity, and who, when given the chance, have made good.89  
The extensive literature on the contributions of the new immigrants that both communities a d 
their supporters produced testifies to their willingness to oppose accusations of being a disruptive 
force in America with positive and constructive arguments rather than all-out attacks on their 
opponents.90  
In and out of Congress, the insistence on equating the old and new immigrants and on 
comparing their contributions to America represented a major point of conflict between 
restrictionists and anti-restrictionists.  In fact, as soon as Marshall extolled the virtues of the new 
immigrants, the chairman rebuked him for it and asked how he could not see the obvious 
differences between Northern European immigrants and Eastern and Southern European 
immigrants.  Taking his argument further, the chairman asked Marshall how he could not realize 
that the 'new' immigrants were not as readily assimilable as those of th  earlier immigration 
coming from northern Europe, the Scandinavian countries, Germany, and Great Britain.  Both 
Marshall and Scaramelli argued that if the new immigrants did not assimilate as the old ones, it 
was because their receiving country had failed them and not because they did not want t  belong 
to their newly adopted homeland: 
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The treatment of the newcomer has not been in the past always as happy as it might have 
been.  Discontent, resentment, and even lack of American spirit has sometimes been 
allowed to breed in the newly arrived immigrant, not because he was so by nature but 
because he was driven by hard circumstances.  A contented man always makes the best 
citizen, and this hold with equal truth to the newly arrived alien.91 
Exploitation, deception, rejection, discrimination, and vituperation of their origin at the hands of 
Americans certainly did not help them feel as full-fledged members of American society.  That 
these immigrants and naturalized aliens, Marshall and Scaramelli observed, were nonetheless 
willing to serve and give their lives for their newly adopted country only attested to their 
willingness to be active and contributing members of American society despite how poorly 
American society treated them.   
When all other arguments in favor of an open door immigration policy failed, the 
witnesses observed that quantitative immigration restriction was unnecessary because the 
existing qualitative restrictions already sufficed to bar unwanted and unwelcom  immigrants.  
None of the Italian and Jewish witnesses opposed any of these measures, and theyll insisted 
that they already successfully reduced the number of unwelcome people to the country.  "What 
we need today," stated Scaramelli, "is not prohibition of immigration, but proper regulation, 
selection, and distribution of the immigrants."92  If the country invested more money to build 
more inspection facilities and to hire more inspectors and physicians, the likelihood to admit 
more undesirables would practically amount to zero.  Most of all, they pleaded for personnel 
knowledgeable of the workings of the immigration laws in place to avoid the many injustices 
that immigrants currently faced because of the immigration personnel's incompetence.  "Have 
more men," suggested Marshall, "have enough inspectors; and what is more have the right kind 
of inspectors, men who have sufficient intelligence to pass upon the application of the laws [...], 
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and not men who merely perform their duties perfunctorily."93  Widening the issue to the 
international sphere, Scaramelli argued that the existing immigration laws could become even 
more effective and guarantee the arrival of only desirable immigrants if the United States began 
collaborating with the sending countries on immigration to stipulate bilateral agreements that 
regulated the labor flow between the two countries involved.  These treaties, Scaramelli insisted, 
would foster good relations with sending countries, and most of all, they would guarantee the 
admission of only "the proper timber."94   
Amidst Italians and Jews' efforts to mobilize against restriction, a third, and not always 
welcome, ally emerged to advocate for their cause, the Italian government.  Y t as they had 
already done in the past, Italian government representatives often gave precedence to Italy's 
national interests rather than to the protection of Italian immigrants rightsand welfare abroad.  In 
many cases, the Italian government's pressure to limit the impact of restriction on Italian 
emigration often harmed Italian Americans' mobilization and irritated many members of 
Congress, who reacted to Italy's insistence with a stronger desire to approve stricter immigration 
laws.  Moreover, many of Italy's proposals to address the American immigration problem 
without penalizing the sending countries often reminded congressmen, especially Representative 
Albert Johnson, of the unsavory negotiations with Japan about Japanese immigration at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
Starting in November 1920, Adolfo Vinci, royal counselor of emigration at the Italian 
Embassy in Washington D.C., and Giuseppe De Michelis, Commissioner of Emigration in 
Rome, began an intense and frantic exchange of letters to decide on the best course of action t  
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address the immigration restriction bills pending in the United States Congress.  In November 
1920, Vinci traveled to New York City to attend a conference on immigration with the expr ss 
intent to meet Representative Albert Johnson from Washington.95  Already from this first 
meeting, both Vinci and De Michelis realized that immigration restriction had become 
unavoidable.  Certain that the Jewish community would protest any restrictive immigration bill, 
the two officials decided that they needed to negotiate privately the best possible deal for Italy's 
emigration, evidently convinced that their opinion would sway American politicians to be 
magnanimous towards Italian immigrants if they intervened: 
I believe that our self-restrained conduct [...] would provide us with a privileged position 
whenever the time comes (and I do not think it will be long) to negotiate on the future 
criteria of acceptance of prospective immigrants from Italy.  [...]  I would not recommend 
raising too many objections—a very violent opposition will in any case occur, especially 
from the Jews who are supported by powerful Israelite financiers in the Unitd States—
not to raise the suspicion that our opposition derives from internal political necessities 
and from the desire to liberate ourselves of politically and socially dangerous lements.96 
 
From the first meeting with Johnson, Vinci began to negotiate for Italian emigration.  He 
immediately suggested that, if Johnson's bill passed, Congress should allow for a peri d of 
adjustment to elapse between the ratification of the new policy and its implementation so that the 
sending countries had time to adapt to the new criteria and avoid a sudden and potentially 
damaging arrest of their emigration.  The mere consideration of his proposal did notcome 
without a price.  Vinci, in fact, had to promise Johnson that the Italian government would not 
oppose any provision requiring the registration of all foreigners in the United States to discipline 
and follow "the movements of the foreign element in the country."97   
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Vinci's confidence in his ability to persuade Johnson stemmed from his incapacity to 
grasp that Italians represented one of the primary targets of the proposed legi lation.  In his 
opinion, Johnson's commitment to restriction derived from "the necessity for the United States 
[…] to defend itself from an invasion of immigrants (especially of Israelites from Eastern 
Europe) considered dangerous propagandists of extremist ideas" and "to put to rest for a while 
the issue—so politically dangerous —with Japan […], stopping all immigration [fromAsia] 
without any discrimination of origin or race."98  This conviction led him to believe that the 
American government could still exempt Italian immigrants from the natio l origins quota 
system.  With cautious approval from Rome, Vinci proposed that the United States stipulate 
agreements with foreign sending countries to establish the qualifications and number of 
immigrants allowed to migrate in accordance with the United States' demand for laborers.  The 
proposal also entailed that the United States selected prospective immigrants according to their 
skills and based on the industries' demand.  The immigrants would arrive through labor contracts 
with specific industries and work according to union rights and standards to avoid any further 
conflict with American unions, especially the American Federation of Labor.99  Vinci firmly 
believed that if industrialists selected how many and which immigrants to let into the country, 
they would undoubtedly choose Italians in overwhelming numbers.   
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Industrialists' endorsement of this plan, Vinci hoped, represented an extraordinary 
resource to convince the incoming new Republican Congress and president to adopt a more 
lenient immigration policy, since traditionally Republicans complied with the industrialists' 
agendas.100  He contacted prominent industrialists and representatives of ship lines to test the 
ground for his proposal.  The industrialists were enthusiastic about it and offered thei support if 
the plan arrived in Congress.  This initial success convinced Vinci and De Michelis to present 
their proposal to Rhode Island Senator and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Immigration 
LeBaron Colt and Commissioner of Immigration Anthony Caminetti.  Both men appeared to 
consider seriously the idea of an agreement between the two countries to solve the immigrat on 
problem.  Their cautious endorsement of Vinci's proposal convinced the Italian government to 
demonstrate with a concrete token of appreciation its commitment to finding an alternative to 
restriction and its willingness to negotiate an agreement.  On December 17, 1920, Vinci 
informed Norman H. Davis, acting Secretary of State, that the Italian government had just 
"suspended the issuance of passports to subjects emigrating to the United States, and [would] 
refrain from issuing such passports until informed as to the classes of immigrants desired into 
this country."101  In a last attempt, Vinci told De Michelis to pressure future New York 
Immigration Commissioner Robert E. Tod to consider the idea of stipulating labor contra ts or a 
guest worker program for Italian migrants wishing to work in the United States during his 
upcoming trip to Europe to assess the status of European emigration on behalf of Representativ  
Johnson and his immigration committee.102 
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Senator Colt seriously considered Vinci's proposal as a viable alternative to the quota 
system.  In fact, he decided to bring it up for discussion during Representative Johnson's 
testimony at the hearings for the pending immigration bill.  He told Johnson that he d heard 
that the government of Italy was to ready to suspend the issuance of passports, thus "suspending 
emigration from Italy, with a view of entering into cooperation with the United States to the end 
that Italy might supply such immigrants, peoples of such classes, as this country might desire."103  
Johnson's reply not only shed light on the representative's real feelings about Vinci but also on 
the restrictionists' conviction that immigration was a domestic problem in which foreign 
governments should not meddle: 
The rumor has run all over Italy, and other countries as well, that the United States would 
suspend all immigration by January 1, 1921.  That rumor created great excitement 
throughout Italy, and some semiofficial statements by the Italian Government were made 
along the lines the chairman has mentioned. But in the meantime a representative of he 
Government of Italy is here, spending much time around steamship offices in New York, 
and he is begging that the time allowance of this bill, which is 60 days, be made six 
months, in order to permit Italy to send to this country those of its people already in line 
for passports.  This would rather indicate that Italy could not shut the movement off 
quickly.104 
To support his statement and reiterate the importance of immigration restriction, Johnson 
provided the Senate committee members with American consular agents' reports on the 
applicants for passports to the United States.  The reports stressed that Italian applicants were 
"inimical to the best interests of the United States" because they had standards of living and 
"characteristics" that rendered them unassimilable, belonged to the undesirable "peasant class," 
were illiterate, poverty-stricken because of the war, and had "socialisti  ideas."105  
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General Commissioner of Immigration Anthony Caminetti further corroborated Johnson's 
statements during his testimony to the Senate Committee on Immigration in Ja uary 1921.   
During his two-day interview, Caminetti applauded the sending countries' efforts to abide by 
U.S. immigration laws and to collaborate with U.S. immigration authorities to select prospective 
migrants to the United States carefully, but he also told the committee that these efforts could 
scarcely prevent the imminent flood of immigration to the United States. 106  To Colt's comments 
on Caminetti's lack of any hard evidence to support his conclusions on the trend of European 
immigration, Caminetti responded that migrants in Europe were only waiting for traveling 
conditions to improve and for naval traffic to the United States to resume at full speed.  As a 
confirmation of this, he added that, during his recent trip to Europe, official and unofficial 
sources had informed him of the lucrative traffic of fake passports with fake visas to emigrate to 
the United States, of the large number of agencies proclaiming to assist immgrants to leave for 
the United States for money, and of the many non-profit Jewish agencies that were preparing to 
assist Eastern European Jews to settle in the United States.107   
Ultimately, no argument or defense persuaded Congress to reconsider its approach to 
immigration and look for a less drastic solution.  If anything, the Italian government's 
machinations only exacerbated congressmen's commitment to immigration res riction.  On May 
19, 1921, Congress passed the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921, which limited the annual 
number of immigrants admissible from any country to 3 per cent of the number of pers ns from 
each country living in the United States according to 1910 census.  Of the 357,802 total, the law 
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allocated slightly over half the number to immigrants from Northern and Western Europe and the 
remainder to Southern and Eastern Europe.  Although intended as temporary legislation, the law 
"proved in the long run the most important turning-point in American immigration history" 
because it imposed numerical limits on immigration for the first time.108   
 
Immigration at a Crossroads: Reacting to the 1921 Immigration Act 
When Congress passed the 1921 Immigration Act, few anticipated the problems, 
inefficiencies, and injustices that the haste with which legislators had drafted the first national-
origins quota system would cause to many immigrants.  The new law unleashed "the race of 
races."  Laden with immigrants, "steamers raced madly in order to reach the various United 
States ports" before the quotas were filled.  Many immigrants with their visa in hand landed in 
the United States only to be rejected because the quota for that month had been already filled:   
The height of absurdity was reached in the case of a group of immigrants who arrived on 
June 30, 1922, the last day of the fiscal year, a few hours before the new quotas for 
another fiscal year would be available.  They were counted as having arrived in the old 
year after the quota was filled and required, in order to gain admission, to return to the 
old country and then come back again and make another application under the new 
quota.109   
From June 3 to June 30, 1921, the first twenty-seven days of operation of the 1921 Immigration 
Act, more than 10,000 aliens arrived at United States ports in excess of the quotas.  By the end of 
1921, the authorities deported 2,680 persons for the sole reason that they were in excess of quota. 
An executive order subsequently allowed 10,000 surplus immigrants to enter the country and 
during Christmas week of 1921, 1,000 more excess-quota immigrants were admitted as an act of 
"Christmas good will."   
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Less than a week after the passage of the law, anti-restrictionists were back in Congress 
to protest against the inadequacy of the emergency immigration act.  On June 10, 1921, the 
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization scheduled a hearing to decide wheth r to 
authorize the admission of immigrants brought to the United States on vessels which had 
departed from foreign ports on or before June 8 and count them against future quotas or pass a 
resolution applying the 2 per cent plan to the June quota, as the new law prescribed.  The 
confusion arose from the fact that many immigrants and the representatives of th  countries from 
which they came were under the assumption that the 2 per cent quota was monthly and not 
yearly.  When asked if the Department of Labor knew if the steamship companies real zed that 
the new system was already in place when they sailed from Europe, Commissioner General of 
Immigration W. W. Husband testified that the cases of Italy and Poland, the countries that the 
new policy affected the most, illustrated well the source of the mishap.  In the case of Poland, 
Husband told the committee, the large presence of excess quota immigrants origi ated from the 
shift of the country's borders after the settlement at the end of the war.  Because the Department 
of Labor did not find out about the new boundaries of Poland until June 2, 1921, they could not 
issue the official annual quota for Poland until then.  The new quota for Poland dropped from the 
expected 58,000 to 20,000 per year, thus penalizing all the migrants already on board steamship 
lines headed towards the United States.  In spite of the problems this created, American 
immigration authorities were more lenient towards the Polish government because overall it 
"was not inclined to have [its] nationals come to the United States."  The government, of course, 
made a notable exception, as E. J. Henning, Assistant Secretary of Labor, pointed out: "Poland 
proper does not issue passports; at least, they are not granted to Poles. They are the Jewish 
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residents who get passports, and it is more or less a race question, and Poland is trying to 
eliminate certain races from Poland."110   
Commissioner Husband was not as understanding when he addressed the Italian case.  
Husband belied that, in Italy, the steamship lines, "must have known that the law was going to be 
enacted at a very early date [...] they had ample opportunity to keep within the Italian quota, but 
they apparently elected not to do so."111  In Husband's and many of the committee members' 
minds, the callousness of the Italian steamship companies, in part, derived from the Italian 
government's slow regulation and control over the migration process from Italy.  The frustration 
with the Italian government was such that one of the committee members, Rep esentative John 
Raker from California, even proposed to enact stricter regulations specific to Italian immigration.  
More than anything else, Raker resented the Italian government for pushing the State Department 
to admit all the Italian immigrants arrived above the quota for the month June.  "Do I 
understand," Raker asked Harry McBride, State Department Chief Visa Division, "that the Italian 
Government is dealing through the Secretary of State to this Government to admit these Italians 
and their nationals, to be entered and coming as they are when their own nationals, knowing the 
law, knowing that they can not be admitted, are bringing them over here?"112  Although a few 
American officers praised the Italian government's recent efforts to egulate and supervise Italian 
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emigration, most people in the government and in Congress openly condemned Italy's intrusion 
in what they considered American domestic affairs.113   
In addition to highlighting congressmen and immigration authorities' position on sending 
countries, the hearing also represented the first moment of protest against the 1921 Immigration 
Act.  Among those who testified in front of the committee were State Senator Andrew Casassa 
and ex Representative Vincent Brogna from Massachusetts who spoke on behalf of the 1,040 
Italian and 125 Portuguese immigrants left on board of the Canopic in the port of Boston because 
American immigration authorities refused to admit them.  In their testimony, the  said that they 
had come to Washington, DC, to urge Congress to present a proposal for "an amendment of the 
present law restricting the admission of a certain number of Italian immigrants during the 
remainder of the present fiscal year ending June 30" on behalf of the attendees of a mass meeting 
held in Boston's North End the day before the hearing.114  Their presence at the hearing was part 
of a larger strategy conceived at the meeting that also entailed asking the presidents of Italian 
societies throughout New England to write to their representatives to urge them to intervene to 
amend the new immigration law.115   
Brogna and Casassa's testimonies shed light on some of the problems that the new law 
created and on the arguments that anti-restrictionists began to use to fight restriction.  Both men 
mentioned the haziness of the new law, the desire of the incoming immigrants to reunite with 
family members already in the United States, and the validity of the previous immigration laws 
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to weed out undesirable immigrants.  The Italian immigrants on the Canopic only longed to 
reunite with their families and contribute to America's economy.  They could not be punished 
because they did not know the new immigration policy.  Many of the Italian immigrants on 
board of the Canopic, Casassa explained to the committee, were desperate and discouraged 
because they could not understand why some of the passengers had been allowed to land and 
others had been left on the ship: 
This is a drastic piece of legislation that has gone into effect as far aimmigration is 
concerned, and […] this is the practical operation of it.  It is something new for this 
country.  They have never tried it before, and necessarily when a drastic piece of 
legislation goes through there are emergencies arise [sic.], and I thik one has arisen.116   
Similarly, Vincent Brogna argued that lack of knowledge of the law on the part of the 
immigrants and the ongoing adjustment of American authorities to the new law were to blame 
for the immigrants' current predicament.  When Representative Johnson asked Casassa if he 
believed that a similar situation would repeat itself in the future, Casassa, like many of those who 
had been asked the same question before, promptly replied: "I feel that this has been  sufficient 
lesson to the transportation companies, the Italian Government, and our own Government, so that 
they will be able to take care of any situation of that kind that might arise in th  future."117  As it 
turned out, the Italian government had not learned the lesson. 
 Disappointed that Representative Johnson had not taken into any consideration his 
proposal to have some time elapse between the ratification and the enactment of the new 
immigration policy, Vinci began immediately to undermine the 1921 Immigration Act. s early 
as June 1921, he contacted several members of Congress and members of the Department of 
Labor to ask them to intercede in favor of the admission of the surplus immigrants.  In hi  view, 
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the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization had decided to admit the surplus 
immigrants because of his intervention:  
It was only thanks to my personal efforts that we could obtain the amendment that last 
June allowed the excess immigrants to be admitted.  At that time, I exposed myself 
immensely to members of both the Senate and the House so that now, to be more 
effective, it is convenient that I be very cautious in my dealings with Congress.118 
  
Yet the meddling did not stop.  In July 1921, De Michelis asked Vinci if it were possible, in case 
Congress insisted on maintaining the quota system as the primary facet of the country's 
immigration policy, to plea for a more liberal reading of its criteria.  De Michelis proposed to 
find out if the legislators were willing to consider basing the 3 per cent quotas "not on the 
Foreign Born (which would put us at 1.343.125) but on the Foreign white stock by country of 
origin (which would put us at 2.098.360)."119  In his reply, Vinci pointed out that it was virtually 
impossible to influence legislators on the criteria they should use to select immigrants.  Only if 
the American economy improved again, Vinci wrote, could the Italian government easily defeat 
any opposition to immigration and push for the admission of a higher number of Italians in the 
United States.  For now, the only option was to rely on private negotiations with the Secretary of 
State, the Department of Labor, and a few "influential friends" to curb the impact of the quota 
system on Italian migration.120 
In Vinci's opinion, besides the slump in the American economy, two other major 
obstacles prevented him from achieving any concrete results in mitigating the restrictions against 
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Italian immigration:  Representative Johnson and his allies' ever risinginfluence and Italian 
Americans' lack of support for any of Vinci's proposals.   In September 1921, finally admitting 
that perhaps Italian immigrants were indeed one of the primary targets of the new American 
restrictive policy, Vinci conceded that his idea of proposing country by country agreements to 
regulate migration would most likely fail: 
Unfortunately, some people—as Johnson himself said, notwithstanding his previous 
favorable declarations on the matter—don't like such agreements […] because they 
remind them of the never too criticized agreement with Japan (the famous Gentlemen's 
Agreement), which is a synonym with 'international joke' to Representatives of the 
Western United States.121  
Representative Johnson and his allies, Vinci asserted, created such an environment of suspici n, 
uneasiness, and opposition, that any attempt to propose an alternative or a variation of the 
existing law met with profound hostility.  In an environment that asked for restriction at all cost, 
any effort to ask for more liberal amendments "would be like to ask for the moon."  It would be 
counterproductive, Vinci insisted, to ask for anything when the counterpart is willing to concede 
nothing.122 
 Representative Johnson's refusal to concede anything soon created a problem for th  
Italian government's credibility among Italians in the United States.  In October 1921, in the 
middle of his negotiations with Secretary of State Hughes to convince him to supp rt bilateral 
treaties on immigration, Vinci wrote De Michelis about the profound discontent among Italians 
in the United States about the Italian government's inability to stop the passage of the quota 
system or at least to secure a bigger quota for Italy.  Genuinely afraid that Italians on both sides 
of the Atlantic would soon rebel if the Italian government and the Commissariato failed to 
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maintain their promises to promote unrestricted emigration to the United States, Vinci suggested 
to promise less and be more realistic and truthful about the status of American immigration.  
After the ratification of the 1921 Immigration Act, these promises were dangerous and 
damaging.  It was better to prepare "the masses" for the worst, "present the American labor 
market as economically unable to absorb any immigration," so that they would appreci te any 
victory, however small, that the Italian government would subsequently achieve.123  Vinci's 
relationship with the Italian American community further deteriorated after the New York Italian 
Chamber of Commerce refused to collaborate in the creation of offices across the country that 
could assist Italian immigrants to relocate to agricultural areas rather than industrial centers.  
They told him that they needed more data before making a final decision and that, in any case, 
they would rather have Vinci found the organization.  "As your Excellency can see," Vinci 
complained to De Michelis, "to involve 'the active elements of our Colonies' entails a fight 
against an incredible inertia, not only of works but of thought.  If one tries to take one of our 
citizens abroad away from his daily activities […], he will lack any intellig nce, any sense of 
initiative."124   
The lot of excess quota immigrants became an immediate concern among American J ws 
as well.  Many of the problems these immigrants faced stemmed from the refusal of the House 
Committee, in its provision admitting all immigrants in transit in the month of June 1921, to 
amend the law to clarify what would happen to future excess quota immigrants and to clarify 
whose competence it was to decide their lot.  Judicial decisions often further complicated the 
Department of Labor's decisions.  In November 1923, Federal Judge Knox, evaluating the case 
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of a group of excess immigrants, ruled that the Secretary of Labor did not have the power to 
charge the excess immigrants of previous months against the quota of a subsequent month.125  
Knox's ruling questioned the status of a group of Russian Jewish immigrants that, in e same 
month, had been ordered deported because the immigration inspectors thought that the quota for 
the month of November had already been filled.  Of this group, only twelve ultimately ent red 
the country because they received writs of habeas corpus thanks to the intervention of a group of 
Jewish organizations that offered to pay for two New York Jewish lawyers to aid he Russian 
Jews in the group that had just arrived.  The ruling judge supervising the revision of these 
deportation cases, in turn, deemed that his decision also affected eight hundred and seventy-six 
other immigrants detained on Ellis Island at the time.126  What happened to the immigrants in 
excess of the quotas in November 1923 was typical and reflected how immigrants arriving were 
often at the mercy of the immigration inspectors, unpredictable court decisions, or volatile spurs 
of humanitarianism.    
The Union of American Hebrew Congregations was one of the most active Jewish 
organizations involved in the resolution of the November excess quota problem.  Its activiies 
during 1923 alone reflected both the problems that the new legislation created and the extent of 
the involvement of many immigrant organizations.  After the November 1923 excess quota 
immigrants, the Union turned its attention immediately to the predicament of the excess quota 
immigrants temporarily admitted into the country on parole or under bond between July ad 
November of the same year.  In November 1923, of the 2,400 excess immigrants on parole, 
1,597 were Russian Jews.  The Chairman of the Civil Rights Committee of the Union and Rev. 
Abram Simon of Washington, D.C., decided to intervene and obtained an interview with W.W. 
                                                




Husband, Commissioner General of Immigration, to discuss the future of this particular group of 
people.  The meeting yielded the results desired.  After a compassionate plea in favor of the 
excess quota immigrants, the Commissioner General suggested that these immigrants and their 
representatives take no action whatsoever because he was convinced that the Department of 
Labor would do nothing to disturb or impair their life in the United States.  The Department 
would not intervene because "the circumstances surrounding the entry of these unfortunate 
persons was of a tragic nature, and their deportation would impose upon them hardships of 
greater severity than it would care to inflict."127  The discrete intervention of strong and powerful 
interest groups on behalf of specific cases often yielded positive results for incoming immigrants 
with entry problems.  Yet, as both Jewish and Italian activists knew, these successes hardly ever 
produced concrete legislative provisions that would guarantee that any of these problems would 
never resurface again.  The situation would not change until the end of World War Two. 
Also in 1923, the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society presented the American 
Jewish Committee with a report on a thousand Russian immigrants who had been directed to be 
deported because they were in excess of the 1923 Russian quota.  The Hebrew Sheltering and 
Immigrant Aid Society pleaded for the intervention of the Committee on behalf of these
immigrants.  The Committee's executive committee immediately authorized Marshall to secure a 
stay of the order pending relief through apposite legislation.  Accordingly, Marshall 
waited upon President Coolidge, presented to him the facts, and urged him to suspend the 
exclusion of these unfortunate men, women and children, so that it might be possible to 
secure the admission by Congressional action of those who had arrived under these 
extraordinary circumstances, when they had every reason to believe that the Russian 
quota had not been exhausted, and that they had the right to enter, having done 
everything humanely possible to conform with the law.128  
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 The President conceded the stay but gave instructions to review every single case and not to 
deport those for whom deportation would clearly represent a hardship or a danger to their lives.  
As a result of this executive action, four hundred were admitted conditionally.  As the rest of the 
immigrants were about to be deported, the defense discovered in the course of habeas corpus 
proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Newport that 
approximately 1,000 aliens who could not be technically classified as immigrants h d 
erroneously been charged against the 1923 Russian quota.  Marshall promptly notified the 
president and the Secretary of Labor of the mistake, and all one thousand immigrants were 
legally admitted into the country.129  Marshall's actions anticipated one of the key strategies to 
which both the Italian and Jewish communities would turn to limit the impact of the national 
origins quotas, namely to appeal directly to the president or congressmen and propose the 
introduction of personal immigration bills to solve the problem at hand.  Although, they did not 
know it at the time, this would later become was one of the main causes behind the end of the 
quota system.  
Jewish organizations also protested that the law unduly punished some individuals more 
than others.  They argued that women and children trying to reunite with their famil es and 
Jewish immigrants appealing to their refugee status for admission were often the hardest hit by 
the new immigration laws.  Because of anomalies and inconsistencies, neither the 1917 nor the 
1921 Immigration act elucidated when family members could reunite with their relatives already 
in the United States.  If the law was ill-conceived, American authorities' pr judices against the 
new immigrants contributed even more to the surge of deportation cases that followed the 
ratification of the 1921 Immigration Act.  Commenting on the many cases involving alleged 
mental and other incurable ailments and the consequent distressful separation of families, the 
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authors of the Annual Report of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations t ld its readers 
that "criticism has been directed at doubtful medical determinations excluding alleged feeble-
minded children, where eminent medical authorities have controverted [sic.] the adverse 
Governmental medical certifications."130  Similarly,  Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe who 
failed the literacy test often struggled to meet the requirements of the refugee status because of 
the American authorities' lingering suspicions that they wanted to abuse the system by 
pretending to be refugees.131   
Both Italian and Jewish immigrants soon learned of the possibilities of appealing the 
immigration authorities' decisions and decided to take their cases to court.  The previous 
decisions on similar cases for Chinese and Japanese immigrants again set important precedents 
that allowed Eastern and Southern Europeans to take advantage of the legal system to challenge 
restriction.  Although many of the cases were ultimately successful, the economic and emotional 
strain, the humiliations that the petitioners often experienced, and the lengthy proceedings 
severely limited the effectiveness of such a strategy.  Goldman v. Tod and Patton v. Tod, in 
particular, showcased some of the key weaknesses of the 1921 Immigration Act, as they 
highlighted the primary victims of an ill-conceived policy and shed light on the inadequacy of 
the Immigration Service to implement the new law.  At the same time, these two cases also 
showed the behind-the-scenes mobilization of Jewish organizations, politicians, and common 
citizens for a positive resolution of these two cases.   
Goldman v. Tod focused on what exactly constituted mental defect and on when it 
represented sufficient ground to exclude immigrants.  In 1921, when Samuel Goldman, a young 
Polish boy, arrived in the United States with his mother, brothers, and sisters to join his father in 
                                                




Syracuse, New York, the medical authorities in Ellis Island found him "a feebleminded 
undesirable alien" and threatened him with deportation.  The local Jewish community 
immediately intervened and secured a lawyer to take the case to court.  Despiteattorney Ralph 
Shulman's successful demonstration that Samuel's seeming feeblemindedness was due to 
malnutrition, the court still ruled that he should be deported.132  After the harsh sentence, the 
Jewish community in Syracuse again mobilized and wrote Louis Marshall to ask for his
assistance in the case as legal advisor for the appeal:   
Congressman Magee has done all in his power to prevent the injustice but has been 
unable to do so. We are seeing Judge Hiscock and Paul Andrews to see if they could not 
reach the Governor. Letters are being written to Senators Calder and Wadsworth, and as 
last resort we are appealing to you.  Unless some powerful influence can be set into
motion the boy will be returned to Europe.133  
Louis Marshall agreed to collaborate with Ralph Shulman and, considering that the evidence on 
the boy's progress had yielded little result, suggested to change strategy and argue that the boy 
was admissible as the son of an American citizen.  Samuel Goldman's father h d even included 
the boy's name on his certificate of naturalization.134  The appeal allowed the boy to continue to 
remain in the United States and guaranteed that the Goldman case be tried simultaneous y with 
the Fink v. Tod case and the Patton v. Tod case, both addressing similar questions, thus gaining 
nationwide attention to the plight of immigrant children hastily rejected as undesirable.135  
 Despite the involvement of Louis Marshall, the attention of the media, the intervention of 
many prominent public figures, and the change of defense, the case dragged on until 1925.  By 
1924, Marshall and Shulman decided to appeal directly to the Secretary of Labor.  In June 1924, 
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Shulman and Marshall asked Congressman Magee to pressure the Department of Labor for a 
resolution to the case and to endorse Senator Roach's bill to facilitate the entry of children 
arriving in the United States to join their parents to find a permanent solution to pending cases 
similar to Samuel Goldman's.136   Magee acted immediately and after his negotiation with the 
Department of Labor about the Goldman case, the department signaled that it would issue a 
special order consenting to Goldman's admission provided the court proceedings be 
discontinued.  Shulman and Marshall immediately began proceedings to dismiss the case, but the 
department's decision about Goldman was prematurely leaked to the press.  As a result, the 
Assistant Secretary of Labor curtly declared that the case was still open and stayed the same.  
Eventually, the Department of Labor did issue a special order on behalf of Samuel Goldman, but 
only when the publicity died down and the issue appeared as a matter of daily administratio .137   
Simultaneously with Goldman v. Tod, Marshall also agreed to serve as counsel for Patton 
v. Tod.  In a letter to A.S. Gilbert, Patton's attorney, Marshall highlighted the importance of both 
cases in respect to immigration and naturalization laws, especially as Congress debated how to 
modify the 1921 Immigration Act.138  Both cases, in fact, raised questions about derivative 
citizenship.  Pola Patton arrived in the United States from Lithuania on July 6, 1914, at the age of 
nine.  Two weeks after her arrival, a board of special inquiry certified that, "the girl was mentally 
deficient and must be excluded."  The Department of Labor issued an order for her deportation, 
but the application for a writ of habeas corpus and more appeals delayed the resolution of the 
case until the United States' entry into World War One put a halt to her deportation.  She was 
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released on bond to her family.   At the end of the war, in August 1919, the Department of Labor 
issued a new warrant for her arrest, but this only began a new round of appeals and of evaluation 
of the girl's mental health.  All examinations again declared Pola Patton feebleminded.  In April 
1921, the Department of Labor issued a new order of deportation, which the defense curtailed 
with the application of a new writ of habeas corpus.  The case ultimately ended up in the United 
States Circuit Court, where Judge Julius M. Mayer ruled that the girl be returned o Lithuania 
after ten years in the United States.139    
Judge Mayer's decision had two deleterious consequences for immigrants who appealed 
their deportation and further complicated any efforts of immigrant organizations that provided 
assistance in these cases.  His decision to rule that the Department of Labor did not have the 
authority to release the girl on bond revealed the confusion over which departments and officials 
within the government had the authority to decide over issues pertaining to entry to the United 
States, deportations, and appeals of minor immigrants declared feebleminded.   This conclu ion 
also revealed the unreliability of the legal system as a way to oppose unjust restric ions and 
violations of civil rights, as other judges, in decisions over the same point, did agree that the 
Department of Labor had the authority to decide over appeals and deportations.  More 
importantly, Judge Mayer's ruling also revealed the precarious status in which naturalized 
citizens found themselves.  As in Goldman's case, Pola Patton's father was an American citizen 
who had listed his children's names on his documents of naturalization.  Many cases involving 
minors entering the country to join their naturalized parents rested their deportation appeals on 
the argument that the parent's citizenship transferred to them as well.  Although the law itself 
was vague on the subject, Meyer ruled that, "a foreign-born minor child dwelling in the United 
States at the time of the naturalization of the parent automatically becomes an American citizen.  
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A foreign born child not in the United States when the parent is naturalized becomes a citizen 
only from such time as, while still a minor, it begins to reside permanently in the United 
States."140   Because in his opinion the Department of Labor had no authority to admit Pola 
Patton on bond, the judge concluded that her ten-year permanence in the United States was 
illegal, which disqualified her from the benefits of her father's citizenship.  This ruling 
represented a major setback for many similar cases, and in part, explains why Mars all opted to 
resort to Congressman Magee to resolve Goldman's case privately rather than in court.
Testimonies in Congress and legal battles represented only two of the strategies that 
Italians and Jews in America adopted to fight restriction.  Assisted immigration and illegal 
immigration represented two more grass-roots strategies to circumvent restriction after the 1921 
Immigration Act went into effect.  By 1921, Eastern European Jews could rely on a powerful and 
well-organized web of American Jewish organizations that could assist them o migrate to the 
United States and relocate once in the country.  The most prominent organization was the 
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), an organization founded in 1890 and incorporated in 
1911 in New York City through the merger of the Hebrew Sheltering House and the Hebrew Aid 
Immigrant Society "to facilitate the lawful entry of Jewish immigrants at the various ports in the 
United States."141  Italian immigrants lacked any corresponding organization engaged in such 
immigrant assistance.  The first Italian American organization of this sort would not emerge until 
1952.  In the meantime, many Italian immigrants who arrived outside the quotas or risked 
deportation opted for illegal immigration into the United States through Canada, Mexico, and 
Cuba.  
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HIAS also represented one of the most active Jewish organizations committed to assisting 
immigration.  With branches in Paris, Warsaw, Lemberg, and Danzig, HIAS provided financial 
and legal aid, transportation arrangements, educational and vocational programs, location of 
missing relatives, and lobbying the United States and other governments on behalf of individual 
cases.  Aware of the criticisms that Eastern European Jewish immigrants received in the United 
States, HIAS ensured, similarly to the Italian government regarding Italian immigrants, that only 
immigrants who would be accepted at the American ports of entry left Europe and promoted 
immigrant relocation to agricultural areas rather than urban industrial centers.  Following a 
strategy that both Italian and Jewish organizations had adopted as the attacks against Southern 
and Eastern Europeans began, HIAS also committed to foster "American ideals among the 
newcomers and to instill in them [...] a true patriotism and love for their adopted country" but 
also "to make better known to the people of the United States the many advantages of desirable 
immigration, and to promote these objects by means of meetings, lectures and publications."142  
As the hostility towards Eastern Europeans mounted, HIAS also began programs to relocate 
these immigrants in other receiving countries, including Argentina and Palestine.  In 1921, these 
efforts were still at a developmental stage and were not always successful, but they gained 
strength as restriction became law in the United States.  
When assisted immigration was not an option, migrants turned to illegal immigration to 
get to the United States.  The 1923 report of the Commissioner General of Immigration 
highlighted that attempts to gain admission into the United States illegally increased somewhat 
in proportion to the number and character of the restrictions.  "Undoubtedly," the commissioner 
wrote, "the literacy test requirement which became effective in May 1917, and the per centum 
limit immigration act of May, 1921,—the so-called quota law,—have greatly increased the 
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number of such attempts to enter the country illegally."143  These two laws, the commissioner 
observed, were at the origin of "a recent growing tendency among inadmissible European aliens 
to attempt to enter the country surreptitiously."144  The resort to illegal immigration often 
revealed the immigrants' frustration with the new immigration policy, as "even many admissible 
aliens [entered] the country illegally in disregard of the quota limitations."145  A report to the 
New York State Joint Committee on the Exploitation of Immigrants provided further details on 
the illegal traffic of European immigrants into the United States: 
Such aliens enter the country in considerable numbers from Canada, Mexico and Cuba.  
New York’s long northern boundary line adjoining Canada justifies that she gets more 
than her share of the aliens who enter the United States illegally from that country.  
Another source of additions to New York’s share of aliens arises from its being a port of 
such magnitude.  It is known that large numbers of deserting alien seamen leave their 
ships permanently in ports of the United States to take advantage of superior wage 
conditions existing here.146 
By June 30, 1923, desertions reported for all ports of the United States reached a total of 23,194, 
of which 14,734 were at the port of New York alone.  To date, little evidence exists documenting 
European illegal immigration before 1923.  Congress itself did not recommend harsher laws 
pertaining to seamen until it evaluated the bills proposing revisions to the 1921 Immigration 
Act.147 
Aspiring Italian migrants could not benefit from the assistance of an organizatio  with 
the budget, the connections, and the network of HIAS.  Circumstantial evidence suggests that 
Italians represented a considerable number of those who entered the country as seamen and then 
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deserted to overcome the restrictions of American immigration policy.  As the oldest cases of the 
Italian Welfare League show, the peak of Italian illegal immigration began right after the passage 
of the 1924 Immigration Act and continued well into the war years.148  The Italian Welfare 
League, a non-profit organization composed of social workers who assisted Italian immigrants 
upon their arrival and with legal problems, helped numerous Italian migrants in the forties, 
fifties, and sixties to adjust their illegal status and naturalize.  Its cases all date from 1924 
onwards.  Partial evidence of an earlier beginning of Italian illegal immigration emerges from the 
records of the Commissariato Generale dell'Emigrazione.   
Already in 1923, De Michelis received reports from Italian immigration authorities 
stationed along the Italian border warning him of attempts of Italians to emigrate illegally to 
circumvent the quota system or arrive in the United States before the new law passed.  On 
December 1923, the Emigration Inspector in Ventimiglia, Liguria, on the border with France, 
wrote De Michelis about the intensification during the last year of illegal Italian emigration to 
the United States through France.  To alleviate inspections at the border and reduce ill gal 
emigration, the inspector suggested having immigration agents check passenger at train stations 
before departure in coordination with authorities at intermediate unmonitored stops bef re 
crossing the French border.  The Commissariato's active involvement in negotiations and 
stratagems to delay, stop, or circumscribe the enforcement of restriction on Italian emigration, 
along with a change of government, perhaps distracted De Michelis and his coworkers fr m 
pursuing the issue further.  The Commissariato began to investigate systematically illegal Italian 
emigration only in 1927.  
 
Conclusion 
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Congress's adoption of the first quota system in 1921 concluded an era of qualitative 
immigration and ushered in an era of quantitative immigration.  Because Congress hastily put 
together and ratified the new immigration law, the shortcomings of the first quota system created 
unexpected consequences for prospective migrants and for immigrants and immigrant advocacy 
groups in the United States.  Anti-restrictionists hoped that the many outstanding failures of the 
1921 Immigration Act would suffice to persuade restrictionists and their supporters in Congress 
to envision a different immigration policy.    
The congestion of immigrants at Ellis Island, the arbitrary rejections, and the hardships 
that many immigrants had to endure caused an outcry among Americans and immigrant 
communities alike.  Even the framers of the law ultimately conceded that the law ad been ill 
conceived.  The realization of the law’s inefficiencies, though, only convinced legislators to draft 
a more effective and 'scientific' national-origins quota system.  Although they realized that any 
new bill would meet obstruction and opposition from many fronts, an important precedent had 
been set.  The years preceding and following the ratification of the 1921 Immigration Act had 
clearly shown restrictionists that anti-restrictionists would oppose them with any means and until 
the end of the draconian immigration policy.  For Italian and Jewish immigrants those years 
represented a rehearsal for the battle against the 1924 Immigration Act.  The results of their 
battle differed enormously, however.  Although both groups realized that the help of politicians 
and the vote could seriously undermine the restrictionist position, they achieved very different 
results.  Italians could count on very few politicians and leaders ready to voice their concerns and 
their opposition to restriction.  Their presence in politics was still rare, and the overbearing 
presence of Italian government representatives like Royal Commissioner of Emigration Vinci 
often harmed rather than boosted their cause.  At the more grassroots level, Italian immigrants 
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still did not turn to the legal system for justice or form organizations that could assist more 
Italians come to the United States.  Eastern European Jews, on the other hand, benefited greatly 
from the politically well-connected older German community, criticisms and frictions over its 
elitism notwithstanding.  The well-established German Jews defended them in Congress, gave 
them a voice in court, and contributed financially to the organizations dealing with assisted 
immigration.  At the same time, though, the prominence and popularity of these famous fellow 
Jews attracted even more negative attention to Eastern and Southern European immigration and  
provoked further calls for restriction because many Americans came to iden ify the fight against 





"The doors of America are worse than shut when they are half-way open:" The Fight 
against the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act (1924-1929)149 
 
  When Congress passed the 1921 Immigration Act, legislators repeatedly emphasized that 
the new law was highly experimental.  Indeed, many presented it as a temporary measure to give 
the country 'a breathing spell' and to allow Congress enough time to conceive a 'sc entific' 
method to control immigration.150  Despite the many legal shortcomings and international 
embarrassments that emerged after the 1921 Immigration Act went into effect, the idea of 
excluding immigrants by the quota method steadily grew in favor:  
The United States of America, a nation great in all things, is ours today.  To whom will it 
belong tomorrow?  The United States is our land. If it was not the land of our fathers,  
least it may be, and it should be, the land of our children.  We intend to maintain it so.  
The day of unalloyed welcome to all peoples, the day of indiscriminate acceptan of all 
races, has definitely ended.151   
Unless immigrants were of Northern European origin, they needed to be restricted o  excluded.  
For many, the quota system was the best tool for immigration control available.  It was this 
atmosphere that progressively convinced Italian Americans and American Jews that quotas 
would be the hallmark of American immigration policy. 
Congress was under such pressure to pass restrictive immigration legislation that it only 
reluctantly conceded public hearings on the Johnson-Reed immigration bill.  After holding 
preliminary hearings in late December 1923, both Italian and Jewish agencies succ eded in 
having an extension of the hearings through the month of January to protest against its blatant 
discriminatory nature.  Subsequently, most of these same agencies and institutions contacted 
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several members of Congress personally to impress upon them the injustice of immigration laws 
based on a census, contending that the basic immigration law of 1917 was sufficiently sel ctive 
in nature to keep out all undesirable immigrants.  While the immigration bill was under 
consideration by a Committee of both houses, these agencies and institutions also tried to secure 
amendments and to have provisions inserted to mitigate to some extent the rigor of the bill, 
especially to secure exemption from the quota, or give priority to those prospective immigrants 
who had received visas under the old act and who had been unable to sail because of the 
exhaustion of the quotas from their respective countries.  
After Congress passed the bill, these organizations tried to arrange for a public hearing 
before the president to convince him to veto the bill.  The president did not agree to the hearing
but accepted to read a memorandum of their arguments in its place.  The memorandum did little 
to change President Coolidge's mind, but for the first time, the petition signaled a shift in Italian 
Americans and American Jews' concerns about the implications of restriction.  The ostensibly 
permanent nature of the new Immigration Act, unlike previous claims of emergency legislation, 
sent a clear message to Southern and Eastern Europeans already living in the United States.  In 
addition to concerns about foreign policy and about those left behind, the petitioners for the first
time consciously reflected on the consequences of restriction on the immigrant communities 
already in the United States.   
After its passage in Congress, the fight against the Johnson-Reed Act continued on 
several different fronts, in Congress, in court, in the newspapers, and in public appearances.  
Both groups continued to oppose the 1924 Immigration Act through 1929, the year in which the 
act went into effect.  Until then, the Italian and Jewish communities in the United States assisted 
migrants stranded on either side of the Atlantic trying to reach the United States or caught in 
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between legislations.  In the midst of its mobilization against the Johnson bill first and the 
Johnson act later, the Italian community underwent a major change that affected both its fight 
against restriction and reinforced many of the prejudices that Americans had of It lians as 
unwelcome citizens.   The rise of Mussolini to power severely divided the community and put a 
halt to any collaboration with other immigrant groups for a long time.  The outbreak of the Great 
Depression officially put an end to the second phase of Italian and Jewish mobilizati n against 
restriction in the United States and left both groups to reckon with the impact of restriction on 
their life in the United States.  
 
The Battle up to 1924  
 When the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization announced that it would 
hold hearings from December 26 to December 31, 1923, on the Johnson bill, anti-restrictionis 
flooded Chairman Albert Johnson's office with letters of protest.  They asked for an extension of 
the hearings in January and denounced the injustice of holding very short hearings over the 
holidays.152  Cairoli Gigliotti of Chicago, publisher of Il Nuovo Venuto; Andrew Dorko, 
president of the First Catholic Slovak Union; Representative Samuel Dickstein of New York; 
William Edlin, representing a committee of foreign language newspapers; Loui Marshall of the 
American Jewish Committee (AJC); and Representative Emanuel Celler of Brooklyn, all wrote 
to Representative Johnson asking him to prolong the hearings after January 1 to allowa greater 
number of constituents "to voice their sentiments on the important changes proposed."153   
Eventually, the committee reluctantly conceded more hearings in January, but its discontent was 
palpable.  On the very first day of the January hearings, voicing the feelings of all the committee 
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members, Representative Raker commented that all these letters were just a subterfuge to delay 
further the passage of new immigration legislation.154  
Many of the anti-restrictionists who testified in Congress focused their criticisms of the 
pending legislation on the stereotypes it upheld and on the broader consequences of restricti n.   
On the one hand, they stressed the racial and religious nature of the discrimination against the 
new immigrants and emphasized the contributions that all these immigrants had made, especially 
during the Great War.  On the other hand, they pointed out the political, economic, and 
diplomatic repercussions that a restrictive immigration policy would have at both the domestic 
and international levels.  The main arguments were always the same from group to group, but 
some of the testimonies shed a light on the intricate web of the implications that restriction had 
on their community.  The Italian case was particularly revealing.  Among those who testified in 
the presence of the House Immigration Committee was Salvatore Cotillo, Grand Master of the 
Order Sons of Italy of the State of New York.155  Cotillo's testimony in Congress summed up the 
main points of the anti-restrictionist agenda by the early 1920s, but it also reflected how the 
relationship that Italian immigrants in the United States had with Italy affected their response to 
restriction.   
Cotillo's testimony revealed an important difference between Italian nd Jewish 
mobilization against immigration restriction.  While Jewish migrants moved to the United States 
as families, tended to settle permanently in the country, and immediately began to build social, 
economic, and political networks to integrate into American society, Italian immigrants 
continued to travel back and forth between the two countries, maintained strong contacts with 
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their families left behind, and continuously had to deal with the presence of representatives of the 
Italian government in the United States.  The Italian government, especially after Mussolini's 
ascent to power, constantly interjected itself in their life in America and worked to foster a sense 
of pride among its expatriates to persuade them that they were Italians abroad representing and 
defending Italy's interests in their host country.  At the height of 100 per cent Americanism, 
Italian Americans' open stance on defending Italy created several problems for their acceptance 
by the American mainstream. 
In his testimony, Cotillo used many of the arguments that anti-restrictionists had used 
since the beginning of the restrictionist attacks against Southern and Eastern Europeans and 
discussed two more recent reasons to object to restriction.  Like many critics before him, Cotillo 
criticized the press for its incendiary rhetoric of racial fear, religious hatred, and nativism to rally 
support for restriction and to marginalize Italian and Jewish communities.  He emphasized the 
new immigrants' numerous contributions to the development of the American economy and to 
Americans' prosperity.  Finally, he reminded his audience that recent studies clearly showed that 
crime rates were lower among the new immigrants than among native whites.156    
At the same time, Cotillo also emphasized the new immigrants' participation in the Great 
War and denounced the bill's regulation on family reunification.  Despite the vicious pr paganda 
that had turned Southern and Eastern Europeans into scapegoats for every ill that touched the 
city, the state, and the nation, Cotillo believed that it was "unfair, unjust and inequitable to 
discriminate against the immigration of certain countries, which have fought with us and shed 
their blood with us and helped to build what is known now as the Great American Nation."157  
Immigrant soldiers had offered their most precious possession, their lives, to the United States' 
                                                





cause, even though many of them had not yet naturalized.   Within the Italian community alone, 
Cotillo pointed out, over 30,000 Italian-speaking soldiers had enlisted in the American Amy 
during the war.  Although Italian immigrants represented only 4 per cent of the American 
population, they accounted for 10 per cent of the American military forces and suffered 12 per 
cent of U.S. casualties.  The deaths and sacrifices of so many un-naturalized soldiers with n the 
ranks of the U.S. Army demonstrated the artificiality of terms like 'straight Americanism,' Cotillo 
observed.  Nonetheless, the new bill severely punished Italian migrants, as the quota for Italy 
would go from 42,057 under the existing law based on the 3 per cent from the 1910 census to 
4,112 in the proposed law, representing the 2 per cent based on the 1890 census.158   
In his testimony, Cotillo also criticized the harshness of the new policy's provisions on 
family reunion, identifying an issue that would become central to immigration refrm rs' 
campaign until 1965 and that still plays a critical role today.   As the 1921 Immigration Act had 
demonstrated, the convoluted protocol that immigrants sending for family members had to 
follow often caused family separation, expensive trials, and hardship on family members forc d 
to live apart.  The Johnson bill further complicated family reunion.  The application process, 
Cotillo noted, essentially assumed that each applicant represented a potential crimin l given the 
type of information that they had to provide and the legal hoops they had to go trough before 
their relative could begin their application process on the other side of the Atlantic.159    
 Yet Cotillo also proposed a specifically Italian reason to object to the passage of the 
Johnson bill.  Shifting the focus of his testimony to Italy, Cotillo emphasized the impact that the 
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law would have on Italy and praised the Italian government for implementing an exacting 
selection process of prospective migrants.  He emphasized that Italy's attitude towards 
emigration was not to send criminals to the United States, like restrictionists sustained, but rather 
to allow only the very best and the most fit to come to American shores, thus preceding 
Americans in that policy of selective emigration advertised by the restrictionists.160  Secretary of 
Labor Davis, Commissioner of Immigration Curran, former Commissioner of Immigration Tod, 
and Congressman Cable all confirmed the fitness of the immigrants that Italy had been sending 
over the previous few years.  Moreover, Cotillo added, restriction on Italian immigration would 
also have negative consequences for American exporters to Italy.  Thanks in part to the 
emigrants' remittances, Italy could, in fact, afford to purchase the wheat, oil, copper, iron, and 
other materials she needed from the United States, since the high protective tariffs prevented 
Italy from obtaining all these materials in exchange for its products.  Severely restrictive 
immigration legislation, warned Cotillo, would, within a few years, greatly reduce remittances to 
Italy and strike a severe economic blow to a country endeavoring to do its share in the 
reconstruction of Europe and in the restoration of peace and order.  "This deadly blow," Cotillo 
concluded, returning to the opening theme of his testimony, "will be dealt to her by her form r 
ally towards which she has acted always in a friendly and loyal manner."161  
While Cotillo and other prominent speakers testified before the Immigration and 
Naturalization Committees, the battle against restriction continued outside of Congress as well.  
In January 1924, Max J. Kohler published five articles on "Aspects of the Pending Immiration 
Legislation" in The New York Times and dissected many of the pro-immigration groups' 
criticisms of the Johnson Immigration bill in an effort to educate Americans on immigration 





issues.  Kohler's expertise in migration matters dated back thirty years.  He had been Assistant 
U.S. District Attorney in New York City for four years, a legal representative of immigrant aid 
societies to assist immigrants in court, and an ardent defender of immigrants' rights in Congress.  
He was also an active member of the Board of Delegates on Civil Rights of the Union of 
American Hebrew Congregations and sat on the Executive Committee of the American Jewish 
Committee.  In the same vein of Cotillo's testimony, Kohler's criticisms focused on three specific 
issues:  blatant racial and religious discrimination underlying the national-origins quotas system, 
violation of personal liberties, and obstruction to international treaties stipulating the mobility of 
other countries' citizens.  Unlike Cotillo, however, Kohler refrained from focusing exclusively on 
the constituency he represented and spoke on behalf of all European immigrants.  This strategy 
reflected the Jewish community's concern to avoid the perception of the immigration problem as 
a Jewish problem, an issue that had existed since the community's first mobilizati n against 
restriction and that would periodically resurface until the repeal of the quota system.162   
Reflecting the ideas and the sentiments of many anti-restrictionists, Kohler's first article 
centered on the racial and religious discriminatory nature of the new national-origins quota 
system.  The use of the 1890 census, instead of the 1910 or 1920 ones, to calculate the quotas of 
each country, he wrote, indicated the House Committee's clear intention to target Eastern and 
Southern European immigrants with their reform, since it predated the peak of their arrivals.  The 
adoption of the 1890 census as a frame of reference, in fact, enormously decreased the number of 
persons admissible from the countries from which most immigrants had arrived in the previous 
thirty years and penalized wives and minor children who were waiting to reunite with their 
family members in the United States.  At the same time, Kohler wrote, the pending Joh son bill 
explicitly discriminated on the basis of religion, as most of the restricted mmigrants were 
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Catholic or Jewish.163  The Union of American Hebrew Congregations, to which Kohler 
belonged, took his criticisms a step further and, in its 1925 annual report, connected the law's 
religious bias towards all non-Protestant aliens in the United States to the proposed alien 
registration as an effort on the part of the government to keep track of unwelcome religious 
affiliations and intimidate prospective immigrants.164 
Like Cotillo, the section of the bill that Kohler considered the most outrageous was the 
proposal to introduce "Quota Relative Immigrants" in addition to the regular immigrant quotas.  
The proposal discounted all anti-restrictionists' previous efforts to facilitate family reunions.  The 
House Committee on Immigration was in fact evaluating the idea to include two different sets of 
quotas in the new version of the bill:  one based on the 2 per cent of the 1890 census for 
immigrants "selected in view of their economic value" and a separate quota specifically for 
incoming wives and unmarried minor children of residents of the United States planning to 
become citizens.  Limitations on family reunions had already created problems during the 1921 
Immigration Act tenure, when many Eastern European immigrants went to court to challenge the 
provisions pertaining to family reunions.  The uproar that the cases had generated along with 
formal diplomatic protests from sending countries including, among others, Italy, Spain, and 
Greece had convinced the House Committee to take out of the final version of the 1921 
Immigration Act the quota restrictions on wives and unmarried children of resident aliens who 
had lived in the United States for two years and were declarants for American naturalization for 
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at least one year.  The new Johnson bill, however, put such regulations for wives and children 
back into the quotas again.165 
In his articles, Kohler also objected to the proposed regulations that violated migrants' 
personal liberties  in the name of controlling immigration.  In addition to the already prescribed 
medical exams and literacy test, the Johnson bill proposed to fingerprint all immigrants upon 
their arrival in the United States and to request the submission of a military record, if any.  The 
idea of fingerprints, Kohler argued, was an insult and a poorly disguised attempt to draw a 
connection between immigrants and criminals.  Rather than fostering love for their newly 
adopted country, he continued, fingerprinting would only blight their spirits and "instill 
indignation in them upon landing."166  Fingerprinting created a wave of uproar within Eastern 
and Southern European communities alike, and its repeal from the final version of the law was 
one of anti-restrictionists' few victories in the battle over immigration in 1924.167  Immigrants 
already residing in the country did not fare much better.  The new version of the bill, in fact, 
requested all residents who wanted to send for their families to provide a copy of their income 
tax return along with their applications.  As Kohler noted, "scarcely any of the male married 
immigrants residing here […] have succeeded, when they are ready to send for wives and 
children, in reaching the stage of enjoying the substantial annual income which requires an 
income tax return."168  Finally, the bill provided for no statute of limitation for the deportation of 
residents found to have entered the country illegally.  
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The pending bill did not affect just the migrants, Kohler argued, but it had important 
international ramifications on the relationship that the United States had with sending countries.  
The introduction of "un-reviewable czars" granting visas and American medical inspectors 
examining prospective immigrants abroad  ran counter to the notion of the United Sta s as a safe 
haven and could be construed as a violation of national sovereignty.169  Sending countries 
resented that the United States simply refused to sign bilateral treaties to regulate immigration.  
As Kohler explained, "universal inborn prejudices against all foreigners made such treaties 
indispensable for their protection."170   This attitude towards European sending countries 
contrasted with the provision in the bill that provided that immigrants who had resided 
continuously for seven years in Mexico, Canada, Cuba, or any other Central or South American 
country and their wives and children could "enter as they [pleased], regardless of any quota, and 
despite greater opportunity to smuggle in excess quota immigrants over long borders."171  Yet, 
Kohler reflected, what European countries faced was less harsh than the creation of n "Asiatic 
Barred Zone."  The barring from citizenship of all Asians seriously endangered the United States' 
relationship with China and Japan, and with Britain, France, and Turkey because of their colonial 
possessions in Asia.  The Chinese boycott against the immigration exclusion enforced by the 
United States had already demonstrated the diplomatic and commercial damage that a 
discriminatory immigration policy could cause.172   
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The authority the bill vested in medical inspectors and consular officers created outrage 
both at home and abroad.  The Italian government, in particular, vehemently opposed such a 
provision and requested that the issue be regulated through a treaty stipulating and re ulating the 
inspectors' examinations on its territory.  As Italian emigration consular Vinci wrote to De 
Michelis, director of the Commissariato Generale dell'Emigrazione, the request to let foreign 
medical inspectors on their territory only proved that the United States thought of Italy as a 
country of straccioni (good-for-nothings), damaging Italy's moral and political standing in the 
international sphere.173  The Italian government understood that it could not fight this battle 
alone, and so it sought to gain the support of other European countries that would suffer the same 
predicament.  Unfortunately, as Italian representatives often complained, the only countries 
willing to support Italy's requests were usually "weaker or less powerful countries" like Poland, 
Rumania, and other Eastern European countries, rather than more powerful countries like France 
and Britain.  
The bill's provision granting American consuls the final say on visas without any 
possibility for the immigrant to appeal the decision also preoccupied anti-restrictionists.  This 
practice, Kohler argued, would concentrate too much arbitrary power in the hands of few and 
often prejudiced and ignorant individuals.174  Even an enthusiastic supporter of the new 
immigration system like immigration lawyer Warner A. Parker found it troublesome that the 
final decision concerning visas rested solely in the consuls' hands: 
If the consul concludes that an applicant is an 'undesirable,' he may, without any chance
of his reasons being reviewed by anyone else, simply decline to issue the visa; and no 
matter how insufficient or technical his reasons may be, the alien has no redress.  This is 
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the first time in the history of immigration legislation that subordinate officials have been 
allowed finally to determine the question of admissibility.175   
Both Kohler and Parker pointed out that the widespread corruption among consular officials that 
emerged from previous investigations lent further weight to their claims about the dangers posed 
by the consuls' new discretionary powers and the impossibility to appeal their decis ons.  As 
Parker noted in his article, the records of the Department of Labor included numerous cases in 
which, had it not been for the right of appeal, most serious injustice would have been 
perpetrated, and the reports of the federal courts contained many cases in which, even with the 
appeal to superior administrative officers, unfairness and arbitrariness had still prevailed.176   
Kohler's article series on the pending bill did little to dispel people's misconceptions 
about Southern and Eastern Europeans and did little to build support for a liberal immigration 
policy.  The two responses to his articles that the New York Times published reflected the 
widespread support for restriction and the persistence of stereotypes against Southern and 
Eastern Europeans.  New York University Professor Pratt Fairchild wrote an article questioning 
Kohler's sources and data to defend the contribution of the new immigrants to the United States 
and their rates of assimilation and naturalization.177  In a letter to the editor, Walter W. Hoffman 
wrote that Kohler's articles were interesting but, alas, misleading becaus  the author forgot "that 
it is the undeniable right of any nation to select its immigration, to discriminate between those 
judged desirable and those judged undesirable."178  In his defense of America's right to exclude, 
restrict, and select, Hoffman pointed out that it was not the issue of the new immigrants' 
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inferiority that was at stake but rather that they were racially different:  "the difference in racial 
type renders them undesirable entirely irrespective of the question of their inferior ty."179 
Readers like Pratt and Hoffman responded more positively to articles in favor of 
immigration restriction, especially if the author was one of the sponsors of the bill.  Like Kohler, 
Senator Reed published on April 27, 1924, in the New York Times Sunday to discuss the genesis 
and the purpose of the pending immigration bill and to reiterate the reasons for his refusal to alter 
the bill.180  For years, wrote Reed, Americans had indulged in the illusion that the new 
immigrants could be fused by the melting pot into a distinctive American type, but the recent tide 
from Southern and Eastern Europe had proven that America, if it wanted to survive, could not 
afford to be the refuge of the oppressed of all nations anymore.  The new immigrants th ea ened 
the survival of the American racial type.  During the last forty years, Congress, h  admitted, had 
passed some laws to limit the consequences of this invasion and guarantee that only immigrants 
complying with certain physical and moral standards be permitted to enter the country, but these 
tests had managed to exclude only cases of blatant unfitness, such as those with contag ous 
diseases, the insane, and the notorious criminal.  It soon became clear, wrote Reed, that these 
immigrants could not assimilate nor understand the value of American institutions since they 
came from countries where popular government was a myth: 
With the wisdom of such a policy of exclusion there can be no real disagreement.  It 
implies no reflection upon the merit of the excluded peoples.  It is merely a recognition of 
their fundamental dissimilarity from ourselves.  Many other nations have adopted similar 
policies.  At the present time the Asiatics are excluded from Australia, New Zealand and 
most of the British colonies in South Africa. At the present time Japan itself exclud s 
Chinese, Koreans and Malays for the very proper reason that their people are essentially 
dissimilar from her own.  Some of the South American countries by Constitution or by 
legislative enactment have had similar exclusion policies in effect for many years.  The 
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constitution of the Argentine Republic, adopted in 1853, contains such an exclusion 
clause for all except European immigrants.181 
Perhaps more significant than his efforts to frame immigration restriction in an international 
context, Reed's reference to the exclusion of Asians across the world to justify his bill 
highlighted the correlation between the exclusion of Asian immigrants and the restriction of 
Southern and Eastern Europeans that existed for many restrictionists. 
While Cotillo testified in Congress and Kohler wrote articles for the New York Times, the 
Order Sons of Italy leadership wrote a letter directly to Representative Albert Johnson to protest 
against the pending immigration restriction bill.  In addition to the letter to Repres ntative 
Johnson, OSIA leaders also decided to send telegrams to congressmen representing distric s with 
a heavy Italian American presence to invite them to propose amendments to the Johnson 
immigration bill to avoid any discrimination against Italy and make sure that all countries be 
treated the same.182  Although it reiterated many of the criticisms and concerns that Italian nd 
Jewish anti-restrictionists had discussed before, the letter from OSIAalso testified to a slow shift 
of focus within the Southern and Eastern European communities.  For the first time, both groups 
began to reflect on the consequences that restriction might have on them and on their life in the 
United States if the Johnson bill became law. That this concern emerged first within the Italian 
American community perhaps reveals a growing awareness of the fragility of their presence in 
America.   
Focusing exclusively on the Italian case, the letter from OSIA criticized the new 
immigration bill because it singled out Italian immigrants for discrimination and dismissed the 
Italian government's efforts to comply with American immigration requirements.  The law, 
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explained the letter, virtually eliminated immigration from certain European cou tries rather than 
just regulating or further restricting the immigration flow to the United States.  The authors 
adduced four reasons that made the proposed bill unacceptable to the Italian American 
community:  it was unfair, unjust and un-American; it was detrimental to the economic progress 
and prosperity of the United States; it confirmed illogical fears of race deterioration; and it 
contradicted America's attitude during the recent world war.183  The bill established a hierarchy 
among European immigrants and formally classified Eastern and Southern Europeans as inferior 
to Northern European immigrants.  This connection, in turn, threatened their rights and cast them 
as in-betweens within American social hierarchy.  
 From an international perspective, the letter from OSIA observed, the bill under 
examination in Congress discriminated against eight European friendly nations and unjustly 
favored France, Germany, Norway, Great Britain, and Denmark.  Of the discriminated nations, 
OSIA felt that the bill marked Italy for special humiliation.  If Congress approved the Johnson 
bill, with its blatant discrimination against Italian immigrants and the increase of the quota of a 
former enemy nation, it would ungratefully dismiss Italy's sacrifices to the cause of the Allies 
during the war.184  As loyal and observant American citizens, the letter continued, OSIA 
members observed that they had always upheld the sovereign right of the United States to 
regulate, limit, and even abolish immigration when the best interest of the country required it.  In 
the past, the United States had always exercised that right in a fair and just manner, without ever 
favoring one portion of its citizens to the detriment of another.  "Our policy with the European 
nations," the letter pointed out, "has heretofore recorded no instance of favoring one nati  or 
                                                




people to the detriment of another."185  In their opinion, the bill's division of people from Europe 
into two classes did not just affect prospective immigrants but inevitably altered the relationship 
among different groups within the United States as well.  "The near exclusion of a once welcome 
class of immigrants," the letter read, "must necessarily precipitate and excite a racial feeling 
among the various elements of our citizens, which will ultimately form itself nto racial blocs."186  
The ratification of this bill would nourish a false pride of racial superiority f one class of 
American citizens over another and encourage Americans descended from the favored r ces to 
view other Americans as an inferior and undesirable part of the American population.  The new 
law, they argued, risked to weaken the feelings of patriotism of the millions of American citizens 
belonging to the restricted groups and to undermine the country's cohesiveness. 
 The Italian government expressed early on its appreciation for OSIA's campaign and 
initiatives against the Johnson bill.  On February 26, 1924, Gelasio Caetani, the Italian 
ambassador to the United States, wrote Di Silvestro to thank him for the Order's extraordinary 
activity to defend Italy's dignity, so profoundly offended by the Johnson bill.  The ambassador'  
letter reiterated one of the most recurrent themes within the Italian American community.  It 
stated that because they were of Italian origin, Italian immigrants made excellent American 
citizens, and as such they should keep alive their spiritual ties to Italy while being loyal to their 
newly adopted country: 
I can reassure you that your Motherland is conscious of everything and sees with 
profound satisfaction that her sons are proud of their origin, without which they would 
not be worthy of being citizens of the Great Republic of which they are an integral and 
loyal component.187 
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As Mark Choate demonstrates in his article, the Italian government carefully balanced its 
encouragement to its emigrants to naturalize with its efforts to build a community of Italians 
abroad who always had the interest of their motherland at heart.188  
If OSIA and Italian Americans had barely participated in the opposition agaist the 1921 
Immigration Act, their involvement in the debate about the 1924 Immigration Act reflected the 
transformation that both had undergone within a few years.  Two factors contributed to th  
change.  Despite doubts about the Italian American community's political effectiveness, the 
Italian government understood that it needed to collaborate with Italian Americans to build a 
strong opposition to immigration restriction proposals.  In 1922, right after Mussolini became 
prime minister, the Italian government designated OSIA as its official representative of Italians 
in the United States.  It was then that OSIA began to sponsor student exchanges and annul 
pilgrimages to Italy where OSIA leaders could meet with the Pope, the king of Italy, and 
government leaders.  At the same time, the Italian American community assumed new contours 
when, at the beginning of the twentieth century, more and more Italian immigrants decided to 
settle in the United States permanently.   This shift pushed them to build the financial, polit cal, 
and intellectual resources to become active members of American society and to pursue their 
political aims.  By 1924, the first evidence of their transformation began to appear. 
OSIA's emergence as a primary speaker against immigration restriction in the 1924 
debate was a clear sign of the new status of the Italian American community in the United States.  
OSIA Supreme Venerable John Di Silvestro, who served seven consecutive terms from 1917 to 
1935, reflected the ambition and the aspirations of the entire community.  For him, as for many 
of the prominenti in the community, the key was to reconcile their connections to Italy with 
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Americanization.  Di Silvestro arrived from Italy in 1903 at the age of twenty-four to join a 
brother and a sister, graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1918, and 
passed the Bar exam in the same year.  In 1906, he founded and was editor in chief for three
years of La Voce del Popolo, a daily newspaper "devoted principally to work of Americanization 
and of a remedial nature, among Italian emigrants."189  In 1911, Di Silvestro organized the first 
convention of Americans of Italian origin.  The convention was held in Philadelphia and brought 
together seven hundred delegates from all over the United States to discuss "the Americanization 
of Italian emigrants, and the fulfillment of their civic and patriotic duties."190  The nationwide 
push to restrict Southern and Eastern Europeans further convinced Di Silvestro to pursue his 
Americanization campaign after he became Supreme Venerable of OSIA, a position that gave 
him extraordinary influence over the large membership of the organization.191 
Ultimately, no Americanization efforts, no newspaper articles, no testimonies in 
Congress, no letter campaigns to congressmen, no intervention from sending governments, or 
public denunciations of the unfairness of the pending Johnson bill succeeded in convincing 
Congress to vote against it.  With only six dissenting votes in the Senate and a handful of 
opponents in the House, Congress passed the 1924 Immigration Act to go into effect on July 1, 
1927 (the starting date was later postponed to July 1, 1929).  The new law limited the number of 
immigrants who could be admitted from any country to 2 per cent of the number of people from 
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that country who were living in the United States according to the Census of 1890, nullified the 
Gentlemen's Agreement by establishing that "no alien ineligible for citizenship" could be 
admitted as an immigrant, and narrowed the Western Hemisphere exemption by removing ost 
black Caribbeans from the quota-free category.   The law also mandated that no alien c uld enter 
the United States without an unexpired immigration visa issued by an American consular officer 
abroad, created a system of preferences for family reunion, and prescribed fines for 
transportation companies that helped inadmissible aliens arrive to the United States.192  
 At this point, the last chance for Italian and Jewish groups to stop the bill from becoming 
law was to convince President Coolidge to veto it.  The American Jewish Committee 
immediately tried to arrange for a public hearing before President Coolidge.  While the President 
did not grant the hearing, he conceded to read a memorandum discussing the organization's 
objections to the law.  In one of the last collaborative efforts for a long time to come, prominent 
Jewish and Italian representatives prepared a memorandum to express their concerns and 
objections to the Johnson bill.  The signatories included Louis Marshall (American Jewish 
Committee), Stephen Wise (American Jewish Congress), Joshua Kantrowitz (Independent Order 
of B'nai B'rith), Salvatore Cotillo and John Freschi (OSIA).193  The memorandum summarized 
many of the arguments that the two groups had used throughout the anti-immigration restriction 
campaign and, for one last time, focused on both the domestic and international consequences of 
ratifying the Johnson-Reed bill. 
 The memorandum sustained that the ratification of the bill reflected more the atmosphere 
of racial hostility that permeated Congress and the country at large than a genuine concern to 
approve a law to regulate the immigration flow to the United States.  The racist bi s underlying 
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the new immigration policy distracted congressmen from considering the impact that such a law 
would have at the international level.  Reiterating once again an argument already pr sented 
before, the petitioners argued that the termination of the Gentlemen's Agreement r presented a 
serious threat to the relationship between the United States and Japan:  
This bill [...] inflicts a deep insult upon the national and racial consciousness of a highly 
civilized and progressive country.  Such a wound will never cease to rankle.  It will give 
rise to hostility which, even when not apparent on the surface, will prove most serious.  It 
cannot fail to be reflected upon our commerce, and in days of stress will be likely to 
occasion unspeakable concern.  And what will be the net result upon immigration by the 
elimination  and to play on the lingering fear of a rising Japanese imperial power in the 
country. 194    
If the signatories found the law's exclusion of Japanese immigrants dangerous, they could hardly 
accept that, for the first time in the history of American legislation, the United States would 
discriminate among European immigrants based on their country of origin.  "To add insult to 
injury," the memorandum read, "the effort has been made to justify this [...] legislation [against 
Southern and Eastern Europeans] by charging that those who are sought to be excluded are 
inferior types and not assimilable."195   
 For the petitioners, the division between desirable and undesirable Europeans reflected 
deeper and more problematic prejudices that would negatively affect the lives of Southern and 
Eastern Europeans in the United States if the president signed the bill into law.  They believed 
that the Johnson-Reed bill not only differentiated among countries of origin but also 
discriminated on the basis of "racial stocks and religious beliefs."  The disruptions that the 1917 
and 1921 Immigration Acts had created would pale in comparison to the impact of the new bill 
on the life of their communities.  They had no doubts about the impact the new law would have 
on their communities: 
                                                




What we regard as the danger lurking in this legislation, is that it stimulates racial, 
national and religious hatreds and jealousies, that it encourages one part of our population 
to arrogate itself a sense of superiority, and to classify another as one of inferi rity. At a 
time when the welfare of the human race as an entirety depends upon the creation of a 
brotherly spirit, the restoration of peace, harmony and unity, and the termination of past
animosities endangered by the insanity and the brutality of war, it should be our purpose, 
as a nation which has demonstrated that those of diverse racial, national and religious 
origins can live together and prosper as a united people, to serve as the world's 
conciliator.  Instead of that this bill, if it becomes a law, is destined to become the very 
Apple of Discord.196 
Legislators forgot, the petitioners pointed out, that the new immigrants, like the old ones, had 
been the target of discrimination when they first arrived to the United States.  Like Irish and 
German immigrants in the nineteenth century, Southern and Eastern European immigrants we e 
industrious, law-abiding, and loyal to the spirit of American institutions.  Likethe European 
immigrants who had preceded them, their contributions to the country's industrial, commerial, 
and social growth deserved praise not scorn.  If the goal was to regulate immigration into the 
country, they maintained, then the 1917 Immigration Act was already sufficiently s lective.   
 The last point of the memorandum concerned family reunion, an issue that would become 
central to the battle for immigration reform until 1965.  The Johnson-Reed bill, for the fi st time, 
strictly regulated family reunion.  The signatories criticized Congress for breaking its promise 
not to separate families and for approving a bill that assigned quotas to family members as well.  
The reduced quotas and the citizenship requirement necessary as a pre-condition to send for one's 
family made it virtually impossible for wives and children under twenty-one years old to reunite 
with their naturalized husbands and fathers in the United States.197  The authors of the 
memorandum considered these family provisions as further evidence that Congress clearly meant 
to discriminate against Southern and Eastern Europeans.  The law, in fact, also stipu ated that 





wives and unmarried children under eighteen years old of U.S. citizens who were natives of 
Western Hemisphere countries fell under non-quota status: 
Can it be seriously contended that Mexicans, Cubans, Haitians, Santo-Domingoans, or 
Central and South Americans, are more desirable or more assimilable than Italians, Poles, 
Russians, Austrians, Belgians, Hungarians, Romanians, Greeks, Dutch, Czecho-
Slovakians or Yugoslavians?198 
The irritation underlying this statement reflected the frustration that both Italian and Jewish 
organizations had with the exemption of Western Hemisphere immigrants from the quota system 
despite widespread belief of their inferiority and discrimination against them in the communities 
in which they settled.  Yet legislators' different treatment of immigrants from the Western 
Hemisphere also spoke to the role that the different constituencies had in the immigration 
restriction debate.  The exemption, in fact, was partly the result of the insistence of many 
Southern and Southwestern legislators that the states they represented needed ch ap Mexican 
agricultural labor. 
 None of the arguments the joint memorandum made persuaded President Coolidge to 
veto the bill.  On May 26, 1924, the president signed the bill into law.  Yet, on that very same 
day, the anti-restrictionist front achieved one small victory.  In Commissioner of Immigration v. 
Gottlieb, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Rabbi Gottlieb and allowed him to reunite with his 
wife and infant son.  The Supreme Court decision convinced Congress to add a provision in the 
final version of the bill that prescribed that, unlike other immigrants, ministers of religion and 
university professors could bring their families to the United States outside the quota 
limitations.199   The case involved the wife and an infant son of Solomon Gottlieb, a rabbi of a 
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synagogue in New York City who, on December 1, 1921, had arrived from Palestine to join the 
rabbi.  After a hearing before the board of special inquiry at Ellis Island, the immigration 
authorities ordered them deported on the ground that the quota for their country had already been 
filled for the year.  Louis Marshall personally advised the defense lawyer of the case, and the 
American Jewish Committee along with other Jewish organizations supporting the case widely 
publicized the case in the newspapers and called on Congress to consider adding a provision in 
the pending bill to avoid such hardships in the future.200  The next year, the American Jewish 
Year Book reported that the Gottlieb decision had helped thirteen thousand similar cases.201   
 This small victory was little consolation in the face of the terrible defeat American Jews 
and Italian Americans suffered after years of mobilization against immigration restriction.  Yet 
both groups continued to oppose the 1924 Immigration Act until the law was expected to go into 
effect on July 1, 1929.  Like the 1921 Immigration Act, the 1924 Act created more problems than 
it solved, especially when it came to immigrants who found themselves in between the two sets 
of legislation.   The years between the ratification of the law and the beginning of its 
implementation represented a crucial transitional period in which both groups began to 
experience the impact of restriction and to search for loopholes and grey areas to g t around the 
law's harshest provisions.   
 
“The Most Drastic Immigration Statute ever Passed:” The Battle Continues, 1924-1929202 
 The first consequence of the passage of the law was the barrage of attacks that both 
groups faced for their opposition to the Johnson-Reed bill.  Article after article continued to 
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question Italian Americans and American Jews' loyalty to the United States, highlighted their 
inability to assimilate, and criticized their efforts to use their vote as a weapon to influence 
legislators to oppose immigration restriction.  Indicative of the general mood after the fight over 
the Johnson bill was the exchange between Professor Roy L. Garis and Louis Marshall of the 
AJC.  In August 1924, Garis wrote an article titled "How the New Immigration Law Works" for 
Scribner's Magazine, in which he firmly criticized the anti-restrictionist front.  In his letter of 
response, Marshall focused on three major criticisms of the article.  Garis argued that the 
opponents of the pending immigration bill knew so little about the problem at stake that they had 
testified in Congress that, "the plan was one in favor of blondes and against brunettes."  Marshall 
retorted that Garis obviously failed to understand that anti-restrictionist groups were merely 
questioning the principle underlying the bill which posited Southern and Eastern Europeans as 
inferior when compared to the mythical Nordics.  Garis also wrote that, during the congressional 
debate, those who opposed the legislation had "suddenly [become] enthusiastic advocates of 
absolute restriction for five or ten years."  Marshall responded that the groups who testified in 
Congress were simply fighting for "true Americanism against the bogus and pinchback 
Americanism of the Ku Klux Klan."203  Finally, Garis noted that it certainly was no coincidence 
that the congressmen who had voted against the bill came from states with a high number of 
constituents of Eastern and Southern European descent.204  Marshall forcefully rejected the 
implication that anti-restrictionist groups had used their voting power to pressure their 
congressmen to vote against the bill and instead argued that they had voted against the bill 
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simply because they lived in states whose citizens were better acquainted with the value of the 
immigrant than those living in states where there were practically no immigrants.205    
 The type of accusations that Garis leveled in his article made both Jewish and Italian 
lobbying groups aware of the hostility towards their presence in American society.  As Garis's 
article attested, for many, the immigrants' use of the political process to assert their rights and 
voice their concerns only further justified the need for restriction.  Yet if critics stigmatized 
Southern and Eastern European immigrants for their political participation, their a tacks on these 
groups' loyalty were even more intense, if from different viewpoints.  A Princeto  professor's 
remarks at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law in 1925 on the 
opposition to the admission of more Eastern European Jews into the United States reflected the 
prevalent and stereotypical view of their loyalty: 
I venture to suggest that a great deal of the animosity, the hostility, the prejudice, the 
unfairness toward the Jew has been due to the unfortunate fact that the Jew has preserved 
the idea that he wants to keep his racial integrity; that he desires and preserves his ace 
intact; that he is unwilling to be assimilated fully in the community in which he lives.  
That I think is the real basis for most of the race prejudice that exists on this subject, and 
for that reason I feel that there is more need than ever for affirming the first obligation of 
a citizen and that the first obligation, it seems to me, is that of undivided allegianc .206 
The Jewish response to this attack on their loyalty came during a public ceremony for the laying 
of the corner stone of a Jewish Community Center in Washington, D.C., organized with the 
express intention to convince skeptical Americans of Jewish loyalty to the Unitd States.  Like 
many times before, it was Louis Marshall who addressed the Princeton professo 's remarks. 
Among the strongest advocates for Americanization and most vocal critics of Zionism, 
Marshall nonetheless refused to exhort his fellow Jews to relinquish their connectis with world 
Jewry.  Those who attended the ceremony hoped that the Jewish Community Center could 
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represent a reminder to the rest of the nation that the American Jews did not harbor any dual 
allegiance but simply a strong connection with other Jews around the world.  Using a langu ge 
strikingly similar to Italian Americans' justifications for their spiritual ties to Italy, Marshall 
explained that American Jews' ties had nothing to do with issues of allegiance: 
That we love Palestine, the home of our fathers, and are ready to help other sons of our 
ancient faith to seek there the opportunities for betterment which under our present 
immigration laws they are denied here, and to create there a cultural centre, is the same 
response to the feeling of brotherhood that the Sons and Daughters of the Revolution feel 
toward those who live in Anglo-Saxon lands, which our Irish fellow-citizens have 
evinced for those who belong to the same religious community. That is not double 
allegiance in the political sense of the term.  It is merely evidence of thefact that, 
however men at times may differ, the call of humanity in the end, resounds above the 
clash of arms and the artificial hatreds and jealousies which are, too often alas, stimulated 
by cowardly propagandists and by narrow-minded bigots.207   
 
Marshall's answer to the professor's accusations also reflected the two sides to American Jews' 
relationship with other Jews around the world that would remain at the heart of their  
mobilization against restriction for decades to come.  On the one hand, Marshall attested to the 
American Jews' belief that their commitment to retain their ties to the World Jewry constituted 
an essential aspect of their identity.  On the other hand, his words revealed American J ws' 
awareness that, despite the passage of a restrictive immigration system, they were still better off 
than many of the Jews living in other countries and that, as such, it was their responsibility to 
assist them in their relocation.  As they continued to oppose the quota system at home, many 
American Jews in the United States also began to look for other viable countries to which their 
countrymen could migrate, often intervening financially, diplomatically, and political y to help 
them move to other countries.  
Accusations of dual loyalty plagued the Italian American community as well. Like 
Jewish critics, Italian spokespersons opposed the expectations of full loyalty t  the United States 




underlying the new policy.  On April 4, 1925, author Tino published an article for the anarchist 
newspaper L'Adunata dei Refrattari in which he connected the deportation delirium that 
followed the Red Scare, the new immigration bill, and the American insistence to punish
immigrants for their reluctance to become 100 percent Americans.  For him, the new legislation 
represented a manifestation of the nation's phobia of immigrants and an attempt to get rid of 
whoever was not willing to conform: 
[They want] a more elastic law that seconds the careful choices of the immigration bill, 
kicking out of here those who do not yield to the distillation of one hundred per cent 
Americanism.  And this is the Alien bill in its new form and in its more drastic sanctions, 
even more effective because the experiment perpetrated in Massachusetts on Nicola 
Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti indicates new ways to get rid of the reprobates, the 
insufferables, and the dreadful irregulars, because they cannot be disciplined.208   
The connection between the 1920 mass deportations to the Sacco and Vanzetti trial, through the 
ratification of the new immigration law, reflected a clear awareness of the dangerous 
consequences of the association between foreigner and subversive.   
Despite the harsh criticisms and the attacks that followed the ratification of the law, 
neither group was willing to concede, however.  Both of them began to rethink their strat gies of 
mobilization against restriction and to get ready for the impact the law would have on their 
communities once it went into effect.  Immediately after Congress approved the Johnson bill, the 
American Union of Hebrew Congregations came up with an agenda that strove both to provide
for aspiring immigrants and to limit the discrimination and attacks that the ratification of the 
quota system would unleash as it justified people's beliefs that the restricted g oups were indeed 
members of an inferior stock.  To help aspiring Jewish emigrants to the United Stats, the Union 
suggested to monitor the administration of the law to identify its main problems; to provide 
assistance on questions of immigration, passports,  and miscarriage of justice; and to ensure that 
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the enactment of the new system would operate with equality upon all religious faiths.  The 
suggestions that the Union proposed to attenuate the impact of restriction on American Jews shed 
light on what they believed the consequences on their life in the United States would be nce the 
immigration authorities began to enforce the new system.  The Union proposed to provide means 
for the relief of Jews from political oppression; to take action seeking to eliminate unjust 
discrimination against their civic and political rights; to promote the separation of Church and 
State; to educate the public about the Jewish experience in cases of misunderstanding of the 
Jewish culture; and to provide assistance with civil and military authorities.209  The American 
Union of Hebrew Congregations' proposals not only reflected American Jews' awareness of the 
consequences of restriction but also their emerging conception of immigration as a social justice 
and civil rights issue.  
Yet both Italian Americans and American Jews had little time to pause before they had to 
turn to their attention to the problems the 1924 Immigration Act posed.  As with the 1921 
Immigration Act, Congress failed to address the fate of immigrants already traveling to the 
United States when it ratified the 1924 Immigration Act: 
In discussing the new immigration law, the fact should not be overlooked that its 
enactment has in some quarters led to untold hardships and special reference is made to 
those refugees stranded at various ports in Europe, Cuba, Mexico and Canada, who had 
obtained passports in the land of their domicile which passports had been viseed [sic.] by
the United States Consular representatives, and while enroute [sic.] to America, the 
present law became effective, thereby preventing the refugees referred to f om continuing 
their journey to the United States.210  
As with the 1921 Immigration Act, anti-restrictionists groups lobbied for provisions to relieve 
people caught in between legislations and to accelerate family reunion.  One of the most active 
congressmen to fight for both issues was Polish-born Representative Nathan D. Perlman from 
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New York City's fourteenth congressional district.  Between 1924 and 1929, Perlman regulrly 
introduced proposals to relieve immigrants stranded abroad and favor family reunification to no 
avail.  On December 1, 1924, Perlman introduced a joint resolution to allow into the country all 
admissible immigrants with passports with visas released prior to July 1, 1924 as non-quota 
immigrants.   Later that year, he introduced in the House of Representatives his fir t bill to 
amend the Immigration Act of 1924 to facilitate family reunion.  In 1926, Perlman joined a 
group of Jewish  representatives and senators to sponsor an amendment for the admissions of 
relatives, soldiers, and immigrants stranded in foreign ports because of the new immigration law.  
Finally, in 1928, Perlman endorsed Senator Wadsworth's proposal to help immigrants lawfully 
admitted into the country reunite with their wives and minor children still abroad.  Introduced as 
an amendment to another bill already adopted by the House and likely to pass the Senate, the 
measure ultimately succumbed to the filibuster of the closing days of the session.211  
 The objections to the passage of Perlman's proposals reflected the continued hostility 
towards Southern and Eastern Europeans.  Many critics of these bills argued that immigrants 
were responsible for familiarizing themselves with the new quota system and that they should 
have known that they would find it difficult to have their relatives join them.  Commissioner 
General of Immigration Harry Hull reiterated the same view, when he maintained that much of 
the fault for the ongoing separation of the families fell upon the immigrants themselves.  
According to Hull, immigrants were aware of the law, and yet they left "their wives and children 
to come here on the gamble that they [would] be able to slip in in the next monthly quota."212  As 
the executive committee of the AJC argued, although that reasoning might be acceptably applied 
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to immigrants admitted after the passage of the 1924 Immigration Act, it wasunreasonable to use 
the same logic with immigrants who had arrived in the country under the previous quota system, 
a policy expressly introduced as a temporary measure rather than the preludeto the 1924 national 
origins quota system.213    
 In the meantime, the Emergency Committee for Jewish Refugees decided not to wait for 
congressional action and mobilized to help the stranded emigrants.  The Emergency Committee 
for Jewish Refugees had been recently organized and, overcoming ideological and religious 
differences, included representatives of a number of national Jewish organizations from around 
the country.  The AJC and its president Louis Marshall once again played a key role in the 
activities of the newly formed committee.  Marshall was in fact the chairman of the Emergency 
Committee for Jewish Refugees and the committee member with the stronges political 
connections.  After studying the problem, the committee came up with three possible solutions to 
help the stranded migrants:  the repatriation of refugees able to return to their countries of origin 
without incurring persecution, the distribution of those who wished to proceed to other 
destinations where they could be lawfully admitted, and the assistance of those who were 
permitted to remain in the countries of temporary sojourn.  The Jewish community in Canada 
secured permission for the admission of 5,000 refugees after the Emergency Committee 
guaranteed that it would financially contribute to the sustenance of these refugees until they 
could become self-sufficient.  The Emergency Committee also promised social, religious, and 
financial assistance to emigrants in Cuba and in Mexico.214 
 The most acute problem that the Emergency Committee faced, however, concerned th  
thousands of Jewish refugees stranded at ports of embarkation in Europe who were unabl to 
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return to their country of origin or to proceed forward.  During the summer of 1927, 
representatives of the Emergency Committee, the Jewish Colonization Association, the Jewish 
World Relief Conference, and the Emigdirekt, representing the Hebrew Sheltering and 
Immigrant Aid Society, met in Paris and reached an agreement by which the three organizations 
would jointly assist these refugees to move to countries in which they might be able to settle 
permanently in compliance with the immigration laws of the receiving countries.  The agreement 
also stipulated that the organizations needed to collect 425,000 dollars to carry on theirrelief 
work, with the Emergency Committee's share of the total amount being 80 percent.215  By the 
summer of 1928, the Emergency Committee had taken care of all the emigrants to the United 
States stranded in European ports.  The Committee assisted these migrants either o stay in the 
country of their temporary sojourn, to move to Canada, to settle in Palestine, or to retu n to their 
country of origin.216  
As after the passage of the 1921 Immigration Act, the group that faced more problems 
than others was the immigrants who arrived to the United States in between legislations.  Many 
immigrants who had obtained visas, bought tickets, or arranged for their families to join them 
were left waiting in the ports of arrival to understand which of the new or old provisions applied 
to their situation.  As with the 1921 Act, many immigrants resorted to the legal system to solve 
many of the inconsistencies of the new act.  Believing that this would guarantee mor  chances of 
success, the American Jewish community focused its attention on cases that revolved around two 
major issues:  the admission of ministers of religion's families and the admission of American 
residents' under-age children with mental defects.  The most important case for ministers of 
religion remained Commissioner of Immigration v. Gottlieb, while Fink v. Tod and Duner v. 
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Curran inconsistently dealt with children under age with mental defects trying to join their 
fathers in the United States, continuing the debate first addressed in Goldman v. Tod.217 
Marshall and the American Jewish Committee had considered the Supreme Court ruling 
in Commissioner of Immigration v. Gottlieb and its impact on the revision of the 1924 
Immigration Act a victory, but their elation was short lived.  In response to the Supr me Court 
decision, the Department of Labor Solicitor, in fact, decided that the ministers and professors 
provision applied only to ministers and professors admitted after July 1, 1924, thus leavingthose 
who had entered the country before then with no options.  Exemplary of what happened to 
immigrants caught in between the two Immigration Acts was Rabbi Schevelovitz's case.  
Advised by Marshall to wait for the Supreme Court to decide on the Gottlieb case, Shevelovitz 
began the procedure to send for his family after the Court approved Gottlieb's request and after 
Congress approved the provision concerning ministers' families.  As required by the 1924 
Immigration Act, the steamship company from which Schevelovitz purchased the tickets for his 
family laid the matter before the Department of Labor and had to inform the rabbi tht the non-
quota status of wives and children of ministers applied only to ministers admitte  to the United 
States after July 1, 1924.  Because Rabbi Schevelovitz had arrived in the United States in 1923 to 
administer a Jewish congregation at Long Branch, New Jersey, the steamship company informed 
him that his options were either to return to Riga, Poland, and then travel back to the United 
States with his family, or to leave the country, return to the United States by himself first, and 
then send for his family as immigrants outside the quota.218   
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Marshall personally wrote a letter to Secretary of Labor James J. Davis to protest the 
Solicitor's decision.  The decision, Marshall argued, completely ran counter Congress's recent 
provision on ministers and professors in the 1924 Immigration Act: 
Can it be said for a moment that the Congress which sought to deal humanely with 
ministers of religion and professors of colleges, academies, seminaries or universities, at 
the same time intended to subject them to the enormous expenditure of money, waste of 
time and mental and physical suffering incident to an unnecessary journey across the 
ocean and back as a condition to the admission of a family intended to be exempted from 
the quota provision of the Act?219  
Ultimately, after considerable opposition on the part of the various officials in theDepartment of 
Labor and protracted correspondence, Rabbi Schevelovitz's family was admitted.  The Gottlieb 
and Schevelovitz cases ultimately helped many other families who faced the same situation and 
who were stranded in Ellis Island waiting for the authorities to decide on their cas s, but the 
positive resolution of these cases rested often on long and unpredictable legal battles.220 
If the Gottlieb and Schevelovitz cases ended well after over two years of legal battles, 
Duner v. Curran and Fink v. Tod demonstrated the arbitrariness and unreliability of the legal 
system.  Rabbi Duner arrived in the United States in 1923 and sent for his family to join him 
from Poland in 1924.  When the family arrived, immigration authorities ordered the youngest of 
his five children, the four-year old Channa, deported because the authorities deemed her 
mentally defective.  Rabbi Duner then arranged for an adult to accompany the child back to
Europe.  The rest of the family was admitted as non-quota immigrants under the 1924 
Immigration Act, but a Board of Special Inquiry subsequently excluded all of Rabbi Duner's 
family as likely to become public charges after it found that the other son, Michel, had a heart 
problem that prevented him from earning a living.  The Board excluded the wife as th
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accompanying adult responsible for taking him back to Europe and the remaining children 
because they would inevitably become public charges without two parents taking cre of them.  
Marshall assisted the lawyer in charge of the case, Morris Jablow, and helped him draft an appeal 
to the Secretary of Labor to reopen the case.  To defend Duner's case and the rightfor h s family 
to be admitted, Jablow and Marshall referred to previous cases that had deliberated on th  
legitimacy of some of the provisions of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, pointing to the fact that 
exceptions for ministers and professors applied to Chinese emigrants but not to European 
emigrants.221  
After the Secretary of Labor ordered the case reopened, Marshall began a month-long 
correspondence with Representative Perlman to intervene on behalf of Rabbi Duner. Marshall 
asked Perlman either to intercede with Secretary Davis to persuade him to ad it the boy in the 
exercise of his discretion or, in case this were to no avail, to institute personally a second habeas 
corpus proceeding, hoping that this might be regarded as a tacit invitation to the Circuit of 
Appeals to resort to that remedy.  This practice of inviting congressmen to present p rsonal bills 
to delay deportation until courts settled the cases favorably would soon become one of the most
used loopholes and, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, would convince Congress to consider 
reform because of the backlog that the inordinate amount of personal bills created.  Perlman 
personally appeared in front of the Board of Review of the Labor Department to plea fr 
Michel's admission.  Despite Marshall's cooperation with Rabbi Duner's lawyer and the personal 
intervention of Representative Perlman in the case, the Court of Appeals ultimately ruled to 
                                                




admit the rabbi's wife and all the children expect for Michel, who was ordered deported back to 
Europe.222  
The Fink v. Tod ruling revealed yet another layer of the complications immigrants faced
when trying to reunite with their families immediately after July 1, 1924.  When Pauline Fink 
arrived in the United States with her mother to join her father already living in the United States, 
a board of physicians excluded her on the alleged ground that she was feeble-minded.  Marshall
once again assisted the lawyer in charge of the case, Max Kohler, and asked Representativ  
Perlman to intervene on behalf of Pauline Fink as well.  After requesting a series of medical 
examinations to evaluate Pauline's mental capacities, all of which agreed with the first board's 
decision, a Board summoned by the Surgeon General of the United States concluded that th  girl 
was not feebleminded but rather deaf-mute, a fact that the teachers at the schools that Pauline 
was attending since her arrival in the United States had immediately discovered.  Nevertheless, 
the original board of physicians overruled the decision of the higher body and insisted upon her 
deportation.  After both the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected Fink's petition to be 
admitted, Kohler and Marshall took the case to the Supreme Court of the United States.  During 
the debate before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General arose in court and, recognizing the 
grave injustice perpetrated at Pauline Fink's expense, admitted the errors in the proceedings of 
the lower courts and moved that a writ of habeas corpus be allowed.  The Supreme Court then 
went on to rule that Pauline be regularly admitted.  The American Jewish Committee could claim 
another victory, but its members realized that legal battles were expensive ad unpredictable and 
offered no guarantee of positive resolution.  Their plan, which would soon become a pivotal 




strategy in their mobilization against restriction, was that undermining the law one provision at a 
time would ultimately lead to the entire system's demise.223   
The AJC quickly discovered that the rigid interpretation of the new law extended to 
naturalization practices as well.  Beginning in 1925, the Committee began to receive complaints 
that the courts were denying naturalization to immigrants legally eligible to become citizens 
whose wives and minor children were not yet in America.  In a large majority of the cases, the 
requirements of the new immigration law had prevented these immigrants from reuniting sooner 
with their families.  Even when these naturalization applicants showed that their in ention was to 
send for their families as soon as they became citizens so that their wives and children could fall 
outside the quotas, the courts nevertheless continued to deny them naturalization.  The reason 
behind this peculiar persistence on the part of the courts in denying naturalization to this specific 
type of immigrants long remained unknown.224 
The mystery, however, was cleared up in a court proceeding in May of 1925.  During the 
naturalization case of an immigrant named Abdullah, representatives of the Departm nt of Labor 
produced a memorandum dated January 31, 1925, from their department urging its agents to 
oppose the granting of citizenship to any applicant whose wives and minor children were still in 
Europe.  The explanation for this recommendation revealed the extent to which the bias against 
new immigrants pervaded the Department of Labor and the lengths to which its repre entatives 
would go to obstruct immigration.  According to the 1926 American Jewish Committee report, 
the authorities believed that there was a possibility 
That among the members of the new citizen's family, who would have the right to come 
to America, there might be one or more who would otherwise be inadmissible for some 
cause; that to debar such a person from entering would lead to the separation of families; 
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that this separation would, in turn, arouse public indignation under pressure of which the 
immigration authorities would feel constrained to admit the person in question, thus 
evading the law.  Therefore, it was urged that rather than force the immigration officials 
to violate the law it was necessary to prevent this contingency from arising by the simple 
expedient of opposing the naturalization of all aliens whose families are still abroad.225 
Familiar with some of the tactics that anti-restrictionists would use to fight against immigration 
restriction provisions, the immigration authorities were trying to counteract these strategies by 
preventing any controversy from arising in the first place.  These circulars also instructed the 
officials to report every case in which a judge overruled the objection to the admission of these 
petitioners for naturalization and to keep track of the judges who complied with the views of the 
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.226  Immigration authorities' obstruction of 
immigration would only increase after 1929 after the beginning of the Depression and the 
emergence of the Jewish refugee problems. 
 Outraged by these memoranda, the executive committee of the American Jewish 
Committee took immediate action and went straight to the top.  On June 8, 1925, Marshall wrote 
a letter of complaint directly to President Coolidge to inform him of the "extra-statutory 
requirements" that the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization had added to the provisions 
defining the conditions upon which immigrant applicants could naturalize contained in the last 
immigration law.  Denouncing the Assistant Secretary of Labor's memoranda as unmitigated 
lawlessness and an act of tyranny, Marshall called the president's attention o the fact that the 
efforts of the Department of Labor to deprive the wife and children of a resident entitled to 
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citizenship of the right to come to the United States by stripping the husband and father of his 
right to naturalize clearly ran counter to Coolidge's most recent appeals to humane policies.  The 
president referred the letter to the Department of Labor and let Acting Secretary W. W. Husband 
handle the matter.227  
The correspondence between Husband, Robe Carl White, the new Acting Secretary, and 
Marshall lasted until July 3, 1925, when Marshall wrote a letter to White to which the Ac ing 
Secretary never responded.  In this exchange, the Department of Labor denied any ntention to 
abuse its power to encourage the courts to disregard the law and refuse naturalization to 
immigrants whose families still lived in Europe or to require naturalization officers to provide 
the names of the judges who complied with the department's directions and of those who instead 
criticized them.228  In a letter to Marshall on June 23, 1925, Husband explained that the courts' 
penchant to decline American citizenship to applicants whose families lived abroad was in fact 
an old practice and that the department's instructions with regards to keeping track ofjudges' 
decisions was only for statistical purposes.  To avoid any misunderstanding or misinterpretation 
of the law, Husband continued, the department issued another memorandum to instruct 
naturalization field officers to alert the courts whenever such a case arose so that judges could 
consider whether an alien whose family resided abroad could be said to be a permanent esident 
of the United States before making their decisions.229 
 Once Robe Carl White became Acting Secretary, the correspondence with the 
Department of Labor became increasingly tense, especially after Marshall's letter to Husband on 
June 26, 1925.  Annoyed by the department's persistence in denying the true intentions behind 
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the memoranda circulated among naturalization officials, Marshall explicitly stated the bias 
underlying the department's guidelines: 
It seems to me exceedingly strange that on the one hand immigrants who have resided 
here for the required period and have not applied for citizenship, are frequently 
denounced in certain quarters as having no interest in the welfare of the country and as 
being undesirable, and that on the other hand immigrants who likewise have been here 
for the required period and signify their desire to cast their lot with the country by 
seeking to become citizens, are sought to be deprived of the right by a chop-logic which 
declares that though they are here in body they are nevertheless absent because th ir 
families are in a foreign land.230 
After this letter, White still refused to address Marshall's criticisms directly and to send him the 
full text of the memoranda as Marshall had repeatedly requested.  In his last letter to Marshall on 
June 30, 1925, White vaguely reassured him that the department issued those instructions 
regarding the naturalization of immigrants whose families were abroad only to guarantee a fair 
presentation of the cases in court and that the department would investigate any buse that the 
field service officers might have committed under a misrepresentation of the department's 
directions.231   Despite White's reassurances, naturalization problems continued into the 1930s. 
  The Department of Labor's efforts to derail naturalization applications fr m immigrants 
with families still living in Europe were not the only obstacle to Jewish immigrants' 
naturalization.  Another important question pertaining to naturalization emerged in the 1925 case 
of United States v. Cartozian, which addressed the status of Armenian immigrants and their right 
to naturalize.  The court had to establish whether Armenians were white and thus entitled to 
become American citizens.  In the case In re Halladjian the court had ruled that Armenians were 
eligible to naturalize.  Yet in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ozawa v. United 
States, denying citizenship to Japanese, and of United States v. Thind, enying citizenship to East 
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Indians, the Department of Labor sought to reopen the subject of naturalization in connection 
with Armenians, suggesting that if the latter were declared ineligible for citizenship then the 
question of naturalization should be investigated in connection with Asian Jews as well.232  Once 
again the AJC intervened in the person of Marshall who provided counsel for Cartozian with 
data proving that it was "the overwhelming opinion of anthropologists and other authorities that 
Armenians in Asia Minor are white persons within the common usage of the term."233  Judge 
Wolverton, the presiding judge in the Cartozian case, ruled that Armenians were free white 
persons within the meaning of the United States Revised Statutes, section 2169 and, as such, 
eligible for naturalization.  After Judge Wolvetorn's decision, both the Department of Justice and 
the Department of Labor decided to acquiesce to the conclusion reached in the Cartozian case.234   
As the American Jewish community took its objections to court and tested its 
effectiveness, the Italian American community underwent a significant change that weakened 
and in part derailed some of its efforts to speak out against restriction.  In 1925, following a 
disagreement over the organization's support for the Italian Fascist government, Salvatore 
Cotillo, with the support of social worker Edward Corsi, city Judge Francis X. Mancuso, and 
Fiorello La Guardia, withdrew their New York chapter from OSIA and renamed it the Sons of 
Italy Grand Lodge.  The existence of two Sons of Italy organizations in New York dispersed 
energy and attention from the mobilization against restriction and deeply divide  the Italian 
community along political lines.  More importantly, the bitter controversy that followed and the 
intensity of the feelings over the split, even as the division over Fascism began to w ne, damaged 
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Cotillo's credibility as a political representative of the group.235  Until then, Cotillo had been the 
most outspoken critic of immigration restriction in public, in Congress, and in the newspaper .  
Cotillo had also been the most prominent Italian American to believe in the collaboration with 
other potentially restricted groups and had often collaborated with leading Jewish organizations 
to voice the two communities' frustration and criticisms of the country's move towards 
immigration restriction.  As Cotillo's prominence languished, Supreme Venrable Di Silvestro 
and OSIA's reputation continued to gain strength and began to represent the official v ice of 
Italian Americans. 
In addition to the internal split within the Italian community, disagreements between 
Fascists and anti-Fascists in America generated a new wave of criticisms against Italian 
immigrants.  For some critics, the arguments between the two factions only upheld the 
stereotypes about violent and irritable Italians, and for many, the disruption that their 
disagreements caused further confirmed the need for immigration restriction.  In 1925, Supreme 
Venerable John Di Silvestro received an anonymous note along with an article discussing the 
quarrels between Fascists and Anti-Fascists: 
The American people are tired of the trouble that the Italians are making in [New York 
City]; every time any one comes, that they don't like, the Italians disgrace themselves, 
and also the American people; we pay the bills for the police to keep in order a lot of 
cattle that are not fit to live in a decent country.  All out crime is committed by Italians; 
there were 12 Black Hand murders in one week here in this city a short time ago.  It
would be appreciated if the Italians would All go back.236 
The article included along with the note complained that recently arrived European immigrants 
refused to naturalize took advantage of their host country and continued to fight out the quarrels 
of their homeland in the United States.  This time, the article complained, it was the Italians 
                                                
235 Thomas M. Henderson, "Immigrant Politician: Salvatore Cotillo, Progressive Ethnic," International Migration 
Review 13, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 100. 




fighting over Fascism.  "If any Italian in the United States thinks that things are going badly in 
Italy," concluded the article, "his duty is to go back there and rearrange them. H  cannot help his 
country by mobbing Fascists on steamship decks and in hotels here."237   
 The advent of Fascism gave many Italian Americans the illusion of a home country f 
which to be proud and whose achievements could positively reflect on their status within 
American society.  Di Silvestro's collaboration with the Fascist government reflected a wider 
consensus within the Italian American community, especially among a substantial number of the 
3,000 OSIA members spread across the United States and Canada: 
While the delegates of the Order Sons of Italy in America assembled in Supreme 
Convention at Montreal, Canada are about to begin their labors, they send you, 
magnificent animator of the virtue of the race within and without the confines of Italy, 
their devoted greetings.  Proud of the common origin, we re-assert our loyalty t America 
where we have built our new home and where we work intensely for her greatness, proud 
of the fact that we are in accord with the policy of your Excellency with reference to our 
spiritual ties to our motherland.  We here turn our thoughts with intense love to our native 
land which gives us the divine privilege of proclaiming ourselves, progeny of Rome.238 
In addition to highlighting the influence that the Fascist government had on Italia Americans, 
this excerpt from a letter that Di Silvestro wrote to Mussolini also showcased Italian American 
efforts to reconcile the pressure to Americanize while conforming with Italy's pressure to 
maintain their ties with their homeland alive.  As with Jewish immigrants fighting to maintain 
their old world culture in the new world while remaining connected to World Jewry, this tension 
between Americanization and the permanence of the ties with Italy further complicated Italians' 
place in American society and intensified mainstream America's animosity towards them.  
When it came to opposing the 1924 Immigration Act, Italian Americans increasingly 
opted to focus on mobilizing exclusively for Italian immigrants rather than all immigrants.  After 
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1924, this approach increasingly affected their decisions about with whom to collaborate and 
which causes to further.  In 1927, as Congress debated the postponement of the 1924 
Immigration Act, Di Silvestro received a letter from Catholic foreign policy consultant 
Constantine E. McGuire proposing to collaborate to campaign against the 1924 Immigration 
Act.239  McGuire asked Di Silvestro to distribute among all OSIA members copies of a recent 
speech given by Senator Shipstead of Minnesota challenging the national origins quota system 
and proposing its repeal.  McGuire believed that if anti-restrictionists united to voice their 
opposition to the act as Congress was debating its enforcement, they might have a c nce "to get 
rid once and for all of this proposal of the exclusionist fanatics, which is the first step in bringing 
about the adoption of a rational policy in the United States."240  The letter concluded by praising 
the value of collaboration with an important, well connected, and numerically significant 
organization like OSIA in such an enterprise.  More importantly, McGuire provided a valu ble 
explanation for his personal involvement in the campaign against the national origins system: 
The extent of my earnestness in this fight will be gauged perhaps if I tell you 
confidentially that I was forced last month to decline the conferment of the knighthood of 
the Crown of Italy—graciously offered in connection with the appearance of my recent 
volume, "Italy's International Economic Position,"—because of the embarrassing position 
in which it might seem to put my activity against the Immigration Act of 1924 ever since 
its enactment.241  
McGuire's confidential confession to Di Silvestro, a great supporter of Mussolini, certainly 
contributed to convince him to accept McGuire's offer of collaboration without hesitation.  
Although Shipstead's plea was to no avail, McGuire's request for help from Di Silvestro and 
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OSIA pointed to an increasing Italian American influence on American politicians and 
politics.242 
Although Italian Americans saw these collaborations as important for their rol  in 
American society, their most immediate concern was to alleviate the impact of the new law on 
Italians in the United States and abroad.  They found the1924 Immigration Act's harsh provisions 
about expulsion particularly troublesome.  Under the new law, in fact, immigrants could be 
deported no matter how long they had lived in the United States.  Both Italian Americans and 
American Jews felt that this provision only further criminalized immigrants d established a 
hierarchy between naturalized citizens and native born Americans:  
under our laws, one who commits any crime but murder, cannot be indicted for the same 
after a lapse of three years. Yet should it be discovered that an immigrant—no matter 
how long he has been in this country—had when a child before his arrival here 
committed a minor offense for which he may or may not have been punished abroad, he 
would, if such law passed, be subject to punishment.243  
Italian Americans particularly worried about the consequences that the abolition of any statute of 
limitation had on the many Italians who had entered the country illegally.  After 1924, the main 
Italian American newspapers were inundated with letters from Italian immigrants inquiring about 
the legitimacy of their status and about how to proceed if the law deemed them illegal.   
The preoccupation with the impact of the 1924 Immigration Act brought to light the issue 
of undocumented immigration in the Italian community in the United States.  Similarly to what 
had happened earlier in the decade, the debate and the passage of new restrictive immigration 
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legislation led to a spike in illegal immigration from Italy.  Well into the late 1930's, most Italian 
language newspapers in the United States abounded with stories about Italians arriving in the 
United States illegally.  Right after the ratification of the Immigration Act of 1924, L’Adunata 
dei Refrattari reported that Filippo and Battista Giordano, owners of the Fascist Il Bollettino 
della Sera, had just been arrested because they had tried to help six Italian immigrants to e ter 
the country illegally.  While he rejoiced that the newspaper owners had been arrested, the author 
also denounced the iniquity of the new law because it forced hardworking people to resort to 
illegal means to enter the United States "to turn their misery into a dream of the past."  The two 
brothers had actively opposed and criticized immigration restriction through the columns of their 
newspaper, but their arrest revealed another aspect of their involvement in immigration matters.  
The article concluded that, among other charges, the two brothers had been arrested because they 
had tried to profit from desperate Italians who wanted to migrate to the United States.  The six 
immigrants that they had tried to help, in fact, had paid them three thousand dollars to be a sisted 
in the passage.244  
The Giordano bothers were not the only ones who tried to profit from the enactment of 
restrictive immigration policy in the United States.  On the other side of the Atlantic, Italian 
emigration authorities regularly saw similar cases as they tried to con rol the emigration flow to 
comply with American immigration policies.  As early as 1926, the Commissariato Generale 
dell'Emigrazione in Italy began to receive letters and documentation denouncing the traffic of 
illegal emigrants to North America from emigration officers from across Italy and civilians alike.  
Ciccio Sciulli wrote the Commissariato to denounce Giacinto Pollice as a promoter of illegal 
emigration to the United States in the small rural towns surrounding L'Aquila, in the Abruzzo 
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region.  Taking advantage of the desperation and credulity of peasants desiring to migra e to 
North America, Pollice promised to arrange for them a permit to migrate to th  United States 
through a cousin who was a close friend of the American consul.  "Clients" had to pay a deposit 
of five to ten thousand liras and twenty-two thousand liras total for the permit.245  Another letter 
that the Commissariato received from a delegate from the province of Vicenza informed it about 
rumors that many prospective migrants took advantage of the pilgrimages to Lourdes rganized 
by the Comitato Nazionale Pro Palestina e Lourdes in Milan to migrate to North America 
illegally.  The author also added that it appeared that his predecessor Francesco Curti, previously 
convicted for illegal emigration activities, was involved in the swindle.246  The Commissariato 
immediately began investigating both matters but could never find any evidence supporting 
either of the claims.  Both investigations were ultimately inconclusive, and in the case of Pollice 
and Sciulli, the emigration inspector was unable to locate the culprit and ultimate y discovered 
that both the accused and writer's names were false.247  
From two lists that the Commissariato compiled on the ongoing investigations on illegal 
migration, it emerges that a flourishing illegal migration traffic involving people on both sides of 
the Atlantic prospered at least until Mussolini closed the Commissariato at the end of 1927.  
After 1927, it becomes particularly difficult to trace the evolution of illegal emigration out of 
Italy.  However, in 1926 and 1927 alone, the Commissariato investigated, among others, a traffic 
of illegal emigrants to the United States from Tunis, Tunisia, through Panama; a widespread 
commerce in false petitions for family reunifications; the discovery by a private investigator in 
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Baltimore of an organization that forged passports and reentry permits for the United Sta es; the 
existence in Palermo and Naples of individuals who forged passports by substituting pictures; the 
illicit use of American passports for emigration purposes; the bribery for ten thousand liras at a 
time of two employees at the sub-prefecture in Castrovillari in Calabria to facilitate the release of 
documents to help women in the area leave for the United States; and the bribery of employe s at 
the Alcamo town hall in Sicily to foster illegal emigration.248   
Little of these investigations remains except for the Commissariato's yearlong 
investigation of a case of illicit emigration traffic through Bordeaux, France, involving Italians 
living both in Italy and France.  In April 1926, the French police in Bordeaux arrested six Italian 
migrants from Casalvieri, Lazio, trying to sail to Canada illegally.  French police investigated the 
role in the traffic of illegal migrants of Giuseppe Tiberio, an Italian residing in Tarn, France, who 
was accused of being a co-conspirator because he had provided the six emigrants w th the work 
contracts necessary to be admitted to France.  French police also investigated Pietro Mequio, 
who was charged with supplying forged passports and visas to enter Canada for 500 to 600 
francs.  The investigation that ended in May 1927 found the six migrants and Pietro Mequi 
guilty but dismissed the charges against Giuseppe Tiberio.  The six Italian migrants knew that 
that what they were doing was illegal because they arrived in France in two separate groups and 
then reconvened in Paris to purchase the forged documents to leave for Canada.  Thanks to 
Tiberio's work contracts for Morel and Schiavi, a construction company that built roads and 
railroads, the six migrants had legally obtained their passports from the Italian authorities to 
work in France.  The two groups crossed the border at Ventimiglia near the French border, an 
under-supervised crossing point that had previously been under investigation because it was 
                                                




suspected to be an easy site for smugglers to help illegal migrants cross the border.  Pietro 
Mequio, a professional smuggler, had been earning between eight thousand to ten thousand 
francs per migrant to help them immigrate to the United States illegally from Canada.  He sold 
the six migrants forged visas from the Italian and Canadian authorities.  Giuseppe Tiberio, on the 
other hand, had provided the work contracts necessary for the migrants to be admitted to France 
out of a genuine belief that he was helping six Italians to find work in France.249  
Mequio was not the only one that the Commissariato charged and found guilty of abetting 
illegal migration to North America.  In June 1926, Donegani, provincial delegate for Cosenza, 
Calabria, informed the Commissariato that the border authorities stationed at Como San 
Giovanni, along the Swiss border in Lombardy, had arrested Giovanbattista Busacca, Rosario 
Amendola, and Giovanni Dierna, three migrants from his province, who during customs had 
provided vague answers about their whereabouts and the purpose of their trip.  The border 
authorities had subsequently transmitted the three men's passports to the police headquart rs in 
Cosenza, Calabria, and discovered that the passports were fakes and that the three migrants had 
lied about their domicile.  They were not from Cosenza but rather from two different tow s in 
the province of Siracusa, Sicily.  The police ordered the arrest of the three men and the search of 
their houses.  As investigations continued, the investigators discovered that Emanuele F race, 
who had already previously been accused and arrested for fraud involving illegal emi ration, 
might be involved in the illegal emigration fraud.  Although they never succeeded in prov g 
Farace's involvement in their current investigation, emigration authorities found Farace guilty on 
other charges pressed against him.  Two women from the province Castrovillari, Caabria, had in 
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fact pressed charges against him for asking ten thousand liras to expedite their emigration 
practices.250 
The efforts to assist Italian illegal immigrants soon absorbed the Italian American 
community's full attention.  Its battle to lobby for congressional provisions to amnesty Italian 
illegal immigrants who had long lived in the United States would last well into the late 1930s.  
When, on March 2, 1929, Congress ratified the Regulation of Illegal Residence in the United 
States Act to authorize the adjustment of status for illegal immigrants "not ineligible for 
citizenship" who had entered the country prior to June 3, 1921, Di Silvestro immediately wrote a 
personal letter to Harry Hull, Commissioner General of Immigration, to ask for a copy of the act 
and to obtain forms for Italian illegals who desired to adjust their status.251  At the same time, 
Representative La Guardia encouraged the publication of an article to be distributed to the Italian 
American press detailing the procedure and the requirements of the law.  Applicants had to 
demonstrate that their date of entry was before June 3, 1921, that they had lived continuously in 
the United States since their arrival, that they were persons of good moral char cter, and that 
they were not subject to deportation.  In the article, La Guardia also explained that during the 
scheduled interview with immigration authorities, applicants needed two witnesses of good 
standing that could account for their arrival before June 3, 1921, provide a list of names of 
people that could testify to their good moral character, and two pictures.  If, after the interview, 
the applicants were found subject to deportation, immigration authorities would arrange for their 
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immediate deportation.  More importantly, if the applicants were caught lying, immigration 
authorities would immediately charge them with fraud and cancel their applications.252  
In addition to fighting to help illegal immigrants regularize their status, I alian Americans 
also mobilized to oppose any provision that required the registration of aliens.  The issue 
resurfaced when, in December 1926, Congress again considered legislation proposing the alien 
registration.  Like Jewish activist groups, Italian Americans opposed the univ rsal registration of 
aliens as a practice that was humiliating to the self-respect of immigrants and damaging to their 
interests.  The 1926 OSIA convention in Washington unanimously agreed to oppose "any 
measures concerning the mandatory registration of foreigners living in the United States as 
measures in opposition to the spirit of the fundamental American principles underlying the 
American Government."253  OSIA's activity against the registration of aliens attracted many 
supporters among members of Congress.  On March 20, 1926, Senator J.W. Wadsworth from the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Military Affairs wrote to Umberto Billi, Supreme Recording 
Secretary OSIA Grand Lodge of the State of New York, to express his support for the
organization's opposition to the registration of aliens.  In his letter, the Senator explain d that the 
Vice President of the United States had referred to him several communications from OSIA 
regarding the bill requiring the registration of aliens.  In his opinion, the enforcement of such 
legislation would create extraordinary difficulties, and "it would tend to bring about a condition 
of affairs in this country closely resembling the European espionage system with all its attendant 
evils."254  He proposed that if aliens entered the United States in violation of the country's 
                                                
252 "Per la regolarizzazione dei residenti illegalmente egli Stati Uniti," no newspaper title, no date, John Di 
Silvestro Papers, box 3, folder 5, Italian American Collection, IHRC, University of Minnesota. 
253 "Atti e deliberazioni della Suprema Loggia," January-February 1926, John Di Silvestro Papers, box 1, folder 11, 
Italian American Collection, IHRC, University of Minnesota. 
254 J.W. Wadswort to Umberto Billi, March 20, 1926, John Di Silvestro Papers, box 2, folder 4, Italian American 
Collection, IHRC, University of Minnesota. 
127 
 
immigration laws, a simpler and more American solution to solve the problem and to prevent the 
smuggling of illegal immigrants was for Congress to improve and strengthen the administration 
of the law and not to criminalize the immigrants themselves.255  
American Jews also mobilized against the bill.  Along with many of the organizations 
opposing voluntary or mandatory registration of aliens, many prominent Jewish organizations 
participated in a luncheon conference to discuss registration bills and deportation bills before 
Congress at the Hotel Astor in New York City on January 9, 1926.  The attendees included, 
among others, the Hebrew Shelter Immigrant Society; the Conference on Immigration Policy; 
the Department of City, Immigration and Industrial Work of National Missions of the 
Presbyterian Church in the United States; the National Board of the Young Women's Christian 
Association; the League for American Citizenship; the American Civil Liberties Union; and the 
Council of Jewish Women.  Max Kohler delivered the keynote address at the conference, where 
he reiterated many of the points and criticisms he had raised in the columns of the New York 
Times in his series on the Johnson bill in January 1924.  The conference received a strong 
endorsement from the American Federation of Labor, which, along with the other manifestations 
of opposition against the measure and the support of a few prominent Congressmen, persuaded 
Congress not to pursue the matter any further, at least for the time being.  Italian Americans and 
American Jews' participation in the opposition to the various registration bills represent one of 
the last successful attempts to undermine restriction before the 1924 Immigration Act went into 
effect.256 
Their enthusiasm for their success, in fact, was short lived.  If Congress decided to refrain 
from legislating on the matter, the Department of Labor took it upon itself to find an alternative 
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to alien registration.  In 1928, the Commissioner General of Immigration, with the approval of 
Acting Secretary of Labor Husband, issued General Order 106 to go into effect July 1, 1928, 
demanding the issuance of identification cards for newly arriving immigrants who intended to 
become residents.257  Despite Secretary of Labor Davis's efforts to reassure critics of General 
Order 106 that the system of the identification cards could actually benefit incoming i migrants, 
both Jewish and Italian representatives pointed to two provisions of the order that threatened not 
just incoming immigrants but also naturalized citizens.  The order provided that immigrants 
should present their identification cards whenever an immigration officer requested it, and that 
the cards should be confiscated in case of arrest.  The non-presentation of the card would 
automatically be considered as a tacit admission of illegal entry into the cuntry.  Furthermore, 
in public interviews, the Commissioner General of Immigration admitted that the registration 
cards for incoming aliens was only the first step of a larger plan to issue similar identification 
cards to all resident aliens trying to establish their residence in the United States.  Responding to 
a letter of complaint from Congressman La Guardia, Davis himself stated that there was 
considerable demand that certificates of residence also be issued to immigrants al eady residing 
in the country, but that it had not yet been possible to determine whether the issuance of such 
documents was feasible.258   
La Guardia and critics of the order argued that the provision was a usurpation of 
legislative authority, a registration of aliens in disguise, and a discriminatory measure promoting 
suspicions and prejudice against Southern and Eastern European immigrants.  In its 1929 report 
to its members, the executive committee of the American Jewish Committee went as far as to 
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point out that some of the conditions of the Order were harsher than those established for 
Chinese immigrants: 
The clause in the Order quoted as to the confiscation of the card in case of arrest, is 
extraordinary in its oppressiveness and illegality, even if measured by the standards of 
our "Chinese Registration" procedure.  In cases of arrest in deportation proceedings in 
which the burden of proof rests upon the immigrant, the chief value of the "Identification 
Card" would come into play. To despoil the alien of the card at that critical moment 
would be unspeakably arbitrary. Even under the Chinese Exclusion Law procedure, such 
despoiling of the aliens of such a document was strongly recommended by our courts as 
illegal and tyrannical.259 
For Eastern and Southern Europeans, starting at the end of the nineteenth century to 1929, the 
battle against immigration restriction began, continued, and ended with a comparison of their 
condition with that of Asian immigrants.  They often found any connection with Chinese 
immigrants, in particular, disparaging and sought to fight against the notion that im ny 




 The passage of the 1924 Immigration Act sent shockwaves through the Italian and Jewish 
communities.  During a fundraiser for the emigration of Jews to Palestine, Zionist Rabbi Stephen 
Wise echoed the palpable disappointment in the community: 
If in 1898 I had said that in 25 years America's doors would be shut to the Jews it would 
have been unthinkable that this country should so fail to live up to her traditions of 
freedom and opportunity.  The doors of America are closed to the Jews and open part 
way to the Nordics and non-Jews.260  
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Despite their defeat after decades of mobilization, both Italian Americans and Americans Jews 
decided to prolong their battle and continue to oppose the act until it was set to go into effect n 
July 1, 1929.  After President Coolidge signed the Johnson-Reed bill into law in May 1924, the 
two groups focused on providing assistance to migrants who found themselves in between 
legislation and on limiting the impact that the new legislation would have on those already in the 
United States.   
 The years from 1924 to 1929, in a sense, were a rehearsal for the battles to come in 
subsequent decades.  As they grappled with the humiliating imprimatur that the law put on their 
status in American society, American Jews and Italian Americans began to consider how to live 
in a society that regarded them as undesirable.  Yet, despite the new obstacles to their migration 
and the discrimination they faced, they still managed to win a few of the battles they waged, 
namely the exemption of families of ministers and professors from the quotas and amnesty for 
illegal immigrants who entered the country before June 3, 1921.  In the process, both groups 
learned the advantages and the dangers of using the political process to advance their ag nda, 
questioned any accusations of dual loyalty because of their efforts to help Italians and Jews 
abroad, and readjusted to assist aspiring emigrants once the quota system became law.  Th ir 
experiences in these years foreshadowed the ebb and flow nature of their anti-rstric on battles.   
 Nonetheless, American Jews and Italian Americans would not grasp the full extent of the 
impact of immigration restriction on their communities until the outbreak of the Great 
Depression.   The simultaneous reduction of immigration from Europe, the rise of fascism, and 
the discrimination they experienced as the Depression raged on dramatically changed their 
perception of their role in American society and in the anti-restriction battle.  The two groups 
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would move in two different directions and focus exclusively on their communities without 




"Assimilated but Undigested:" Becoming American under Restriction (1929-1945)261 
The 1930s represented a critical turning point for the Italian and Jewish communities in 
the United States.  More than anything that happened in the 1930s, restriction forced the two 
groups to contemplate on their role in American society and reflect on how to carry on their 
battle against immigration restriction now that the quota system was law.  Interestingly, as Italian 
Americans searched for strategies, many of them turned to the American Jewish community for 
guidance: 
Many Italians have held up the Jews to their countrymen as an example of the successful 
adjustment of a minority group in America, with admonition that their fellow Italians 
follow the same methods the Jews have used […] It is also true, no doubt, that Jewish 
immigrants had some things working for them which Italians did not—a greater his o y 
of urban dwelling, for example, and some perhaps higher financial and educational level 
to start with.262 
Ironically, as Italian Americans looked at the Jewish community for inspiration, American Jews 
in the 1930s worried that their newly achieved visibility, especially with the numerous 
nominations under the Roosevelt administrations, might hurt them, attract unnecessary attention, 
and spark a new wave of anti-Semitism.263   
Looking back on the 1930s, many Italian Americans and Jewish Americans in the 1950s 
perceived that the decade had changed their communities permanently.  Three years apart f om 
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each other, writer Lawrence Pisani and historian David Brody grappled with the legacy of the 
1930s for Italian Americans and American Jews, respectively.  Pisani explored Italian 
Americans' affair with Mussolini and Fascism, while Brody explored Jewish Americans' 
reluctance to intervene sooner on behalf of Jews persecuted in Europe under Nazism.  For Brody, 
economic distress, anti-Semitism, and popular opposition provided unsatisfactory explanations 
of American Jews' acceptance of the quota system during the 1930s.  More frustratingly, "the 
question," Brody noted, "was not peculiarly Jewish; no immigrant groups of recent origi  
showed a real desire to change the immigration laws."264  Investigating similar issues for 
different communities, Pisani and Brody arrived at the same conclusion: during the 1930s, Italian 
Americans and Jewish Americans were too busy assimilating and Americanizing to fight 
immigration restriction.  
On the one hand, Pisani and Brody were right.  During the 1930s, both Italian Americans 
and Jewish Americans believed that integration and Americanization were positive processes 
that the two communities needed to speed along.  No other element convinced Italian Americans 
and Jewish Americans of the need to Americanize more than the implicit assumption behind th  
passage of the quota system:  Southern and Eastern Europeans were undesirables.  Commnting 
on the implications of the 1924 Immigration Act, author and prominent Zionist Maurice Samuel 
observed that Eastern European Jews were not only excluded but "told in the most unmistakable 
language of the immigration laws, that [they were] an 'inferior' people."265  Similarly, in an 
article published in all Italian American newspapers, New York City judge Francis X. Giaccone 
decried that the worst immigration laws were those that declared that some gr ups were 
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inferior.266  Moreover, in times of severe hardships for everybody, Italian Americans and 
Americans Jews saw the government used the likely to become public charge (LPC) clause to 
deny welfare support or entry into the country. 
On the other hand, Brody and Pisani did not give their communities enough credit.  If 
neither group actively sought to have the quota system repealed until the outbreak of the Second 
World War, both of them continued to look for loopholes to circumvent the system.  They fought 
in court and in Congress on behalf of immigrants in the United States whose status remained 
uncertain, lobbied politicians to endorse and pass bills that would "humanize" the country's 
immigration policy, and assisted prospective immigrants in Europe to come to the Uni ed States 
or to relocate somewhere else.  Moreover, older members of both communities also complained 
of an American-born generation speaking only English and forgetting their old wor d heritage. 
Italian and Eastern European Jewish immigrant generations thus also found themselves striving 
for a delicate balance between maintaining a Jewish and Italian core while becoming part of 
American society.  In a time of fervid nativism, both groups hotly debated how to pursue this 
balance, and for both the discussion assumed transnational and international contours, as 
American Jews had to confront European Jewry's predicament and Italian Americans had to 
grapple with a fascist Italian government's renewed efforts to keep their ties to Italy alive.  
In a sense, American Jews and Italian Americans' insistence that they could assimilate 
and were assimilating represented a battle against the intellectual foundations of restriction.  
Both groups considered naturalization as only the first step and realized that political 
participation was the key to their acceptance in American society.  Their political activism in the 
1930s would shape how they approached migration mobilization in the 1950s and 1960s.  In the 
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1930s, the solidification of Jewish liberalism and American Jews' embrace of the New Deal's 
emphasis on social justice paved the way for the American Jewish community's later 
commitment to immigration as a social justice issue for all.  As they struggled to persuade the 
Roosevelt Administration to help European Jews, many American Jews struggled to dissipate the 
preconceived notion that the immigration problem was a Jewish problem and found inter-group 
collaboration to represent a possible solution to the impasse.   
Integration and participation in politics was more complicated for Italian Americans.  
Although the quota system and the Depression reduced immigration from Italy to a trickle,
Italian Americans continued to travel back and forth between the United Statesand Italy, and the 
Fascist Italian government continued to nurture the relationship with the Italian community in 
the United States.  Both of these issues affected their integration into American so iety and 
complicated their effectiveness in the political sphere.  Their 1930s battle for he legalization of 
the status of illegal Italian immigrants, however, taught them to be more pragmatic about 
immigration issues and to lobby for Italian migrants first and foremost.  Finally, although the 
widespread negative attitudes against immigrants of the 1930s persuaded American J ws and 
Italian Americans that the use of quotas would always remain the foundation of American 
immigration policy, the Roosevelt Administration and Democrats' favorable view of family 
reunion convinced them that this represented an issue that provided immigration reformers and 
restrictionists with some common ground.  
The outbreak of World War II presented both groups with yet other problems that shaped 
how they would later handle immigration issues.  After cautious efforts to influence the 
Roosevelt Administration to intervene during the 1930s, American Jews forcefully asked the 
Administration and Congress for the repeal of the quotas to rescue European refugees once the 
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war began.  Their campaign for a refugee policy paved the way for the fight against restriction 
that developed during the 1950s and 1960s.  For the first time, the Truman Directive of 
December 1945 assigned a prominent role to voluntary agencies in the administratio  of 
immigration policy, effectively turning them into powerful advocates for imm gration reform.  
Ethnic and religious groups and voluntary agencies (VOLAGS) responsible for the resettlement 
of refugees would later become the major nongovernmental groups influencing American 
immigration policy.267  Lacking a crisis of similar proportions to the Jewish refugee problem, 
Italian Americans did not exhibit the same sense of urgency about the need for immig ation 
reform that the American Jewish community did.  Nonetheless their strong relationship with Italy 
and the slow pace of their integration forced Italian Americans to wrestle with wartime attacks 
on their loyalty to the United States, the government's violations of some of their civil rights, and 
opposition to their efforts to help free Italy from Fascist rule.  
 
 "Strangers in the Land that Harbored them:"268 Depression, Identity, and Politics 
When the 1924 Immigration Act went into effect in 1929, Italian Americans and 
American Jews needed few reminders of the impact of the quota system on their communities or 
of the consequences they faced if they mobilized for its repeal.  In 1935, Commissioner General 
of Immigration David McCormack, considered by many restrictionists "too soft" on 
immigration, warned advocates of a more liberal immigration policy to consider the country's 
national interests before asking for any changes to the existing immigration policy: "One of the 
best ways to promote latent racial, and religious antagonisms is to advocate increased 
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immigration, particularly during a period of depression and unemployment."269  The rampant 
anti-immigrant sentiment in the country led to the proposal of six bills to decreas  or stop the 
immigration flow entirely during the spring of 1934 alone.  As Washington Senator Louis B. 
Schwellenbach observed, "to condemn aliens […] is perhaps the best vote-getting argument in 
present day politics."270   
Calls for restriction, in fact, continued despite the consistently decreasing numbers of 
arrivals from Europe and the increasing number of departures to return to Europe.  After the 
beginning of the Depression, the number of immigrants admitted each year was significantly 
below the 153,714 total annual quota that President Hoover had fixed with his Proclamation of 
March 22, 1929.  Starting in 1931 and ending in 1938, the annual immigrant arrivals were: 
54,118; 12,983; 8,220; 12,483; 17,207; 18,675; 27,762; 42,494.  Moreover, from July 1, 1932 to 
June 30, 1938, 246,449 European immigrants left to go back to their country of origin.271  
Official statements showing that immigration restriction succeeded in limiting the flow of 
immigrants into the country did little to assuage public opinion.  In August 1933, Harold Fields, 
executive director of the National League for American Citizenship, published an article in The 
South Atlantic Quarterly, later reprinted in the New York Times, to announce that for the second 
year in a row more foreign-born persons were leaving than entering the country.  Thanks to the 
immigration laws in place, Fields observed, the United States no longer had an immigration 
problem.  Emigration and not immigration was becoming a problem.  Moreover, he added, the 
reduction of immigration sped up the assimilation of the foreign born.  Immigrants moved out of 
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the slums, participated in Americanization programs, and naturalized in high numbers.  Lastly, 
the new immigrants arriving from Europe were mostly skilled workers and women and children 
reuniting with their family members in the country.272   
With immigration from Europe reduced to a trickle, a severe economic crisis, and a 
climate hostile to immigrants, American Jews and Italian Americans hanged their agenda and 
chose to focus on integration into American society and to limit their work on immigration to 
practical assistance to immigrants.  First and foremost, immigration restriction proved that 
isolation within their community and exclusive reliance on their community organizations could 
do little to improve their lot in America, especially as the Depression threaten d the survival of 
the institutions in their communities.273  Both groups hoped that success in Americanizing might 
lead to more accomplishments in changing the immigration laws as well.  They also agreed that 
the political arena offered the most powerful way to achieve both goals.  Yet their political 
participation suffered from stereotypes against 'immigrant' politicians whom many Americans 
considered a threat to the American political system because they sought to benefit only their 
communities and brought old world interests into American politics.  Political reporter Raymond 
Clapper echoed these feelings in a 1938 article published in the New York World Telegram and 
other newspapers on the presence of immigrant politicians in American politics.  After arguing 
that "racial groups" in the United States shook down political parties for the inclusion of at least 
one candidate from their group in both state and local tickets, Clapper added, "Thereafter if they 
don't get one of their racial brothers on the ticket they take it as an insult to the old country."274  
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To these accusations, Italian Americans and American Jews retorted that if politicians gave equal 
opportunities to everybody, "irrespective of their racial strains or religious beliefs," the main 
argument for the creation of hyphenated groups would cease to exist.275  
For both groups, the first step in acquiring more political visibility rested in 
naturalization.  The years immediately following the implementation of the 1924 Immigration 
Act saw a flood of applications for naturalization across the country.  The American Jewish 
Committee calculated that from July 1, 1932 to June 30, 1938, 241,962 immigrants became 
permanent residents.276  By 1935, the New York City naturalization bureau complained that it 
had 18,000 pending applications.277  Nevertheless, the impact of naturalization was different for 
the two groups.  Despite their disagreements, naturalized Eastern European Jews joined a fairly 
well integrated community of Jews of German descent that facilitated their transition into 
American society and provided the financial, social, and political structure from which they 
could benefit and upon which they could build.  Italian Americans, on the other hand, had only 
recently begun to naturalize and were still trying to build a community in the Unit d States that 
could help them integrate into American society and maintain connections with Italy.  
As the 1930s went on, the debate about the ethnic vote took on new connotations for 
Jewish Americans.  They found themselves dealing with a problem that Italian Americans did not 
have to face, not even at the peak of the attacks against them for their support for Mussolini or 
during the 1942 internment.  By the end of the 1930s, anti-Jewish sentiment reached a critical 
point in the United States, further fomenting fear of the Jewish vote.  Father Coughlin's rad o 
speeches became increasingly virulent, and Nazi and nativist groups openly held demonstrations, 
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broadcast "Buy Christian" slogans, and distributed anti-Jewish leaflets.  These accusations had 
their intended effect.  Many Americans considered the Depression the result of a moral and 
spiritual crisis precipitated by a conspiracy of unchristian subversives, especially Jews, and 
discriminated against them in the workforce and with the establishment of Jewish quotas in 
universities.278  By May 1939, the press and radio routinely talked about "the Jewish problem" and 
speculated that Jews were pushing the United States to enter the war.  The America First Bulletin 
spoke of "numerous groups which fight for America's entry into the war—foreign and racial 
groups which have special and just grievances against Hitler."279  The hysteria around a renewed 
Jewish conspiracy led many American Jews to fear that the very presence of large numbers of 
recent Jewish immigrants in the United States would be a constant source of anti-Jewish 
feeling.280 
The rise of anti-Semitism in the 1930s influenced American Jews in more subtle ways.  
Along with anti-Semitism, waves of nativism, pressure to conform, and charges that Jews in 
America were more loyal to their tribe than to their country often made American Jews fearful of 
overrepresentation and more cautious in their pleas.  The concern over Anti-Semitism and 
visibility profoundly divided the American Jewish community when American Jews began 
mobilizing for the admission of Jewish refugees to the United States between 1933 and 1939.  
They disagreed over what the most effective strategy to help Jewish refugees could be.  Some, 
like the American Joint Distribution Committee, preferred to focus on social programs, ising 
money and sponsoring direct assistance to refugees.  Others, namely the American Jewish 
Committee and the American Jewish Congress, dedicated themselves to lobbying political 
leaders and marshaling public opinion's support to the refugee cause.  Still others, like B'nai 
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B'rith and the Jewish War Veterans, were fraternal organizations uninterested in politics that 
decided to intervene only when the refugee crisis galvanized their leaderships.281  Similar to the 
impasse that the fight between Fascists and anti-Fascists created within the Italian American 
community, American Jews' inability to stay united prompted each group to blame the others for 
failure, de facto weakening their political influence and confirming other Americans' impressions 
that they—like Italian Americans—were a gaggle of squabbling factions.   
 Internal divisions and political obstruction notwithstanding, the American Jewish 
community accomplished remarkable achievements during the 1930s.  Although American Jws 
in the Great Depression faced unprecedented financial hardships, barriers to economic and 
educational progress, and a sudden increase in anti-Semitism, many believed that, as a 
community, they were still progressing thanks to their wholehearted support of the Roosevelt 
Administration.282  The political visibility that the Roosevelt era brought them and the New 
Deal's emphasis on social justice resonated with Jews of both German and Eastern uropean 
descent and cemented a liberal tradition within the community at large.  As sociologist Steven 
Cohen has suggested, "Jewish Liberalism—as much as modern Orthodoxy, Zionism, 
assimilationism, and so forth—should be seen as a reflection (if not, sometimes, a strategy) of 
the entry and integration of Jews into modern society."283  As Jews of German and Eastern 
European descent came together to build a common identity, many American Jews realized that, 
despite the small numbers of their community, their position in American society was improving 
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faster than that of some of the other new immigrants, especially Italians.  In his oral interview, 
Seymour Graubard effectively captures the impact of politics on the two communities:  
In my work in the La Guardia Administration which I enjoyed for six years, I learned a 
great deal about the City of New York and about the factions that worked against each 
other in the city.  I learned how the politicians, above all, made alliances for their own 
selfish advantage.  But they made peace particularly among the dominant Irish and the 
upcoming Jews.  The poor Italians had to wait awhile before they came into the front 
rank of citizens in the City of New York.284   
The younger Jewish generation was particularly committed to political partici tion.  In a 
collection of essays titled How to Combat Anti-Semitism in America, a generation of younger Jews 
urged the rejection of the "sha-sha philosophy of Jewish polemics, which sought to turn away 
wrath with gentle words, to obscure the Jew from public gaze" and asked the American J wish 
community to assume leadership in liberal movements.285   
Italian Americans also hotly debated the future of their community after restriction.  Like 
American Jews, they realized that participation in the political process was fundamental to their 
success in the United States.  Pisani cogently captured the essence of the debate: "It became 
increasingly clear that to remedy some of the evils they were suffering would require not only 
self-help but changes in the law.  To secure these, political participation could hardly be 
avoided."286  Like American Jews, Italian Americans realized that naturalization was central to 
their integration efforts.  A few Italian Americans explicitly linked naturalization and restriction.  
In an article published in the Italian American press, New York City judge Francis Giaccone 
urged Italians in the United States to naturalize and to create a unified Italian American voting 
bloc specifically as a strategy to oppose the recently passed draconian immigration policy.  
Emphasizing that "vile is the people that accepts this law without reacting and combating," 
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Giaccone called for unity among all Italian American organizations to fight American 
immigration policy and proclaimed that, as contributing and productive members of American 
society, Italian Americans had a duty to oppose restriction and to ask for equality for all peoples: 
We want and must become good and honest American citizens, participating in the 
national life and customs. In the North American continent there are over five million 
Italians; in the city of New York alone more than a million and three hundred thousand 
Italians exist, representing a formidable force and power. The leaders, the POLITICAL 
BOSSES, have to acknowledge this power.287 
For Pisani and Giaccone, Italian Americans like Cotillo, Marcantonio, and La Guardia became 
politicians because they believed that politics was the best means to correct"the social evils" that 
the Italian American community suffered and that non-participation in the political process 
risked marginalizing Italian Americans further.   
 Echoing Giaccone's arguments, The Vigo Review published an article titled "Hyphenated 
Americans—An Open Letter to an Anglo-Saxon Friend" to justify the adoption of the hyphen 
among Italian immigrants.  The hyphen, the article read, was "their only protection against being 
submerged in the maelstrom of American life, without however receiving any of the benefits to 
which they would be entitled if they actually had equality of opportunity."288  It was America's 
disdain of their looks and last names, he continued, that convinced many young Americans of 
Italian extraction that, in the eyes of other Americans, they were Italian Americans and could 
never be just Americans.  The difficulty of finding and getting better jobs convinced many that 
this was certainly the case.  Even more than in their search for better jobs, Italians suffered in 
their efforts to enter politics:  
In politics, of course, the Italians haven't got even a Chinaman's chance, unless they can 
muster the 'Italian vote.'  If you think that it is not so, study the matter for yourself.  Of 
course there are exceptions, but very rare exceptions.  Take, for instance, any Italian 
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community in which the 'Italian vote' is of no importance.  How many Italians do you 
find holding public offices?  And even in those communities in which there are many 
Italians, but not organized, what has happened to public officials of Italian extraction?  
Look at Newark, or at Cleveland, or Buffalo, or Cincinnati, or St. Louis, or Baltimore.  
Do you not suppose that there are in those communities Italian-Americans who could 
have been trained for the higher offices available?289 
The presence of hyphenated Americans would disappear, commented the author, when all young 
men and women would receive equal opportunities not just in name but in fact and when 
Americans of "old stock" would abandon any pretensions of superiority and refer to th  children 
of the 'new' immigrants as Americans, and not as Italians, or Germans, or Poles. For that to 
happen, Italian Americans, concluded the author, needed to organize and achieve more visibility 
in politics. 
 Nonetheless, by the end of the decade, Italian Americans had achieved much less 
political prominence than their Jewish counterparts.  Despite repeated efforts to rally them 
around either of the major parties, Italian American voters never became a unit d front the way 
American Jews did when they became part of the New Deal coalition.  Tied to Tammany Hall, 
Generoso Pope created a powerful chain of political clubs known as the Italian Federation of 
Democratic Clubs, which, by 1933, counted 150,000 voters.  Yet most of the members went on 
to vote for Fiorello H. La Guardia, running for the Fusion ticket.  When La Guardia endors d 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt for president in 1933, many Italian American voters voted to reelect 
Roosevelt, but when both La Guardia and Roosevelt failed to appreciate Italian American voters' 
loyalty with more appointments and benefits, many Italian Americans manifested their 
disappointment in the next round of elections, when both La Guardia and Roosevelt saw their 
votes among Italian Americans in New York City decline.   




 Unlike those of American Jews, Italian Americans' efforts to integra into American 
society and to enter the American political arena suffered severe disruptions after the rise of 
Fascism in Italy.  In addition to stark divisions between Fascists and anti-Fascists, the continuous 
interference of the Fascist Italian government posed numerous obstacles to th ir integration and 
favored a clientelistic attitude toward immigration matters that ultimately accomplished very 
little.290  In an environment that heaped discrimination and disparagement, Fascism fulfilled a 
much-needed psychological function for them.  Fascism promised Italian Americans a respect 
they had hardly ever enjoyed before: 
The respect for Italy which the Mussolini regime temporarily won was reflect d in an 
increasing prestige given to the Italian immigrant here. It was as if, once Italy was 
accepted in the international community as a first-rate power, her immigrants abroad 
could at last be treated as first-class citizens. Mussolini's popularity in America had given 
a new dignity to the status of being Italian.291 
Examining the sources of Italian Americans' fascination with Fascism, anti-F scist organizer 
Gaetano Salvemini concluded that many first generation Italian Americans' ties to their 
homeland slowed down the assimilation process enough to make them vulnerable to Fascism.  
Their strong ties to Italy were not the only reason.  Salvemini soon realized that under the 
pressures of American society and the stresses of assimilation Italia Americans often felt a 
pervasive sense of inferiority as well as a bitter resentment towards the Uni ed States, making 
them an easy target for Fascist propaganda.292  
Yet Italian Americans' support for Mussolini and Fascist Italy was also the product of a 
carefully orchestrated propaganda campaign.  Recognizing that Italians abroad represented 
potential troops, remittances, and public relations agents, especially in the United Stat s, 
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Mussolini's government increased the number of Italian consulates in the major destinations of 
Italian emigration, subsidized the Italian language press, sponsored after-school language 
programs, organized cultural events to celebrate it lianità, and constantly reminded immigrants 
that they remained Italians to the seventh generation.293  In their efforts to retain Italian 
Americans' loyalty, Mussolini and his government effectively tapped into Italian Americans' 
frustration with the passage of restrictive immigration laws to cement th ir ties with their 
ancestral home.  As Pisani later argued: 
The recently-passed immigration-restriction law, with its implication hat Italian 
immigrants were less desirable than others, was an especially vulnerable point. Fascist 
propagandists who proclaimed the superiority of Italian people found a more eager 
reception for their ideas from those whose spirits were mortified by the immigration 
act.294  
After initial strategic blunders, the fascist Italian government also understood that, unlike its 
policy towards Italian migrants in other countries, it needed to encourage Italians in the United 
States to naturalize and take advantage of the power of their vote. 295  The new campaign 
ultimately yielded the results desired.  Many Italian Americans enroll d in language classes; 
became members of organizations like the Italian Touring Club, the Order of the Sons of Italy 
(OSIA), and the Italian war veterans' association, Associazione Ex Combattenti e Reduci; and 
enrolled their children in the youth clubs like Gruppo Giovanile.296  The membership of OSIA, 
in particular, rose dramatically after the Italian government's endorsement, and the organization 
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collaborated with the Italian government to help it maintain its influence over Italian Americans.  
In his closing speech at the 1931 OSIA national convention, Di Silvestro reminded his audience 
of the indefatigable work of the Order and Giacomo Di Martino, the Italian Ambassador in 
Washington, D.C., to build a strong relationship between Italy and the United States.  The 
ambassador, said Di Silvestro, was especially fond of the Order and followed its developments 
closely, constantly inciting its members to be devout American citizens mindful of their 
origin.297  
The turning point of the popularity of Fascism in the United States came with Italy's
invasion of Ethiopia.  As Fox points out, up until the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian War, 
Republican and Democratic administrations alike shared four assumptions about Mussolini and 
Italy: "he was bringing economic and social progress to his people; he was a dictator, but 
popular; he might serve as a moderating influence on Hitler; and therefore he wasgood for Italy 
and the United States."298  The Second Italo-Ethiopian War represented both the apex of Italian 
Americans' support for Fascism and the beginning of its decline.  At first, many Italian 
Americans enthusiastically supported the war and the country's expansionist ambitions as yet 
another proof of Italy's greatness and of its status as a great power with an empire.  Yet, the 
United States' ultimate condemnation of Italy's aggression against Ethiopia quickly convinced 
many prominent Italian Americans that their support for Fascism and Fascist Italy could actually 
damage their efforts to rise politically and socially.  
The debate that raged within the OSIA leadership when discussing its strategy owards 
the Ethiopian War reflected concerns similar to those over which the Jewish community 
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struggled as well.  During the 1937 annual OSIA convention, Supreme Venerable Stefano Miele 
proudly remembered the organization's protest against the passing of a law that would put Italy at 
a clear disadvantage in the war.  The decision to issue a public statement calling for the 
Roosevelt Administration to remain neutral, in fact, aroused many concerns among many Italian 
Americans who feared that such exposure might in the long run hurt Italian Americans' 
integration into American society.  These critics proposed instead to identify prominent and 
influential American allies belonging to other groups to fight this cause with them.299  Miele 
explained that in the cause at stake the Order could not wait upon other groups to intervene and 
defend Italian Americans' position on the United States' stance on the Ethiopian war.  According 
to Miele, for Italian Americans to avoid intervening in the debate and let other groups speak on 
their behalf would have been to admit their political weakness and admit an inferior ty complex 
with respect to other groups.300  In part, Italian Americans' reluctance to collaborate with 
prominent Americans insulated them further and dampened their chances to represent th ir voice 
in the immigration reform debate at least until 1952, when a group of Italian Americans agreed 
to collaborate with the Irish Catholic hierarchy to mobilize for reform. 
In addition to their old world ties, many Italian Americans realized that the negativ  
images of Italian American voters also stemmed from the stereotypes that mainstream America 
had of them. To dispel some of these images, throughout the 1930s, many Italian Americans 
mobilized to redeem the Italian reputation among American newspapers. They created committees 
that specifically targeted attacks against Italian immigrants in the press or provided help to Italian 
American victims of discrimination.  Starting in 1931, Generoso Pope, through his two 
newspapers, Il Progresso Italo Americano and Il Bollettino della Sera, waged a decade-long 
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campaign to "have English-language newspapers cease the practice of identifying an Italian 
criminal suspect by his nationality, while not doing the same in case of other such gro ps."301  The 
initiative quickly gained the support of many Italian American organizations across the country, 
especially OSIA's.  The 1931 article in Il Bollettino della Sera that announced Pope's initiative 
explained that the campaign was "an act of justice for Italians residing here—citizens and non-
citizens alike—but also [was] a patriotic campaign of pure Americanization, aimed at banning the 
prejudices and the discriminations that create lines of demarcation among the elements that 
constitute the great American family."302   
In addition to naturalization, involvement in politics, and disputing the stereotypes 
plaguing them, Italian Americans and Jewish Americans reflected on how to maintain a 
distinctively Italian and Jewish cultural identity as their communities transitioned into a society 
with fewer and fewer arrivals from Europe.  Within the Italian community, OSIA appointed itself 
as the only Italian American organization that could take on such an ambitious campaign because 
of its numerical and political strength, the endorsement of local, state, and national politicians 
and businessmen, and the official endorsement of the Italian government.  Throughout the 1930s, 
under the aegis of Supreme Venerables John Di Silvestro and Stefano Miele, OSIA shifted its 
focus to the Italianization of young Americans of Italian descent, insistig that "for the 
preservation of the spirit of our race, the admission of one of our children into one of our lodges 
will have a value infinitely superior to the admission of an immigrant."303  Both Di Silvestro and 
Miele presented the campaign as indispensable for the survival of an Italian American identity in 
the United States.  "Left alone, without our propulsive force," Miele observed, young Italian 
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Americans "would find themselves, given the current competitions among different races, 
without the powerful engine that has pushed young Americans of other nationalities."304  For Di 
Silvestro, the new agenda inaugurated the fourth and most important phase since the creation of 
the organization, as it meant the survival of the entire Italian American community.305  
After recruitment, the second step was to instill in the new recruits the pride of th ir race 
through the knowledge of Italian culture, history, language, and customs.  Learning Italian 
represented the most important aspect of this plan. The power of the language in presrving the 
culture, explained Di Silvestro, was undoubtedly at the root of the extraordinary succes  of "the 
children of Israel" in the United States because "the history of all times and peoples teaches us 
that the races whose linguistic patrimony disappeared made them in turn disappear as ethnic 
entities, while those who managed to impose their language survived and ultimately 
prevailed."306  Similarly to Di Silvestro, Miele considered knowledge of the Italian languge the 
most visible vestige of Italian heritage and a constant reminder that advancing in life for an 
Italian American meant the advancement of the entire community.  Yet Miele also recommended 
that older Italian Americans use English in order to reach out to young Italian Americans who 
only spoke English.307  
As they struggled to decide how to position themselves within American society, man  
American Jews worried about the changes that restriction imposed on their cultural heritage too.  
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As American-born, young Jewish intellectuals looked for a new cultural identity, the immigrant 
generation worried that their Yiddish heritage would be forever lost.  Writing of the dim future in 
the Yiddish press, Abraham Cahan, editor of the Yiddish-language Jewish Daily Forward, 
concluded, "The children are becoming Americanized, and it is only natural; they ive in this 
country and it treats them as its own children."308  If the older generation worried that the old 
European traditions would be lost, the new generation of American Jews rejected the idea of 
collaborating with non-Jewish leaders and believed that their elders' approach was the product of 
an old world mentality that failed to understand the differences of the American environment.  
Typical of the attitude of many younger Jews was Alexander F. Miller's memories of his 
activism within the ranks of the Anti-Defamation League:  
One thing I did learn in Chicago was that the 'sha-sha' policy was still quite prevalent 
among many of the older ADL leaders.  They felt that Jews were a powerless minority 
and therefore would be better off if maintained a low profile.  They believed Jews should 
attempt to fight anti-Semitism and conquer discrimination with the help of important 
Christians rather than speaking up for themselves. It was the 'shtadlonem' theory that long 
had pervaded many Jewish communities in Europe.309 
The more prudent approach of the older Jewish community of German descent would eventually 
prevail.  Jewish leaders continued to pursue interfaith collaboration with prominent Protestant 
Americans at least throughout the 1950s and especially in conjunction with its effor to push 
Congress to pass refugee legislation after World War II. 
Throughout the 1930s, American Jewry's relationship with European Jewry shaped their 
identity as well.  Until 1938, many American Jews believed European Jews were the cultural and 
intellectual leaders of world Jewry, especially when it came to Zionism.  Philip Klutznick 
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cogently explained that the sentiment, in part, derived from the perception that American Jews 
were still a youthful and growing community with reasonable financial resou ces but lacking the 
cultural tradition and the political prominence necessary to represent or lead world Jewry:  
One must think back in those days of a Jewish world in which the greatest political and 
cultural influence was not in America, it was in Europe. Europe represented the 
leadership of the Zionist movement, not America […] American Jewry was reltively 
weak in terms of political strength. It was not the Jewry of the 1950s, '60s, '70s, '80s and 
it was secondary in terms of influence in the international Jewish community in those 
days.310 
This deference to European Jewry often caused misunderstandings and delays when American 
Jews began to strategize on how to help Jews get out of Europe.  Oftentimes, European Jewish 
leaders advised against taking action or suggested waiting, trusting that the enlig tened outlook 
of modern Germany and civil rights guarantees enshrined in the Weimar constitution sufficed to 
defend them again the threat of National Socialism.311 
Ironically, American Jews' efforts to provide a refuge for European Jews and to bols er 
their identity at home functioned as a springboard for the growing popularity of Zionism in 
America in the 1930s.  A new, specifically American brand of Zionism slowly began to emerg  
during the 1930s, providing yet another prominent cultural focus for the community at large. As 
American Jews struggled to rescue European Jews from the Nazis, Zionism beca e a unifier of 
the different Jewish factions and provided a clear goal, even to those who had previously resisted 
it or feared that it might only attract criticisms from mainstream Aerica as evidence of their 
reluctance to integrate.  As Philip Klutznick remembered in his oral interview, "The notion that 
there would be a Jewish state […] was not really believed with the depth that we began to 
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believe it until the horrible things that happened in Europe."312  Zionism continued to garner 
support during the war as well, but it would surge to prominence only in the 1950s. 
Although influenced by domestic and international events and despite numerous 
disagreements, American Jews ultimately created in response to restriction an identity that they 
decided and shaped for themselves. From this point of view, statelessness served American Jews 
well.  The absence of any powerful external interference gave them more agency in negotiating 
their role in American society.  It allowed the Jewish community to overcome their differences 
and unite around a common agenda when, during the war, they had to assist European Jews, 
lobby for changes in the existing immigration laws, and later promote the creation of a Jewish 
homeland.  This independence from an ancestral home forced them to create and operate through 
transnational and exclusively Jewish organizations to aid European refugees, but it also provided 
them with an incentive to invest resources, time, and energy in politics to protect their inter sts 
and voice their concerns.   
Italian Americans, on the other hand, found themselves in between two worlds that pulled 
them in two different directions.  They were caught between the pressure to integrate in 
American society when the new arrivals from Europe dwindled and the demands of the Italian 
Fascist government to retain their loyalty.  Mussolini's campaign to cultivate their ties with Italy 
and Italian Americans' continued travels between the two countries further compli ated their 
efforts to create a niche for themselves in American society.  Furthermore, Italian Americans, 
unlike Eastern European Jews, did not benefit from the presence of an older and establish d 
community that could ease their transition to American society.  This was particularly evident in 
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the political sphere, where Italian Americans struggled to assert their presence more than Eastern 
European Jews did.  
Yet as Italian Americans and American Jews sought to create a prominent role for 
themselves within American society in response to restriction, they also worried about how to 
help all those whom the law condemned to stay behind.  Life under restriction, the rise of 
Fascism in Europe, the Depression, and the persistence of anti-immigrant sentiments hroughout 
the 1930s and World War II limited and, oftentimes, hindered their mobilization in favor of a 
more favorable immigration policy.  
 
"Almost as Inaccessible as Tibet:" 313 Mobilizing under Restriction 
Italian Americans and American Jews soon realized that the new restrictive immigration 
policies affected them as much as they affected those who found themselves barred from this 
nation's shores.  Similar to what happened to Mexicans in the 1930s, the two groups became the 
target of local, state, and federal officials' efforts to bar newcomers from entering the country and 
exclude those already in the United States from welfare benefits.314  The impact of the new 
restrictions became obvious in 1930, when President Hoover and the Department of State 
instructed American consulates in Europe to use the likely to become public charge (LPC) clause 
to bar immigrants from Europe.315  The decision was an extension of a 1928 order first applied to 
prospective immigrants from Mexico.  The impact of the decision was immediate.  The case of 
Italian immigrant Sirianni provides one example of the clause's impact.  With his application for 
American citizenship well under way and a steady income from his factory job, Sirianni decided 
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to send for his wife and their children living in the province of Catania, Italy.  Yet, in both June 
and October 1931 his wife, Maria Giuseppa, received letters from the American Vice Consul in 
Naples asking her to provide further information about her husband's financial status to 
guarantee that she and her children would not become a public charge once in the United States.  
Even after proving the soundness of Sirianni's finances and the intervention of Italian Officer of 
Emigration Torquato Giannini, the consul still denied the visa.  Similarly, in 1931, Maria 
Mazzone requested non-immigrant visas for her husband and their child, confident that her
American citizenship would hasten the process.  Both OSIA Gran Venerable Di Silvestro and 
Representative Clyde Kelly from Pittsburgh intervened on her behalf, but the American Consul 
in Naples again denied Mazzone the non-quota immigrant visas because there was not enough 
evidence that the entire family would not become a public charge once they reunited in the 
United States.316   
The new approach yielded successful results immediately.  A year after issuing his order, 
Hoover reported to Congress that his administrative restrictions had reduced the montly average 
of admissible European immigrants from 24,000 to 7,000.317  The success of the measure 
convinced the Roosevelt Administration to continue Hoover's administrative restrictions. Even 
before the Depression, the two major parties' platforms on immigration were hardly
distinguishable, although the Democratic Party did favor more lenient provisions for family 
reunification.  The major difference between the Hoover and the Roosevelt Administrat ons with 
regard to immigration was the decline in deportation and repatriation rates.  Deportations, which 
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had soared from 2,672 in 1920 to 19,865 in 1933, dropped to less than 9,000 the following year 
and remained at about that level for the rest of the decade.318   
As the Depression deepened, the impact of the new use of the LPC clause affected
immigrants in the Unites States as well.  The courts and the immigration authorities, in fact, 
began to use it to exclude resident aliens from welfare relief, public assistance, and housing 
relief.  Although federal relief regulations considered resident aliens eligible for relief, many 
states tightened their residency requirements in the administration of their public assistance 
programs.  Most states had no citizenship requirements for this type of relief, y t all of them 
required a specific length of residence in the state and used the public charge lauses 3 and 19 of 
the 1917 Immigration Act to bar resident aliens from public assistance and, in extrem  cases, to 
deport them.  Section 3 declared that aliens who were inadmissible because they could 
potentially become public charges and who had nonetheless entered the country could be 
deported if taken into custody within five years of their entry.  Section 19 established that any 
alien could be deported at any time if, within the first five years of entry, he or she became a 
public charge.319   At the state level, authorities often interpreted the acceptance of any type of 
relief by a resident alien with less than five years of residence as grounds for deportation as a 
public charge.  At the federal level, the Department of Labor and many courtsused the LPC 
clause to contend that any misdemeanor committed within five years of landing made the 
immigrant retroactively inadmissible as likely to become a public charge, re ardless of his or her 
actual status at the time of entry.320  The Ex parte Costarelli case fully demonstrated the bias 
against Southern and Eastern European immigrants when they went to court to redress the charge 
of deportation against them.  "The ever-alert Immigration Service," wrote Maryland lawyer Leo 
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Alpert, "arrested the man for deportation on the ground that, although admissible in 1920 when 
he had entered the United States, he had later committed the crime of bigamy for which he might 
be jailed, and therefore at the time of entry in 1920 he was likely to become a public charge."321   
American Jewish leaders repeatedly complained of the exaggerated enforcement of the 
LPC clause and the skyrocketing number of refused visas.322  In response to these criticisms, the 
House Committee on Immigration held a hearing on a proposed amendment allowing review of 
consular refusals of visas.  Immigration expert Max J. Kohler testified on behalf of three of the 
most prominent American Jewish organizations, B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee, 
and the American Jewish Congress. The testimony is significant more for th arguments it used 
to encourage reform than for what it accomplished.  Kohler's appeal for the mitigation of he 
application of the LPC clause, in fact, revealed the emergence of three key points that would 
substantiate future battles for immigration reform.  His testimony showed that, by the 1930s, 
restricted groups believed that quotas were here to stay and would always represent the 
foundation of American immigration policy.  To this end, immigration advocates usually felt 
compelled to clarify that they were not trying to revert to an open door policy but rather just 
trying to improve the existing one.  Thus, at the outset of his testimony, Kohler pointedly 
avowed that he did not challenge the executive order of 1930 but welcomed it as "a salutary 
thing."   
Within this framework, immigration reformers realized that the system had to be 
undermined one provision at a time and that the only approach that could guarantee any results 
was to focus on family reunion.  After expressing his approval of the 1930 LPC clause order, 
Kohler quickly added that his "plea [was] on behalf of non-laborers and some exceptional 
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persons."  Finally, Kohler's testimony also highlighted a third element of the immigration reform 
battle that specifically characterized American Jews' view of reform:  the need to frame their 
battles on behalf of all immigrants and not just Jewish immigrants.  To this end, Kohler 
concluded his testimony saying that he opposed special legislation for the benefit of a single 
group.323  
No Italian American witness attended the hearing.  Appeals to American authorities in 
the United States would have done little to help Italian Americans, a group whose members, 
unlike American Jews, continued to travel back and forth between Italy and the United States,
even after many of them naturalized.  As they experienced problems with admission into the 
country or family reunion, many Italian Americans preferred to resort to the prominent members 
in their community with connections to Italian and American government officials in Italy.  As 
early as 1931, many of them wrote OSIA Gran Venerable John Di Silvestro asking him to help
them with their cases through his contacts with key members with members of the F reign 
Affairs Ministry in Italy.  A sample of the cases on which Di Silvestro decided to intervene 
illustrate well the legal quandary in which many Italians found themselves because of their 
transnational ties.  In a memorandum prepared for the director of the Direzione Generale degli 
Italiani all'Estero Piero Parini, Di Silvestro described the case of Fortunato Menga, a naturalized 
American citizen from Mansfield, Massachusetts, who, upon his return to the United Sta s from 
studying at a conservatory in Naples, discovered that the Italian government had summoned him 
for the draft, apparently still considering him an Italian citizen.324   In a letter to Morris N. 
Hughes, American Vice Consul in Naples, Di Silvestro pleaded for the cases of a deserter who 
wanted to return to Italy one final time to see his mother on her deathbed and of a man who hd 
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returned to the United States after marrying his niece in Italy and wanted to s nd for her.325  If 
the volume of the correspondence between the three men testified to OSIA's power within the 
Italian American community across the United States, the special treatment also had unpleasant 
consequences.  Di Silvestro, in fact, helped mostly OSIA members with their applications, and 
the entire system was based on clientelism, thus rendering the process personalistic and arbitrary.  
To this end, most of the people asking for Di Silvestro's help provided a letter of 
recommendation from high-ranking local OSIA officers to ensure that he would cnsider their 
pleas. 
Yet, Di Silvestro's intercessions taught Italian Americans an important lesson.  Like 
Americans Jews, Italian Americans learned that family reunion was the only expedient that could 
succeed.  Italian authorities were aware of this as well and pushed Di Silvestro to eek assistance 
only for family reunion cases.  In a letter to Di Silvestro in June 1931, director of the Direzione 
Generale degli Italiani all'Estero Parini admitted that, because of theharshness of American 
immigration laws, only the emigration of wives and minor children of legally admitted Italian 
residents in the United States willing to travel to Italy to collect their families was possible.326  In 
these cases, Di Silvestro often managed to have his contacts at the Italian Foreig Ministry speed 
up the release of passports for applicants or authorize an emigration inspector to include the 
recommended individuals in the Italian annual quota.327  Di Silvestro was also able to get 
officials at the various emigration offices across Italy to verify the statu  of an application or 
expedite it.  From some of the letters that Di Silvestro received, it appears that he encouraged the 
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applicants to take advantage of the yearly OSIA-organized pilgrimages to Italy to bring back 
their relatives.  In August 1929, for example, Di Silvestro asked Berardelli, a representative at 
the Royal Italian Embassy in Washington, D.C., to help Teresa De Angelus bring back her 
twenty-four year old daughter on her way back from a OSIA pilgrimage to Italy.  Berardelli 
wrote back to say that he had already instructed the Emigration Inspector in Naples to begin the 
application process for De Angelus's daughter, so that the documentation would be ready by the 
time De Angelus arrived in Italy on her pilgrimage.328   
The courts and the immigration authorities were only two of several governmental 
entities that complicated Italian and Jewish immigrants' lives in a restrict d and economically 
depressed America.  Despite decreasing immigration rates, both the House and th Senate 
Immigration and Naturalization Committees continued to consider and to hold hearings on bills 
that either further curtailed immigration or targeted unanticipated loopholes that migr nts were 
using to enter the country.  After 1929, stopping illegal immigration became a top priority for 
Congress.  In particular, they targeted immigrants entering the country under the guise of being 
seamen.  "We feel," Frank Morrison, the Secretary of the American Federation of Labor, testified 
in Congress, "that any avenue through which Chinamen and any other undesirables can  
bootlegged into this country should be stopped."329  As the Alien Seaman Act—the only law 
specifically targeting the illegal seamen traffic—neared its expiration in 1931, the House 
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization held hearings to consider its extension under 
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pressure from the American Federation of Labor, the American Seamen's Union, General 
Commissioners of Immigration, and public opinion.330   
Critics of illegal immigration primarily invoked reform in the name of the competition to 
American workers, but their criticisms also reflected Nativist fears.  The American Seamen 
Union complained that the lucrative traffic of illegal immigrants to the United States created 
competition for American seamen during a time of economic depression and brought large 
profits only to foreign ship owners.  The American Federation of Labor endorsed the renewal of 
the bill as a necessary measure to protect American labor from competition from smuggled 
immigrants.  Critics denounced that in 1931, illegal immigrants coming from China paid up to 
$1,100 and European immigrants paid from $200 to $400 for a passage to the United States, 
often via Cuba, Mexico, or Canada.331  Furthermore, they complained, Europe was not only 
sending a substantial number of illegal immigrants, but it was also becoming a pivotal hub of 
illegal immigration traffic:  
They are manufacturing fraudulent papers in Europe, so that you can buy them in every 
port in Europe from Greece all around the Mediterranean to Hamburg, to my knowledge. 
I know of a consul's office in Berlin where I was told they had an entire building, 
occupying it for no other purpose than to make fraudulent papers of all descriptions. The 
men who made those papers were usually Russian Jews, but they were making them, 
although they had succeeded in breaking it up.332 
Despite being less significant in numbers, many perceived illegal immigration from Southern 
and Eastern Europe as dangerous to the future of the country as the illegal entry of immigrants 
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from Asia.  Critics of illegal immigration often singled out Italy as the main source of illegal 
emigration from Europe.  "With reference to the Europeans, the greatest violations up to the 
present have been on vessels coming from the Mediterranean," Furuseth testified in Congress, 
"the Italian longshoremen in New York could tell much about it if they, as they say, 'were tired 
of life.'"333  
Officials found it difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of the number of illegal 
immigrants entering as seamen.  The official annual reports of the Commissioner General of 
Immigration showed that the Public Health Service and immigration officials examined 
approximately 1,000,000 alien seamen per fiscal year.  Of this total, the annual average number 
of deserters for the years from 1911 to 1921 was a little over 8,500.  As Congress debated th  
1924 Immigration Act, the number of deserters skyrocketed.  It increased to 23,194 in 1923 ad 
to 34,679 in 1924.  In 1925, it went down to 19,710, but it hovered above 10,000 until 1929: the 
number was 18,456 in 1926; 23,447, in 1927; 12,357, in 1928; and 11,314, in 1929.  Although 
there were no official records available from which to determine the number of seamen who left 
on board of other ships, the Immigration Bureau also indicated that about two-thirds of such 
deserters returned to being seamen shortly after leaving their ships.  Based on this estimate, an 
annual average of approximately 6,000 or 7,000 alien seamen deserters remained unlawfully in 
the United States during each of the eight years that followed the ratification of the 1921 
Immigration Act.334   
The illegal entry of immigrants from Europe became a critical issue for many in both the 
Jewish and Italian community, if for different reasons.  While Italian Americans hoped primarily 
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to help illegal Italian immigrants already in the country to adjust their status, American Jews 
wished to help European Jews escaping Nazi-dominated countries.  On March 16, 1937, Il 
Corriere d'America reported that, after two years of campaigning, Generoso Pope had finally 
obtained a hearing at the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization for the Dies bill. 
The bill sought to counteract the provision in the 1924 Immigration Act that placed no statute of 
limitation for illegal immigration, regardless of how long the immigrant resid d in the United 
States.335  It proposed to grant the Department of Labor more discretionary power to decide over 
deportation cases and prescribed that this discretionary power be applied only to illegal 
immigrants of good character who either had resided in the country for more than tn years or 
had a close relative lawfully admitted into the country or who was a citizen of the United States.  
The bill also stipulated that its provisions lasted only for four years, enough time to resolve the 
problem of the illegal immigrants already present in the country.  
Many Italian and Jewish organizations supported the bill.  Tapping into the only 
argument that could persuade Congress to consider reform, they argued that ratification of the 
Dies bill was necessary to avoid the disruption of families and the risk that many families would 
then become public charges.336  The Italian community was particularly enthusiastic about the 
hearings, as their battle for the legalization of the status of illegal Itali n immigrants represented 
yet another strategy in their decision to integrate into American society and use the political 
process to do so: 
Many family heads wrote to Pope encouraging him to continue his sacred campaign […] 
There are many families today in the United States who live under the constant fear that 
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their breadwinners could be deported any day.  They don't have any fault but to have
entered the country out of desire to improve their conditions, to take advantage of the 
great opportunities that this great nation has to offer.  [...]  It is thus only humane and 
right that their status be legalized with a law from Congress.337 
Pope's campaign received support from prominent Italian members of the community as well.  
The same issue of Il Corriere d'America that published the excerpt above also reported about a 
letter that immigration lawyer and former member of the Immigrant Aid Society Gaspare 
Cusumano had written to Pope to praise his campaign and volunteer his services.    
Cusumano's letter to Pope addressed many of the criticisms that Americans had of Italian 
immigrants in the United States and expressed the hope that many Italian Americans had in the 
Roosevelt Administration.  Following the 1930s strategy to encourage integration, Cusumano 
invited newspaper readers to work to discard the images of disloyalty, isolation, and ignorance of 
American customs that mainstream society had of them.  In his letter, Cusumano reiterated that 
these illegal immigrant men had committed no crime and that their deportation would only cause 
severe hardship for their families and for society.  Their only fault, he continued, was their desire 
to improve their lives, have an American life and American families.  Moreover, all of them 
yearned to become American citizens, had adjusted to life in America, and could not see
themselves living in Italy anymore.338  In spite of the enthusiasm and the success of Pope's 
campaign, Cusumano also understood that passing the bill still remained a difficult battle.  The 
long-standing hostility against Southern and Eastern European immigrants proved very resili nt, 
and, at times, the passage of a law to regulate the illegal status of many immigrants seemed a 
Sisyphean task.  However, Cusumano noted, perhaps the current Administration could be the 
only one under which such a law could pass: 
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I am convinced that, given the President's liberal politics and Miss Perkins' humanitarian 
spirit, the probability of success in this session is higher than in the past.  However, th re 
are still many prejudices and misunderstandings about the foreigner in this Country.  
Your most committed personal interest is thus necessary to obtain laws that maintin 
intact the families and the households of these future Americans.339 
Despite Cusumano's confidence in the Roosevelt Administration, the Dies bill never became law. 
Yet public campaigns and testimonies in Congress were only part of the plan to solve the 
problem within the Italian American community.  
The letters that many Italian Americans wrote to their local Italian newspapers revealed 
yet other facets of illegality, namely confusion about the many provisions in the law and the 
widespread fraud committed against immigrants.  The Corriere della Sera, Corriere d'America, 
Il Commerciante Italiano, and La Donna Italiana all established permanent weekly columns to 
answer questions about immigration matters.  Most of the letters sent to the C rriere della Sera 
and the Corriere d'America asked questions pertaining to citizenship issues in general, but many 
of them specifically inquired about what happened to illegal immigrants who wanted to become 
citizens or who feared to adjust their status because of a past crime.  Some of the letters also 
revealed some common misconceptions about legality.  Sixty-five year old Maddalena thought 
that her thirty-two year residence in the United States sufficed to make her a citizen and now 
asked where and how she could apply for her social security.  Similarly, Ingrassia believed that 
when evaluating his application for citizenship, the judge would grant him citizenship because of 
his long-term residence in the country.  Lastly, a World War One veteran asked if his registration 
with the immigration authorities would automatically adjust his status from illegal to legal 
immigrant.340  Many of the letters also revealed that some individuals took advantage of the 
desperation and credulity of aspiring Italian immigrants or of Italian immigrants who resided in 
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the United States and sought to adjust their status.  Commenting on a reader's hope for P 's 
campaign to succeed, a journalist of the Corriere della Sera urged him not to "let the usual 
swindlers who promise that they can obtain your citizenship card for you convince you. You 
might find yourself in serious trouble."341 
The monthly New York-based La Donna Italiana, the only Italian women's newspaper 
published in the United States, and Il Commerciante Italiano revealed yet other concerns that its 
readers had when it came to immigration.  Similar to letters sent to other newspaper , the queries 
that troubled Italian women also pertained to the adjustment of status for illegal immigrants, the 
procedure to apply for citizenship, and the rules on derivative citizenship.  Aware of their 
different status in the eyes of the law, many women wrote letters to inquire about which laws 
specifically applied to their cases.  They wondered if they lost their citizenship if they divorced, 
if their husbands enjoyed similar citizenship benefits to those of women marrying American 
citizens, and if their citizenship would help their fiancé immigrate to the United States and 
become a citizen more easily and more quickly.342  Yet, as caretakers of the family finances, they 
also seemed to have more practical concerns in mind.  On May 1938, in a letter to La Donna 
Italiana, Marta M. from Union City, NJ, wondered about the fee to apply for the final certifi ate 
to obtain citizenship.  Significantly, the reply stressed that the amount of the fee—ten dollars—
was still prohibitive and often prevented many aspiring citizens from applying for citizenship, 
but the response reassured that help might be on the way: 
Congressman Emanuel Celler has presented a bill H.R. 9907 to bring the fee down to 
$2.00.  This bill, if made law, would facilitate the process of naturalization of millions of 
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non citizens, desirous to become such but unable to pay the current fee.  All the Italo-
American organizations and individuals should write letters of support for this bill.343 
More significant perhaps than the prohibitive costs of the naturalization process, the response to 
Marta's question revealed the beginnings of a renewed collaboration with Jewis  politicians and 
organizations similarly interested in immigration matters.  
Amnesty for illegal immigrants already in the country became a crucial issue for 
American Jews as well, especially after many European Jews tried to escape persecution 
following Hitler's ascent to power.  In March 1936, 2,000 people attending the celebrations for 
the fifty-first anniversary of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society urged Congress to humanize 
some parts of the country's immigration policy by passing the Kerr-Coolidge Bill.  To reinforce 
their pleas, Abraham Herman, president of the society, reported that the promulgation of the 
Nuremberg laws and the rising anti-Semitism in Poland and Rumania had led thousands more 
Jews to register with the agency for help.  To that point, HIAS, in collaboration with the Jewish 
Colonization Association, had assisted 13,428 German Jews to relocate to South America, China, 
Palestine, Spain, France, and the United States.  The society, already with thirty-one agencies 
operating across the world, was looking for new countries where Jews could relocate.344  
Many critics of the country's immigration policy considered its deportation directives 
excessive because they warranted deportation even for minor technical violations.  Many 
supporters of the Kerr-Coolidge bill observed that the pending deportations would separate 
families, punish prospective productive and law-abiding citizens, and protect professional 
criminals from deportation.  Both the House and Senate Committees on Immigration and 
Naturalization recommended the adoption of the bill.345  Reflecting the sentiments of many 
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supporters of the bill, New York Senator Royal S. Copeland adduced that the exceptional 
circumstances in Europe granted the pardon of these cases to avoid sending illegal aliens back to 
a destiny of certain persecution.346  On the other side, voicing the sentiments of many 
restrictionists, William B. Griffith, chairman executive of the Immigration Restriction League, 
criticized the Kerr-Coolidge bill as giving too much discretionary power to the already 
munificent Secretary of Labor Perkins and Commissioner of Immigration McCormack to decide 
on deportation cases and as adding more criminals, dependents, and unemployed at a time when 
the country was undergoing a serious economic crisis and had over eleven million 
unemployed.347  The Kerr-Coolidge bill never became law. 
The mobilization on behalf of the Kerr-Coolidge bill represented only one of the many 
attempts by the American Jewish community to help European Jews leave Europe.  From the 
moment Roosevelt took office in 1933, American Jews sought to persuade the president and his 
administration to intervene on behalf of European Jews and change the existing immgration 
laws to facilitate their immigration to the United States.  From 1933 to 1936, the two different 
Jewish groups—the "accommodationists" and the "protesters"—worked both together and 
separately to focus the government's attention on the fate of European Jews, while a handful of 
prominent Jews tried to use their personal access to the president to elicit direct act on from him.  
As early as 1933, the three leading Jewish organizations, B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish 
Congress, and the American Jewish Committee, met to discuss a common strategy and, as result, 
formed a Joint Conference Committee to meet regularly to discuss the status of the German Jews 
and strategize the American Jewish response.  Yet only three weeks after the creation of the 
committee, without consulting the other two organizations, the American Jewish Congress 
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decided to endorse mass meetings and demonstrations across the country.  The alliance declined 
further when the American Jewish Congress supported a one-day boycott of German goods, 
despite the objections raised by American and European Jews alike.348 
Complicating the chances for American Jews to promote any concrete changes in the 
country's immigration policy was Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to deal with the Nazi 
persecution of Jews through a series of executive and administrative orders.  Although Roosevelt 
spoke out against Nazi persecutions, for years he chose to do little or nothing to change 
American immigration policy.  Revealing his reluctance to take serious action, in 1936, 
Roosevelt refused to appoint Rabbi Stephen S. Wise as one of the members of the American 
delegation to a League of Nations conference on refugees and sent a minor functionary inste d.  
Similarly, when his handpicked successor as New York governor, Hebert H. Lehman, wrote him 
in 1935 and in 1936 to inform him of the problems that German Jews were having in getting 
their visas, Roosevelt had the State Department write replies on his behalf.  The etters vaguely 
reassured the governor that consular officials abroad were carrying out their duties "in a 
considerate and humane manner."349  
The administration began to take more action on the refugee question only after the 
Anschluss, the German annexation of Austria in March 1938.  That year, Roosevelt created an 
Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, ordered an extension of the visitors' visas granted to 
German Jewish visitors to enable them to remain in the United States as long as possible, and 
instructed Secretary of State Hull to enjoin immigration officials to interpret liberally the 
sections of the 1924 Immigration Act requiring specific documentation for their visa 
applications, especially if the applicants were in personal danger.  The bitter criticisms that 
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Roosevelt's initiatives received from the public made it difficult for American Jews to plead for 
more action.  In November 1938, for the second time in two weeks, Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis met with President Roosevelt for forty minutes to plead with him to interve e on behalf 
of European Jews.  Brandeis's appeals came along with requests for intervention from the 
Women's International League of Peace and Freedom and the United Palestine Appeal, but they 
were ultimately to no avail, as Roosevelt continued to receive warnings against acti g on behalf 
of European Jews.350  On the same day Brandeis met with Roosevelt for the second time, Senator 
William E. Borah of Idaho proclaimed that any proposal to revise the existing immigration 
policy to allow more German refugees into the country would arouse tremendous oppositin in 
Congress.  Echoing Borah's comments, Chairman Martin Dies of the House Committee 
investigating Un-American Activities challenged the right of the President to extend the six-
month visitors' visa permits under which between 12,000 and 15,000 refugees had already been 
admitted.351  
 American Jews rejoiced in 1938 when Roosevelt also asked Secretary of State Hull to 
organize an international conference to facilitate the emigration of political refugees out of 
Austria and Germany, under the condition that no country receive a greater number of 
immigrants than prescribed by its existing laws.  The only major accomplish ent of the 
conference held in Evian, France, in July 1938, was the creation of an Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees with headquarters in London.  Jewish organizations applauded the 
creation of the committee, as they knew that, given its magnitude, no private agencycould deal 
with the refugee problem adequately.  Yet they also asked the American government to expand 
the powers of the new committee to coordinate emigration plans for displaced and stateless 
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Jews.352  Just before the outbreak of the war, the committee reached a secret agreement 
stipulating the orderly emigration of 400,000 Jews over a period of five years, but the beginning 
of hostilities invalidated it.  By 1945, the enthusiasm for the committee waned and many Jewish 
organizations realized that  
while eager to serve and highly successful in preparatory work, [the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees] is still lacking both the means and the authority needed to 
achieve the task itself.  General resistance to emigration schemes prevails on the part of 
governments, often in the hope that the delay may further reduce the number of the 
displaced persons who wish to emigrate.353   
Their fears about resistance within the government was justified.  Many Stte Department 
officials, in fact, repeatedly obstructed refugees' applications for asylum in the United States.  
 Emblematic of the State Department's attitude toward assisting European refugees was 
Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long's obstructionism.  Typical of his attitude towards 
European refugees was his false claim to a congressional committee on November 26, 1943, that, 
in the ten years since the rise of Hitler to power, the United States had admitted about 580,000 
refugees under the quota, "not counting American generosity with visitors' and transit visas." 
Many Jewish organizations as well as scholars of immigration and state officials criticized 
Long's estimate as based on the number of visas issued rather than persons actually admitted into 
the country.354  Attorney General Francis Biddle, in an address before the 1944 Convention of 
the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, stated that the United States had admitted an aver ge of 
fewer than 28,000 immigrants a year during the same time period.  Former Commissioner of 
Immigration and Naturalization Earl Harrison equally objected to Long's labeling of all 
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immigrants as refugees.  Under Long's definition, Harrison observed, "Our entire nation can be 
said to consist of refugees and their descendants."355   
Despite all their efforts to humanize existing immigration policy, Italian Americans and 
Jewish Americans accomplished little in terms of immigration reform in the 1930s.  Both groups, 
as A. Abbot Rosen reminisced in his interview for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith 
Oral Memoirs, were still "an immediate post-immigrant community" trying to adjust to life in 
America under restriction during a time of economic hardships and amidst hostility and 
resentment towards them.356  Though both groups achieved political prominence through the 
New Deal coalition, neither achieved enough political clout to influence Congress or the 
President to change the country's immigration policy.  They still faced fierce opposition from a 
broadly based, bipartisan coalition of hostile and suspicious voters, including Southern 
Democrats and Western and Midwestern Republicans.  The outbreak of World War II, by 
contrast, dramatically changed their opportunities to have an impact on American immigration 
laws.  In addition to the new role that the war assigned the United States and the beginnings of a 
new civil rights movement, changes to the immigration policy enacted during the war provided 
stepping stones for future changes and paved the way for more effective lobbying in the 1950s 
and 1960s.  
 
World War II: "The Refugee Invasion of America through Immigration"357 
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The outbreak of the war in Europe brought little change to American immigration policy
until the fall of France in June 1940, when nativists and others began to fear that Nazi agents 
disguised as immigrants or refugees were infiltrating the country as fifth columnists.358  In 
response to these pressures, Congress passed the Alien Registration Act of 1940 and transferred 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from under the aegis of theDepartment of 
Labor to the Department of Justice, de facto transforming its functions from protective to 
prosecutorial.359  The Alien Registration Act provided criminal penalties for various subversive 
activities, expanded the grounds for deportation, and required all aliens to register and r port any 
change of address or employment.360  Within months after passing the Smith Act, Congress 
ratified the Selective Service Act, requiring all men between twenty-two and thirty-five years of 
age to go through a year of military training.  The following year, the President authorized the 
FBI to wiretap suspects of subversive activities, especially aliens, declared a state of national 
emergency, and closed the Italian and German consulates and repatriated their diplomatic staff.  
Many Italian and Jewish organizations had long opposed the registration of aliens, and, 
after Congress passed the Alien Registration Act, they immediately mobilized along with other 
ethnic organizations to ensure that its enforcement did not discriminate against its targets.361  
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Encouraged by calls for cooperation from the government, many of these organizations met to 
discuss how to address potential problems and had conferences with representatives from the 
Division of Alien Registration and other officials in the Department of Justice.  Th  meetings 
convinced them that they could provide an extremely important service to the Government, to 
immigrants, and to the public in general by assisting immigrants to prepare for registration.  To 
this end, they jointly issued a memorandum outlining the law, the solutions to possible problems 
that could arise, and how to avoid cases of exploitation.  Difficulties with the process derived 
either from uncertainty of status, illegal entry, technical infractions of laws and regulations, and 
past participation in activities now deemed questionable or from language difficulties, lack of 
information, and fears as to the purposes and consequences of registration.  The organizati ns 
also worried that the law would be used "to impose a stigma on the law-abiding alien population" 
and organized to prevent the use of registration "as an excuse for discharging or black-listing 
aliens, or extorting money, or otherwise imposing upon them."  To prevent this from happening, 
the memorandum encouraged the organization of programs of public education about the 
implications of the law for immigrants and Americans alike.362   The collaboration and help that 
these organizations provided during the registration process set an important precedent that 
would later influence the government's decision to seek their help again when it had to de l with 
refugee resettlement. 
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At the same time, the outbreak of the war made immigration policy part of President 
Roosevelt's wartime foreign relations strategy.  This enabled him to enact a series of small 
initiatives to help refugees without obtaining Congress's approval.  He asked his Advisory 
Committee on Refugees to put together a list of eminent refugees and then instructed the State 
Department to issue temporary visas in their names.  In late 1940, the Roosevelt Administration 
authorized consuls outside of Germany to issue visas to refugees who had managed to reach 
places like Portugal, French Africa, and China, and to charge them to the German quota 
established in the 1924 Immigration Act.  Then, in January 1941, an agreement with Canada 
allowed refugees with temporary visas in the United States to cross the border, apply for a quota 
number in Canada, and reenter the United States as regular immigrants.  Finally, the Roosevelt 
Administration took the lead in providing for refugees in North Africa and Europe first under the 
Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation at the State Department and later under the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).363  
The provisions the government took following the fall of France to Nazi Germany set in 
motion two distinct paths for Italian Americans and American Jews regarding mobilization 
against immigration restriction during World War II.  The Smith Act along with the other 
security orders set up mechanisms that eventually led to Italian resident al ens becoming enemy 
aliens for most of 1942.  The new regulations tested the entire community for loyalty and 
silenced its voice against immigration restriction at least until Italy switched sides and became an 
ally.  Italian Americans did not get involved in the relocation of refugees and displaced persons 
until after the war was over.  American Jews, on the other hand, while appreciative of the 
Roosevelt Administration's initiatives, challenged the negative propaganda surrounding the 
refugees and pressed for drastic changes in the country's immigration policy.  As they fought for 
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refugee legislation, they obtained changes in the overall immigration law that ould later be 
crucial to the fight to repeal the quota system in 1965.   
The war and the persecution of European Jews precipitated a debate among American 
Jews over immigration restriction.  For many American Jews, finding a viable solution for 
European refugees and displaced persons coincided with the abolition of the quota system.  Yet, 
as it had been the case throughout the campaign against the quotas, Jewish organizati ns helping 
European refugees and advocating a liberal immigration policy initially worried about exposing 
themselves too much; they did not want to turn the refugee problem into an exclusively Jewish 
question.  The rampant anti-Semitism of the 1930s had declined but not disappeared.  Sporadic 
episodes of intolerance and anti-Semitism re-emerged throughout the war and encouraged many 
Jewish organizations to act behind the scenes.364  Moreover, the fear of fifth columnists 
threatening the survival of American democracy rekindled the flurry of proposals advocating 
further immigration restriction, the most radical of which was the Gossett Bill, asking to cut the 
immigration quotas in half.365 
When discussing possible solutions for the refugee problem, all Jewish organizations 
recognized the need to push the countries that could absorb individual immigrants to open their 
doors at the end of the war.  Yet Jewish groups and potential receiving countries hotly debated 
the terms and conditions for admitting potential Jewish refugees.  A 1940 American Jewish 
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Committee memo outlined a proposal for Jewish organizations to prepare both the aspiring
Jewish emigrants and the receiving countries for each other.  The American Jewish Committee 
committed to create a bureau that, in collaboration with other Jewish and non-Jewish institutions, 
would survey and train the aspiring immigrants in agricultural, manual, and industral labor.  The 
Committee would also work to assure positive public opinion in potential receiving countries to 
support legislation in favor of Jewish immigrants and to welcome the new immigrants as a 
valuable asset.366  Despite the 1940 memo's optimism, its authors were also aware of the massive 
numbers of Jews who desired to leave Europe and the reluctance of most Western countries t  
welcome new immigrants.  Thus, they also encouraged the committee to find alternative 
destinations, including Africa, Asia, or Alaska, that could accommodate entire groups of Jewish 
immigrants, not just individuals.  In 1944, representatives of the American Jewish Committee 
conducted extensive trips to Latin American countries to convince them to receive European 
Jews, but the two sides disagreed on the details of the communities in which the migrants would 
live once they arrived.  In 1945, an American Jewish Committee Latin American specialist, 
accompanied by a non-Jewish South American, visited the embassies of eight South American 
countries in Washington to encourage them to open their doors to European Jews, but most of 
the negotiations proved fruitless.367  
These discouraging results convinced a growing number of American Jews that the 
creation of an autonomous Jewish state represented the best solution for the Jewish refugee 
problem.  As the situation in Europe worsened and American governmental intervention 
languished, even the more reluctant American Jews, such as those affiliated with the American 
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Jewish Committee, began to endorse the creation of a Jewish homeland.368  As the idea gained 
momentum, however, many American Jews realized that they also had to continue to lobby the 
American government until it relented, as even the creation of a Jewish state might fail to resolve 
the European refugee problem: 
Even with early favorable solution of the Palestinian impasse, homes in countries other 
than Palestine will have to be found for a far larger number of European Jews than was 
anticipated.  Appeals to nations of the world have fallen on deaf ears, and it is now clear 
that unless the United States sets an example, no change in their attitude can be 
expected.369 
This awareness convinced many Jewish organizations to act on both fronts.  To this end, on 
January 16, 1944, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau presented Roosevelt a report 
indicting American policy in general in regard to European refugees and singling out the State 
Department for keeping immigration well below the established quotas in the name of national 
security and for failing to rescue Jews.  The report convinced Roosevelt to undertake additional 
steps on behalf of Jewish and other refugees.  He issued an executive order creating th  War 
Refugee Board, and, in June 1944, he ordered that approximately 1,000 refugees be brought from 
Italy to the United States.370   
As they exerted pressure on the White House, many Jewish organizations, in 
collaboration with non-Jewish representatives, began a campaign to create support for 
humanitarian refugee legislation among Americans at large.  For many of the individuals 
involved, dissipating rumors about "the refugee influx" represented a primary objective.  Many 
considered their efforts to rally support for refugee legislation a patriotic duty and a contribution 
to an American victory in the war:  
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As we approach the closing phase of the war, the work of the [Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi] 
League is more urgent than ever before.  Between now and the time peace treaties a  
ratified, good Americans must fight and win the great political battle which w ll decide 
who has actually won the war.  The League's function in exposing enemy propaganda, 
anti-Semites, "Nationalists" and neo-Isolationists is therefore immediately urgent in a 
sense never paralleled before in the history of our organization.371 
The campaign to gain support was nevertheless arduous and lost momentum, as the closing of 
the war profiled new enemies on the horizon.  In an attempt to persuade the newly constituted 
Truman Administration into immediate action, prominent Jews organized a meeting with the 
Secretary and Under Secretary of State in the fall of the 1945.  The American Jewish Committee 
urged the full use of the quotas up to the maximum of 150,000, the reopening of American 
consulates in Germany and Austria, and the preference for displaced persons and refugees at all 
European consulates.372  This time, the pressure worked. 
On December 22, 1945, President Truman issued an immigration directive reserving half 
of the quotas of European countries for displaced persons (DPs).  Truman issued his order amidst 
strong criticisms.  Many Americans, in fact, shared isolationist Hamilton Fish's sentiments: "If I 
were in Congress today, I would sponsor a bill to deport all aliens, immediately after the war, if 
they had been admitted to this country within the last ten years."373   The president hoped that his 
provision would bring about 40,000 DPs a year to the United States.  Trying to reassure activist 
Americans, Truman insisted that the provision conform strictly to the quotas imposed by the 
1924 Immigration Act, yet his directive allowed for the kind of quota swapping that the c  
explicitly forbade.  Despite the broad scope of the directive, only about 5,000 Jewish and non-
Jewish DPs arrived in the United States in the first nine months of 1946.  United Nations Relief 
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and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) director Fiorello La Guardia's pleas that Congress 
amend the law to allow greater flexibility in its application remained unheard.374  "The United 
States," journalist Thomas Hamilton wrote, "once the haven of refuge for the oppressed peoples 
of Europe, has been almost as inaccessible as Tibet."375  October 1946, an American Jewish 
Committee analysis of the directive reflected a similar disappointment.  The author of the 
analysis believed that inflexibility of the legislation, insufficient fiancing, understaffing, 
thorough screenings, and lack of transportation accounted only in part for the limitations of 
Truman's directive.  "There is no doubt," the document read, "that the State Departm nt did not 
use all the necessary dispatch and maybe even not all the good will for the carrying out of the 
President's directive."376  It was a meager consolation that during the first months of the directive 
the number of Jewish refugees was higher than non-Jewish refugees, as American J ws knew 
that this was only because non-Jewish welfare agencies lagged behind the Jewish ones in the 
work of assisting immigrants.  
 More importantly, the United States' inaction on its requests to solve the refugee and 
displaced person problem intensified the other countries' reluctance to open their doors.  In an 
American Jewish Committee memorandum, its authors explicitly said that America's 
immigration policy could hardly dissuade the other countries from their indifferenc  to the war 
refugee problem and admitted that "in our attempts to preach to other nations, we have b en 
handicapped by our own practice."377  If the United States kept its restrictive immigration policy, 
other countries would never change their attitudes.  The time had come to ask again for the 
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passage of more liberal immigration laws.  However, the memorandum warned, the battle would 
be difficult to win, and it encouraged the Committee to seek non-Jewish allies, to work with non-
sectarian organizations, and to mobilize public opinion on behalf of a measure that, "in addition 
to offering a haven here for Jewish refugees, seems indispensable if a haven is to be found for 
them in other lands."378  This was exactly the strategy that the American Jewish Committee was 
to follow to push for refugee and DP legislation immediately after the war. 
Despite its disappointing results, Truman's directive introduced a major chnge that 
would shape the country's immigration and refugee policies for the rest of the century.  Rather 
than requiring affidavits of support filed by financially stable individuals, the directive allowed 
blanket assurances for large number of persons issued by competent agencies to assist the 
government in refugee resettlement.379  Until then, as Seymour Graubard remembered, many 
affluent American Jews had signed affidavits in the hope of helping Jewish applicants in Europe:  
"During those years, like so many of my friends, I signed affidavits of support for would-be 
immigrants.  It did not matter whether or not I knew the people for whom I signed."380  By 
including private groups in the administration of immigration policy, the Truman Directive 
inaugurated a sea change in the role that interest groups would have in the draftingand 
enactment of the country's immigration policy.  This change provided these organizations, 
including Italian and Jewish ones, with special access to the government and legitimiz d their 
advocacy for immigration reform. 
As American Jews struggled to help European Jews, the Italian American community 
wrestled with attacks on its loyalty to the United States.  As Mussolini and Fscism lost favor in 
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America, Italian Americans quickly realized that any connection with either of them could 
profoundly hurt their chances to be accepted as legitimate members of American society.  On 
more than one occasion, Italian Americans found themselves compelled to justify their actions 
and their support for the war effort against "the disgraceful and unwarranted insinuations that are 
being made daily by malicious newspaper writers, by the subversive groups and by the real 'fifth 
columnists' of the country."381  In the face of mounting American criticisms of Italy's war, Italian 
Americans began to distance themselves from Mussolini and his government and to challenge 
any charges of disloyalty based on their earlier political dalliances with Il Duce.  "Americans of 
Italian origin," claimed G.S. in his open letter to an Anglo-Saxon friend published in The Vigo 
Review, "are not interested in Fascism, Nazism, or Communism. The only 'ism' they believe in is 
Americanism.  Italy to them is only a cultural expression, and they should not be blamed if they 
take some interest in Italian literature or Italian painting or Italian music."382  Not all Italian 
Americans went this far in denying any real connection to Italy.  Others, especially as the war 
began, took it upon themselves to prove to Americans that Italians living in Italy, like thos  
living in the United States, disapproved of Mussolini and Fascism and they argued that an 
American victory in the war represented a victory for the Italian people as well.  Many also 
resented the lingering discrimination against them because of their ancestry.  In an article about 
the refusal of two U.S. Navy officers to hire an Italian applicant because of his ethnic origin, the 
journalist lamented that Anglo immigrants were still favored and their loyalty and patriotism 
never questioned: "Speaking the same language as the American people, they are no sooner 
admitted into this country that they soon call themselves Americans. Though newly arrived, to 
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them, even a descendant of the third generation of an immigrant from a non-English speaking 
country of Europe is a foreigner."383 
Distancing themselves from any association with Fascist Italy and condemning Fascism 
as undemocratic, many Italian Americans set in motion a campaign to rehabilitate Italy's name in 
America.  In New York City, on November 25, 1941, a group of Italian Americans decided to 
found the bi-weekly newspaper L'Azione to dissipate "the legend created abroad by Fascism, and 
accepted for mental inertia or out of interest, that the Italian people is Fasci t."384  The day of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, a group of prominent Italians from the Mazzini Society sent a telegram to 
President Roosevelt expressing their support for a free America and  free Italy:  
On the day when Japan, vanguard of the Axis, treacherously attacks the United States, the 
Italians and Italo-Americans of the Mazzini Society reaffirm their absolute loyalty to the 
principles of justice and liberty for which free America and free Italy stand and offer their 
unlimited services to the American nation for the cause of the democracies against ll 
tyrants and aggressors.385 
Similarly, the United Italian-American League telegraphed President Roosevelt urging the defeat 
of all enemy forces.386  The Comitato d'Azione degli Ex-Combattenti d’Italia announced, in an 
article in L'Azione, that the war was total and urged Italians living in the United States to fight to 
free Italy and Europe and Italians living in Italy to resist and oppose Fascism. Together both 
groups, along with people from all over the world, had to fight against Fascism, Nazism, nd 
Japan.387  Italian-language newspapers, as well as many Italian groups acros the country, rushed 
to declare their unstinting support of the American government.388  Far from voicing protests 
against the detention of Italians, many of these newspapers justified and accepted the need for 
vigilance and detention of suspect individuals in times of war. 
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Despite their efforts to defend their loyalty to the United States and the fact that Italian 
Americans were disproportionately represented among enlisted personnel in the war, attacks 
against resident Italians began immediately after America's entry into the war in December 
1941.389  Within the first few weeks following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the government issued 
a series of proclamations that declared noncitizen Italians, Japanese, and Germans to be alien 
enemies and established regulations governing their conduct.390  All enemy aliens had to register 
and receive certificates of identification to carry with them at all times.  The new regulations 
required 600,000 Italian residents to carry identity cards at all times, limited their freedom of 
movement, and forced 10,000 Italians residing in California alone to relocate.  Local poli e 
conducted searches in many homes to sequester guns, shortwave radios, and cameras; arrested 
about 1,500 Italians for curfew, travel, and contraband violations; and sent 250 Italians to 
internment camps for up to two years.391   
Bewilderment, frustration, and concern followed the issuance of the orders among Italia  
Americans.392  Many feared that the provisions against enemy aliens would lead to mass 
internment and/or deportation.  The initial relocation of many Italians on the West Coa t and the 
news about what the Japanese and Japanese Americans were undergoing caused a surge in the 
number of naturalizations within Italian American communities across the country.393  The low 
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naturalization rate among Italian Americans raised particular sspicion.  For many Americans, 
naturalization represented the most tangible evidence of immigrants' loyalty and allegiance to 
their new country.  That Italians living in the United States for over forty years often preferred to 
maintain their Italian citizenship convinced officials in both the War and State Departments that 
these immigrants were under the ideological spell of Fascism.  Many of these officials also 
believed that the maintenance of dual citizenship, as many Italians did, constituted another 
blatant proof of their disloyalty.  Although the officials used the dual citizenship argument 
primarily to intern many Japanese Americans, Italy and Germany had long insisted on adherence 
to dual citizenship even more aggressively than Japan.  Italian law strictly enforced the principle 
by descent, according to which, no matter where a child lived, he or she remained an Italian 
citizen if either parent was Italian.  Even their Italian passport reminded them that space and time 
placed no limit to their allegiance to their homeland.394 
Italians' experiences with the internment program were inconsistent and unpredictable.  
Unlike their Japanese and German counterparts, of the approximately 4,000 Italians who faced 
arrest and/or detention under the internment program, most of them ultimately only answered a 
few questions and received a release or parole, spending very little time in custody.395  Most of 
the Italians whom the authorities took in for questioning or interned were individuals who had 
joined pro-Fascist organizations before the outbreak of the war or who had been vocal about 
their support for and admiration of Mussolini.  They usually fell in one of the following three 
categories: members of the Federation of Italian War Veterans; editors/writers for Italian-
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language newspapers and announcers on Italian-language radio; and instructors in Italian-
language schools sponsored by the local Italian consulate.396  Yet many prominent Italian 
Americans who had had close ties with Mussolini and his regime remained untouched, thanks to 
the political influence they had achieved, especially within the Democratic P rty and labor 
unions.  Moreover, stereotypes about the soft "Italian character" and  the popularity of  handful 
of Italian Americans, including Fiorello La Guardia, Don Ameche, and Joe DiMaggio, helped 
consolidate a less threatening image of Italian Americans.  According to a survey conducted in 
April 1942, forty-six percent of Americans considered the Germans the most dangerous element 
in the nation, thirty-five percent chose the Japanese, and two percent selected Italians. Finally, 
Italy's repeated defeats during the first months of the war persuaded many A ericans that it 
could hardly represent a threat to the United States.397   
The very different outcomes of the decisions to intern Italians and Japanese ultimately 
reflect the different impact that the 1924 Immigration Act had on the two groups and the 
different role that racism and discrimination played for the groups.  As Fox points out, "It was 
the racially motivated step of halting Asian immigration in 1924 and its numerical implications 
across the country, not the attack on Pearl Harbor and its bitter emotional legacy, that determined 
what happened to the Japanese in 1942, and why Italians and Germans did not experience the 
same fate."398  Because of the 1924 Act, the fewer and disenfranchised Japanese on the mainland 
were more vulnerable to relocation than the vastly larger, more scattered, politically organized, 
economically prominent, and more "assimilable" Italian and German communities.399  
Significantly, similar to Italian and German communities on the mainland, the Japanese 
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community in Hawaii was spared from internment and relocation, mostly because of its size and 
its role in the Hawaiian economy.400  Finally, as Daniels explains, although the language of the 
proclamations treated the different enemy nationalities identically, in practice, the government, 
from the White House down, had a hierarchical notion about the seriousness of the threat that 
each group posed.  In a private conversation with Attorney General Francis Biddle, President 
Roosevelt himself admitted that he worried more about the Germans than the Italians, who were 
"a lot of opera singers."401  
With an eye to the impending November congressional elections, on Columbus Day 
1942, Attorney General Biddle announced the decision to lift the blanket designation of 
unnaturalized Italians as enemy aliens.402  As historical accounts have documented, in addition to 
the notion that Italian aliens were less dangerous than others, two reasons influeced the 
administration's decision:  the congressional elections scheduled for November 1942 and plans to 
invade Italy the following spring.  President Roosevelt and his political advisors m st likely still 
remembered the aftermath of FDR's June 1940 speech condemning Mussolini's declaration of 
war on France.  Following his speech, many Italian American voters in New York, San 
Francisco, Philadelphia, and other American cities had supported Wendell Willkie's candidacy. 
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Moreover, the large presence of Italian American soldiers in the armed forces warranted the need 
for their crucial support in the Italian campaign.403  
As preparations for the campaign in Italy began, the American government, much as it 
did during World War I, sought the help of prominent Italian American organizations and 
individuals to promote its agenda in Italy.  The shift began when governors and other prominent 
authorities in states with large Italian American constituencies lauded in public the Italian 
American support and valor in the war.404  On January 4, 1943, the government appointed the 
newly instated New York governor Charles Poletti as special assistant to Secretary of War Henry 
L. Stimson.  For his experience in state politics and his Italian ancestry, the army selected Poletti 
as the U.S. Army civil affairs officer in postwar Italy, where he rose to the rank of colonel.  The 
government also sent labor organizer Luigi Antonini to address the northern industrial workers.  
 Despite the high numbers of enlistments in the U.S. army, the collaboration with the U.S. 
government in the Italian campaign, and the pledges of support for the war effort, Italian 
Americans never advocated nor lobbied for changes to the existing immigration laws. They 
concentrated their efforts on securing support for American intervention in Italy, on convincing 
Americans that Italians had pledged to Fascism under duress and as such needed help to restore a 
democratic Italy, and on collecting money and supplies to provide relief after Mussolini's regime 
fell.  In the meantime, however, they rose more prominently in the political sphere and acquired 
the connections, the language, and the mobilization strategies they would later adopt to advocate 
for immigration reform in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
Conclusion 
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As World War Two came to an end, American Jews and Italian Americans realized that a 
new era was about to begin in the history of their communities.  Living in a restrict d and 
depression-stricken America, American Jews and Italian Americans during the 1930s became for 
the first time a predominantly native-born rather than an immigrant population.  As they wrestled 
with this new reality, both communities worked to negotiate their presence in the United States, 
carve out a niche for themselves in American society, and attenuate the hars st provisions of the 
1924 Immigration Act on both sides of the Atlantic.  The Depression and pervasive nativism 
limited the effectiveness of their efforts to integrate into American society and their immigration 
battles of the 1930s, but these experiences taught them valuable lessons to use in the 1950s and 
1960s.  Their support and participation in the New Deal coalition reinforced the belief that the 
political arena represented the most appropriate setting to advocate for reform.  Their challenges 
to the LPC clause, the rules on illegal immigration and family reunion, and the existing refugee 
policy showed the importance of undermining restriction from the margins of legislation, the 
importance of advocating for reform in the name of family reunion, the usefulness of educational 
campaigns, and the need for interfaith collaboration to lay the groundwork for a widespread 
support for reform.    
As American Jews and Italian Americans prepared for a post-war world, they hardl  
realized how the war had set in motion changes that would profoundly shape their fight against 
restriction until 1965.  In addition to the Truman Directive giving power to private organizations 
to handle resettlement and intervene in the immigration reform debate, modifications to 
immigration laws unrelated to European immigrants opened the immigration door a little nd 
provided immigration reform advocates with critical arguments for theicampaign later on.405  
Congress's decision to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Acts in 1943, make Chinese immigrants 
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eligible for naturalization, and assign China an annual quota of 105 to reward China for its 
wartime support transformed immigration policy from a domestic to a foreign policy issue.406  
Furthermore, the lobby that fought for the repeal of the exclusion acts effectively argued that 
ending exclusion represented a Christian and democratic philosophy, providing the foundation 
for a post-World War II rhetoric to contrast with the Communist hysteria of the 1950s.  Finally, 
the atrocities perpetrated in European concentration camps and the movement to end Western
colonialism challenged American society to re-evaluate, if slowly, the pervasive racism and 
discrimination in its society as the United States emerged as the leader of th  free world. 
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"International Migration and One World:" Reframing the Debate on Immigration Reform 
in a New Era, 1945-1952407  
 
Soon after the end of World War Two, Alexander F. Miller Write, director of the Anti-
Defamation League regional office in Miami, FL, organized a committee to talk to a hotel owner 
in the South Florida area who had placed on the hotel roof a sign, which read, "The Gulf Hotel: 
every room with a view without a Jew."  Miller recalled: 
Our attempted communication, to say the least, was unsuccessful.  'My Host' was 
unimpressed.  He was also a war veteran, and [he said] he had fought for the democratic 
right to keep away from "Jews and niggers and wops and the whole damn bunch who 
were trying to run the country into the ground by preaching newfangled notions like 
equality."  He had a right to let the whole world know how he felt.  As for the "Four 
Freedoms," he suggested a place where we might place that historic document.408  
The end of World War II marked the beginning of a new era both for the United States and for 
immigration reform advocates.  As the United States emerged as the leader of the free world, 
immigration policy assumed a new role and became central to the country's foreign policy 
interests.  As displaced persons and refugees wandered around Europe at the end of World War 
II, immigration and refugee legislation intertwined and brought new issues to the fore, 
challenging legislators and immigration reformers to define the boundaries nd the distinctions 
between the two.   
 From the end of the war to 1965, refugee and immigration debates often overlapped and 
opened new opportunities for immigration reformers to undermine the quota system.  American 
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Jews and Italian Americans played a key role in this shift in discourse, by r casting the debate to 
fit the country's Cold War agenda.  They emphasized the connection between immigration and 
American foreign policy, and Italian Americans framed immigration reform in the language of 
Christianity and humanitarianism, while Jews used that of social justice.  In a political climate in 
which the public was resistant to change to the immigration policy and suspicious of new 
arrivals, both groups understood that the best strategy to push for reform was first to weaken the 
existing immigration legislation by undermining some of its core provisions through ad hoc 
reforms and measures and later to advocate for an overhaul of the entire system at a more 
opportune moment.   
 The battle over the Displaced Persons Acts and the McCarran-Walter Act marked a 
transition to new approaches to immigration reform for both groups.  American Jews were the 
most visible and engaged proponents of refugee legislation.  Despite their claims to the contrary, 
they remained the prime motor behind the passage of the Displaced Persons Act.  The batle for
refugee legislation had two major consequences for the American Jewish Community.  It 
allowed them to carry on their long-standing commitment to provide succor to Jews in need 
around the world, and, at the same time, it transformed the premise underlying their mobilization 
for a liberal immigration policy.  Their work to promote refugee legislation, amidst efforts to 
resist the label of the refugee issue as a Jewish problem, reinforced their belief that immigration 
policy reform was a social justice issue that affected all groups and transformed it into a pivotal 
tenet of their agenda.  While they had made a similar argument during the 1920s, they now 
embraced it as their central mission, especially as the creation of the State of Israel and the 
Refugee Acts resettled the decimated European Jewry and Cold War geopolitics made it hard to 
help Jews behind the Iron Curtain.  Despite the mixed results, their efforts to prom te interfaith 
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cooperation during the refugee legislation campaign convinced many American Jews that an 
interfaith strategy represented the only way to work for universal immigration reform. 
 Italian Americans experienced a transformation of their own.  Italian Americans hardly 
participated in the mobilization for refugee legislation because they focused on other aspects of 
the aftermath of the Second World War, such as Italy's high unemployment rate and 
overpopulation problem.  As American Jews worked on refugee legislation, Italian Americans 
lobbied Congress to ratify a treaty with Italy that would allow their ancestral home to keep its 
African colonies as a way to solve its unemployment and overpopulation problem.  Despite the 
negative outcomes of their efforts, the experience taught them a few valuable lessons.  They 
learned that Italy's position in the Mediterranean, their own collaboration with the Catholic 
Church, and their professed anti-Communism all lent them the ears of Congress and the 
administration.  Moreover, unlike American Jews, they chose to focus pragmatically on 
mobilizing for provisions, bills, and amendments that specifically benefited Italian migration and 
Italy's interests.  Finally, Italian Americans' connections with Catholic resettlement agencies 
engaged in the debate on immigration reform opened the way for future interfaith collaboration.  
 More than ever before, American Jews and Italian Americans' fight for immigration 
reform overlapped with their efforts to be fully accepted in mainstream America and acquire 
more visibility in American society.  Both groups realized that religiosity and anti-Communism 
represented the most prominent symbols of belonging and credibility in 1950s America.  They 
reframed their immigration reform agenda to reflect both.  If anti-Communism also represented 
an obstacle to passing legislation, one of the appeals of the domestic "red scare" was its ability to 
offer "every American, however precarious his ancestry, the chance of being taken for a good 
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American simply by demonstrating a gut hatred for Commies."409  At the same time, both groups 
saw their church and synagogue membership rise, even if attendance at worship services 
remained small.  As sociologist Will Herberg noted at the time, "To find a place in American 
society increasingly [meant] to place oneself in one or another of these religious 
communities."410  Italian Americans and American Jews collaborated only sporadically between 
1945 and 1952, but the early years of the Cold War and the shared desire to portray themselves 
as staunch anti-communists began to create a common ground for Italian Americans and Jewish 
Americans, encouraging them to focus on the discriminatory nature of the quotas themselves.   
If anti-Communism and religion provided a reliable entry into mainstream America, the 
visibility that American Jews and Italian Americans achieved in the sphere of immigration 
reform was also the product of the solidification of a state-private network.  Fllowing a strategy 
begun during the war, the U.S. government continued to cement its connections with citizen 
groups, private sponsors, and voluntary agencies involved in immigrant resettlement.  As early as 
1948, a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs officially acknowledged that 
voluntary agencies should be considered "an essential counterpart of foreign assistance 
programs."411  International relief, particularly the relocation of migrants, refugees, and displaced 
persons, became the most important area of cooperation between church and state.  Collaborati n 
with the government brought agencies like ACIM, through its affiliation with the National 
Catholic Welfare Conference, and HIAS not just government subsidies for their relocation 
activities but also visibility to their immigration reform agenda.  
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 Yet if anti-Communism could function as a badge of honor and sign of belonging, the 
atmosphere of the early years of the Cold War also severely limited any serious attempt to 
advocate for changes to the country's immigration policy.  This was particularly true of the years 
from 1948 to 1952 and accounts in part for the difficulties of passing any refugee legislation.  
Albeit to a smaller degree, supporters of DP legislation and proponents of a liberal immigration 
policy often faced pressures similar to those that civil rights activists experienced during the 
same period.  McCarthyism framed and circumscribed both groups' battles and left very little 
space for criticism of the status quo.  It constrained their agenda, limited their strategies, and 
narrowed the boundaries of acceptable civil rights and immigration rights discourse at home and 
abroad.  As Mary Dudziak shows in her Cold War Civil Rights, McCarthyism transformed critics 
of American society into potential subversives and forced civil rights groups t repeat time and 
again that their goal was to fill out the contours of American democracy, not to challenge or 
undermine it.412   
  
The 'Delayed Pilgrims:' American Jews and the DP Acts (1948 and 1950)413 
  When the war came to an end in May 1945, from seven to eleven million displaced 
persons (DPs) were scattered across Europe.  By the fall of 1945, after a large majority had been 
repatriated, estimates counted fewer than two million non-repatriable DPs in Western Europe.  
Yet the United States and the West in general had little inclination to help them. They were 
either stateless victims of the Holocaust or expatriates of newly communist countries.  Late in the 
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winter of 1945, the U.S. Congress specified that the United States would admit, settle, or resettle 
refugees and displaced persons only after congressional approval and without any alter tion to 
the existing immigration policy.414  A 1945 Gallup Poll captured Americans’ attitude towards the 
DP problem.  The poll asked Americans whether more, fewer, or the same number of European 
immigrants should be admitted into the country than before the war.  Five percent of the 
respondents answered more, 32 percent answered the same, 37 answered fewer, 14 percent 
answered none at all, and 12 percent had no opinion.415 
Concerned by the negligent treatment of European DPs, American Jews immediately 
mobilized to attract the American government's attention to the DP problem.  They first 
contacted Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau.  Almost at the end of his appointment, 
Morgenthau tried unsuccessfully to persuade Truman to create an ad hoc cabinet committee to 
deal with the DP problem.  Morgenthau later approached Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. 
Grew to suggest that his department send Earl G. Harrison, former Commissioner of 
Immigration and current Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, to t ur the 
displaced persons camps in Europe to report on the conditions and the treatment of the DPs.  
Harrison's report was a bombshell.  It scathingly denounced the precarious living conditions in 
the camps and the isolation of the displaced persons.416  
Despite the improvements enacted in the camps after Harrison's report, many A erican 
Jews remained disappointed that the predicament of Jewish displaced persons continued t 
represent a low priority for the military, the American government, and the American people.  In 
response to this inaction, the American Jewish Committee took preliminary steps to carry out a 
                                                
414 Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door, 98. 
415 As cited in Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust, 114. 
416 "Memorandum to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry from the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid 
Society," 1946?, HIAS Collection, RG 245.4, series 1, folder IV-41a, YIVO, Center for Jewish History. 
197 
 
campaign to admit Jewish DPs.  Under condition of anonymity, its department of public 
information and education put together and mailed potential refugee legislation supporters a 
brochure sketching the DP problem and proposing ideas to change the existing American 
immigration policy to provide for the admission of refugees.  This initiative had immediate 
results.  In September 1946, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, the 
Catholic weekly Commoweal, Life magazine, and a few New York state politicians all endorsed 
the idea of bringing more refugees.  These public endorsements pushed President Truma  to 
make a new public commitment, resulting in a December, 1945, directive to admit refugees 
outside the quotas.417 
This early initiative demonstrated the American Jewish Committee's commitment to 
frame the DP problem and immigration reform in broader terms.  As early as 1945, the American 
Jewish Committee had decided that any action to promote change in the country’s immigration 
legislation must not be perceived as an exclusively Jewish initiative.  The wholproblem of 
immigration, the committee believed, was a question of American democracy in its relation to 
other nations and of honesty in dealing with them.  As such, the American Jewish Committee 
decided to "emphasize the democratic integrity of our laws rather than the exceptional need of 
the Jews for immigration into the United States."418  They also believed that Americans owed it 
to themselves "to establish a sound, sane immigration system responsive to their social and 
economic needs" and owed it to the world "to take the lead in fomenting international peace and 
good will and sharing equally in international responsibility."419  
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In early October 1946, Truman, disappointed by the meager results of his December 
directive, told reporters that he planned to ask Congress to enact legislation to admit Jewish 
refugees outside the existing quotas.420  The directive's insufficient ability to alleviate the 
situation could hardly be played down.  "It is significant to note," reported the American Jewish 
Committee, "that since the war's end, Palestine and Great Britain have accepted more displaced 
persons than has the United States, and Belgium almost as many.  During the period under 
review, Great Britain, Belgium, France, and Canada exceeded the United States in the number of 
displaced persons admitted."421   Yet, Truman's proposal overnight turned the DP problem into 
an issue of public concern and revealed the hostility that the majority of Americans felt towards 
Truman's suggestion.  A poll conducted later in October 1946 further underscored Americans' 
hostility to the president's idea.  Asked whether they favored "allowing more Jewish and other 
European refugees to come to the United States to live than are allowed under the law," only 16 
percent of the respondents said yes, while the remaining 72 percent said no and 16 percent said 
they had no opinion on the matter.422  Manifestations of hostility of this kind undoubtedly 
convinced American Jews involved in pushing for DP legislation of the importance of creating a 
coalition that involved non-Jews as well. 
Truman's proposal drew strong criticisms and attacks not only from traditional nativist 
groups and from people opposed to any change to the existing immigration policy, but also from 
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Orthodox and Zionist Jews concerned with the impact of American refugee policy on the 
prospects of creating a Jewish homeland.  Until Truman's announcement, American Zionists and 
non-Zionists unanimously approved the proposal to relocate 100,000 Jewish DPs to Palestine.  
While the non-Zionists viewed it as another initiative to assist the survivors of the war, Zionists 
considered it a crucial step towards the creation of a Jewish state.423  As early as February 1945, 
the American Jewish Committee had tried to create a united front on the matter by holding an 
informal conference to formulate "a unified Jewish post-war program" with the Agudas Israel, 
the American Jewish Conference, the American Jewish Congress, and the Jewish Labor 
Committee.424  Truman's new suggestion divided the two groups, and the united front crumbled.  
The two groups' different position on Palestine influenced their stance on Truman's 1946 
proposal.  To many Zionists, Truman's proposition signaled that the president had abandoned y 
hope of helping Jewish DPs move to the Holy Land.  This fear was not completely unfounded.  
As the Joint Distribution Committee's publication JDC Review reported, as of June 30, 1947, 
only ten percent of the refugees the organization had helped desired to go to Palestine.  Fifty 
percent of the remaining ninety percent desired to relocate to the United Sta s, and Latin 
America was a distant second-preferred destination with twenty-two percent.425  Under the 
leadership of Rabbis Abba Hillel Silver and Stephen S. Wise, the Zionists intensified their efforts 
to bring about a Jewish commonwealth.  Affiliated with the American Jewish Committee and the 
American Council for Judaism, the non-Zionists started lobbying to bring more Jewish displaced 
persons and refugees to the United States.  The two organizations worked behind the scenes to
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establish the nondenominational Citizens Committee on Displaced Persons (CCDP) with the 
primary objective of raising awareness on the DP problem and making public and congressional 
opinion more receptive to refugee legislation through a campaign of public education and 
persuasion.426  
 The American Jewish Committee, like many other Jewish agencies, initially hoped that 
Congress would understand on its own the need for change in immigration laws and act upon it.  
Yet, as late as April 1947, Congress had failed to act on the DP problem, and numerous 
congressmen had sponsored bills to restrict immigration.  Many of the bills called for a 
temporary suspension of immigration or for a drastic reduction of the existing quotas.427  It was 
then that the American Jewish Committee decided to take the lead.  Determined to keep i s
involvement in the DP cause as quiet as possible, the AJC set in motion its efficient and well-
oiled machine and its affluent members to create a nondenominational organization, to seek 
endorsements for its agenda from prominent non-Jewish public figures, and to identify respected 
Protestants to call for legislation on behalf of displaced persons.428  In light of this view, AJC 
members carefully avoided the involvement of any minorities of European origin in the nitial 
stages of the creation of the CCDP and decided that, if they wanted to succeed in bringing 
100,000 Jews to the United States, their campaign had to focus exclusively on those people 
uprooted by the war in Central and Eastern Europe.  Because no other well-organized and wll-
financed organization seriously joined the AJC campaign to raise awareness about the DP plight, 
"the American public learned only about the 850,000 or so DPs in or near the German, Austrian, 
and Italian assembly centers, and received almost no education about the other several million 
                                                
426 "The Call of the Hour: Presidential Address of Joseph M. Proskauer," American Jewish Yearbook, vol. 47 (1945-
1946), 687; see also Dinnerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust, 117. 
427 "Legislative Activities," American Jewish Year Book 49 (1947-1948), 219-220. 
428 "The Stratton Bill," American Jewish Year Book 49 (1947-1948), 220. 
201 
 
for whom the Jewish leaders felt no sense of responsibility."429  Americans learned little about 
the expulsion of about 12 million Volkedeutsche in the summer of 1945 and almost nothing 
about the Africans and Asians still roaming around the globe because they had been forced from 
their homes before, during, and after the war. 
 After securing Earl Harrison as chairman, the AJC carefully organized the first strategy 
session of the CCDP at the Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York City on December 20, 1946.  
AJC staff members prepared and mailed invitations to notable Americans, emphasizing the non-
sectarian nature of the organization.  The most urgent priority was to secure the endorsement of 
Protestant and Catholic leaders because, as an interim report on the American Jew sh Committee 
immigration campaign read, "any effective program in this area required the ac ive support of all 
sections of the population, particularly of the Catholic and Protestant lay and church groups, 
inasmuch as three quarters of the DPs are not Jews."430  The thirty-two prominent Americans 
who agreed to attend the first CCDP meeting included, among others, former Supreme Court 
Justice Owen Roberts; Charles P. Taft and Samuel McCrea Cavert, president and xecutive 
director of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America; Major General William J. 
Donovan, former head of the Office of Strategic Services; Catholic Bishop McIntyre; and a few 
Jewish leaders from business, labor, politics, philanthropy, and religious organizations.431  
Shortly after the meeting, Eleanor Roosevelt, Fiorello LaGuardia, William Green, former 
Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and Charles P. Taft all lent their am s as vice-
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chairmen to the CCDP letterhead.  The most authoritative endorsement from within the Italian 
community for DP legislation came from Charles Poletti, who was referred to as the "governor" 
of Italy by many Italians during his two-year stay in Italy as U.S. Army civil affairs officer.  In 
his letter to Harrison, Poletti unconditionally approved the passage of a DP Act.  "My military 
service in Italy in the Allied military government during the war and after," he wrote, "gave me 
first hand knowledge of the miserable conditions of the displaced people in Italy.  And, 
obviously, I know that the same situation exists in Germany and Austria.  In my opinion, 
allowing part of these refugees to come to the United States would be useful to our nation a d to 
world peace."432  
The meeting accomplished very little in terms of developing a strategy, but from he AJC 
standpoint it was a success.  The event brought the DP issue to the fore, it appeared as an 
initiative that noted Americans, and not Jewish interests, had promoted, and, more importantly, it 
immediately attracted the endorsements of other prominent Americans.433  Only then, did the 
CCDP pursue the endorsements from a wide variety of ethnic organizations to add to the lis  of 
supporters for the proposed immigration legislation concerning displaced persons.  Yet, despite 
the numerous endorsements that the CCDP received from its inception, very few non-Jews made 
or asked their organizations to make substantial donations to the committee.  Over 90 percent of 
the money that sponsored the committee’s activities came from individual Jews, Jewi h groups, 
and their friends.434  The mobilization for the passage of the first Displaced Persons Act 
remained a Jewish concern.   
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Italian Americans' response to the movement for DP and refugee legislation epitomized 
the reaction of many other non-Jewish ethnic groups with an interest in the issue.  Depite the 
fact that Italy hosted a substantial number of refugees, Italian Americans participated only 
marginally in the debate over the legislation to provide succor to refugees and displaced persons.  
When it came to the displaced persons legislation battle, the Italian American p ess mostly 
reported what the CCDP was doing, covered Jewish agencies' pleas to help Jewish displaced 
persons to emigrate to Israel, or contended that Britain should relieve Italy from some of her 
refugees.  Italian Americans, like Greek Americans and other groups, mostly endorsed American 
Jews' efforts through larger Catholic organizations involved in refugee resettlement like the 
National Catholic Welfare Conference expressed as the CCDP. 
 Similarly to the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion, the Citizens 
Committee on Displaced Persons chose to lobby specifically for the group it was repre enting 
rather than try to push for changes to the country's overall immigration policy.  Also similarly to 
the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion, the CCDP focused its effort  on alerting 
the wider public and members of Congress to the problem and building momentum in favor of 
legislation.  CCDP representatives participated in national and local conventions, prepared and 
mailed thousands of flyers to newspapers, wrote radio scripts, solicited articles on the topic, 
provided speakers and movies to local events, met with key leaders, identified congressmen who 
could help them pass DP legislation, sent out mailings, promoted letter-writing campaigns, and 
organized local groups to support the cause.  Hoping to rally broader support for its campaign for 
refugee legislation, the CCDP propaganda campaign emphasized from the very beginning that 80 
percent of the approximately 850,000 DPs in Europe were Christian.  The campaign also stressed 
that most of the people displaced by the war had already returned to their home country, and that 
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the few still in the camps could no longer go back either because they feared persecution or 
because the loss of their families and their former lives discouraged them from doing so.435  
These efforts continued throughout 1947 and 1948, as getting Congress to intervene with special 
legislation proved a Sisyphean task. 
 In addition to educating the public about the DP problem, the Committee also worked to 
find a Congressman who could present legislation in Congress.  Early on, they came to the 
conclusion that they needed to win the support of a member of the majority Republican party 
from the Midwest to give legislation any chance to pass.  After several congressmen refused to 
sponsor a bill, preferring to wait for solid and widespread support for the legislation to emerge, 
the CCDP settled on Republican William G. Stratton, Representative from Illinois, to introduce a 
bill that the CCDP had drafted.436  The Stratton bill called for the admission of 100,000 displaced 
persons for four consecutive years above and beyond the quotas.  It required aspiring immigrants 
still to meet all the requirements of American immigration law to be admitted and privileged 
close relatives of American citizens and allied war veterans.  The American Jewish Year Book 
reported, "Individuals and organizations favoring the admission of a fair share of displaced 
persons to the United States have rallied behind this proposal."437  Yet, despite a straightforward 
bill, the widespread support outside of Congress, and the encouragement of Truman's Special 
Assistant on Minority Affairs, David K. Niles, very few members of the eightieth Congress paid 
attention.  Few congressmen considered immigration legislation a priority.  
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 When the hearings on the Stratton bill began, the American Jewish Committee and the 
CCDP worried about presenting a nuanced image of the DP problem to discard the common 
belief that it represented an exclusively Jewish issue.  To this end, they carefully handpicked 
their witnesses and chose many prominent Americans and only two Jews, Rabbi Philip S. 
Bernstein, a former adviser on Jewish Affairs to the army in Europe, and Herbert H. L hman, 
former United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) director.  Moreover, 
they believed that the endorsement of the Truman administration would send a strong signal to 
Congress to pass legislation.  To convey its support for a solution to the DP problem, the 
administration sent Assistant Secretary of Labor Philip Hannah, Assistant Secretary of State John 
H. Hilldring, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Ugo Carusi, and three Cabinet 
members—Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, and 
Attorney-General Tom Clark—requested to testify.  The most successful speaker was Lieutenant 
Colonel Jerry M. Sage, respected by many legislators in Congress for his se vice as second in 
command to Colonel Stanley Mickelson, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the European 
Command.  Recalled from Europe expressly to offer an evaluation of the status of the DPs in 
Europe from a military perspective, Sage persuasively argued on behalf of the bill.438  The 
hearings proved to be an instructive experience for the American Jewish Committee as they 
justified its inclination to cast the DP problem in broader terms and demonstrated the lingering 
hostility towards Jewish immigration.   
 Critics of the bill presented familiar anti-immigration arguments to oppose its passage.  
They contended that the United States had already done more than the other Allies to help the 
DPs, expressed concern that the entering DPs might include subversives or be particularly 
susceptible to socialist and communist ideals, and argued that refugees represented a potential 
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threat to the jobs and standards of living of the American workforce.  As in previous debates, 
some of these witnesses also reflected the fear that the arrival of new destitute immigrants 
endangered the survival of the American institutions and the country itself.  Many of these 
witnesses were spokesmen for conservative groups like Charles E. Babcock of the Junior Order, 
United American Mechanics; John B. Trevor of the American Coalition of Patriotic S cieties; 
and Merwyn K. Hart of the National Economic Council.  As testimonies progressed, 
Representative Ed Gossett from Texas, a member of the Immigration Subcommittee of the 
House Judiciary Committee, became the most vocal critic of the bill.  Echoing many of its 
critics, Gossett reiterated that many of the DPs were subversives, and helso pointed out that 
many of them were Jewish and that the DP issue was receiving so much attention only because 
of the involvement of prominent Jewish groups in the matter.439  A few critics of the DP 
measures also pointed out that those in favor of helping European displaced persons and refugees 
were inconsistent in their concerns as they did little to help uprooted peoples in Palestine, India, 
China, and elsewhere.  An even smaller number of critics worried that legislation to help 
European refugees and displaced persons could establish a dangerous precedent to admit non-
Europeans as well.440  Despite the urgency to help Jewish displaced persons and refugees that 
many American Jews felt, the arguments against passing DP legislation because of a fear of a 
Jewish invasion confirmed the need to frame refugee and immigration reform as an issue 
concerning all immigrant groups.  
 The success that the CCDP's educational campaign about the number of Christians 
included among the European displaced persons confirmed the validity of this decision.  During
the summer of 1947, despite the reluctance of Congress to act swiftly on passing legislation, in 
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fact, the Stratton bill and its Senate companion, the Ferguson bill, won endorsements from many 
state and local government officials, from prominent national and local organizatio s, and from 
newspapers and magazines.441  More importantly, all the major bodies of Catholic, Protestant, 
and Jewish faiths in the United States publicly voiced their support for the bill.  The support of 
Catholic and Protestant institutions in turn attracted the backing of grass-root Catholics and 
Protestants across the country.  This shift contained yet another valuable lesson for American 
Jews' future efforts to reform immigration, one that they would soon adopt against the 
McCarran-Walter Act.  The majority of Catholics and Protestants began to f vor a refugee bill 
not only when they learned that many refugees were Christian, but also when they read in 
publications like the Jesuit weekly America and the Protestant weekly Christian Century that 
many of the European displaced persons were Christian victims of communism.  As Genizi 
explains, because communism embodied "Christianity’s archenemy, the churches reluctantly and 
gradually called upon America to open its gates to those people who refused to return to their 
countries of origin, now dominated by Communists."442  Finally, the emerging interfaith support 
for refugee legislation was also the product of earlier collaborations to dispel fears that an 
incessant flow of refugees would invade the United States.  In 1944, for example, the National 
Refugee Service along with four other national refugee-service organizations— he American 
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Committee for Refugees, the American Friends Service, the Catholic Committee for Refugees, 
and the United States Committee for the Care of European Children—commissioned a study on 
the adjustment of refugees and their effect on American society.443   
As the new congressional session began, congressmen knew that this time their 
constituents expected them to pass some form of legislation regulating the DP issue, but they still 
obstructed it.  In public, many congressmen justified their reluctance by expressing concern for 
the competition to American workers and the congestion to the major metropolises the r fugees 
would bring.  In private, however, they admitted that they worried that the majority of the DPs 
would be Jewish and resented that the Stratton bill had no provision to prevent a wave of Jewish 
migrants from entering the country.444  Despite the CCDP's efforts to dissipate these fears, the 
majority of congressmen soon began  to endorse an alternative more restrictive bill and to 
propose provisions to the bill that would limit the number of Jews admitted to the United Sta s, 
including a proposal reserving fifty percent of the visas for agricultural workers and another one 
setting a December 22, 1945 cutoff date for eligibility, de facto excluding the 100,000 Jews who 
had left Russia in the spring of 1946 or who had fled the Polish pogroms that summer.445  As 
Congress debated the bill, a frustrated American Jewish Committee observed, "Every anti-
Semitic device was employed, not only by the anti-Semitic press and orators, but in Congress 
itself."446  In its final version, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 maintained the December 22, 
1945 cutoff date; favored farm laborers; included the clause mortgaging the refugee visas against 
the quotas of the countries from which they arrived; and limited eligibility to refuge s in the DP 
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camps in the American, British, and French zones of Germany, Austria, and Italy.447  The law 
was a far cry from what the American Jewish Committee had anticipated, but they ul imately 
chose to support the bill because they believed that, despite its anti-Semitic bias, the law still 
provided some help. 
Inevitably, the passage of the 1948 Displaced Persons Act unleashed a virulent debate 
within the American Jewish community.  Members of the American Jewish Committee v ewed 
the passage of the law as a sound defeat, leaving them to wonder whether relying on non-Jewish 
representatives and spending exorbitant amounts of money for the propaganda campaign 
represented an effective strategy.  "This compromise measure," lamented the American Jewish 
Committee, "was a shock and a disappointment to all who had hoped that this country would 
assume world leadership in the solution of the DP problem."448  Anticipating a pattern that would 
characterize most of the 1950s and 1960s fight for immigration reform, most American Jews 
came to the conclusion that some legislation was better than no legislation at all and realized 
that, given the hostile environment towards immigration in general, proposing amendments to 
the act would be easier than starting over and trying to have another version pased.  Many also 
understood that protesting against its passage after arguing for months that the majority of the 
DPs were Christian could strain Jewish-Christian relations and would be politically risky.449   
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As individuals and organizations debated the merits of the DP Act, others within the 
American Jewish community longed for immediate action.  In a long established tradition of 
self-help that became crucial to refugee and immigrant resettlement aft r World War II, the three 
leading Jewish agencies in the immigration and refugee aid field—the National Refugee Service, 
the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), and the National Council of Jewish 
Women—immediately activated to help administer the law.450  HIAS once again emerged as the 
leader, and at least half of all Jewish displaced persons in the United States arrived through its 
operations.  "In 1947, when the Displaced Persons Program was still in its embryonic stage," 
remembered New York Industrial Commissioner Edward Corsi, and "many new and 
inexperienced agencies came into being [,] it was HIAS that set the pattern of experience for 
these agencies and aided in the success of their work."451  To speed up the relocation of 
European Jewish displaced persons and refugees, HIAS opened new offices across Europe to 
provide shelter and assistance to refugees and collaborated with the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO) and with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA) until its program ended on June 30, 1947.  In 1947, the U.S. State Department 
authorized HIAS to issue as many as 2,000 corporate affidavits in Shanghai and 4,500 corporate 
affidavits for displaced persons in Germany and Austria.  Finally, from June 1, 1946 to April 30, 
1947 alone the HIAS Washington bureau argued 3,812 immigration cases before the Justice and 
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State Departments and gave expert counsel to 8,805 mail queries.452  In the United States, HIAS 
cooperated with local welfare agencies and assisted the families of prospective immigrants with 
the immigration process.453  By 1950, HIAS remained the only agency to offer temporary shelter 
for newly arrived Jewish DPs in the New York area.454  
 During its relocation efforts in the United States, HIAS also sought to promote a positive 
image of the arriving Jewish refugees and to assuage fears of their negat ve impact on American 
society.  In an effort to counteract accusations that Jewish refugees crowded big cities and 
remained isolated and distant from American life and traditions, HIAS repeatedly s ressed that 
while many of the new arrivals landed and often remained in New York City for a while, a 
substantial number of them soon relocated to other cities in the United States, where local HIAS 
offices helped with housing and employment.  Moreover, the HIAS executive director explained, 
"the desire to become American citizens and integrated into the life of their new la d runs high 
in these immigrants, and a large percentage of them avail themselves without delay of the 
opportunity to file their applications for citizenship."455  In the first six months of 1950 alone, the 
report indicated, 2,589 persons applied for U.S. citizenship through the HIAS office, and many 
of the newly arrived refugees immediately enrolled in school to learn English and to familiarize 
themselves with life in America.456   
 Outside the United States, HIAS collaborated with its bureaus in East Asia, Afric , and in 
Central and South America to find alternative destinations.  It repeatedly sent special 
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representatives to Canada, Australia, and Latin and South America to meet in person with local 
governmental officials in an effort to obtain concessions for displaced persons and refugees 
seeking to enter their countries.457  With its well-established system and its long-standing 
connections across the globe, HIAS was instrumental in aiding in the resettlemen  of some 
150,000 people in 330 U.S. communities, as well as Canada, Australia, and Latin and South 
America.458  In addition, HIAS, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency for Palestine, paid for 
inland transportation, assistance, lodging, and supplies until refugees boarded a ship directed to 
Palestine.  In the first eight months of 1947 alone, this program helped 3,784 bona fide 
Palestinian certificate holders.459   
 
Finding a Cold War Voice 
Italian Americans took notice of the many shortcomings of the 1948 DP Act as well, and, 
like American Jews, believed in the need for a more lenient post-war immigration policy.  Italian 
Americans criticized the act for making it more difficult for Catholics and Jews to gain 
admission and for disproportionately favoring refugees in the Balkan region.  "The final version 
of the act," denounced Il Progresso Italo Americano, "is characterized by an intolerance that runs 
against and is inconsistent with the American sense of justice."460  Yet, as Italian Americans 
came out of the war more confident of their position in American society, they chose to f cus 
                                                
457 "HIAS Envoy to Appeal before Nine South American Governments in Behalf of Immigrants," HIAS News 
Release, no date, HIAS Collection, RG 245.8, series 10, folder 287, YIVO, Center for Jewish History; "Canada 
Showed Way to World in Absorbing DPs Reports HIAS Official on Return to U.S. after 3 Years in British Zone," 
HIAS News Release, no date, HIAS Collection, RG 245.8, series 10, folder 286. 
458 "Report Covering Period from June 1 1946 to April 30, 1947," no date, HIAS Collection, RG 245.4.10, series 1, 
folder X A-8, YIVO, Center for Jewish History; HIAS News Release, December 8, 1949, HIAS Collection, RG. 
245.8, series 10, folder 286, YIVO, Center for Jewish History; no title, November 14, 1947, HIAS Collection, RG 
245.4.10, series 1, folder X A-8, YIVO, Center for Jewish History. 
459 No title, HIAS News Release, December 12, 1949, HIAS Collection, RG 245.8, serie  10, folder 286, YIVO, 
Center for Jewish History. 
460 "Una legge che deve essere modificata," Il Progresso Italo Americano, February 3, 1949. 
213 
 
exclusively on Italian migration and became the most prominent non-state actors that Italy had in 
its efforts to solve the country's post-war overpopulation and unemployment problems.  The war 
had left Italy with a fairly damaged industrial capacity, a lowered standard of living, an 
unemployment rate above ten percent, and a serious overpopulation problem.  Italian Americans 
believed that the only solution to Italy's problems was for the United States to press for the 
stipulation of a peace treaty with Italy that would allow it to retain its African colonies to solve 
its overpopulation problem and create remittances, to use its limited resources t boo t its 
economy rather than to pay war retributions, and to receive financial assistance for its 
reconstruction efforts.461  At the same time, they realized that they too had to dispel a stigma of 
poverty and ignorance that mainstream America had of Italian immigrants.  In a way, in their 
efforts to defend and explain Italian immigrants to Americans, post-war Italian Americans found 
themselves in the same position in which American Jews of German origin had found themselves 
when Americans began to attack Eastern European Jews at the end of the nineteenth century.  
Like them, Italian Americans felt compelled to defend the newcomers also to pr tect their own 
image and to assert their position in American society.   
Unlike American Jews of German origin, though, Italian Americans also had to negotiat  
their strategies with the Italian government.  The Italian government strongly supported Italian 
American efforts, especially after the demand for bi-lateral agreements to regulate an Italian 
emigration flow to Northern and Western European countries in need of manpower for their 
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post-war reconstruction languished by the end of the 1940s.462  Aware of Americans' 
preoccupation with communist infiltration in Western Europe and of the evolution of American 
immigration policy into an international issue, the Italian government encouraged Italian 
Americans to use these arguments when making a case for more American support to Italy.  To 
this end, the Italian-American press regularly covered speeches given by Italian Communist 
leaders extolling Russia, denounced the Italian Communist Party's effort  to seek Italian workers' 
affiliation, or decried the attacks that the Italian Communist Party perpetrated against the 
Catholic Church.463  As late as 1949, Il Progresso Italo Americano published thirteen editorials 
in a row to discuss "the perverse activities that the communists and their […] socialist allies have 
been perpetrating at the expense of the Italian nation and the Italian people."464 
Thus, while Congress held hearings for the DP bill in 1947, New York-based politician 
Generoso Pope wrote a letter to all congressmen to enjoin them not to ratify the peace treaty with 
Italy.  The treaty, Pope contended in his letter, was unfair because it forced Italy to relinquish 
Trieste and its colonies in Africa, required Italy to pay considerable reparations, and failed to 
acknowledge adequately the need to include provisions in the treaty that would help Italy solve 
its overpopulation problem.  According to Pope, the treaty, in its existing version, would 
endanger the growth of democracy in Italy, tip the balance towards the Italian Communist Party, 
effectively leave the Italian workforce in the hands of Russian propaganda, and endanger the 
spread of democracy in the West and world peace.  At the same time, Pope's Il Progresso Italo 
Americano organized a letter writing campaign under the motto "No Ratification without 
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Revision."  For over a month, the newspaper invited its readers to fill in, sign, and mail the letter 
provided in the daily edition to their senators and to encourage their friends without any 
distinction of race, color, or religious creed, as long as they were convinced of the necessity to 
protect American interests in the Mediterranean, to do the same in the name of Amrica's 
national security, lasting world peace, and justice to the new, democratic Italy.465   
Other prominent Italian American politicians voiced their concerns as well. The Italian 
American mayor of New York City, Vincent R. Impellitteri, intervened in the debat , giving a 
public speech in which he defined the treaty as unfair with respect to Italy's contribution to the 
war effort and expressed his concern that it could damage the country's growth towards 
democracy, as "the seed of democracy cannot germinate in a disgruntled country." 466  He 
pointed to the ongoing civil war in Greece and the political problems in Turkey to remind 
congressmen of the consequences of a disgruntled country.  During his testimony to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations in the spring of 1947, labor organizer Luigi Antonini urged the 
committee members to send the unfair treaty back to the State Department and instruct it to 
reopen negotiations with the other superpowers, arguing that the treaty stymied economic 
recovery in Italy and endangered the balance of power in the world:  
Is it worth spending all hundreds of millions of dollars in Turkey and Greece if then Italy, 
strategically more important, is left, because of the current peace treaty, under the 
prospect of an aggressive Asiatic invasion?  I am convinced that Truman’s political 
theory needs to be applied to the democratic Italy as well, at least in the same way that it 
is applied to Turkey.  I am convinced that it is against the most important of American 
interest to leave the Italian people, tied to us by ideals, by many traditions, and by blood, 
to the mercy of Tito.467 
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Impellitteri and Antonini's emphasis on the ties that connected Italy and the United States and on 
the need to secure a democratic Italy would soon become central themes in Italian Americans' 
agenda for immigration reform along with an emphasis on Italy's overpopulation and 
unemployment problems.  
Luckily for Italian Americans, their campaign for the Italian treaty coincided with the 
1948 elections in Italy.  The Truman administration had long worried about the strength of the 
Communist Party in Italy.  As early as 1946, Walter Dowling, Italian desk officer at the State 
Department, reported to his superiors that the political gridlock and the worsening of economic 
conditions were favoring the Italian Communist Party.  To slow the party's ascendance to power, 
he urged the administration to use a combination of economic aid, moral support, and flattery, 
and to present itself as "so damned pro-Italian that even the dumbest wop would sense the 
drift."468  After the 1948 Italian elections ended with a victory for the Christian Democrats, 
Father Edmund A. Walsh’s words on the significance of the victory reflected a widespread 
feeling among American politicians:  "If Italy had fallen into the lap of Moscow, [...] not one but 
three or four victims of the creeping imperialism of Marxian Communism would surely have 
been involved, and communism would have advanced that much nearer to the English Channel 
and the Atlantic World."469  Thanks to the 1948 Italian elections and Cold War geopolitical 
interests, Italian Americans saw their political influence rise substantially. 
Consequently, the "No Ratification Without Revision" campaign received extensive 
attention in and out of Congress.  Republican and Democratic congressmen from across the 
country responded favorably to the myriads of letters pertaining to the Italian reaty that they had 
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received from their constituents.  Some of them explicitly labeled the treatyas too harsh, 
declared themselves as against the treaty, and observed that Italy's help to t Allies during the 
last phases of the war deserved consideration before passing the treaty.  All thanked Pope for 
bringing the matter to their attention, praised the articles published in Il Progresso about the 
shortcomings of the treaty, and promised to take the objections the Italian American community 
raised into careful considerations before voting on the treaty.   The American Federation of 
Labor also condemned the treaty as unjust and as disastrous to the development of Italy into a 
healthy democracy that could take her rightful place in the community of free and prosperous 
nations.470  
The numerous endorsements notwithstanding, Pope's letter campaign yielded no results 
in 1947.  In 1949, he launched a new letter writing campaign that more explicitly connected the 
restitution of the former Italian colonies in Africa to Italy with the possibility of solving Italy's 
overpopulation problem.  "The colonial problem," Pope wrote, "needs to be addressed from the 
perspective of the current world tension and in view of peoples' needs and aspirations."471  
Furthermore, a 1949 form letter that of Il Progresso Italo Americano invited readers to send to 
their representative or senator further emphasized that "by urging the United Nations to give 
Italy trusteeship over these colonies, we will also be making possible the emigration of tens of 
thousands of Italy's population to lands that can well absorb them."472  As in 1947, the new letter 
campaign received positive endorsements from Italian American organizatio s, workers' unions, 
congressmen and local politicians, especially in areas with heavy concentrations of Italian 
American voters.  A group of Italian American organizations met to organize a committee that 
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met with President Truman to plead for the restitution of Italy's former African colonies, and 
Representative John J. Rooney (D-NY) presented a motion in the House asking for the complete 
realization of Italy's aspirations to its pre-war colonies.473   
Pope's campaign represented only one of the strategies that Italian Americans adopted to 
deal with Italy's overpopulation problem.  Instead of mobilizing politically, many Italian 
Americans sought to take advantage  of the family reunion clauses in the existing legislation to 
assist friends and relatives immigrate to the United States.  Throughout the late 1940s and early 
1950s, "La cassetta dell'immigrato," Il Progresso Italo Americano's weekly column to answer 
readers' questions about immigration matters, published letters that revealed other, quieter ways 
of getting around restriction.  Some adopted nephews and nieces, married aspiring migrats, sent 
for one family member in the hope of bringing other relatives left behind, or vouched for tourist
visas for applicants who anticipated remaining in the United States and hoped to adjust their 
status once in the country.  Others tried to naturalize as quickly as possible after s ttling in the 
United States so that they could send for other family members, asked their employers to offer a 
job to their friends arriving from Italy, or entered the country illegally with the plan of 
regularizing their status soon after their arrival to bring the rest of their families over afterwards.  
These strategies did not always yield the desired results, and much confusion remained, 
especially about the status of newly arrived migrants.  As in the previous decades, mny did not 
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know how to apply for naturalization, send for their loved ones, or legalize their illegal status.  
Others believed that their permanence in the country sufficed to become residents, or mistakenly 
relied on people who promised them help with the transatlantic trip, the search for a job, or the 
bureaucracy in exchange for exorbitant amounts of money.  Still others worried that they would 
never be able to go back to Italy if they became American citizens or believed that voting in 
Italian elections would not affect their status in the United States.474   
Yet, more important than the results and the visibility Italian Americans achieved through 
their actions to solve Italy's overpopulation and unemployment problems, the battle for I aly's 
former colonies represented an important steppingstone for the entire community.  After the 
bitter divisions and attacks of the 1930s, Pope's campaign provided a cohesive theme around 
which the entire community could rally.  An article published in Il Progresso Italo Americano n 
May 1, 1949, reflected the newly found cohesion as it described the support that Pope's 
campaigns were receiving within the Italian American community: 
Judging from the endorsements that Generoso Pope is receiving for his campaign for the 
former Italian colonies, we can proudly say that our communities have found the old 
enthusiasm of all the battles fought in the name of justice for the rights of Italy, our Great 
Mother from afar that remains alive in our hearts, an Italy poor but always great, always 
so rich because it has something that's worth everything:  the love of her sons wherever 
they are.  They are the most genuine ambassadors because the Italians of America, except 
for a few renegades, unite their forces, let their shout be heard in unison, represent a 
formidable embassy that no diplomacy can provide.475 
After over a decade of timid political ascendance and divisive internal disputes, Italian 
Americans had found confidence in expressing their political voice.  Ironically, the strong ties 
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with Italy the author professed in his article were in a way the product of the campaign to 
italianize Italians abroad that the Fascist regime had conducted after it took power.  Yet, this time 
the relationship with the Italian government was on a more equal footing, as the Italian 
government recognized that Italian Americans were evolving into an influential constituency in 
the United States.  
The mobilization for a just treaty for Italy also helped Italian Americans find new rhetoric 
to justify their mobilization.  After a hiatus that spanned from 1924 to 1945, Italian Americans, 
like American Jews, once again cast their concerns in transnational terms.  This time, though, the 
recent Cold War developments helped their voices to be heard.  In an editorial on the great 
responsibilities that the United States had in the promotion of world reconstruction and the 
preservation of peace, the writer reminded readers that little could be accomplished until the 
stain of discrimination and racism disappeared in the United States first: 
Even with the best democratic foreign policy, the United States will never ha t e 
support of the peoples of other countries in the reconstruction of the world and of the 
peace until we’ll seriously decide to eradicate every vestige and to eliminate every 
practice of racial hatred, religious prejudice, and national origin discrimination among us 
[…] Our schools, our churches, our workers unions, our cultural institutes, the media and 
the radio need to be mobilized for an incessant campaign against this terrible stain on the 
good name of our nation—against this serious, but not insurmountable, obstacle to the 
realization of America's destiny.476 
The theme resurfaced frequently in the columns of Il Progresso Italo Americano.  Again and 
again, the articles observed that there was no worse or more dangerous folly for the United 
States' standing around the world than that to refuse someone a job only because the applicant
was born in Italy or in Poland, because he was Catholic or Jewish, or because his skin was of a
different color.477  Thus, as American Jews fought for Jewish displaced persons and Italian 
Americans sought to help Italian migrants, both groups adopted a similar rationale o justify their 
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actions and found in the exigencies of the Cold War a common ground that would later bring 
them together in the struggle for the repeal of the quota system.  
 
A New DP Act (1950) 
 As American Jews quarreled over the merits of the 1948 Displaced Persons Act ad 
Italian Americans advocated for Italy's right to a more favorable treaty, the administration began 
to administer the 1948 DP Act.  Despite the divisions and the criticisms that the 1948 DP Act
unleashed, detractors and supporters of the law alike were in for a surprise.  When it came to the 
administration of the new act, the creation of the United States Displaced Persons Commission 
and the provisions that allowed private or public agencies approved by the Commission to act as 
immigrant sponsors turned out to be more relevant than all the restrictions contained in the law.  
Truman appointed a Protestant, a Catholic, and a Jew to head the Commission, all of them 
sympathetic to the refugee cause and with expertise in immigration matters:  th  Protestant 
Chair, Ugo Carusi, was a former U.S. commissioner of immigration; Catholic Edward M. 
O'Connor had spent fifteen years as a welfare worker and had directed the War Rlief Services 
for the National Catholic Welfare Conference; and Jewish Harry H. Rosenfield had served as a 
former delegate to UNESCO and as an official of the Federal Security Administration.  As 
Dinnerstein observes, the three commissioners were so imaginative in their interp etation of the 
act’s provisions, "that many legislators would later wonder how the bill that they had voted for 
contained so many loopholes."478  At the same time, the success of the implementation of the DP 
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Act also depended upon the role that voluntary agencies played in the resettlement of th  
refugees. 
 In fact, the provisions in the act regulating the role of voluntary agencies allowed a higher 
number of refugees to resettle in the United States and transformed the voluntary agencies into 
powerful advocates for immigration reform.  Putting the congressional imprimatu  on the 
groundwork that the Truman Directive had laid, the 1948 DP Act officially allowed ethnic and 
religious groups to sponsor applicants and assist them in their resettlement.  Th  federal 
government consolidated its relationship with these voluntary agencies by generously funding 
their activities to relocate the refugees.  Through the Displaced Persons Committee, it dispensed 
more than $1.5 million dollars to various voluntary agencies to finance their activities.479  These 
agencies were so efficient and organized that they were responsible for almost ninety percent of 
the sponsorships filed with the DP Commission during its existence.  The DP Commission 
eventually accredited nineteen different voluntary agencies, but four of them did most of the 
work.  The National Catholic Welfare Council, the Church World Service, the National Lutheran 
Council, and the United Service for New Americans together helped to resettle more than two-
thirds of the total number of refugees who arrived in the United States.480  The American 
government fully realized the importance of these agencies.  "The private agencies," New York 
Industrial Commissioner Edward Corsi acknowledged, "deserve full credit for the success of our 
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DP program and I have this occasion to express the State's full appreciation of the great job they 
did and are still doing for these new immigrants."481   
As the Displaced Persons Commission and the voluntary agencies worked to bring as 
many DPs as possible to the United States, many critics of the discriminatory provisions in the 
act mobilized to amend it.  Truman's victory and an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress after 
the November 1948 elections gave many hope for the successful passage of a revised bill.  Many 
of the new congressmen were more sympathetic to the refugee cause and considered a revision 
of the DP Act a high priority for the 81st Congress.  Once again, American Jews were the most 
vocal about the need for reform.  HIAS repeatedly issued press releases to lament the inadequacy 
of the existing law and the slow pace of the resettlement.482  New York Governor Thomas E. 
Dewey and New York Representative Emanuel Celler both publicly called for more liberal DP 
legislation in the presence of delegates from 2,500 labor, religious, and fraternal Jewish 
organizations and from communities from all around the globe who attended the sixty-fifth 
annual meeting of HIAS in New York City.483  The chair of the Displaced Persons Commission 
himself, Ugo Carusi, intervened in the debate to call for changes in the DP Act.  Between July 1, 
1948, and June 30, 1949, more than one hundred bills dealing with technical matters in the 
refugee and immigration and naturalization legislation were introduced in Congress.  Y t only 
two of the proposed bills became law.  In 1950, Congress modified the War Brides Act to admit 
all spouses and minor children of service members eligible for admission to the United Sta es 
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outside the quota system and ratified H.R. 2663, which provided for the permanent admission, 
regardless of existing immigration laws, of 100 aliens a year if their entry was "in the interest of 
national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission."484  Neither 
law tackled the DP issue, but, to many American Jews, the two acts signaled Congress's 
willingness to modify the existing immigration laws.   
As during the passage of the first DP Act, Italian Americans' role in the debate was 
limited.  They remained bystanders in the fight for refugee and displaced persons legislation and 
did little more than endorse the American Jewish efforts for more humane legislation.  Similar to 
how it had covered the case of the 1948 DP Act, the Italian American press once again followed 
with interest and reported regularly on the American Jewish Committee's campaign to change the 
existing legislation.  On May 10, 1949, Il Progresso Italo Americano praised the committee's 
efforts and criticized the State Department's recent suspicion of all vis  applicants irrespective of 
their origin and connection to American citizens and to organizations in the United Stats that 
sponsored these applicants.485  The most prominent Italian American to take a public stance on 
the issue was Edward Corsi.  Significantly, however, he criticized the 1948 DP Act in front of a 
Jewish but not an Italian audience.  In a speech during a donors luncheon of the Women's 
Division of HIAS, Corsi urged that the current DP legislation be amended to allow a larger 
number of Europe's DPs into the country and that "restrictions which make it impossble for 
many of the war sufferers to enter the United States be eliminated."486  
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All the hopes and enthusiasm for imminent change waned as Nevada's senior Senator Pat 
McCarran ascended to the chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee.487  Senator McCarran 
strongly believed that the act, if anything, should become more restrictive.  Oth rs once again 
worried that too many Jews were entering the country and that they all were settling in major 
metropolises.  It did not help that by March 1949 New York State already led the res  of the 
country in the resettlement of displaced persons.  HIAS tried to counter these concerns with news 
releases explaining that the initial higher number of Jewish refugees arrived in the United States 
would not continue.  One of the organization's news releases distributed to all major newspap rs 
quoted New York State Industrial Commissioner Edward Corsi as saying that the high 
percentage of Jews among the recently arrived displaced persons was because Jewish agencies 
"were better organized at the beginning of the program and naturally they procssed their cases 
with greater speed."  Yet, he added, "this ratio was bound to drop quickly as the program gets 
under way and the other agencies hit a normal stride."488 
Despite their determination, McCarran and other critics of the legislation faced an uphill 
battle when they sought to restrict rather than to liberalize the DP Act.  They ultimately remained 
a small minority.  In and out of Congress, clear signs emerged that many were in favor of 
amending the bill.  Many congressmen received letters supporting changes to the bill, and 
newspapers across the country endorsed a liberalization of the DP Act as well.  The CCDP began 
a new campaign, and this time it successfully received the endorsement of many of the members 
of the Displaced Persons Committee, of several ethnic organizations that wanted special 
consideration in the amended version, and of religious groups that spoke in favor of a more 
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liberal and effective DP law and against discrimination on grounds of race, religion, or national 
origin.  In total, 140 national institutions, including the major welfare, civic, and labor
organizations, publicly supported changes to the law.489  "Prominent among these groups," the 
American Jewish Committee reported, "were the national labor organizations, the CIO and AFL, 
which unequivocally endorsed the effort to secure adequate and non-discriminatory legislation," 
a fact of considerable significance since organized labor was traditionally ag inst a liberal 
immigration policy.490  No major Italian American groups adhered. 
 Discussion over the amendment to the 1948 DP Act divided the American Jewish 
community yet again.  Disagreements again arose on whether or not more legislation was 
opportune.  Similar to their previous battles against discriminatory legislation, the more 
assimilated American Jews of German descent of the American Jewish Committee and the 
American Jewish Congress wanted to have the law amended and to work to guarantee that even
more Jewish DPs arrived in the United States.  They continued to believe that both goals would 
be accomplished only through the collaboration with prominent non-Jewish personalities and 
organizations, thus furthering Jewish relationships with Christians in America.  By contrast, 
secular Zionists, Orthodox Jews, and the Yiddish press advocated that no more Jews should be 
brought to the United States.  The establishment of Israel in 1948 only reinforced this conviction.  
They believed that the new state represented the best and safest haven for Jewish efugees.  
Although not voiced publicly, many Zionists worried that fewer European Jews would opt to 
move to Israel if offered the opportunity to settle in the United States.491  The Zionists and the 
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Yiddish press's concerns received little attention from the wider public and press, though, and the 
views of the American Jewish Committee and of the American Jewish Congress prevailed. 
 American Catholics represented a more united front.  Catholics of different backgrounds, 
including Polish, Czech, and Lithuanian, wanted the amended bill to reflect the religious 
composition of the refugees more accurately and demanded proportional representation along 
with religious affiliation.  Italian Americans generally endorsed the Catholic Church's stance on 
the issue but did not actively participate in the debate or publically plead for the law to allow a 
greater number of Catholic DPs to relocate to the United States.  The Catholic hierar hy, and in 
particular Monsignor Swanstrom, who was in charge of the relocation of refugees for the War 
Relief Service of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, supported the sugg stion, especially 
because very few Catholics had made it to the United States until then, despite being the most 
numerous group among the DPs.492  As Dinnerstein details, American Catholics' plea for 
proportional representation in the revised act attracted the attention of a few congressmen, as 
"both groups feared that without this provision a disproportionate number of Jews might 
continue to swell the totals."493  The National Catholic Welfare Council adopted a resolution 
maintaining that if the quota were raised to 400,000 without adequate proportions for the 
religious groups, the law would then be discriminatory.   
The resolution set in motion a month-long crisis between the Jewish and Catholic 
representatives on the CCDP.  The proposal raised serious concerns among American Jews, who 
worried that it might provide further motivation to Senator McCarran and his supporters t  
obstruct the passage of the amended act.  Along with other members of the CCDP, they object d 
that such a provision would distinguish among suffering human beings on the basis of race, 
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religion, and nationality.  After a series of meetings, the two parties finally re ched an 
agreement:  in exchange for the withdrawal of the “group and elements provision,” the Jewish 
representatives agreed to accept a carefully worded provision allowing more Volksdeutsche to 
enter the country.494  
Diametrically opposed to McCarran and his Senate committee's resistance to modify the 
act, Representative Celler from Brooklyn, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, quickly 
became the staunchest advocate for a new DP act.  He sponsored a bill that the House Judiciary 
Committee put forth for consideration, which stipulated the admission of an additional 179,000 
DPs (over and above the original 205,000 in the 1948 Act) and of 56,623 persons of German 
ethnic origin, and incorporated special provisions for 18,000 members of the Polish Army then 
residing in Great Britain, 4,000 refugees in Shanghai, 5,000 nonquota orphans, and 15,000 recent 
political refugees.  More importantly, the bill set a new cutoff date of January 1, 1949, to provide 
equal opportunities to migrate to the United States to refugees from Nazism as well s from 
communism.  In June 1949, the House of Representatives passed the bill after only three hours of 
debate, overcoming the opposition of those representatives who insisted on keeping the cutoff 
date of the original bill.  Any hope for a similar expeditious passage of a Senate bill faded as 
Senator McCarran announced that his committee would not report on the Ferguson-Kilgore bill, 
the Senate version of the Celler bill, within the year nor schedule hearings anytime soon. 495  
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 McCarran's obstructionist tactics successfully delayed the passage of n amended DP bill.  
In January 1950, McCarran proposed a restrictive immigration bill to counteract the more liberal 
Ferguson-Kilgore bill.  Once the bills came up for discussion on the Senate floor in Ma ch 1950, 
McCarran's argument that the Ferguson-Kilgore bill would "tear down our immigration barriers 
to the end that this country will be flooded with aliens" and his appeal to fears of communism at 
home helped him rally enough opposition to the bill to stall the voting until the beginning of 
April.496  On June 1, 1950, after lengthy debates, the conferees reached an agreement that both 
houses of Congress could endorse.  The new act allowed entry for a total of 415, 744 DPs 
eligible for admission, retained the quota mortgaging, extended the life of the Displaced Persons 
Committee to June 30, 1951 (the next Congress extended it to August 31, 1952), provided a 
cutoff date of January 1, 1949, and assigned equal authority to consuls, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service officials, and the Displaced Persons Committee to rule n the eligibility 
and admissibility of individuals who applied for entry to the United States.  President Truman 
signed the bill into law, hailing it as a measure that corrected the discrimination inherent in the 
previous act.497  
 The euphoria for the success of the campaign for the new DP Act turned out to be short-
lived and ephemeral.  As Leonard Dinnerstein observes, though McCarran lost the legislativ  
battle on the DP issue, he won the administrative fight.498  His tour of the Displaced Persons 
Committee offices in Europe the previous fall, his repeated accusations of malpractice and 
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incompetence, and the general tone of hostility towards the United States Displaced Persons 
Commission during the hearings took a toll on the commission officers once the new DP Act
went into effect.  Charles Jordan, European director of the Joint Distribution Committee, la er 
wrote that the members of the Displaced Persons Commission took the criticism very seriously.  
As a result, the agency enacted stricter screening procedures that led to backlogs, snags in its 
operations, and a slowdown in the processing of applicants.  
Many organizations involved in refugee and displaced persons resettlement repeatedly 
sought to bring the problems in administering the new DP Act to the public and Congress's 
attention.  Some called for the expedition of the processing of displaced persons but to no 
avail.499  As voluntary agencies and immigration reform supporters continued to criticize the 
inefficiency of the immigration system and the bureaucratic obstructionism of the 
implementation of the DP acts, a new strategy emerged.  In an address before del gates of the 
Workmen's Circle, HIAS executive director, Isaac L. Asofsky, told the audience that HIAS and 
other pro-immigration advocates saw an imminent need for "a greater measure of flexibility in 
the administration of quota limitations" and invited the organization to mobilize to call for the 
pooling and utilization of unused immigration quota numbers.  In 1950, the climate of hostility 
towards immigrants and the fear of subversives and communists led Asofsky to clarify in his 
statement that he had no intention of advocating for the revision of the immigration quota system 
of the United States.500  Yet the first timid calls for the allocation of unused quotas would grow 
stronger as pro-immigration groups sought to reignite the immigration reform debate after 1952.  
The request to allocate unused quotas would become increasingly important as they worked to 
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undermine the validity of the entire quota system by pushing Congress to ratify one exception to 
the system at a time.   
Chances for the admission of more DPs dwindled even further when McCarran 
successfully convinced Congress to pass his internal security proposal less than three months 
after the outbreak of the Korean War.  McCarran’s Internal Security Bill required Communists 
already in the country to register with the Attorney General's office; stipulated the creation of 
concentration camps to detain subversives, spies, and saboteurs in times of emergency; and 
introduced what critics called the principle of "permanent guilt," namely that no alien who had 
previously belonged to a totalitarian or Communist organization could receive a visa to the 
United States.  Despite Attorney General McGrath's criticisms of the bill as a sign of domestic 
hysteria and President Truman's veto, both houses overrode the veto, passing the bill by more 
than the required two-thirds majority.501  
The 1950 Internal Security Act had disastrous consequences on refugee resettlm nt.  
The DP Commission estimated that the Internal Security Act and the clausein the DP Act that 
prohibited the issuance of a visa to any person who had participated in or had been a member of 
a movement hostile to the United States or to the American form of government barrd more 
than 100,000 refugees from entering the United States.502  More importantly, in light of the 
Jewish community's efforts for refugee legislation, of the 410,000 refugees who entered the 
United States thanks to the special refugee legislation passed between 1945 and 1950—including 
the 1950 act's deadline extension—only about one in six admitted was a Holocaust survivor.  
American Jews' mobilization for DP legislation demonstrated the persistence of prejudice against 
them, despite and because of their political, social, and economic strides.  Moreover, bcause of 
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their prominence in the DP legislation efforts, American Jews continued to be perceived as the 
principal motor behind the movement for immigration reform until 1965.  However, this 
experience also convinced them of the validity to seek a broader consensus with Catholic and 
Protestant advocates to secure reform and to continue to frame immigration reform in terms of 
social justice. 
 
"We are really in the business of closing the door:"503 The McCarran-Walter Act (1952)  
The 1950 Internal Security Act was only the first step that McCarran took to control 
immigration in response to the passage of the two DP Acts.  Incensed over the passage of the 
1950 DP Act, McCarran wrote to his daughter:  "I met the enemy and he took me on the DP bill.  
It's tough to beat a million or more dollars and it's something worthwhile to give the rotten gang 
a good fight anyway, and they know they have been to a fight for its [sic.] not over yet."504  With 
a not so subtle reference to the persisting accusations that Jewish funds and organizati ns 
accounted for the success of the passage of the two DP acts, McCarran vowed to carry on his 
fight against higher immigration rates.  On April 20, 1950, he proposed his first omnibus bill to 
overhaul American immigration policy.  Influenced by McCarthyism, the bill retained the quota 
system based on the 1920 census but also added new, harsher criteria for deportation and 
exclusion, narrowed the grounds for court review and administrative appeal, and severely 
curtailed the naturalization process.505  Congress did not act upon his first proposal, so, with 
minor modifications, McCarran reintroduced his bill in the 82nd Congress on January 29, 1951.  
On February 5, 1951, Representative Walter, chairman of the House Immigration Subcommittee, 
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introduced a similar, but slightly more lenient bill.  On February 22, 1951, Representative 
Emanuel Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, introduced a more liberal third 
omnibus bill, which also provided for the reallocation of unused quotas.506   
Most of the fight against the future McCarran-Walter Act played out in the halls of 
Congress during the joint hearings on the three bills from March 6 to April 9, 1951.  Both 
American Jews and Italian Americans participated in the debate over the pending bills, but their 
testimonies at the hearings crystallized the different approach that the two groups chose to pursue 
in their criticisms of the McCarran and Walter bills.  Following a strategy hat they began to 
develop after World War II during their campaign for a fair treaty for Italy, Italian American 
groups who testified at the hearings focused on provisions and amendments that specifically 
concerned Italian migration rather than on the bills in their entirety.  The reallocation of unused 
quotas represented Italian Americans' major concern as it had the potential to alleviate Italian 
oversubscribed quotas.  Among the Italian American groups who testified in Congress wer  the 
Columbia Civic Group Club of New Jersey, the National Unico Clubs of America, and the Order 
of the Sons of Italy.  All of these Italian American fraternal and welfare groups testified to 
endorse the Celler bill specifically because its provision for a system of utilizing unused quotas 
allowed for the largest number of Italian immigrants to be admitted.507 
American Jews also continued the multi-pronged strategy that had emerged most 
forcefully after World War II.  They promoted and joined non-sectarian coalitions hat opposed 
the McCarran and Walter bills, criticized the bills in their entirety, and argued for the benefits of 
reform for all immigrant groups.  Jewish organizations joined two umbrella organizations and 
subscribed to their testimonies against the bills in Congress.  A representative from the Joint 
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Conference on Alien Legislation presented a fifty-point written statement on behalf of twelve 
organizations opposed to the McCarran and Walter bills.  Significantly, the twelve organizations 
belonging to the Conference included some of the major agencies that had been active ithe 
refugee resettlement and refugee legislation.508  No Italian American organization belonged to 
the Joint Conference on Alien Legislation.  The four Jewish organizations that belonged to the 
conference—the American Jewish Committee, the Hebrew Sheltering Immigrant Aid Society, 
the National Council of Jewish Women, and the United Service for New Americans—also 
subscribed to the testimony of Judge Simon H. Rifkind, who testified on behalf of a large 
number of Jewish organizations affiliated with the National Community Relations Advi ory 
Council (NCRAC).509  
Both organizations objected to the restrictive character underlying the two bills.  They 
pointed out that the total annual quota of about 154,000 established in the Immigration Act of 
1924 had to a large extent remained unused due to the rigidity of the quota system.  They 
proposed to amend the law to provide that all unused quotas in any fiscal year be made availbl  
the following year to all immigrants, regardless of their country of origin, who qualified in 
certain specific categories, including close relatives, victims of totalitari nism, persons with 
skills needed in the United States, or special hardship cases.  They recommended that, r gardless 
of the system of preferences on which the Congress would ultimately settle, any new legislation 
should allow the full use of unused portions of the preference categories.  Many of the Jewish 
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organizations also found objectionable the preference given in McCarran’s bill to aliens with 
special skills or education "on the ground that immigrants should be viewed as persons and not
as economic commodities, and that many of the most significant contributions to American 
society had been made by immigrants who when they arrived in the United States could not 
claim special skills or education."510  The Joint Conference and the National Community 
Relations Advisory Council cautioned against shifting the American naturalization system from 
one encouraging aliens to become citizens to a procedure intended to place obstacles in the way 
of the immigrants who desired to naturalize.  Finally, they urged that a reasonable statute of 
limitations should be retained and applied, at least in cases that did not involve the security of the 
United States or serious criminal or moral offenses.511  However, despite these groups' 
opposition to the McCarran bill, the Senate ultimately opted to pursue it over the Celler bill.   
 Other groups raised concerns similar to those that Italian Americans and American Jews 
addressed in their testimonies.  The National Community Relations Advisory Council; agencies 
working in immigrant and refugee resettlement; professional organizations like the Association 
of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers, the International Social Servic, the American 
Psychological Association, and the Committee to Improve United States Immigration law; 
unions like the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the International Ladies' Garment 
Workers Union (ILGWU); civil rights organizations like the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, the Americans for Democratic Action, and the Liberal Party of 
New York; and other national and local organizations from across the country in favor of n 
enlightened immigration policy all testified against the McCarran and Walter omnibus bills.512  
They all concurred that the bills "did not accord with the humanitarian and liberal traditions of 
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the United States or with its obligations as leader of the free world" but their appeals remained 
unheard as they failed to coalesce into a strong opposition group that could effectively influence 
the final version of the bill.513  Yet, despite their vocal opposition, the front against the McCarran 
and Walter bills struggled to gain momentum and a coalition similar to the one that had emerged 
during the mobilization for DP legislation and that had successfully overcome internal 
ideological divisions never materialized.   
 The American Jewish Committee lucidly identified at least four reasons that justified 
McCarran's ultimate triumph.  First, Senator McCarran held a strategic pos tion as chairman of 
the Judiciary Committee to influence immigration and naturalization legislation.  Second, "the 
effective working relationship between the Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans" 
during the Senate debate on the McCarran bill effectively stifled the liberal immigration forces 
from raising a candid debate over the crucial issues of McCarran's omnibus bill in Congress.514  
Third, the breadth and complexity of the three hundred-page bill added to McCarran and his 
allies' victory.  The Senator presented the public with a bill addressing such a wide host of issues 
involving difficult questions of immigration policy and vexing issues of civil liberties that many 
pro-immigration advocates felt confused about who to support and reluctant to take any position.  
Finally, McCarran continuously played "on the fears of other elements in the United States," 
arguing that the pooling of unused quotas would change the ethnic composition of the country 
and that the elimination of the 'one-half ancestry' concept would result in flooding the country 
with Asian immigrants.515 
 The complexity of the law convinced many groups traditionally in favor of immigration 
reform to pursue the same strategy for which Italian Americans opted and focus exclusively on 
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issues that pertained to their group.  "A minor, but not unimportant factor in the McCarran 
victory," wrote the AJC, "was the role of the Japanese American Citizen's L ague, and in 
particular, of its energetic legislative representative."516  According to the committee, Minnesota 
Republican Representative Walter Judd's campaign for the repeal of 'oriental exclusion' also 
contributed to McCarran's victory.  As early as 1947, Judd, a former missionary who wanted to 
repeal all aspects of immigration exclusion against Asian immigrants, had been lobbying for an 
'Asia-Pacific Triangle,' assigning a quota of one hundred to each nation east of Ir n without a 
quota.  His proposal quickly gained widespread support and passed the House in early 1949.517 
When the McCarran bill included the Asia-Pacific Triangle, Judd immediately endorsed the bill 
and began a campaign in support of the McCarran bill, highlighting its progressive racial features 
and, in general, buttressing his case by using McCarran's same arguments.  "In its campaign," 
wrote the AJC, "the Japanese group went so far as to join with twenty-three traditionally anti-
alien 'patriotic' and veterans' organizations in a public statement endorsing the bill."518  In the 
course of the House debate over the bill, Representative Walter himself quoted at length 
statements from Judd to justify passage of the bill.  The State Department's endorsement of the 
bill, specifically because it believed that its racial provisions would enhance American prestige 
in Asia, further validated the McCarran camp.519  
 In addition to the Japanese American Citizen's League and the State Department's 
endorsements, McCarran also relied on the support of the AFL and of a few influential Catho ic 
organizations.  As early as April 1951, a representative of the AFL expressed the organization's 
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approval of the major provisions in the McCarran bill.  During the Senate debate, McCarran also 
included in the Congressional Record a letter, dated May 19, 1952, from the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference and the National Council of Catholic Women, stating that they favored the 
McCarran bill as amended rather than the more liberal Humphrey-Lehman bill.  He also 
incorporated into the record a letter, dated May 17, 1952, from the National Catholic Rura Life 
Conference disavowing its support for the Humphrey-Lehman bill and officially endorsi g the 
McCarran bill as amended.  While most local Catholic organizations opposed the bill, the only 
national Catholic organization that openly criticized and refused to support the bill was the 
National Conference of Catholic Charities.  The organization's general secretary, Msgr. John 
O'Grady, denounced the bill as opposed to American tradition and publicly called for its 
defeat.520   
The fragmentation of the front against immigration restriction also reflect d the impact of 
heightened fears of communist influence in America.  In a climate of suspicion and hostility, 
immigration reformers' proposals and objections struggled to attract attention.  Senator Lehman, 
one of the few politicians to endorse a more liberal immigration policy,  repeatedly complained 
of the inability of immigration advocates to have their opinions heard and to generate a debate 
over the issues in the bill that they found problematic:  
To me it has been a source of disillusionment that although this bill, one of the most 
important within my memory, […] was debated for a long time, for several weeks, [and] 
its opponents have not even had the courtesy of reply from the authors of the bill to 
objections made and questions asked by us.521 
Adducing fears of an invasion of spies and subversives, supporters of the McCarran and Walter 
bills proposed to restrict immigration even further or to stop immigration altogether  for a period 
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of time to protect the United States against a Communist threat.522  Playing on this fear and 
confident of the large support his bill enjoyed in and out of Congress, McCarran insisted that any 
objection to his law was Communist-inspired and argued that the non-Communists opposed to 
the bill were either "soft on Communism" or duped.  To the critics who insisted that his bill was 
discriminatory because it retained the national origins system and the racially discriminatory 
provisions of the Asia-Pacific Triangle, he retorted, "The rock of truth is t at the Act does not 
contain one iota of racial or religious discrimination."523  McCarran's accusations of communism 
to his critics at the height of McCarthyism seriously hampered the emerg nce of a strong and 
united front against his bill, especially after the difficult and rocky experience with lobbying for 
and passing two DP Acts.   
McCarran's accusations also limited the allies that the anti-restriction coalition found in 
Congress.  Among the few voices to object to the passage of the McCarran bill was 
Representative Adolph Sabath, Democratic Representative from Illinois, born in Slovakia of 
Jewish parents.  As a representative who had served in the House for forty-five years, with much 
of that time spent as a ranking member of the former Committee on Immigration, nd who had 
assisted in the drafting of the Immigration Act of 1924, he stated that he believed th  McCarran 
bill "to be one of the most unfair, discriminatory, and un-American measures dealing with this 
vital subject ever to come before Congress."  To those who argued that the new law was
necessary to avoid admitting immigrants who would endanger American free government, he 
responded that, "the record shows, beyond any doubt, that the immigrants who came to our 
shores following World War I and after World War II have become loyal, patriotic, law-abiding 
citizens and have contributed materially to the development and strength of our economy."  If 
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Congress and the President ratify the pending legislation, he concluded, "the United States will 
itself become an iron-curtain country."524  Despite Sabath's appeal to proceed with caution, the 
debate over the bill lasted only three days, and the House amended and passed the bill 206 to 68 
on April 25.525 
Immigration advocates' last resort was President Truman's veto.  Although applauding the 
Act for banning exclusion based on race, Truman rejected the act as a piece of legislation that 
perpetuated long standing injustices against other countries, stifled America's efforts to unite the 
East and the West in a common fight for freedom, and further exacerbated the country's 
immigration procedures: 
Today, we have entered into an alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty with Italy, Greece, and 
Turkey against one of the most terrible threats mankind has ever faced.  We are asking 
them to join with us in protecting the peace of the world.  We are helping them to build 
their defenses, and train their men, in the common cause.  But, through this law, we say 
to their people:  you are less worthy to come to this country than Englishmen or 
Irishmen.526  
Truman's plea was to no avail.  At the end of June 1952, Congress overrode the president's veto 
by a vote of 278 to 113 in the House and 57 to 26 in the Senate, answering McCarran's plea to do 
it "in God's name, in the name of the American people, in the name of America's future."527  The 
speedy passage of the McCarran-Walter Act left many of its opponents stunned.  While many 
anticipated the passage of the law, few expected for it to happen as swiftly as it did. 
Yet, in an interesting development, many of the Catholic organizations that had originally 
favored the passage of the bill rejected it almost immediately after Congress ratified the bill.  In 
its July 5, 1952 issue, the Catholic weekly magazine Am rica supported President Truman's veto 
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in its editorial.  On August 2, the Catholic Association for International Peace sh rply criticized 
the newly passed immigration law for using a "white supremacy" principle and for assigning 
severely prohibitive quotas to immigrants from Eastern Europe and recommended a survey of 
Asian immigration needs and the encouragement of necessary population shifts.  More 
importantly, all the major Catholic organizations realized their blunder and appeared "prepared 
to conduct a vigorous campaign for a major liberalization of the country's immigration 
policy."528  The major Catholic organizations also subscribed to the National Community 
Relation Advisory Council's public statement of disapproval of the passage of the bill on behalf 
of the Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant organizations it represented.  On July 25, after Congr ss 
overrode the President's veto, NCRAC and other ethnic organizations, this time including an 
Italian American organization, spoke out to express their dissent and successfully pleaded to the 
Platform Committee of the Democratic National Convention to adopt as part of its foreign policy 
plank the liberalization of the immigration laws of the United States.529   
American Catholics were not the only ones who played a role that differed from what 
they had done on the DP legislation battle.  Despite remaining prominent advocates f r 
immigration reform, no Jewish organization rose to orchestrate a campaign against the McCarran 
bill similar to the one that the American Jewish Committee had sponsored for the CCDP.  The 
American Jewish Committee suggested the most likely explanation for the difference in Jewish 
Americans' attitudes towards the refugee and immigration policy: 
For unlike the situation during the previous twenty-five years when the economic—and 
later, the very physical—survival of the Jews of Europe depended on holding open the 
doors of America, the European reservoirs of potential Jewish emigration had now been 
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depleted through extermination and emigration.  The Jewish concern [about the 
McCarran bill] therefore transcended any specific Jewish interest.530  
The American Jewish Committee's admission de facto sanctioned the American Jewish 
community's consolidation of a new approach to immigration reform, one that rested on the 
conviction that they needed to seek reform for all groups.  From 1952 onwards, the American 
Jewish community's motivation in intervening in the immigration debate articulted their 
commitment to help restore the American tradition of welcoming immigrants, to extend the 
principle of non-discrimination based on race and religion, to protect the rights of naturalized 
citizens and resident aliens, and to preserve a fair judicial process.  These principles, American 
Jews contended, were vital to a healthy and democratic American society and to America's role 
in building a stable world order.531 
Yet the debate over the McCarran bill also revealed an important development for the 
Italian American community.  Following their campaign for a just treaty wi h Italy to solve its 
overpopulation and unemployment problems, Italian Americans intervened in the debate 
surrounding the McCarran bill with a clear strategy, focusing exclusively on the aspects of the 
bill that directly affected Italian emigration, and openly criticized rstriction.  They were 
emerging, if timidly, as important members of the interfaith coalition that the American Jewish 
community had long believed to be necessary to achieve reform.  This might, in part, explain
why, in its analysis of the activities of other ethnic groups interested in immigration reform 
during the debate, the American Jewish Committee praised the Italians, Czechs, Poles, 
Lithuanians, Armenians, and Chinese for speaking out against the bill but regretted tha  "this 
sentiment did not make itself felt soon enough to have the desired effect."532  Moreover, the 
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postwar Catholic influence over the Italian American community yielded an important result 
during the debate over the McCarran bill, one that would critically affect its mobilization for 
immigration reform from 1952 to 1965.  In October 1951, New York Judge Juvenal P. Marchisio 
flew to Chicago for a meeting of the National Catholic Resettlement Council as a eader in the 
postwar relief efforts for Italy.  During the meeting, Cardinal Stritch from Chicago and Msgr. 
Edward E. Swanstrom, Executive Director of Catholic Relief Services, approached Marchisio to 
convince him to take the leadership in forming an immigration committee for Italian Americans.  
The National Catholic Resettlement Council, explained Stritch, included immigration 
committees representing practically every nationality group in the United S ates except for 
Italian Americans.  At a time when Italy faced a serious overpopulation problem as well as the 
danger of the Italian Communist Party's influence over its population, he pointed out, Italian 
Americans needed an organization that would specifically deal with the problems of i migration 
from Italy.533  
Cardinal Stritch's efforts to prompt the creation of a committee on Italian m gration 
coincided with a renewed interest in immigration among high-ranking Church officials both in 
Italy and the United States.  Although the Catholic Church had been actively involved in helping 
refugees from Europe come to the United States since the 1930s, it was not until 1951 that the 
Holy See explicitly committed to aiding immigrants around the world and sponsored the 
establishment of the International Catholic Migration Commission, at the direct request of Pope 
Pius XII.  According to Monsignor G.B. Montini, Vatican Under-Secretary of State and the 
future Pope Paul VI, the primary reason for the creation of the new commission was "the 
stimulation of a greater Catholic interest and participation in the grave problem f migration 
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and the resettlement of surplus population."534  The Vatican's preoccupation with finding a 
solution to solve problems of overpopulation stemmed from a concern that countries afflicted 
with these problems could easily fall prey to Russian influence and turn Communist.  The 
Vatican believed that Italy in particular was, in the words of Montini, "the weak link in the 
European chain" and the primary target of the Soviet Union as "its principal field for 
undermining Western Europe."535  In 1952, the Catholic hierarchy worried particularly about the 
several hundred thousand repatriates from Africa and the displaced from Venezia-Giulia still 
unabsorbed into the Italian economy.536 
Marchisio immediately seized on Stritch and Swanstrom's suggestion and set out to w rk
on creating an Italian organization focused on immigration and affiliated with the National 
Catholic Resettlement Council.  In February 1952, the American Committee on Italia Migration 
(ACIM) was founded with headquarters in New York City.  The National Catholic Resettlem nt 
Council financially supported the committee during its first year of existence and continued to 
sponsor and contribute to its initiatives throughout the organization's entire campaign for the 
reform of American immigration policy.537  The Council warmly praised the addition of ACIM 
to its ranks, fully understanding the scope of its agenda: 
The American Committee on Italian migration comes into being at a period of crisis fo  
Italy—a crisis perhaps not too widely known or at least not sufficiently appreciated.  One 
of the principal concerns of the new Committee will be to make Italy's problems b tter 
known and understood, not only as they relate to the peace and equilibrium of the world.  
It cannot be said too often that "enlightened self-interest" itself should motivate the 
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United States and the countries of the free Western world to increase and hasten their 
efforts to help Italy find the means to a solution of her gigantic problems.538  
From the beginning, the committee attracted endorsements from prominent Italia  Americans, 
from Italians and Italian government authorities, American politicians, and members of the 
Catholic hierarchy in Italy and the United States.  ACIM leadership immediately contacted 
prominent Italian Americans across the country to encourage them to open chapters open to both 
lay and clerical members, men and women.539  Its leadership clearly reflected the committee's 
blend of lay and religious members:  Judge Juvenal Marchisio became its national chairman; 
Father Caesar Donanzan, assistant pastor of St. Mary of Mount Carmel Church of Utica, New 
York, and founder of the ACIM Utica chapter and also of the Women's Division of the chapter, 
worked as its executive national secretary; Yolanda Coda was the committee's administrative 
assistant; and Princess Margaret Draper Boncompagni, daughter of former ambassador to Italy 
General William Franklin Draper, was the national chairman of the Women's Auxiliary of 
ACIM.   
Among its first initiatives, ACIM joined a sizeable number of groups, including the 
American Jewish Committee, interested in immigration reform to solicit Truman to steer 
Congress towards a different path in immigration.  On September 4, 1952, Truman issued 
Executive Order No. 10392, which established a Commission on Immigration and Naturalization 
whose goal was to study and report on the country's existing immigration, deportation, 
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naturalization, and nationality laws by January 1, 1953.540  During the Commission's 
deliberations, the AJC did all it could to keep the issue of immigration reform alive.  It offered 
testimony, distributed material discussing the problem of the existing policy, and provided data 
on immigration to other organizations and individuals interested in reform.  Liberated f om the 
constraints of political negotiations, the Commission endorsed the repeal of the national origins 
quota system altogether.  Most of all, AJC leaders cautioned legislators not to view aspiring 
immigrants as economic commodities and to consider the human issues involved as they decided 
on the parameters to select desirable immigrants.541  The Commission on Immigration and 
Naturalization's report, titled Whom Shall We Welcome?, incorporated many of the concerns of 
the American Jewish Committee and of the American Committee on Italian Migration as well as 
of other groups, individuals, and organizations involved in immigration.  It called for the repeal 
of the national origins system, welcomed an increase in immigration, and suggested more 
flexibility to admit more refugees and migrants with skills needed in the United States.  Walter 
and McCarran, however, categorically refused to hold hearings on its findings and criticized the 
report vehemently.  Francis Walter complained that the report was politically inspired and that he 
had read it with disgust.  McCarran called it a "rehash of the line that was parroted in Congress 
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by the radical, left wing clique in Congress" when the legislators debated the McCarran-Walter 
Act.542  
Outside of Congress, reactions to the report's recommendations were less than 
enthusiastic as well.  Emblematic of the comments that the committee's findings prompted was 
an editorial published in The Saturday Evening Post.  According to the author, the quota system 
represented "pretty well the views of the average American on how new arrivals should be 
distributed among the various emigrating nations."  Reflecting growing anxieties of the political 
clout of some of the ethnic groups that would benefit from a more lenient immigration policy, 
the editorial contended that any change in the policy would mean that "the racial g oup with the 
best public-relations setup and the highest squeeze on politicians would win all the argum nts."  
Finally observing that there was "no universal demand for upsetting the present propor ion of 
ethnic groups in our population," it concluded that, "much as we wish to do so for humanitarian 
reasons, we cannot destroy our immigration standards to take care of people who are a surplus 
elsewhere."543  The animosity towards the report confirmed Italian Americans and American 
Jews' suspicion that the crystallization of Cold War interests and fears dete mined Americans' 
reaction to immigration policy.  This represented yet another lesson that the immed ate post-war 
years had for both groups. 
The contrast in tone was striking particularly with the relative success of the mobilization 
for refugee legislation.  "In view of this experience with the DP program, how can we explain the 
McCarran Walter Law?" asked New York Industrial Commissioner Edward Corsi.  His 
conclusions captured the spirit of Cold War fears about immigrants that underlay th  passage of 
the law: 
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Why? Because those who write our immigration laws are afraid of the immigrant. 
Congress itself is afraid of the immigrant.  Labor is afraid of the immigrants.  The Legion 
and the Daughters of the American Revolution are afraid of the immigrant.  Our whole 
thinking on the subject of immigration is motivated by fear, fear of the immigrant as a 
security risk, fear of the immigrant as a competitor for our job, fear of the immigrant as a 
man and as a human being.  And to protect ourselves against our own fear, we have 
adopted an immigration policy which keeps out one hundred good people for fear that 
one bad may come in.544 
HIAS echoed Corsi's remarks in a brief submitted to Congress in November 1952 asking for 
sweeping revision of U.S. immigration policy and the creation by the new Congress of a new and 
independent government agency for the administration of the new law.  In its present form, the 
report read, the McCarran-Walter Act demonstrated that it was "conceived in unjustified fear and 
distrust for the foreign-born and represents an undemocratic approach to the immigration and 
naturalization problems."545   
 
Conclusion 
Italian Americans and American Jews' last attempt to derail the McCarran-Walter Act 
failed to succeed, and the frustration was palpable.  Writing just before Congress overrode 
President Truman's veto to pass the McCarran-Walter Act, Oscar Handlin concluded that, no 
matter the outcome, the bill represented "a resounding defeat for all those w have toiled to 
bring into conformity with present needs and ideals the complex code by which we regulate the 
admission of immigrants."546  Yet immigration reform advocates' mobilization for changes to the 
country's immigration and refugee policy from the end of World War II through 1952 revealed 
the emergence of a common ground for an anti-quota system coalition.  "On the whole,"
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commented the American Jewish Committee reflecting the mobilization agai st the McCarran-
Walter Act, "the national debate over the McCarran bill revealed substantial active or potential 
support for basic revision of the United States immigration system."547  American Jews and 
Italian Americans began to find their common ground around their conviction that refugee and 
overpopulation resettlement were equally pressing issues, their belief that immigration and 
foreign policy intersected, their understanding of the impact of Cold War concerns on their 
communities and their agendas, and their perception that Americans' fear of new immigrants 
from Europe reflected their continuing ambiguous status in American society.   
 The years from 1945 to 1952 were crucial transitional years for both Italian Americans 
and Americans Jews in their fight against immigration restriction.  When Italian emigration to 
the United States resumed after World War II, Italian Americans, in a way, became what 
American Jews of German descent had been for Eastern European Jews at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  Similar to the American Jews of German origin earlier in the century, 
starting in the late 1940s, Italian Americans felt responsible for the newcomers, and, like German 
Jews, were aware that Americans' perception of the new immigrants would reflect on them.  
Therefore, at least until 1960, they chose to mobilize mostly for Italian immigrants, to educate 
the American public about the new immigrants, and to endorse legislation that specifically 
benefitted Italian immigration to the United States.  The leader in the American Jewish 
immigration restriction battle, the American Jewish Committee, on the other hand, decided to 
abandon its exclusive focus on Jewish migration and sought to pursue a broader agenda.  In 
short, its motivations for mobilization for immigration reform changed.  Until 1952, AJC's 
primary motive behind its immigration policy had been to provide refuge to Eastern European 
Jews in the United States.  After 1952, with most of the Jewish Displaced Persons resettled, the 
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major European reservoirs of Jewish immigration wiped out by the Holocaust, the majority of 
Jews behind the Iron Curtain not free to emigrate, and Israel's doors open to Jewish immigration, 
the Committee reframed its stance on immigration reform and committed to r form in the name 




"A Thing of Shreds and Patches:" Challenging Immigration Reform from Within (1952-1960)548 
 Remembering his work for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith in his 1987 oral 
interview for a history of the organization, Nathan C. Belth considered the late 1940s and the 
1950s as pivotal years in the history of the Jewish community in the United States: 
In the 1940s and 1950s, we were in the mainstream and we held on—increasingly secure, 
increasingly self-confident [...] Jews had truly merged into the majority; we were in 
thought, aspirations, commitment and status part of the majority.  We had lost our 
minority image because something positive had happened over the years, not because we 
had been displaced.  And what was equally important, the recognized American majority 
looked upon us no longer as a minority, subject to special treatment, good and bad, but as 
a part of themselves.549 
Two other leaders of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, David A. Rose and Maxwell 
Greenberg, shared Belth's conviction and concurred with Belth that white ethnic minorities made 
enormous strides after World War II.550  Yet, even a cursory look at American Jews and Italian 
Americans' fight against restriction during the 1950s shows that Rose, Greenberg, and Belth's 
memories of the era were romanticized.  In fact, both groups continued to grapple with p rs sting 
stereotypes against them that at times stifled their efforts for immigration reform and integration. 
The political climate of the 1950s complicated both their role within American society and their 
mobilization against immigration restriction. 
 Italian Americans and American Jews' mobilization for more lenient immigration and 
refugee policies reflected the tension within the national debate on immigration and highlighted 
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the fragility of their newly-achieved status in American society.  Through t the 1950s, the 
country divided between those who supported immigration reform in the name of America's 
foreign policy interests, and those who opposed it because of concerns over national security.  
Italian Americans and American Jews stood in the former group, but they soon realized the 
limitations of what they could accomplish and understood the vulnerability of their status in 
American society.  As both groups soon discovered, in fact, unless their causes for reform 
intersected with America's Cold War interests and values, their calls would go unheard.  In light 
of this development, American Jews and Italian Americans re-crafted their message and their 
agenda on immigration reform to reflect the existing political climate.  For both groups, a display 
of anti-Communism became necessary to pursue their goals and helped them find common 
ground.  At the same time, as both groups emerged as political forces, restrictionists attacked 
them for safeguarding their interests and endangering the survival of the United States with their 
calls for more immigration, leaving them to deal with some of the accusations they had faced 
since the 1890s.   
This complex backdrop forced Italian Americans and Jewish Americans to develop a 
multi-pronged approach to reform.  First, Italian and Jewish organizations decided to s t aside 
their pleas for comprehensive reform for the moment and instead to pursue immigration reform 
through a series of minor laws, amendments, and executive orders.  They hoped that this str egy 
would mitigate the punitive provisions of the existing legislation and demonstrate the untenable 
nature of the overall immigration policy.551  Second, Italian and Jewish organizations 
consciously maintained the public's attention on the shortcomings and the discriminatory nature 
of the McCarran-Walter Act and of the post-war refugee legislation.  They hoped that this 
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groundwork would pay dividends when Congress finally acknowledged the need to overhaul 
American immigration policy.  Third, they worked to build alliances with politicians and 
governmental officials in and out of Congress to lobby for reform.  Finally, as Italian and Jewish 
organizations mobilized to promote reform on their own, they also began to create a coalition 
with other groups interested in immigration reform to present a united front.  Although their 
efforts achieved only limited success in the1950s, this collaboration laid the foundation for 
broader inter-ethnic cooperation in the 1960s.   
Beyond these common traits, however, American Jews and Italian Americans conti ued 
to frame their mobilization against immigration restriction in different terms, as they had done 
during the struggle for refugee legislation and the opposition to the McCarran-Walter Act.  
American Jews persisted in positioning themselves as promoters of social justice within a global 
framework.  Significantly, for the American Jewish Committee (AJC) immigration became an 
aspect of its larger civil rights agenda.  Along with immigration and refuge issues, AJC worked 
for  
those rights and privileges […] guaranteed by law to each individual, regardless of hi  
membership in any ethnic group: the right to work, to education, to housing, to the use of 
public accommodations, of health and welfare services and facilities, and the right to l ve 
in peace and dignity without discrimination, segregation, or distinction based on race, 
religion, color, ancestry, national origin, or place of birth.552   
Moreover, the organization intervened in issues related to subversion, censorship, church and 
state relations, security and loyalty programs, and anti-Jewish agitation as well as in efforts to 
cement American-Israeli relations and secure American support for Israel.  Continuing efforts to 
build a coalition that they had begun during the battle for refugee legislation, American Jews 
worked to create a coalition with other groups to promote their civil rights agenda.  Sensitive to 
the post-war religious revival and the role of Catholic and Protestant voluntary resettlement 
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agencies, they actively sought to build alliances with both lay and religious groups and to appeal 
to their shared anti-Communism to find common ground.553  Because of their overarching 
commitment to issues of social justice, American Jews' lobbying efforts subsided somewhat after 
1952, even though they continued to follow and support efforts to reform immigration 
legislation.  
Whereas Jewish organizations cited social justice and civil rights in their arguments for 
immigration and refugee reform, Italian Americans framed their effo ts as Christian and anti-
Communist.554  Their staunch anti-Communism offered them an entry into American society and 
liberated them from the stigma against their ties with Italy.  Within the framework of American 
Cold War policy, their relationship with Italy became an asset.  Moreover, continuing a trend 
started at the end of World War II, they pragmatically focused on advancing reform specifically 
for Italian migrants.  When they settled on family reunion as the centerpiece of their reform 
agenda, they presented it as a Christian goal that would solve Italy's problems with 
overpopulation and unemployment and shield Italians from the lure of Communism.  Throughout 
the 1950s, the American Committee on Italian Migration (ACIM) emerged as the most important 
Italian American organization working for the resettlement of immigrants d refugees and 
lobbying for reform.  ACIM gladly collaborated with other organizations whenev r they focused 
on immigration proposals that would benefit Italian migrants, but it was initially more reluctant 
to espouse a broader immigration reform agenda.  ACIM's close collaboration with Catholic 
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organizations and clergy profoundly shaped its immigration reform rhetoric.  The Cat olic 
Church's staunch opposition to 'Godless Communism' shielded Italian Americans from any 
potential suspicions of disloyal and un-American activities and supported their efforts to present 
their calls for reform as driven by a commitment to the civic and societal adv ncement of 
American society and to the improvement of the country's standing in the world.555   
 
"The Immigration Fight Has Only Begun:" Mobilization at the Height of McCarthyism556 
McCarran's victory in 1952 was short-lived, as pro-immigration groups immediately 
began to mobilize to discredit and undermine the act.  In the months immediately after the 
ratification of the McCarran-Walter Act, many prominent lay as well as C tholic, Jewish, and 
Protestant organizations took a public stand against the existing immigration policy.  The 
National Conference of Catholic Charities, the American Committee on Italian Migration, the 
American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League of 
B'nai B'rith, the Jewish Labor Committee, the Jewish War Veterans, Jewish community councils, 
HIAS, and the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A all publicly criticized the 
act.  Among the publications that voiced criticisms against the act were the Cat olic periodicals 
America and Commonweal, the New York Journal American, Collier's, the Washington Post, he 
New York Times, the New York Herald Tribune, the St. Louis Post Dispatch, the San Francisco 
Chronicle, and the CIO News.  ACIM Dispatch, the newsletter of the American Committee on 
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Italian Migration, published critiques and reactions to the law from a wide spectrum of 
commentators for five months in a row.557  
Yet, as pro-immigration groups voiced their criticisms and honed their agendas, 
supporters of the McCarran-Walter Act put an equal amount of energy in their efforts to defend 
the Act and extol its advantages.  The newspapers in the Hearst and McCormick chains led the 
effort to discredit critics of the act.  The virulent attacks often singled out American Jews. 
Supporters of the McCarran-Walter Act repeatedly maintained that "attempts to liberalize the act 
were part of a Marxist-Jewish plot to flood the country with aliens determined to abolish the 
American form of government."558  Tapping into old xenophobic stereotypes, some contended 
that American Jews had lobbied for the repeal or revision of the quota system because they 
wished to secure the admission of millions of their co-religionists to dominate the United States.  
"The fact that Christian church groups, both Catholic and Protestant were also opposed to the 
new immigration law," the American Jewish Committee noted in its annual report, "was made 
light of, if not completely ignored."559   
The charged environment surrounding the battle of opinions over the McCarran-Walter 
Act convinced many lay and religious pro-immigration organizations to narrow the scop of their 
agenda for the moment and to focus on the immediate enactment of an emergency refugee 
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program on the heels of the expiration of the 1950 DP Act.  Believing that Congress would 
respond more favorably to an appeal for a temporary emergency program rather than to a call for
an overhaul of the country's immigration policy, these organizations sought out and endorsed 
bills that tackled the renewal or the passage of a refugee act.  The spring of 1953 saw a flurry of 
refugee bills.  Interestingly, however, the mobilization for the 1953 Refugee Act saw a reversal 
of the roles of the groups interested in immigration matters: unlike the battle for he 1948 and 
1950 DP Acts, Italian Americans were more prominent while Jewish Americans pl yed a 
secondary role.  In light of its pragmatic commitment to Italian migration, ACIM and its Italian 
American supporters turned their attention to the refugee legislation because the new proposals 
also sought to address their main concern with Italian migration, Italy's overpopulati n problem.  
In a way, the change also reflected the Citizens' Committee on Displaced Persons and the 
American Jewish Committee's earlier successful campaign to convince Americans that the 
displaced persons that the DP Acts sought to help included a large number of Christians and 
people fleeing the Communist bloc.  The shift reflected the AJC's commitment to immigration 
reform in general but also American Jews' new focus on cementing the United Sta s' 
relationship with Israel.   
The American Committee on Italian Migration and the Catholic hierarchy endorsed 
Representative Emanuel Celler's Refugee Relief bill, which proposed the a mission of 328,000 
European refugees on a nonquota basis within the following three years.  Both groups 
immediately mobilized in favor of the bill.  In February 1953, Congressman Celler met with 
Msgr. Edward E. Swanstrom, executive director of War Relief services and director of the 
National Catholic Resettlement Council, Aloysius J. Wycislo, assistant executive director of War 
Relief Services, James J. Norris, European director of War Relief Services, and Judge Juvenal 
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Marchisio, national chairman of the American Committee on Italian Migration, o muster support 
for his bill.  During the meeting, Celler told his guests that the religious persecution unleashed in 
Eastern Europe gave undeniable urgency to the passage of his bill.  Echoing Celler's concern for 
victims of Communism, Judge Marchisio added that he worried about the possibility of the 
Italian Communist Party emerging victorious in the coming national elections in Italy in May.  In 
his view, Celler's Refugee Relief Bill, which warranted the admission of 100,000 immigrants 
from Italy and Trieste, represented the only measure that could "give to the peopl of Italy a ray 
of hope that would insure a democratic victory."560  Yet, despite the support of the Italian 
American community and the Catholic hierarchy, Congress refused to endorse Celler's bill, as 
the majority of congressmen feared that it provided for the entry of too many refugees.  
This setback notwithstanding, ACIM continued to look for opportunities to push for a 
new refugee law.  Congress began to consider the possibility of passing a new refugee law only 
in April 1953, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower requested the admission of 240,000 
refugees outside the quotas within the following two years.  ACIM immediately mobilized to 
arrange for a meeting with Eisenhower to express its support for his refugee proposal.  Through 
the intercession of Monsignor Swanstrom, the American Committee on Italian Migration 
convinced New York Senator Irving M. Ives to organize a meeting with the president to discuss 
emergency legislation addressing refugee and overpopulation problems.561  Ives arranged a 
meeting with Eisenhower at the White House with three leading officials of the American 
Committee on Italian Migration: national chairman Judge Juvenal Marchisio, nati nal secretary 
Ross J. Di Lorenzo, and public relations director Joseph Jordan.  President Eisenhower told his 
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guests that he was "most sympathetic" towards some form of emergency relief fo  overpopulated 
countries in Europe.  He said that he believed that the most immediate possibility of m gration 
legislation lay in the reallocation of the unused quotas to admit a substantial number of 
Europeans for the years 1950, 1951, and 1952 and in a Joint Resolution in Congress that gave 
him emergency power to reallocate unused quotas.  During the meeting, the attendees also 
discussed the politically and economically disastrous consequences in the free nations of 
Western Europe that could result from a policy of apathy or neglect on the part of the United 
States.562  
ACIM's meeting with Eisenhower reflected the rise in political and social prominence of 
the Italian American community, but it also highlighted ACIM's different approach to 
mobilization for a liberal immigration policy.  Unlike Italian American organiz tions seeking 
immigration reform that had preceded it, ACIM pragmatically decided to take on one single 
issue related to Italian migration at a time and to pursue it until it accomplished ts objective.563  
ACIM's other peculiarity was its alliance with the Catholic Church, whose rising nfluence and 
clear-cut anti-Communism provided the organization with the rhetoric, the connections, and the 
influence it needed to succeed.  The 'law of Christianity,' the 'voice of enlightened conscience,' 
and the 'instinct of decent humanity' represented the key phrases guiding ACIM's mobilization 
rhetoric.  ACIM could rely on the Catholic hierarchy for organizational and financ al support in 
its campaigns, fundraising activities, and educational programs, and each diocese appointed a 
priest consultant to assist the local ACIM chapter in its activities; to publicize ACIM's agenda, 
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campaigns, and fundraising activities in their parishes; and to inform their superiors of the 
success of ACIM's initiatives.564  The most involved member of the American Catholic Church 
in ACIM was by far Monsignor Edward E. Swanstrom.565  He had important connections with 
key religious and political figures, shaped the formulation of the organization's ageda, 
suggested valid potential members, and collaborated with ACIM leaders on important initi tives 
against restriction.  He also secured the support of a prominent base of Italian American 
Catholics in the United States.  Finally, similarly to some of the major American Jewish 
organizations, ACIM adopted English as its language of communication.  Unlike many of the 
Italian American publications, ACIM Dispatch, the organization's magazine, was completely in 
English. This choice helped the organization to secure a wider support base among second- and 
third-generation Italian Americans and, more importantly, to widen their audience to include 
people outside the Italian American community.  
At the same time, cognizant of the old anti-Catholic and papist arguments, ACIM was 
careful to reassure the broader public that its activism was hardly an intrusio  into United States 
foreign policy.  Bishop Cushing, an ACIM supporter, explained:  
We are not interested in becoming involved in Old World politics, but it is entirely proper 
and praiseworthy, I repeat, that we should seek to do something great and good for Italy 
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in helping her solve the basic problem [overpopulation] which plagues her progress 
toward the solution of most of her other problems.566 
Christian ideology legitimized ACIM's work and agenda and shielded its activities from any 
suspicions of disloyalty and communist conspiracy.  The equation of good Christian behavior 
with America's interests reframed Italian Americans' mobilization and cast it into a more 
benevolent and acceptable light for the American government and people. 
The successful outreach that ACIM achieved within just a year of its existence attested to 
the soundness of its strategy.567  In 1953, thanks to the extensive financial and technical support 
from the National Catholic Resettlement Council, the organization could already boast eighty-
five chapters spread across the United States; 40,000 subscriptions to the ACIM Dispatch; 
125,000 people in key areas around the country who received ACIM's brochure outlining the 
main objectives of the organization; an educational campaign that reached 158,370,000 people 
through publicity in major newspapers and 47,250,000 people through appearances on radio and 
television; and finally, 57,270 miles traveled by ACIM leaders, covering 100 cities throughout 
the country to give important addresses and conferences to sensitize people to the subject of 
immigration.  The swift initial success also guaranteed that other organizatio s nd individuals 
endorsed ACIM.  Among its supporters, ACIM could, by then, count many national and local 
labor organizations, women's groups, and prominent Italian American politicians and 
professionals. 
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In May 1953, ACIM, confident of the support and the network it had created, began to 
rally support for Senator Watkins's bill.  Modeled on Eisenhower's suggestions in his inaugural 
address, the bill allowed for the entry into the United States of 240,000 refugees and nationals 
from overpopulated countries, 75,000 of whom would be Italians, outside the quotas.  Major 
religious organizations immediately endorsed the bill and mobilized for its passage.  ACIM 
organized a letter-writing campaign, using the May issue of ACIM Dispatch to invite its 
members to write to their congressmen to advocate for the necessity of emergency le islation to 
admit more people outside the quotas and to write to President Eisenhower to express their 
appreciation for his interest in this legislation.568  Responding to ACIM's call, Italian Americans 
sent more than 100,000 messages to urge emergency legislation for refugees and for people from 
overpopulated countries to the members of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and to 
President Eisenhower.569  Meanwhile, representatives of thirty-two ethnic organizations, 
including ACIM, "interested in aiding refugees from Communist-controlled countries and in 
relieving overcrowded conditions in free Europe" met in New York City to pledge their support 
for the Watkins Bill.  The New York City meeting exemplified the central role that the Catholic 
hierarchy played in the mobilization in favor of the Watkins Bill as most of the organizations that 
attended the meeting were affiliated with a Catholic agency; Edward O'Connor, former director 
of the War Relief Services for the National Catholic Welfare Conference, presented an analysis 
of the bill to the delegates; and, highlighting a shift in Italian Americans' fight against restriction, 
Monsignor Edward E. Swanstrom presented ACIM's resolution urging the passage of the bill.  
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Swanstrom acted in his capacity as executive director of the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference, of which ACIM was a member agency.570 
When the congressional hearings on the Watkins Bill began at the beginning of June, 
religious and ethnic agencies lined up to press for the passage of the bill.  On June 5, 1953, even 
before the hearings got under way, the major Jewish organizations sent a joint writte  statement 
to the House Judiciary Committee to encourage legislators to consider the long-range aspect of 
the immigration problem, emphasizing that the elimination of the national origins quota system 
was essential for the United States to meet emergency situations.  On June 8, 1953, major 
Catholic and Protestant organizations testified before the House Judiciary Committee in favor of 
the Watkins Bill, despite differences among them on some aspects of the legislation.571  Judge 
Juvenal Marchisio, ACIM's national chairman, was among the witnesses at the Senat  
Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization's hearings. "Stressing that the hour is late in 
the crucial Italian elections scheduled for June 7th and 8th," Marchisio urged the passage of the 
bill and "declared that the psychological impact on the Italians would be tremendous in 
strengthening the forces of Italian democracy."572   During his testimony, Marchisio significantly 
invoked America's self-interest and the need for admitting Europeans who could fill jobs n 
American industries that were experiencing a shortage of workers.   
Despite the widespread support that the Watkins bill received from immigration 
reformers, its passage also showed the lingering hostility and stereotypes towards immigrants 
from Southern and Eastern Europe.  To Italian Americans' surprise, when the bill came up for 
debate in the Senate, Senator McCarran violently objected to the inclusion of Italian nationals in 
the provisions of the bill.  In response to his objections, ACIM invited the organization's chapters 
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across the nation to voice their dissent and write to Senator McCarran.  In addition to the letters 
of protest that each chapter sent, ACIM national chairman Marchisio sent a telegrm to 
McCarran as well: 
The American Committee on Italian Migration representing the sentiments of more than 
six million Americans of Italian origin and right-thinking Americans not animated by 
racial or religious bias resents the intolerance manifested in your insiste ce to exclude 
Italian nationals from the provisions of the Refugee Bill.  Your stand on this matter 
violates every basic principle of tolerance and freedom from prejudice which has made 
the United States the leader of the free world and is a slap in the face to all Americans of 
Italian origin who have contributed so much to the welfare and progress of the United 
States and whose record of devotion, sacrifice and service in the armed forces bespeaks 
true Americanism.573  
 
ACIM's protest succeeded, at least in part.  The final bill included visas for Italians as well, but 
the number of admissible Italians shrank from the original 75,000 to 60,000.  Of the 60,000 visas 
the law reserved for Italian migrants, 45,000 were for refugees of Italian origin from former 
Italian colonies, Venezia Giulia, and Trieste, and the remaining 15,000 were for Italian
nationals.574   
Despite the reduction in the number of visas reserved for Italians, many Italian
Americans considered the passage of the 1953 Refugee Relief Act a testament to the success of 
their involvement in the campaign in favor of the bill.  ACIM was particularly elated by the 
victory, as it accomplished the first goal that the committee had established when it was founded, 
namely to seek emergency legislation to admit Italians from overcrowded Italy into the United 
States, over and above the quota.  The passage of the act also reflected the importance of the 
organization's partnership with the Catholic Church and Italian Americans' ascend nt political 
influence.  ACIM immediately acknowledged that the passage of the Bill "was the culmination 
of numerous efforts of the National Catholic Resettlement Council [...] as far back as the pre-
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Presidential election days when Judge Juvenal Marchisio, ACIM National Chairman, spoke to 
the Honorable Winthrop Aldrich, who subsequently discussed the matter with General 
Eisenhower and got a sympathetic reaction for consideration after the election."575  Moreover, in 
August 1953, ACIM leaders met with President Eisenhower during his visit to New York City to 
thank him in person for "the effective role he played in the securing of emergency migration 
legislation" and told him that the executive board "had unanimously voted to name him 
Outstanding Humanitarian of 1953."576  Finally, the mobilization that ACIM mustered for the 
passage of the law offered its leadership two important lessons to keep in mind, namely th t 
Congress continued to be more inclined to consider refugee rather than immigration legislation 
and that some of the stereotypes that mainstream American had of them still per isted. 
 
Working to Overcome Imperfect Legislation: The 1953 Refugee Relief Act 
The elation over the passage of the 1953 Refugee Relief Act was short lived.  Both Italian 
and Jewish resettlement agencies soon realized the many shortcomings of the law.  Disregarding 
the problems that emerged from the 1948 Displaced Persons Act, the new law in fact retained the 
same tight screening requirements, including the prerequisite that applicants could not receive a 
visa unless they provided complete information about themselves for at least two years prior to 
submitting their visa application, the provision requiring refugees to include assurances of 
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employment and housing, and the requirement of certification from the United States
Employment Service.577   Moreover, the number of visa applications from Italians, Dutch, and 
Greeks with relatives in the United States far outnumbered Italian, Dutch, and Greek refugees 
seeking a visa.  As early as February 1954, ACIM also complained that the high hopes that the 
passage of the act had generated were fading fast "because of constant delays, ne dle s 
administration pitfalls and many complex 'safeguards' in the name of 'security.'"578  The 
frustration with bureaucratic ineffectiveness escalated when a State Department spokesman, 
commenting on its decision not to request a supplemental budget to finance the additional 
screening requirements of the 1953 Act, said that "in any event screening requirements to 
prevent subversives from taking advantage of the refugee operation [were] time-consuming and 
would have prevented issuance of more than a relatively few visas in the immediate future."579   
ACIM's response focused on the need for job and housing assurances, following a 
strategy on which many Jewish agencies had relied since the end of the nineteenth century.  
ACIM launched a countrywide campaign to raise awareness of the issue among A ericans, 
while appealing to Italian Americans to secure assurances for Italian immigrants who qualified 
under the 1953 Refugee Relief Act.580  Reverend William Kelly's appeal fully captured the dual 
goals of ACIM's campaign: 
The average American finds it hard and sometimes impossible to understand overseas 
population pressure problems because there is, thanks to God, no counterpart of these 
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problems in America's experience.  Living space is a tragically important consideration of 
many economically poor nations such as Italy.581 
The campaign to secure assurances once again benefited from the full support of Monsignor 
Swanstrom, who, as chairman of the National Catholic Resettlement Council, reassured ACIM 
that it would have the full cooperation of the agencies he headed.  In addition to ACIM, in fact
the National Catholic Resettlement Council included agencies from "35 other racial, n tionality, 
and religious groups."  Thanks to Swanstrom's promise, ACIM's 80 chapters could now count on 
1,500 parishes in every state of the union to obtain 45,000 job and housing assurances for Italian 
immigrants under the 1953 Refugee Relief Act.582  Throughout the entire life of the 1953 
Refugee Relief Act, ACIM leadership visited Italian American communities across the country 
to find potential sponsors.  Moreover, starting in March 1955, ACIM Dispatch published extracts 
of emigration dossiers with photos of individuals and families who had filed petitions to come to 
the United States and needed sponsors who could help them to meet the provisions of the 
Refugee Relief Act of 1953.583   
The Jewish community responded to the crisis that emerged from administering th 
various refugee acts with a merger of the three major Jewish resettlemen  agencies.  In 1954, the 
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the seventy-year old migration agecy, merged with the 
United Service for New Americans and the Joint Distribution Committee offices abroad in order 
to provide for a flexible, expert, national and Jewish international migration service, a 
unified agency representing the entire Jewish community which [could] speak with a
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more powerful voice than can separate individual agencies, no matter how they cooperate 
with each other.584 
The merger created the United HIAS Service, which had offices and committees in more than 
forty countries around the world, eliminated any overlap with other agencies, and capitalized on 
the expertise and connections of the three previously distinct agencies.  The new agecy em rged 
from the fear that it was "a time of great and dangerous urgency in many parts of the world for 
Jews" who looked to Jews in the United States "for aid in distress." 585   It was also the product of 
the American Jewish community's awareness that migration represented a much more technical 
and complicated process than ever before and that to be successful it required "careful selection 
and planning with the family and the community of destination, as well as the constant 
representations to the governments involved."586  Yet, more than anything else, the merger 
represented a major accomplishment within American Jewish community in matters of 
immigration.  With its broad scope, the United HIAS Service quickly prided itself on being "the 
only Jewish international migration agency with the Jews of every community in the United 
States solidly behind it and believing in it."587 
The United HIAS Service worked to relocate Jewish refugees both in the United Stat s 
and in other countries around the world, while continuing to advocate for changes to the law.  
Outside the United States, the relocation process to countries like China, Europe, Australia, 
Israel, Latin America, and South America encountered delays almost at every level and was 
often as convoluted and expensive as resettlement to the United States.588  In the United States, 
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the United HIAS Service, like ACIM, worked to secure work and housing assurances that 
qualified under the 1953 Refugee Relief Act and provided technical guidance to local 
communities for their integration, rehabilitation, and naturalization efforts once the refugees 
arrived.  More importantly, its leadership considered United HIAS Service as "a significant 
instrument in implementing citizen action […] a necessary and useful part of our political and 
cultural life, national, as well as local."589  Like ACIM, United HIAS Service repeatedly 
criticized the 1953 Refugee Relief Act and the McCarran-Walter Act and received the 
endorsements from many of the same politicians that praised ACIM for its work, from President 
Eisenhower to Senator Irving M. Ives, as well as from Senator Herbert H. Lehman, New York 
City mayor Robert F. Wagner, and Commissioner of Immigration Joseph M. Swing.  Reflecting 
a stance similar to other organizations interested in immigration reform, United HIAS Service 
connected immigration reform to the need to foster family reunion, provide asylum to refugees, 
to strengthen American foreign policy, and to guarantee civil liberties to all people.590 
In August 1954, after protests and criticisms of the shortcoming of the 1953 Refugee 
Relief Act, Congress decided to amend it.  The amendment authorized the State Department to 
issue visas eliminating the division contained in the 1953 version of the law between refugees 
and those with relatives in the United States.  The revision came with a caveat, however.  At 
McCarran's insistence, the new law required that both refugees and migrants with relatives in the 
United States applying for a visa needed to show evidence of a job and housing to be granted a 
visa.591   
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The amendment did little to placate criticisms of the act, as it created rather than 
eliminated new challenges.592  ACIM, HIAS, and other groups working on refugee resettlement, 
in fact, warned that the rise in the number of visas available for immigrants with relatives in the 
United States that the amendment opened up meant "a reduction […] for the refugees, escap es 
and other classifications of aliens whom the law was intended to help."593  Confirming its somber 
predictions, in September 1955, ACIM reported that of the 20,000 Italians already admitted to 
the United States only approximately 600 were refugees, the remaining balance being relatives of 
American citizens.  "It is the wish and the hope of both the United States and Italian 
governments," read an article in ACIM Dispatch, "that of the total 60,000, a minimum of 10,000 
be refugees. ACIM is working towards this goal."594  Government representatives' efforts to extol 
the advantages of the act for Italian migrants did little to assuage ACIM's criticisms.  After 
reminding ACIM Dispatch readers that visas accorded to Italians represented nearly 60 per cent 
of the worldwide total of Refugee Program visas issued, Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy Administrator 
for the Refugee Relief Program, added: 
Knowing well the deep concern of President Eisenhower and of Ambassador Luce for the 
success of this emergency legislation, the significant part it plays in American foreign 
policy, and the humanitarian values it has for meeting refugee problems and over-
population distress, I and my staff shall continue our efforts toward the fullest possible 
attainment of all objectives of the Act.595 
Gerety's article boasted another important achievement of his bureau's administratio  of the 
program.  By October 14, 1955, 32,500 of the 60,000 visas allocated to Italy by the Refugee Act 
had been issued.  Yet, the news was far from promising for Italian Americans.  The number 
meant that, with the program expiring on December 31, 1956, fewer than half of the visas 
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available for Italians remained to fill.  By February 1956, Gerety, in his second article for ACIM 
Dispatch, announced that the number of applications for visas from Italians eligible under the 
1953 Refugee Act already exceeded the allotted 60,000 quotas.596 
The debate about the red tape in the administration of the 1953 Refugee Relief Act 
attracted further public attention when Scott McLeod, head of the Bureau of Security and 
Consular Affairs and Administrator of the Refugee Relief Program, fired Edward J. Corsi, his 
Special Assistant for Refugee and Migration Problems.  McLeod argued that Corsi's dismissal 
was necessary because of his public comments criticizing the administration of he law and 
because of his suspicion that Representative Walter's charges that Corsi had past communist 
affiliations were true.  Walter had asked for Corsi's dismissal as a Departm nt of State consultant 
because "he had shown contempt of Congress, addiction to falsehood, and scorn of the law."597 
Corsi denied the charges and retorted that "the security gang" around Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles was administering the Refugee Relief Act unsympathetically.598  In truth, Corsi 
and McLeod disliked each other even before they began working together.  In discussing his 
appointment as Special Assistant for Refugee and Migration Problems with Maxwell Rabb, one 
of the president's assistants who offered Corsi his job, Corsi told him that "in the part of the 
country I came from McLeod's name was used to frighten babies," because of his bad reputation 
among people familiar with immigration problems.599 
Following the uproar that resulted from Corsi's firing, Senator William Langer, chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee, announced 
public hearings from April 15 to 23, 1955, on Corsi's charges and on the administration of the act 
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in general.  Neither the hearings nor the public protests reversed the decision to terminate Corsi's 
position or removed the administration of the refugee program from the jurisdiction of Scott 
McLeod.600  After his dismissal, Corsi took advantage of the uproar generated by his firing and 
went on a tour across the country to speak on the impact of international tensions on the 
movement of people and to advocate fundamental changes in the approach toward basic 
immigration laws as well as toward the admission of refugees.  During his tour, he spoke at a 
rally against the McCarran Walter Act at Carnegie Hall in New York City in June 1955 and 
broadcasted his criticism of the McCarran-Walter Act at the New York City radio station 
WOV.601   
The Corsi affaire, as many referred to it at the time, created a considerable stir within the 
Italian American community.  Luigi Criscuolo, the conservative and former Fascist sympathizer 
editor of The Rubicon, charged that the Corsi affaire revealed that "Italians are made to be the
instrument of a plot to flood this country with Communists, who were the real reason why the 
McCarran-Walter Act had to be so drastic as to even penalize the decent Italia s who wanted to 
come here."  According to Criscuolo, the episode also revealed that "the insinuations made to the 
effect that Corsi had been adopted by Jewish interests in this country was not mere guess-
work."602  It was most likely because of this episode, and the negative publicity associated with it 
in a climate of rampant anti-Communist phobia, that ACIM refrained from participating in the 
Carnegie Hall protest, where Corsi was one of the keynote speakers, against the McCarran-
Walter Act.   
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The Corsi affaire succeeded at least in grabbing President Eisenhower's attention.  A few 
weeks after the scandal, Eisenhower acted on Corsi's allegations and urged Congress to intervene 
legislatively to change the administration of the act and to redistribute the unusd q otas.  The 
president's proposals echoed those for which resettlement agencies had long advocated, 
including the transfer of unused quotas from some categories to others; the elimination of the 
requirement of a complete two-year history of each visa applicant; and the recognition of the job 
and housing assurances given by voluntary agencies.  Many of the Italian Americans and Jewish 
Americans' political allies mobilized after the president's call to acti n but to no avail.  Senator 
Watkins and Senator Ives immediately incorporated the president's proposals into  b ll and 
rallied the support of fifteen other Republican senators.  Senator Langer held hearings on June 8, 
1955, on this and other proposals that suggested possible amendments to the Refugee Relief Act.  
However, despite the president's recommendations and the widespread public expression of 
dissatisfaction with the existing law, none of the proposed amendments ever reach d the House 
or the Senate floors for debate.603   
 If Italian Americans and American Jews faced an uphill battle to amend refugee 
legislation, they had to reckon with even more challenges when they focused on immigration 
reform, as Eisenhower's efforts to push for reform after his re-election demonstrated.  During his 
campaign for his second term as president, Eisenhower launched a new attack on the quota 
system and called for the use of the 1950 census, the increase of the yearly quota to 220,000, the 
redistribution of the unused quotas, and the release of the quotas of countries mortgaged by the 
Displaced Persons Acts.604  Once again, two politicians who shared American Jews and Italian 
Americans' calls for immigration reform tried to act on the president's call for changes in the 
                                                
603 "Refugee Relief Act," American Jewish Year Book 57 (1956), 178-179. 
604 Lieberman, Are Americans Extinct?, 116-117, and "Edward Corsi Appointed Special Assistant for Refugee and 
Migration Problems," ACIM Dispatch, February 1955. 
274 
 
existing immigration policy.  Senators Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas and Everett McKinley 
Dirksen of Illinois suggested to attaching to another pending immigration bill a compromise 
amendment to redistribute unused quotas.  Despite widespread support in the Senate, Dirksen 
and Johnson's proposal raised immediate opposition from Senator James Eastland of Mississippi, 
who had replaced McCarran as chairman of the subcommittee on immigration.  The Senate 
passed the Johnson-Dirksen compromise amendment despite Eastland's criticisms, and, for the 
first time in twenty-two years, many immigration reform advocates felt that "a serious dent in the 
substantive basis of national origins had been made in the Senate."605  Yet, despite New York 
Republican Kenneth B. Keating's attempt to secure House approval on the last day of the second 
session of the 84th Congress, it was too late for the House to act upon it.606 The battle remained 
far from its end, but ACIM showed its appreciation for Senator Dirken's efforts to help Italian 
migration with an ACIM award at a dinner with more than a thousand guests organized by the 
Chicago chapter.607 
More important than the congressional battles over immigration reform, the debate 
surrounding Johnson and Dirksen's proposal exemplified old and new obstacles and stereotypes 
that Italian Americans and American Jews had to endure as they sought immigration reform.  In 
his discussion of the amendment, Senator Eastland denounced the fact that the use of the unused 
quotas would  
change the cultural pattern of our immigration system from northern and western 
Europeans to southern and eastern Europeans […] Ours is a constitutional republic, built 
upon concepts stemming from cultures which reflect themselves in the historic 
composition of our population.  If we transfer the pattern of our immigration to countries 
and peoples who have historically maintained a totalitarian concept of government, it will 
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only be a matter of time until our Republic will veer from its traditions of freedom and 
democracy.608 
In addition to raising the old specter of the danger that immigrants posed to the survival of 
American institutions, critics of immigration reform also continued to use the fear o  
communism to rally resistance against any change to the country's immigration policy.  Robert 
C. Alexander, former Assistant Administrator for the Refugee Relief Program, provided solid 
ammunition to the opponents of immigration reform in Congress.  In a 1956 article for Law and 
Contemporary Problems, he argued that the recent discovery that a member of the American 
Communist Party had been actively involved in the National Committee to Repeal the McCarran 
Act demonstrated the dangers that immigration reform posed to the American way of life. "This 
does not mean, of course," he continued, "that all those who criticize the McCarran-Walter Act 
are Communists, or even Communist sympathizers, but it should cause patriotic Ameri ans who 
have no political ax to grind to ponder before joining any movement to attack the law."609  
Alexander was not alone in his efforts to charge critics of the existing immigration policy with 
Communist affiliations.  As late as 1960, Representative Walter himself repeatedly insisted that 
Communists had successfully infiltrated a large number of churches across the country and 
persuaded them to endorse immigration reform.610   
 In addition to lingering fears of an imminent immigrant and Communist invasion, the 
American Jewish Committee suspected that the absence of a public debate simil r to the one on 
refugee legislation complicated any campaign for immigration reform.  To their surprise, the 
McCarran-Walter Act continued to attract little public concern, despite Eis nhower's repeated 
warnings against its shortcomings.  At its 1955 annual meeting, the American Jewish Committee 
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adopted a resolution that commended the President's recommendation during his Stateof the 
Union message on January 6, 1955, that Congress rectify the discriminatory features of the 
McCarran-Walter Act and the cumbersome, unworkable provisions of the Refugee Reli f Act.  
Similar to ACIM with its political allies, the AJC praised "those memb rs of Congress of each 
political party who, during the last session, joined in sponsoring bills to improve these law ."611  
Yet, a year after Eisenhower's call to action, the AJC realized that the lck of public concern over 
the need to revise the basic United Stated immigration laws failed to rally enough Congressional 
support for sweeping reform.  Ultimately, "only a few private bills, a bill for the relief of 
sheepherders and certain other legislation of a very limited and specialized nature, were seriously 
considered by Congress," lamented the American Jewish Committee.612  
ACIM was equally worried about the lack of public interest in immigration reform.  In 
response to this problem, the organization intensified its efforts to keep Italy's overpopulation 
problem alive in the public's mind as a way to prepare Americans and Congress to consider Italy 
as a primary beneficiary when the country would be ready to tackle immigration policy reform.  
It also used Americans' fear of Communism to continue to reframe the immigration reform 
debate in terms of American foreign policy interests.  Starting in October 1953, ACIM Dispatch 
regularly published articles that focused on Italy's overpopulation problem and warned of the 
danger that it posed to the survival of democracy in the country and the entire West.  ACIM 
recruited powerful allies to discuss these issues in its monthly publication.  Following a strategy 
that American Jews had adopted during the fight for refugee legislation, the authors of the 
opinion pieces included prominent political and religious personalities from outside the Italian 
American community, namely Clare Boothe Luce, American ambassador to Italy; Massachusetts 
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Senator John F. Kennedy; Monsignor John O'Grady; and Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador to 
the United States.  This educational program, ACIM believed, represented the best strat gy to 
"bring about a state of mind in this country where we will be able to have decent immigration 
laws that will permit the citizens of any country to come in—not be discriminated against—but 
to be received in true charity and justice."613  The ACIM headquarters also called upon its 
chapters across the country to organize educational and informational programs in collaboration 
with local and fraternal organizations in industry, labor, and religious groups.  In its effort to 
educate Americans, ACIM also relied on the assiduous presence of a collaborating priest within 
the circumscription of every ACIM chapter around the country.  The pulpit often proved t b  
the most effective instrument to inform churchgoers and ask for their assistance.614  
ACIM's strongest ally in its educational campaign were members of the Cat olic Church 
who wholeheartedly espoused ACIM's commitment to raise awareness about It ly's 
overpopulation problem among Americans and helped the organization popularize its agenda.  
Archbishop Richard J. Cushing of Boston repeatedly admonished that too many Americans 
ignored how essential Italy was and needed to remain to the interests of the West.  Reiterating 
ACIM's position on that matter, Cushing explained: 
There are even more practical considerations of a contemporary kind behind the 
contention that whatever strengthens Italy here and now strengthens Western 
Civilization—and whatever dooms Italy contributes proportionately to the destruction of 
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the Western World […] The Mediterranean is still the sea highway between th  East and 
the West.  It is still the basin where mingle whatever forces for good or evil t avel either 
Eastward or Westward, and the shores of Italy are still, as in centuries past, washed with 
the worries of the West and the East.615  
 
The solution to the fragile conditions of some countries in Western Europe after the war was 
regarded as an international responsibility, but ACIM leaders argued that only if the United 
States, "the recognized leader of the Free World," intervened to help the economies of these 
nations would its allies join to solve this problem.  According to Father Donanzan, it was this 
centrality of the United States in international affairs that made it regrettable that  
immigration sanctions applied to Italy [in] 1924 are still in effect today—5,645 Italians 
per year only can migrate to this country.  This, indeed, harms the good will engendered 
by our foreign policy.  If Italians and others are left without hope of immigration, their 
oppressive conditions cannot be borne for long without the outbreak of violence of 
incalculable proportions.616  
ACIM's use of the anti-Communist rhetoric in its educational campaign in part exorcised some 
of the stereotypes that Americans had of Italian Americans, as it offered the dual advantage of 
proving their loyalty to the United States and of legitimating their ties with Italy.  For similar 
reasons, American Jews recast their mobilization for immigration reform in social justice terms 
to dispel fears of immigration as a Jewish conspiracy but also to present themselves as fully 
American. The two groups' different relationship with their countries of origin and specific 
stereotypes affected their mobilization against immigration restriction, forcing them to frame 
their agenda in different terms.  
In addition to publicizing Italy's overpopulation plight, ACIM leadership decided to 
circumvent American restrictive immigration laws by finding alternative destinations for aspiring 
                                                
615 "Text of Speech by Archbishop Richard J. Cushing of Boston," ACIM Dispatch, Dec. 1953-Jan. 1954. 
616 "Father Donanzan's Address," May 17, 1959. 
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Italian migrants.617  The organization cooperated with the Catholic Relief Services to sponsor 
and direct the resettlement and integration of Italians in Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, and 
Argentina.  In 1958, Father Donanzan visited these four countries, under the auspices of the 
Catholic Relief Services and ACIM, and "met with scores of government officials, church 
officials, Italian officials, to get […] as accurate a picture as possible on the social, moral, 
material, religious conditions affecting the Italians who have migrated since 1946 as well as 
those who have migrated before the war."618  After Donanzan returned from his trip, ACIM 
agreed to collaborate with the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the Intergovernmental Committee 
on European Migration (ICEM), the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), and 
the Scalabrini Fathers to be part of a pilot project "for the social assistance" of Italian postwar 
migrants in South America.619 
In the first months of 1953, Marchisio and Donanzan, with the help of Monsignor 
Swanstrom and his network, also began negotiations with General Rafael Trujillo to coordinate 
the resettlement of a group of Italian migrants in the Dominican Republic.  In the spring of 1953, 
Marchisio; Baron Carlo De Ferrariis Salzano, Italian Consul General in New York; and Ross Di 
Lorenzo, National Secretary of ACIM, met with Trujillo and his aide during one of the gen ral's 
visits to New York City to attend a meeting at the United Nations.  The organizatio  of the 
meeting entailed the involvement of American and Italian government officials and American 
                                                
617 The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), among other organizations, had long been involved in efforts to 
secure possibilities for emigrants to migrate to countries other than the United States.  Like HIAS, ACIM leaders 
focused most of their efforts on South American andLatin American countries, established offices in the sending 
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619 "ACIM Pilot Project Set for South America—Assistance for Italian Immigrants there Asked of Father Donanzan 
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and Italian Catholic clergy members.620  At the end of the meeting, Trujillo declared that the 
Dominican Republic stood ready to welcome to its shores 100,000 Italians and to give each 
family a land grant to settle in the republic.  "The doors of the Republic," said Truj llo, "are wide 
open to God-fearing, anti-communistic Italians who wish to settle in [the Dominican Republic] 
for a life of stability and security."621  Once again, ACIM's avowed anti-Communism and its ties 
with the Catholic was an important asset. 
White, God-fearing, and anti-Communist Italians incarnated Trujillo's favorite migrants.  
Since his first years of government, in fact, General Trujillo, as part of his Dominicanización 
program, had reinforced the country's relationship with the Catholic Church and expanded the 
construction of church-supported schools, especially along the border with Haiti.622  Trujillo's 
Dominicanización program also entailed the reinforcement of the country's white, Spanish 
heritage and the obliteration of its mulatto ancestry.623  This was not Trujillo's first attempt to 
recruit European immigrants to whiten his country.  Before trying to recruit Italians in the 1950s, 
Trujillo had announced at the 1938 Evian conference that his country was willing to accept up to 
one hundred thousand refugees from Central Europe.  His initiative received the blessing of the 
Roosevelt administration and the strategic support of the Joint Distribution Committee, a Jewish 
agency that worked to carry on an agricultural colonization program for Jewish refugees in 
countries other than the United States as a way to circumvent the restrictive American 
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621 "Dominican Republic Will Welcome 100,000 Italians Says Trujillo," ACIM Dispatch, April 1953. 
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immigration policy.  Ultimately, only 757 Jewish refugees stranded in countries of transit along 
Germany's borders during the panic emigration reached the Dominican Republic, but, as in the 
Italian case, this initiative was part of "a despot's racist efforts t  remake his own society."624  
After the meeting in New York City, Marchisio organized a trip to the Dominican 
Republic to verify the desirability and fitness of the environment for Italians and iron out the 
details of resettlement with the secretary of Foreign Affairs and the President of the Republic.  
Traveling with him were Ross Di Lorenzo, Monsignor Ligutti, chairman of the National Catholic 
Rural Life Conference and representative of the International Catholic Migration Commission 
(ICMC) of Rome.625  During its stay in the Dominican Republic, the delegation and the 
government representatives also agreed on "the type of immigrants needed by th  Republic 
whose visas would be given priority," namely seamen, fishermen, marble cuttersand setters, 
upholsterers, mechanics, and farmers.626  At the end of the trip, Marchisio applauded the deal and 
Monsignor Ligutti declared that he would ask the ICMC to pay for the cost of transporti g the 
migrants from Italy.  The negotiations with Trujillo came to a halt, however, when the general 
kept postponing the beginning of the program. 
ACIM's involvement in the refugee legislation in the United States and its negotiations 
with the Dominican Republic confirmed its rise to leadership with regard to immigration matters 
among Italian Americans, Italians, American and Italian authorities, and the Italian and 
American Catholic hierarchy.  Other Italian American organizations often had to succumb to its 
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influence.  In a gesture that acknowledged ACIM's rising leadership, the American Resettlement 
Council for Italian Refugees (ARCIR) relented and decided to join forces with ACIM and its 
campaign.  Led by Fortune Pope and supported by the Order Sons of Italy, ARCIR was an 
impromptu organization created specifically to help Italian migrants with relatives in the United 
States and refugees take advantage of the 1953 Refugee Relief Act.  In June 1954, after months 
of bickering about which organization was truly in charge of the operation, the two organizations 
agreed to divide their tasks to be more efficient: ARCIR was in charge of obtaining Assurances 
for employment and housing, while ACIM provided for the reception and resettlement of the 
Italian refugees.627  A year later, ACIM sealed an agreement with the Comitato Italiano Pro 
Profughi Stati Uniti (CIPSU), the official Italian refugee agency, to coordinate their efforts to 
help Italian migrants with relatives in the United States and refugees who qualified under the 
Refugee Relief Act.628  
The recognition that ACIM received from Italian and Italian American agencies 
effectively paved the way for the Italian government's endorsement of ACIM as the most 
prominent Italian American organization dealing with immigration issue.  After allowing its 
representatives in the United States to participate in and support ACIM's campaigns and 
activities, the Italian government's official approval arrived firstwith a letter in February 1955 
from Prime Minister Mario Scelba congratulating ACIM on its third anniversary and then with 
an official visit of the prime minister to ACIM headquarters during his trip to the United States 
in the spring of 1955.629  At the luncheon organized in his honor, Scelba thanked President 
                                                
627 "ACIM and ARCIR Join Forces on Refugee Act Program," ACIM Dispatch, June 1954. Another major Italian 
American organization that endorsed ACIM was UNICO.  "New UNICO President Pledges Support to ACIM," 
ACIM Dispatch, November 1953. 
628 "ACIM Recognized and Registered by State Departmen—Agreement with CIPSU, Official Italian Refugee 
Agency, Also Made," ACIM Dispatch, September 1955. 
629 "Eisenhower, Scelba Salute ACIM on 3rd Anniversary," ACIM Dispatch, February 1955 and 
"Scelba to be Guest of ACIM Leaders," ACIM Dispatch, April 1955. 
283 
 
Eisenhower and ACIM for their efforts for the Refugee Relief Act and praised their work as a 
crucial material, moral, and humanitarian contribution to the relationship between the two 
nations.  He added that he was delighted to attend the luncheon to thank ACIM, "this deserving 
organization that, motivated by a truly Christian spirit, has done so much to ameliorate the 
immigration laws of the United States."630  A year later, in April 1956, during a visit to the 
United States, the Italian president himself, Giovanni Gronchi, recognized ACIM's work as vital 
to alleviate Italy's overpopulation problem and as invaluable to cement the ties betwen Italy and 
the United States.631   
A little over two years later, ACIM's rise as the leader in immigration advocacy in the 
United States for the Italian government was complete.  In June 1958, Marchisio traveled to Italy 
for a ten-day tour of key Italian cities as a guest of the Italian Government.  The purpose of the 
trip was to bring to the attention of the people of Italy the work and accomplishments of the 
American Committee on Italian Migration through public speeches, meetings w th top-level 
Italian leaders, and radio, television, and press interviews.  The Italian government also saw 
Marchisio's tour as an occasion to foster a closer understanding between the people of the United 
States and of Italy.  More importantly for both the Italian and the American governments, the 
tour "projected the good intentions and the good will of the United States towards the aspiration 
of the Italian people and removed many misconceptions and distortions in their minds planted
there by the enemies of America."632  American Jews similarly engaged in a close relationship 
with the government of Israel, but the two never directly discussed the resettlemen  of Jewish 
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migrants to Israel as Jewish settlement agencies had long been engaged in res ttlem nt.  
American Jews rather represented "honest brokers," as Truman called them, between Israel and 
American society, negotiated American Jewish emotional ties with Israel, ponsored the country 
financially, and monitored Israeli policies towards American foreign policy so as not to 
jeopardize the Jewish position in the United States.633 
As it received recognition for its work from both American and Italian authorities and 
from Italian Americans, ACIM began to mobilize again for a short extension of the Refugee 
Relief Act beyond the December 31, 1956 deadline and for the transfer of unused quotas in the 
act for Germany and Austria to Italy, Greece, the Far East, and Great Britain.  Senator William 
Langer's pending bill fulfilled both of their goals and, if passed, guaranteed 20,000 addition l 
visas for Italians.  When the bill came up for consideration by the committees on immigration in 
Congress in June 1956, ACIM urged its 107 chapters across the country to show their support for 
the bill by writing, wiring, and contacting in any way possible the members of the House and 
Senate Sub-Committees on Immigration to urge them to vote the bill out of the committees 
before Congress closed for recess in July.634  The Senate swiftly passed the Langer bill only to 
see it killed in the House by Representative Walter.  
 
1957: A Change in the Tide?  
Despite the disappointment over the failure of the Langer bill, Italian, Jewish, and other 
organizations began to notice signs in the 1956 election platforms that the climate might soon 
become more favorable for immigration reform.  Both the Republican and the Democratic 
parties, in fact, included planks in their platforms that favored the liberalization of America's 
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immigration laws, and Eisenhower once more committed to immigration reform.635   The shift 
coincided with the expiration in December 1956 of the 1953 Refugee Relief Act.  Encouraged by 
the tepid optimism about immigration reform generated by the election platforms and by 
Eisenhower's renewed commitment, ACIM set its sights on eight ambitious goals for its 1957 
legislative program, which it believed could "serve the American national interest and could win 
approval by Congress."  The goals included, among others, the admission of third-prefe ence 
cases (including approximately 15,000 Italian spouses and minor children of Italians, legally 
residing in the United States); the admission of 24,835 Italian relatives and refugees whose 
assurances were in the "pipeline" under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953; the admission of 5,000 
orphans with an increased age limit of 14 years old; the admission of 250,000 immigrants in the 
United States per year instead of the present 168,000; the pooling of unused quota numbers to be 
made available to aliens having specific skills or relatives in the United States; and the increase 
in quotas to be based on the 1950 and not on the 1920 census.636   
ACIM was not alone in its conviction that the time might be ripe for limited immigration 
reform.  In March 1957, Republican Representative Kenneth B. Keating from New York 
expressed a similar optimism in an article he wrote for ACIM Dispatch.  The combination of a 
number of factors, he argued, made chances for passage of immigration legislation more 
probable in 1957 than they had been for a long time.  In the first place, Congress showed an 
inclination to evaluate immigration legislation earlier than usual, following President 
Eisenhower's renewed calls for reform shortly after the start of the new session.  Another factor 
raising hopes for passage of immigration legislation, he believed, was Americans' realization of 
the growing impact that the inequities of the existing policy produced.  Finally, he believed that 
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Congress and Americans were beginning to appreciate "the fruiting of the lng years of hard 
effort by fine organizations such as ACIM in dramatizing the needs and desires of tho e who 
have already come to this country and become worthy citizens.  Your increasing labor for more 
liberal immigration laws has had its effect on the American people and on Congress."  In the 
long run, he concluded, the contributions to the greatness of the United States by Americans of 
foreign descent was the best argument of all for allowing freer immigration.637   
Despite the encouraging environment, ACIM leaders remained pragmatic about their 
goals and decided to pressure Congress to pass legislation to tackle only two of them, the 
"pipeline" cases and the family reunion cases.  According to data provided by the Department of 
State, Italy had 24,841 pipeline cases; Greece had 11,290; the Netherlands had 377; and 
Germany had 568.  In March 1957, ACIM sent a statement to the members of Congress and to 
the New York Times calling for quick action on the pipeline and family reunion cases as the 
restrictive policy played into the hands of  "red propagandists."   Senator Jacob K. Javits of New 
York had the statement included in the Appendix of the Congressional Record and several of the 
members of the Committee on the Judiciary in both the Senate and in the House sent messages of 
solidarity favoring the recommendations made in the statement.638  Thanks to the public support 
for their agenda from Maxwell M. Rabb, Secretary of the Cabinet at the White Hous, Marchisio 
and his colleagues personally met with Senator Keating, Senator John F. Kennedy, ad Sen tor 
James Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, to discuss ACIM's 
recommendations to provide for family reunion and pipeline cases to be included in Keating and 
Kennedy's pending immigration bills.  They did not succeed in getting an audience with 
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Representative Walter, but they still decided to endorse his bill as well because it included some 
of ACIM's suggestions for reform.639   
 The American Jewish Committee as well as other Jewish organizations acted on the 
favorable climate for reform as well.  On February 1, 1957, five national Jewish organizations 
issued a joint statement praising President Eisenhower's proposals for reform but also asking for 
action to relieve the plight of the Egyptian refugees.  On April 3, 1957, the American 
Immigration Conference issued a public statement supported by thirty-nine of its Jewish, 
Catholic, and Protestant member organizations that urged Congress to act on the president's 
proposals.  The statement also praised the plan for admitting escapees and refugees fleeing from 
Communist countries but asked that the plan be expanded to include victims of religious or 
political persecution in non-Communist countries as well.640  Like Italian Americans, American 
Jews concurred that the pending Kennedy bill represented the last serious attempt t reforming 
American immigration policy in the 1950s.  The bill tackled family reunion, settlement of the 
refugees who remained unsettled, and the regularization of paroled immigrants' status.   
 All the major Jewish agencies also participated in the debate on the Kennedy bill.  On 
July 1, HIAS issued another statement praising Kennedy's bill.  Other testimonies call ng for 
immigration reform during the hearings confirmed another significant aspect of immigration 
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were from a Communist country, the American governme t accepted very few Egyptian refugees citing its 
immigration policy as justification.   
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reform advocacy that emerged after World War II: the prominence of voluntary agencies with 
religious affiliation in the debate over immigration.  The Standing Conference of Voluntary 
Agencies Working for Refugees, the Church World Service, the National Council of the
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., and the National Lutheran Council all testified in support of 
immigration reform.  In August 1957, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish 
Congress, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the Central Conferenc  of American 
Rabbis, the Jewish Labor Committee, the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, 
the Rabbinical Council of America, the Synagogue Council of America, the Union of American 
Hebrew Congregations, HIAS, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, and the United 
Synagogue of America submitted a joint testimony in favor of immigration reform at the Senate 
Immigration Sub-Committee hearings on the Kennedy bill.  The testimony cogently reflected the 
degree of unity behind immigration reform reached within the American Jewish community after 
World War II among organizations that were often at odds with one another on a host of other 
issues.641 
Yet, Kennedy's campaign for his bill revealed to American Jews and Italian Americans 
that the openness that many immigration advocates perceived at the time was only superficial.  
The majority of Congressmen remained reluctant to pass sweeping immigration legislation, no 
matter how hard Kennedy tried to assuage their fears: 
The number of aliens which this bill would admit is relatively small—less than 90,000 
over a two-year period—but the advantage to the United States and the people affected
are tremendous.  More importantly, however, this bill has great moral significance, 
having as its basic purpose the preservation of families and the extension of assistance to 
the homeless […] This bill is no panacea nor is it a final answer to the immigration 
problem.642 
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After an informal poll among congressmen, Kennedy realized that very few would support his 
bill.643  Many of them favored the much narrower immigration bill that Representative Walt r 
had reported to the House Judiciary Committee.  Kennedy then decided to introduce a new bill,
similar to Walter's, in the Senate.  Its limitations notwithstanding, Italian Americans and 
American Jews decided to support the new version of the bill "on the ground that it would help 
in the reuniting of families, would aid in solving some of the existing refugee situations, and 
would in other respects mitigate some of the harsh and inflexible features of the basic 
immigration law."644  Once again, immigration reform advocates concluded that some legislation 
was better than no legislative action at all and hoped that pushing for changes in the exsting 
legislation would prove more feasible than mobilizing for new legislation.  Both chambers of 
Congress swiftly approved the new bill, and, in its final version, the act erased the morgaged 
quotas accumulated since the DP Act of 1948; released previously authorized but unused refuge  
visas to more than 60,000 persons fleeing persecution; and granted nonquota status until 1959 to 
orphans who were being adopted by U.S. citizens.645  
The passage of the 1957 Immigration Act generated different responses within the Italian 
American and the Jewish American communities.  Many of the Jewish organizatio s that had 
testified in favor of immigration reform issued public statements expressing disappointment over 
the failure of Congress to enact more sweeping changes to the country's immigration law than 
those contained in the law just passed.646  For ACIM, in accordance with its pragmatic focus on 
any legislation that favored Italian migrants, it was so important that the law accorded Italy 
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nearly 34,000 visas of the 62,556 total visas that it was willing to disregard its shortcomings.  
Moreover, ACIM could hardly contain its satisfaction for its role in the passage of the law.  "This 
is the result of the initiative, the effort, and the unity put into the campaign by the members and 
friends which constitute the 107 ACIM chapters throughout the United States," read the rticle in 
the ACIM Dispatch that reported the passage of the law.647   
ACIM's enthusiasm for the passage of the law soon waned.  As had already happened 
with the passage of the displaced persons and refugee acts, frustration inevitably followed the 
initial jubilation for the passage of another favorable immigration law.  As early as January 1958, 
ACIM complained of the failure of Congress to allocate funds to hire additional staff for the 
administration of the 1957 Immigration Act.  The lack of funds seemed to jeopardize the family 
reunion visas more than the other provisions in the law.  "So far," lamented ACIM, "only some 
4,000 visas have been issued for Italy and this snail paced rate of issuance defeats th  purpose of 
the law which is immediate reunion."648  Spurred by the inaction of Congress to speed family 
reunion visas along, ACIM decided to launch a campaign to obtain legislation to admit 
thousands of sons and daughters and brothers and sisters of naturalized Italians.  The McCarran-
Walter Act classified this group under the fourth preference, which granted it only a limited 
number of visas.  As the thousands of letters and telephone calls that ACIM national 
headquarters received daily proved, this issue remained central to many Itali  Americans.649   
Once again, ACIM decided to pursue the passage of legislation targeting a specific aspect 
of the quota system.  ACIM realized that family reunion represented a more palatable and 
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achievable goal than other revisions to the law.  In an effort to gauge congressional willingness to 
pass legislation addressing the reunion of American citizens with their sons, daughters, brothers, 
and sisters still residing in Italy, ACIM leaders traveled to Washington, DC, to meet with several 
key senators and representatives.  Many of the congressmen with whom ACIM met expressed 
sympathy towards its cause but regretted that congressional action would remain difficult to 
achieve until the economy improved.650  However, the lobbying campaign ultimately yielded 
favorable results for Italian immigrants.  In the spring of 1958, ACIM proudly report d to its 
supporters that its "campaign to get quick action from Congress to appropriate the necessary 
funds for the implementation of Public Law 85-316 which, among other provisions, [provided] 
for the reunion of families, […] achieved success."651  Congress allocated the funds necessary to 
hire additional personnel to sort through the heavy caseload of fourth preference appliations 
under the 1957 Immigration Act.  Evidently, ACIM's emphasis on the importance of family
reunion to protect the sacred institution and to alleviate Italy's overpopulation problem and 
prevent its fall to Communism touched on sensitive issues for American legislators.  
Once again, however, the passage of legislation failed to turn into concrete action.  Even 
after Congress allocated funds to speed up the administration of the 1957 Immigration Act, the 
obstacles to and the delay in receiving a visa remained.  Nine months after the passage of the act, 
Senator John F. Kennedy wrote an article for ACIM Dispatch to review the act's 
accomplishments and reassure readers that he would pursue further action.  Kennedy lamented 
that from September 1957 to May 1958, only 20,967 immigrants were admitted under the law to 
reunite with family members already in the United States.  Yet, attesting to the attention that 
Italy's overpopulation and emigration problems received from the American government, of 
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those admitted in that period, 13,213, or 63%, came from Italy.  Highlighting a problem that had 
persisted since the 1930s, Kennedy went on to observe that "although the action taken for the 
admittance of parents, spouses and children of Americans has been disappointing, the pro ram
for the granting of visas to orphans, escapees and refugees has been even worse; the 
administration of that part of the Act may almost be termed scandalous."652  Statistically, only 
8% of the visas issued until then had gone to orphans, refugees, and expellees.  Reflecting what 
ACIM and other Catholic and Jewish organizations had long argued, Kennedy admitted that the 
problem with administering the provisions of the law that dealt with refugees, expelle s, and 
orphans stemmed from the failure of those who administered the act to learn from the experi nce 
of the Displaced Persons laws and the Refugee Relief acts.  Finally, Kennedy acknowledged the 
importance of voluntary organizations in the administration of the immigration and refugee laws 
and praised them for the improvements that Congress enacted: 
Such improvements as have been made in administrative practices are due to a large 
extent to the efforts of such organizations as ACIM. These voluntary organizations are of 
immeasurable assistance in the Herculean task of helping the immigrant through the 
transition between life in the old country and life in the United States. In addition, they 
maintain constant watch over the public administration of the program.653 
Reflecting on the necessity to remedy the shortcomings of the administrat on of the 1957 
Immigration Act, Kennedy concluded his article saying that it was morally and psychologically 
necessary to speed up the enactment of the law to avoid the disruption of families and to make 
the law's humanitarian purposes more than a mere gesture. 
While ACIM figured prominently among immigration advocates' efforts to ref rm 
American immigration laws, American Jews did not focus exclusively on the pending 
immigration bills in 1956 and 1957.  Although American Jews closely followed and supported 
                                                





the developments in immigration legislation after the ratification of the McCarran-Walter Act, 
their lobbying efforts subsided somewhat after 1952 as they turned their attention abroad to the 
Israeli-American relationship and at home to civil rights issues, civil liberties, inter-faith 
collaboration, and personal attacks that questioned their loyalty and accused them of Communist 
affiliations.  Until the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Suez Crisis of 1957, the American 
Jewish Committee, in particular, mostly focused on keeping alive  the immigration policy 
problems within the public eye through resolutions, statements, and publications.  The committee 
continued to press for liberal planks on immigration in election years, tried to convin e 
politicians to keep their campaign promises through its contacts in Congress, and collborated 
with other organizations interested in immigration reform whenever a chance for reform arose.  
Yet these activities had become only part of the overall agenda of the Committee and the 
community at large.654 
After the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis, however, American Jewish efforts to 
lobby for refugee legislation resumed at full speed.  The difference in the results they achieved 
for Hungarian and Egyptian refugees was striking and sheds light on the rationale behind what 
type of immigration bills Congress and the administration deemed suitable for consideration and 
passage.  While the Hungarian Revolution provoked "a widespread sentiment in the United 
States and other countries of the free world in favor of relaxing immigration restrictions," the 
Suez crisis revealed that "the failure of the United States to contribute in any significant degree 
to the resettlement of the Egyptian refugees was due to the minimal immigration quota for Egypt 
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and to the inflexible character of the basic immigration law."655  Cold War interests clearly 
determined for which refugees the United States could sidestep its restrictive immigration laws.  
For the Hungarian Jewish refugees, all that American Jews had to do was to activate their 
efficient and well-oiled voluntary agency machine to assist them to come to th United States.  
From November 1956 to June 1957, when most of the Hungarian refugees arrived in the United 
States, HIAS assisted 3,926 Hungarian Jewish escapees to be admitted into the country. 
Reflecting yet another emerging characteristic of American immigration policy during the fifties, 
many of the parolees who managed to enter the United States fell into the two categories that 
would shape American immigration policy after 1965:  those refugees who entered because of 
family reunion and those who possessed skills that were lacking in the United States or ne ded 
for national interest.656  Significantly, beginning in June 1957, thanks to the provision for 
parolees in the McCarran-Walter Act and the provision for escapees from Comunist countries 
in Europe in the 1953 Refugee Relief Act, the United States opened its doors to more Hungarian 
refugees than any other country in the Americas.   
American Jews' efforts to help Jewish refugees from Egypt, on the other hand, took a 
completely different turn.  Confident after the experience with Hungarian refuge s that the 
United States was more willing to admit refugees than immigrants, American Jews mobilized to 
persuade the American government to welcome more Egyptian refugees.  During the early 
months of 1957, several Jewish and non-Jewish agencies beseeched the President, the 
Department of State, and the Department of Justice to admit more refugees from Egypt.  They 
made at least three significant attempts.  On February 26, 1957, a delegation includi g the major 
Jewish national organizations met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lampton Berry to 
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urge action.  On March 22, Senators Case, Ives, and Javits, all long time supporters of 
immigration reform, wrote an open letter to the attorney general to ask him to extend the parole 
procedure to Egyptian refugees.  On May 29, another Jewish delegation met with officials at the 
Department of State to discuss the admission of Egyptian refugees.  Despite their efforts, 
"repeated pleas by Jewish and other civic and religious organization for admission of a fair share 
of the Egyptian refugees under the parole provision of the immigration law, on the same basis as 
the Hungarian refugees, went unheeded."657  Time and again, the Department of State insisted 
that the extension of the parole provision to groups other than Hungarians depended upon 
congressional action and that the administration would not act without first receiving guidance 
from Congress.   
ACIM's participation in the attempts to help Egyptian refugees showcases the differ nt 
approaches that the two groups had.  Rather than plead for all Egyptian refugees, ACIM focused 
exclusively on Egyptian refugees of Italian origin and limited its intervention to a public 
expression of dissent.  In the pages of ACIM Dispatch, ACIM leadership complained that the 
Italian exodus out of Egypt to Italy further clotted an already overpopulated country and called 
for legislation to assist and resettle these families "with no means of earning  living in the 
countries where they [were] stranded without the opportunity to emigrate elsewhere."658  Unlike 
its Jewish counterparts, ACIM leaders, however, did not take direct action to lobby for 
legislation for Egyptian refugees.  It did nothing more than endorse the testimony of Monsignor 
Wycislo, Resettlement Division Director of the Catholic Welfare Conferenc, before the Senate 
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Sub-Committee on Refugees, as the Monsignor asked for the admission of at least 15,000 of the 
Italians displaced from Egypt.659 
Their failure to convince Congress to pass legislation on behalf of Egyptian refugees 
notwithstanding, American Jewish voluntary agencies nonetheless mobilized to relocate these 
refugees to other countries that offered them asylum.  As a consequence of the crisis, by June 30, 
1957, some 20,000 Jewish refugees from Egypt, or about 40 per cent of the Jewish population in 
Egypt, fled to Europe.  By the end of March 1957, the United Service HIAS and the Joint 
Distribution Committee, in collaboration with the Intergovernmental Committee for European 
Migration and other smaller Jewish voluntary agencies, resettled over 7,500 Jewish r fugees 
from Egypt to Israel.  By the end of June of the same year, United HIAS Service assisted 1,446 
Egyptian Jews to relocate to Latin America, 48 to Canada, 65 to Australia, and 69 to various
other countries.  From January through June 1957, however, HIAS managed to assist only 24 
Egyptian Jews to be admitted to the United States.660  Many of the refugees had clearly hoped to 
resettle in the United States: 
Many Egyptian Jews who would have preferred to immigrate to the United States 
resigned themselves to the unlikelihood of obtaining admission to this country and 
accepted opportunities available to them to settle in Israel and elsewhere.  Others, 
however, remained in countries of first asylum in the hope of the eventual liberalization 
of United States immigration policy.661 
United HIAS Service collaborated closely with the refugees' American el tives and worked hard 
to obtain visitor, student, and preference case visas within the limitations of the quota law.  The 
results were nonetheless disappointing.  In her annual review, executive director Ann S. Petluck 
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complained that, "although there were over a thousand persons in whose cases we were 
participating, the actual arrivals in the United States were infinitesimal."662 
The different experience that American Jews had in helping Jewish refugees from 
Hungary and Egypt reflected both a shift in their agenda, as they focused more on refugees than 
immigrants, and the limitations of lobbying for immigration reform and refugee legislation if the 
proposal fell outside of Cold War geopolitical interests.  Yet, the experience with the 
resettlement of Hungarian and Egyptian refugees had one positive result.  It proved that the 
premise behind the creation of the United HIAS Service was successful, as the organization had 
shown that "it could take on an emergency and at the same time continue its work in planned 
migration."663  This experience also helped the organization realize that unless Congress 
corrected the shortcomings of the existing legislation, 1958 would be "a tragic yer for those still 
unsettled refugees who wished to immigrate to the United States."664  As a consequence of this 
conclusion, the organization decided to intensify its efforts to collaborate with other Jewish 
organizations invested in immigration reform as well as with larger umbrella organizations, 
including the American Immigration Conference and the American Council of Voluntary 
Agencies, and with members of Congress who showed interest in immigration reform. 
As American Jews lobbied for Egyptian refugees, ACIM continued its campaign for the 
reunion of families under the 1957 Immigration Act.  Following ACIM's campaign in Congress 
for funding the administration of the law and Kennedy's report on the status of the visas issued in 
the first nine months of the law, ACIM headquarters in New York City received hundreds of 
letters pleading for the resolution of the fourth preference problem and for help to speed along 
                                                
662 Ann Petluck, "Annual Report: January through Decemb r 1957—United States Operations," December 19, 1957, 





the reunion of families.665  ACIM leadership decided to take the problem directly to the president 
of the United States.  In October 1958, thanks to the help of New York Senator Keating, ACIM 
arranged for a brief meeting between Eisenhower and Father Donanzan to discuss current 
immigration problems during the president's visit to New York City.  Referring to the common 
decency of the American people imbued with the "tradition that this country is the sanctuary of 
the oppressed," Eisenhower said he favored a solution to the fourth preference visa problems and 
expressed the hope that Congress would soon take action to expedite family reunions.666   
Although Eisenhower's appeal fell on deaf ears, ACIM continued to lobby for legislation 
facilitating family reunion.  In its campaign, ACIM argued that it was "unfair to permit U.S. 
citizens to file petitions for their brothers, sisters, sons or daughters, grantin  them approval and 
then letting them pile up in a huge backlog at American consulates abroad without the hope of 
any visas being issued."667  In early 1959, Senator Keating introduced a bill proposing to grant 
non-quota status to immigrants who were brothers, sisters, sons, or daughters of United States 
citizens, thus attempting to remedy the delays derived from the fourth preference quota section 
of the McCarran-Walter Act.  Significantly, the introduction of the bill followed a meeting in 
Washington, DC, between Keating and a delegation of ACIM leaders headed by Marchisio.  
Besides meeting with Senator Keating, Judge Marchisio also visited the offices o  Senator 
Kennedy; Joseph M. Swing, Commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; 
Senator James Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Sub-Committee on Immigration and 
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Naturalization; and other leaders to rally support for the resolution of the fourth preference 
problem.668   
To ACIM's satisfaction, Senator Keating's bill unleashed a new debate on immigration 
reform and became the first of other immigration bills introduced in Congress that year.  In 
March 1959, Kennedy presented a seven-point proposal for an all-inclusive immigration bill that 
suggested to replace the national origins system of quotas based on the 1920 census "with a 
formula based upon the blood relationship between citizens and resident aliens already he  and 
those who seek admittance," to raise the annual quota to 250,000, and to admit 150,000 relatives 
of U.S. citizens or resident aliens through the third degree of consanguinity.669  Kennedy's 
proposal not only contained many of the goals of ACIM's campaign on family reunion, but he 
also shared many of the arguments for immigration reform that ACIM and other immigration 
reform advocates had long adopted: 
In these days when we Americans desperately need a clear idea of our national goals and 
a real conception of what our society represents, it is especially important that we re-
examine our immigration policies.  Our basic legislation was developed under the illusion 
that we were a nation of separate nationalities and that our greatness required a 
continuation of a policy under which each nationality was compartmentalized. Such a law 
divides us rather than unifies us.  It is discriminatory against friendly nations. It is too 
inflexible to meet demonstrable needs.  Perhaps most important, it is based upon an 
unnatural fear that we cannot assimilate people with different customs and different 
habits.670 
Despite the enthusiasm among immigration reformers for the Keating and Kennedy bills, 
Congress ultimately decided to evaluate only a third, less overarching immigration bill, which 
Representative Walter introduced.  The final version of the bill would admit nearly 57,000 
immigrants from Western Europe, with 35,000 of the visas set aside for Italian migrants and the 
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remaining 22,000 distributed among other countries.  For Italians, the groups that benefited from 
the new legislation were the second, third, and fourth preference applicants registered at 
American Consulates prior to December 31, 1953 (for a total of 33,000), and spouses and minor 
children of those admitted under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (for a total of 1,709).  Walter's 
bill (H.R. 5896) went through Congress rather quickly, and in September 1959 Eisenhower 
signed it into law.671   
ACIM considered the passage of the bill, despite its limitations, a successful nding to its 
eighteen-month long campaign.  Although the bill dealt exclusively with family reunion issues, it 
introduced a few important changes that further eroded the foundation of the McCarran-W lter 
Act.  The law moved American citizens' unmarried sons and daughters over twenty-on  years of 
age from the fourth to the second preference, thus making it easier for these applicants to receive 
a visa; resident aliens' unmarried sons and daughters over twenty-one years of age fell under the 
third preference quota, whereas before they had no preference status; and spouses and minor 
children who accompanied either brothers and sisters or adult married sons and daughters of U.S. 
citizens fell in the fourth preference and could migrate with them if these were eligible for fourth 
preference visas under the annual quota of the McCarran-Walter Act.  Moreover, ACIM could 
now count on another ally in Congress, Senator John O. Pastore of Rhode Island, who had 
Representative Walter's ear and esteem.  Pastore spearheaded the passage of the Walter bill in the 
Senate and received high praises from Walter for his "wisdom and workmanship" during the 
evaluation of the bill in Congress.672  Finally in 1959, for the first time since its founding, ACIM 
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leaders succeeded in meeting Representative Walter in person to discuss immigration 
problems.673  
That legislators increasingly focused on family reunion over labor in matters of 
immigration became increasingly clear when, only a few months after passing Walter's bill, 
Congress passed another bill sponsored by Walter that dealt with other family reun on provisions 
in the McCarran-Walter Act.  As the ACIM Dispatch noted, this law, as the ones that preceded it, 
did not solve all the problems that the McCarran-Walter Act created, but it was cert inly part of 
the smaller significant changes that ACIM hoped would eventually lead to an overhaul of the 
country's immigration policy.674  The new Walter bill (H.R. 9385) amended the section of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act that allotted 50% of the annual quota of each country to 
immigrants whose services the Attorney General determined necessary for the economy, cultural 
interests, or welfare of the United States because of the immigrant's high education, technical 
training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability.  The bill also gave non-quota status to the 
spouses and children of these immigrants, and the fifth section of the bill provided for the 
admission of fiancés and fiancées of American citizens as visitors for a three-month period to 
allow them to get married.  Until then, marriage was essential before entry was permitted.675  In a 
way, the passage of this new Walter bill confirmed that tackling one issue at a time to undermine 
the overall immigration system was a successful strategy, especially in n environment that still 
viewed immigrants as a threat.   
Amidst the successes, failures, and setbacks that American Jews and Itali Americans 
faced in their mobilization for immigration and refugee legislation, the 1950s also s w the first 
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serious, albeit weak, attempt of different ethnic groups to collaborate to lobby f r immigration 
reform.  On October 1, 1954, the American Jewish Committee, the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference, the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., CIO, Common Council 
for American Unity, and the American Friends Service Committee organized under the 
American Immigration Conference.  ACIM soon joined them but remained a secondary player in 
the organization's activities.  The organization intended to provide a common medium for the 
exchange of information and experience, to promote effective cooperation and joint acti n 
among member agencies, to orchestrate an educational campaign on the need for immigration 
reform, and to represent American organizations in international conferences o  migration and 
population movements.676   
As an organization, the American Immigration Conference repeatedly tried to present a 
unified view on immigration reform.  It testified at and submitted briefings to congressional 
hearings on refugee legislation and immigration bills; collaborated with other umbrella agencies 
dealing with immigration, including the Committee on Migration and Refugee Problems of the 
American Council of Voluntary Agencies and the National Council on Naturalization nd 
Citizenship; and participated in conferences of non-governmental organizations in ere ted in 
migration.677  It also wrote to Congressmen whenever they evaluated a new immigration bill t  
endorse reform and highlight the discriminatory nature of the existing policy.   
Despite its ambitious and far-reaching agenda, the American Immigration Conference 
struggled to convince its member agencies to find and pursue a unifying course of action to 
advocate for immigration reform.  During a meeting discussing "the plan of ttack upon the 
National Origins Quota of the Immigration and Nationality Act,” Donanzan reported to 
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Marchisio that the organization seemed rattled by much division on how to proceed:  "Many
seemed to feel that the organizations represented should act individually on this subject while 
others felt that it should be done in concerted action through the medium of the American 
Immigration Conference."678  The attitude ACIM had towards the American Immigration 
Conference is instructive of the obstacles facing collaboration among groups intere ted in 
migration matters as well as of the organization's pragmatic approach to lobbying for reform.  
ACIM regularly received AIC's correspondence and newsletter and attended its meetings, 
debating action to lobby for amendments to the McCarran-Walter Act.  Yet, more often than not, 
ACIM steered away from initiatives organized by the conference.   
One of Father Donanzan's reports to Marchisio about a meeting of the American 
Immigration Conference he attended sheds light on ACIM's wariness about its affiliation with 
AIC.  Donanzan wrote that he found it problematic that the representatives at the meeting were 
mainly from Jewish organizations leaning from the center to the extreme left.  "I seemed to be 
the only representative of a Catholic group," Donanzan reported, "and there was only one other 
who represented a Protestant denomination."679  In line with this position, Donanzan suggested 
that they not participate in the AIC-organized rally at Carnegie Hall in New York City in June 
1955 to protest against the McCarran-Walter Act.  By the end of the 1950s, however, even 
Marchisio and Donanzan had to recognize that collaboration with other ethnic groups intere ted 
in immigration reform was critical to the overhaul of American immigration policy.  Once again, 
the Catholic Church pushed and shaped ACIM's approach in this regard.  In an address to the 
delegates of ACIM from all over the country at the 1959 national ACIM symposium, Monsign r 
Swanstrom suggested that it was necessary to work with other groups because "we must not kid 
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ourselves at all.  There are not too many people around the country who think as we do who 
would tomorrow permit a change in our basic immigration laws, or our national origins quota 
system."680   
 
Conclusion 
The 1957 Immigration Act represented the climax of immigration reform in the 1950s. 
For three years after the passage of the 1957 Immigration Act, Congress enacted only minor 
changes to the country's immigration policy.  Through their endorsement of and mobilization for 
executive action and ad hoc congressional laws, Italian Americans and Jewish Americans 
contributed to erode the system of immigration restriction created in the 1920s and renewed by 
the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act.  The widespread hostility against immigration reform 
notwithstanding, Italian Americans and American Jews succeeded in takingadvantage of their 
newly acquired position within American society to keep the public's attention on immigrant and 
refugee issues, to push Congress to pass palliative legislation to remedy the shor comings of the 
quota system and the refugee legislation, and to begin to build a broader coalition against 
immigration restriction.  Moreover, both groups, taking advantage of their connections and their 
financial means, tried to circumvent the problems of the McCarran-Walter Ac and post-war 
refugee acts by working to find alternative destinations for Italian and Jewish migrants and 
refugees outside the United States. 
At the same time, both groups developed a post-World War II, Cold War rhetoric on 
which to base their mobilization for reform.  Although they continued to emphasize the 
contributions that immigrants made to the United States, they also began to adopt al nguage of 
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humanitarianism, social justice, and Christian empathy, to stress the repercussions of exogenous 
elements on the country's immigration policy, and to frame the need for a more humane 
immigration policy in international terms.  Finally, they chose to focus on family reunion as a 
primary objective for immigration reform to assuage critics' fears of a new immigrant threat.  
The groundwork Italian Americans and American Jews laid and the rhetoric they developed in 
the 1950s would serve them well in the 1960s.  With John F. Kennedy's campaign pledge to 
abolish the quota system, the 1960 presidential elections marked the beginning of the last p ase 





Reform at Last: A Diverse Coalition at Work 
 
 The 1960s began with tremendous hope followed by profound frustration for Italian 
Americans and Jewish Americans involved in the struggle against immigration estriction.  The 
election of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, a grandson of immigrants and the first successf l Catholic 
candidate, to the presidency of the United States created the fleeting illusion that the elimination 
of the quota system and the overhaul of American immigration policy was imminent.  Y t, when 
many supporters of immigration reform realized that the majority of Congress still opposed the 
idea of revisiting the McCarran-Walter Act and its isolationist provisions, they found themselves 
wondering about what strategy to adopt next.  Sidney Liskofsky, chair of the Immigration 
Committee for the American Jewish Committee, clearly remembered the disillusionment many 
felt until the Kennedy Administration decided finally to commit to immigration reform: 
Until 1963, reformers had not dared hope to obtain more than an improvement of the 
existing system, such as reallocating unused quotas; changing the census base year for 
computing quotas from 1920 to 1960 (to reflect more recent immigration trends), or 
establishing continental quotas.681 
Similarly, Father Caesar Donanzan, executive secretary of the American Committee on Italian 
Migration (ACIM), admitted in a 1962 letter to Joseph De Serto, ACIM officer in Chicago, that 
although ACIM hoped for an overarching reform of the immigration system, "We must, 
however, be practical and either settle for the most of what we can get or nothing at all."682  
Liskofsky and Donanzan's words reflected the frustration that many of the groups who had 
mobilized against immigration restriction felt after their decades of ff rt had amounted to little 
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change.  As the 1960s began, the national-origins quota system had been in place for amost forty 
years. 
After the disappointment with the Immigration Act of 1957, the anti-restriction 
movement faced a serious crisis of confidence.  The major source of frustration stemmed from 
the disconnect between the political prominence achieved by many of the nationality groups that 
supported reform and their inability to accomplish their goal.  Moreover, since the voluntary 
agencies to which many immigration reform advocates belonged were simultaneo sly 
responsible for the resettlement and integration of the arriving refugees and immigrants, the 
backlog and the congestion that discriminatory and poorly conceived policies created made their 
task all the more difficult.  The same government that depended on voluntary agencies to 
administer its immigration and refugee laws did little to facilitate these organizations' job.  A 
speaker at the 1962 Annual Seminar on Integration of Immigrants identified some of the 
unintended consequences that this system generated: 
The United States is unique in its dependence on private individuals and voluntary 
organizations to carry out the initial stages of resettlement and integration.  In general, 
according to the fragmentary studies on refugee resettlement, the sponsor has assumed 
his responsibilities fairly successfully.  In general, however, sponsors are unp pared and 
untrained to handle the newcomer's psychological adjustment problems.683 
As Italian Americans and Jewish Americans decided to continue putting pressure on the 
politicians who represented them in Congress, they also realized that joining forces with other 
groups to fight for a common cause remained their best strategy.  Many of the Italian and Jewish 
organizations, in fact, became part of larger umbrella advocacy organizations that incorporated 
multiple organizations interested in immigration reform.  
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As the 1960s wore on, this collaboration assumed new contours.  While all ethnic 
organizations continued to focus on issues specifically related to the groups they represented, 
their affiliation with umbrella organizations pushed them to expand their agenda outside the 
boundaries of the interests of their ethnic group and to advocate for other groups as well in an 
effort to showcase the need for wide-reaching reform.  Contrary to what Mae Ngai has argued in 
Impossible Subjects, Euro-American immigration advocates began to argue for the right to come 
to the United States for Mexican and Asian immigrants as well as Arab, Chinese, Cuban, and 
North African refugees.684  The change stemmed not only from the realization of the potential 
that such an agenda had for all restricted groups but also from the collaboration among the 
groups, from the influence of the civil rights discourse on immigration activists, and from a new, 
post-World War II approach to immigration.685  In the case of American Jews, embracing a 
larger immigration reform agenda flowed from a long-time commitment to social justice for all.  
For Italian Americans, on the other hand, it was the Catholic Church's Cold War campaign for a 
humane and Christian immigration policy for all migrants that slowly broadened their agenda. 
At the same time, the shift toward the consolidation of an alliance among all agencies 
interested in reform revealed different motivations for Italian and Jewish organizations to join.  
The organizations that joined belonged to two different categories: national voluntary agencies 
defined by religious affiliation, and organizations founded by each ethnic or nationality group.  
In this context, Jewish organizations like United HIAS Service, American Jewish Committee, 
and Anti-Defamation League, regarded themselves as nationwide voluntary agencies like the 
National Catholic Welfare Conference, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA, 
Lutheran Immigration Service, and National Community Relations Advisory Council.  ACIM, 
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on the other hand, fell into the second category and, like many other ethnic organizations, was 
affiliated with one of the nationwide voluntary agencies to carry on both its advocacy and 
resettlement work.  ACIM was in fact a member organization of the Catholic Relief S rvices.  
Yet, the strength and number of Italian American voters helped ACIM succeed in rising above 
similar organizations.   Despite the circumscribed focus of its agenda, in fact, ACIM successfully 
campaigned for many of its goals, attracted politicians' attention to its p l cy objectives, and 
mobilized other ethnic organizations interested in similar issues.  The different character of the 
Jewish and Italian organizations ultimately determined their separate courses after the battle 
against immigration restriction was over.  While all of the Jewish organizations continue to exist 
today, ACIM closed its doors in 1967 as it had completed its mission to fight for changes in th  
law and to assist the beneficiaries of the new legislation to move to the United Sta s. 
Ultimately the passage of the Hart-Celler Act was the product of two interdep n ent 
events.  Without the commitment of the Kennedy and the Johnson Administrations to push for 
immigration reform, the task would have been more difficult, even with the solid Democratic 
majority that the Johnson Administration enjoyed.  At the same time, the abilityof immigration 
reform advocates to join forces and keep the issue of immigration reform alive he ped shift 
public opinion, persuading many Americans of the unjustness of the quota system and the nee
for reform.  The vocal support of a grassroots base in turn influenced how many of the 
congressmen voted on the Hart-Celler bill. 
 
 "Snared in the Sargasso, or When, Oh Captain, Do We Sail?"686 
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The 1960 presidential election reignited the struggle against immigration restriction.  
Organizations interested in immigration reform attended the hearings of the Democratic and 
Republican Platform Committees to encourage both parties to include an immigration pl nk in 
their platforms.  On June 21, 1960, New York attorney Edward J. Ennis testified before the 
Democratic Platform Committee on behalf of seventeen lay and religious organizations 
interested in immigration, including the major Italian and Jewish organizations, o recommend 
that the party acknowledge in its immigration plank the need for serious reform.  He pleaded for 
the increase in the annual number of admissible immigrants based on the 1960 census, a 
reasonable statute of limitation on deportations, the elimination of any distinctions between 
native born and naturalized citizens, the improvement of administrative procedures, and 
assistance to refugees escaping from Communist countries.  Most of all, Ennis insisted that the 
platform favor the elimination of basing quotas "on the accident of national origin:" 
The elimination of national origin of an immigrant as the determining factor of his 
practical opportunity to immigrate to the United States must continue to be the primary 
goal of a revised immigration policy at the present crucial time in which the United States 
must move forward in many ways to discharge its responsibility as a leader of th  
democratic forces of the world.  Increasing closer ties with all the democratic people of 
the world imperatively demands elimination of national origin as the basis of 
immigration.687 
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The Democratic Party listened.  For the first time, the party platform explicitly attacked the 
national origins system as a "policy of deliberate discrimination."688  During his presidential 
campaign, John F. Kennedy pledged to end the quota system if elected.  The Republican 
candidates, on the other hand, opted to advocate simply for the replacement of the 1920 census 
with the 1960 census, but they remained convinced that the overall rationale behind the system 
must stay in place.689   
Kennedy's victory reinvigorated immigration reformers' commitment to mobilize for an 
overhaul of the McCarran-Walter Act.690  For many, Kennedy's election showed that "a member 
of a so-called minority group" could attain the presidency of the United States and usher in a new 
era "of equality of all men under the Constitution," including under the immigration l ws.691  
Many of these organizations realized that his victory offered an extraordinary but brief window 
of opportunity to resume the battle against restriction in full force: 
If the issue of reform is tied up properly with foreign policy, and if real, not token, 
pressure is exerted by the new administration and its leadership in both Houses upon the 
Immigration Subcommittees of Congress, then basic revision can come.  There must be 
popular support manifested, of course.  And the agencies and organizations interested in 
immigration must stand together, fighting for principle and not settling for qua ter 
loaves.692 
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During the first two years of Kennedy's term, however, his administration showed little interest 
in embarking upon an overhaul of American immigration legislation, and the president made 
only moderate proposals to Congress.  However, in the first two years of his administratio , 
responding to Cold War imperatives, Kennedy oversaw the passage of legislation for refugees 
from the Western Hemisphere, the first without an expiration date to acknowledge that the 
refugee problem would be continuous, and signed a law that authorized automatic minimum 
quotas of one hundred for newly independent nations and assigned a similar quota to each 
country within the Asia-Pacific Triangle.  For organizations and activists who had long waited 
for the right moment and had struggled to create an environment more open to reform, 
Kennedy's modest proposals hardly matched their expectations.   
As the hope for immediate immigration reform after Kennedy's election waned, many 
immigration reform groups struggled to find new momentum.  The disappointment was palp ble:  
The administration now in office in Washington is, we know, sympathetic to immigration 
reform and asylum for refugees.  The President himself, when a Senator, introduced 
various bills toward these ends.  But the administration so far in its course is behaving not 
like an ardent swain but more like a selective suitor, looking elsewhere than in 
immigration's direction and casting its nods and becks and wreathed smiles toward a host 
of other issues.693 
Yet these groups found themselves gridlocked as to how to continue their battle.  Many of them 
agreed that the only solution to break the impasse in which immigration reform languished was 
for "agencies, organizations and church groups truly concerned to join together and exercise 
pressure both ways, on the people and on the politicians."694   Many others also realized that the 
plethora of umbrella organizations created divisions and redundancies that limited reformists' 
impact.  By 1959, at least four major umbrella organizations were advocating for immigration 
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reform: the American Immigration Conference, the National Council on Immigration and 
Citizenship, the American Council for Nationalities Service, and the American Council for 
Voluntary Agencies.  Many smaller organizations and agencies often belonged to at least two if 
not more of the larger organizations.  This meant that the initiatives, objectives, and competences 
of these umbrella organizations often coincided, creating an overlap that was detrimental to the 
success of their efforts.695   
The solution to this dispersal of energy and resources and to the frustration that it 
generated arrived in 1960.  That year, the National Council on Naturalization and Citizenship 
and the American Immigration Conference merged to create the American Immigration and 
Citizenship Conference (AICC) with headquarters in New York City. 696  AICC had about one 
hundred affiliated and cooperating agencies for which it functioned as a clearinghouse and 
coordinator of information, research, and educational activity.  Its member agencies included 
several influential Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish welfare and community-rela ions agencies 
(such as the National Catholic Welfare Conference, National Council of the Churches of Christ 
in the USA, Lutheran Immigration Service, United HIAS Service, American Jewish Committee, 
Anti-Defamation League, and National Community Relations Advisory Council); labor unions 
(including the United Steel Workers of America and the Industrial Union Department of the 
AFL-CIO); and an array of nationality group organizations (such as the American Committee on 
Italian Migration, American Hellenic Educational Program Association, and the Japanese 
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American Citizens League).697  From its inception until 1965, the AICC focused on the removal 
of the two most discriminatory aspects of the McCarran-Walter Act, namely the national-origins 
quota system and the Asia Pacific Triangle.   
As they struggled with the significance of Kennedy's election for their cause and tried to 
regroup, Italian Americans and American Jews also continued to fight to obtain legislation for 
refugees and family reunion.  In early 1960, ACIM expressed concern at the unintended 
repercussions that the inclusion of unmarried sons and daughter over twenty-one in the 1959 PL 
86-363 law had on family reunion for spouses and minor children of resident aliens in the third 
preference.  Even though they had previously lacked any preference status, the majority of 
unmarried sons and daughters over twenty-one often had earlier registration dates than spouses 
and minor children of resident aliens, thus penalizing the intended primary beneficiaries of the 
third preference visas.  "Because of this factor, plus the increased number of persons eligible," 
observed ACIM officials, "the limited number of yearly visas issued to the third preference 
applicants has become totally inadequate."698  Moreover, as with previous ad hoc legislation, the 
pace of the implementation of the new provisions remained slow.  A year after Congress had 
passed the law, only 12,267 persons of the 57,000 expected to benefit from it had arrived.699  
ACIM contacted congressional leaders to alert them to the problem: 
Reaffirming their stand that we, as a country, have a moral responsibility to reunite 
families who are separated only by an inadequacy in our laws, ACIM officials appealed 
for legislation that would permit the entry of these spouses and minor children as 
nonquota immigrants.700   
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Congressmen once again expressed sympathy with their cause but took no action because of the 
imminent presidential elections.  The only consolation for immigration reform advoc tes was the 
assurance in November 1960 from Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson and United 
States Visa Office authorities that the issuance of visas would soon increase.701 
 Family reunion remained a central concern among ACIM's leadership throughout 1961 as 
well.  Despite the promises from the Under Secretary of State and the United Stat s Visa Office 
authorities, seventeen months after the passage of PL 86-363, ACIM noted, only 9,684 out of the 
anticipated 30,000 Italian immigrants had reunited with their families in the Unit d States.702  In 
May 1961, the Visa Office Bulletin reported that there were 171,210 pending family reunification 
applications, most of which were from Italy (138,378), with Greece a distant second (6,999).703  
Congress ultimately heard ACIM's and other immigration reformers' complaints, but action on 
the issue took another year after the Under Secretary's assurances.  Between January and May 
1961, eleven congressmen introduced legislation proposing to reform the country's immigration 
laws with an emphasis on family reunion and skills needed in the United States.704  All the bills 
proposed permanent revisions to the existing immigration legislation.  ACIM remain d 
optimistic that Congress might at least pass stopgap legislation facilitating family reunion: 
There is good reason to believe that ACIM's pleas for emergency action—in the absence 
of permanent provisions—will be answered, and legislation will be enacted momentarily 
to alleviate, at least, the most serious hardship cases.705  
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ACIM's confidence derived from the large number of pending family reunification applic tions 
and from past experience—ad hoc legislation had been Congress's response to previous 
immigration or refugee crises for almost two decades by then.706   
 As ACIM suspected, the stopgap solution arrived soon after.  In July 1961, Senators 
Pastore, Dirksen, Keating, and Javits introduced a bill providing for the continuation of the 
program to adopt alien orphan children.  When the House began to debate the bill, 
Representative Walter decided to add a provision that all second and third preference cases 
whose petitions had been filed prior to July 1, 1961 should be admitted on a non-quota basis.  To 
ACIM's initial satisfaction, Congress approved the bill into law with Walter's provision.707  The 
new law, signed by President Kennedy on September 6, 1961, was, in the words of Senator 
Dirksen, "a step forward."  Legislators estimated that 10,000 Italians would benefit from PL 87-
316, namely parents and adult unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (second preference) 
and spouses and unmarried adult and minor children of lawful residents of the United States 
(third preference).708 
At the same time, the frustration over the difficulty of convincing Congress to pass 
legislation that could provide a permanent solution to the problems deriving from the existing 
immigration policy convinced ACIM leaders to continue to pursue destinations other than the 
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United States for future Italian migrants.  While lobbying for PL 87-316, ACIM leadership, with 
the full support of the Italian government, also conferred with Peruvian government officials "in 
connection with the Peruvian-Italian colonization project which would provide for large scal  
financing of irrigation projects in various desert areas of the Pacific coast and the settlement of 
these reclaimed lands of Peruvians as well as immigrants from Italy." 709  Although such efforts 
could help some Italian migrants and lessen the flow of immigrants competing for U.S. visas, 
they did little to reduce the backlog of family reunification applications.  Thus, in spite of its 
efforts to find alternative destinations, ACIM continued to focus its energies on the United States 
and again mobilized its base to fight for adequate family reunification legislation.   
While ACIM identified alternative destinations for future immigrants, immigrants already 
in the United States turned to private immigration bills to circumvent the severity of the quota 
system.  Many immigrants took advantage of the private immigration bills to delay immigration 
authorities' action in their pending cases.  If a congressman agreed to submit a bill, the immigrant 
would be safe for at least a year and could temporarily avoid deportation as the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service would usually not act on the case while the bill was pending i  Congress.  
In 1961-1962 alone, 2,677 private immigration bills came up for discussion.710  Although the 
majority of the private immigration bills concerned the adjustment of status of family members, 
the immigrants who benefited the most from the delay that the bills guaranteed were those 
threatened with deportation because the quotas for their countries had been filled for th  year.  
The delay could be indefinite, as private bills to allow immigrants to remain in the country could 
be reintroduced in each new session of Congress until a quota slot opened up.711  The cases 
behind the proposal of these bills were often ludicrous.  In his A Nation of Immigration, Kennedy 
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discussed the absurdity of one such case:  an Italian immigrant living in Massachu etts with his 
small children could not bring his wife to the United States because she had been convicted on 
two counts involving moral turpitude.  Her crimes?  In 1913 and 1919 she had stolen bundles of 
sticks to build a fire.712  
As private immigration bills required great time and resources and only marginally 
helped the immigration flow, family reunification thus remained the most pressing issue for 
immigration reform groups.  As the number of backlogged applications mushroomed to 
170,000—140,000 of which were from Italian applicants—ACIM resumed its struggle for the 
streamlining of the family reunification process and the reallocation of unused quotas: 
An intolerable situation which confronts low quota countries such as Italy and focuses the 
spotlight on the inadequacy and unfairness of America's immigration policies is the 
present misfortune facing closer relatives of U.S. citizens who seek to join their loved 
ones here.713 
Aware that a permanent solution to the problem still remained a chimera, ACIM allied with the 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to push for legislation for the reallocation of unused quotas to 
resolve the family reunification applications backlog.  ACIM and CRS joined forces wh n they 
realized that Congress would not pass Senator Hart's bill, which proposed an extensive revision 
of the quota system; that the Kennedy administration had decided to postpone to 1963 its request 
for broad changes to American immigration policy; and that they could not count on other large 
and influential religious and other interested groups to support their objective.714  Bishop 
Swanstrom and Juvenal Marchisio, ACIM's national chairman, wrote a letter addresse  to all the 
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members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committee describing the plight of the 170,000 
close relatives waiting to reunite with their family members in the United States and proposing 
that their admission be made possible by the reallocation of unused quotas.  The letter also 
proposed as an alternative solution the extension of PL 86-363—the law passed in 1959 that 
prescribed the entry of relatives with applications submitted by December 31, 1953, as nonquota 
immigrants—to include applications filed by December 31, 1955, and to continue the program 
after its expiration in March 1962.  ACIM mobilized its base and asked its 120 chapters to 
contact their local, state, and national legislators to urge them to support such legislation.715   
As in the past, congressmen responded to ACIM's pleas with the introduction of scores of 
bills aimed in varying degrees at revising the limitations of America's mmigration laws.  ACIM 
rejoiced at the number of bills submitted and took pride in its role in pushing congressmen to act 
on one of its major goals:  
The majority of the bills contained as the major premise the provision that long separated 
families should be re-united—that mother, sons and daughters, sisters and brothers 
should be rejoined as a family unit.  The bills were an acknowledgement by Congress of 
support for the repeated appeals made by ACIM since its founding in 1952 to eliminate 
the hardships inflicted on low quotas countries such as Italy.716   
ACIM leaders were also aware, however, that many of the bills introduced wer  simply "political 
smoke screens" meant mainly for the benefit of congressmen running for reelection in the 
coming months.  Confirming their skepticism, Representative Walter replied to Swanstrom and 
Marchisio's letter and let it be known to his colleagues, as well, that the passage of any 
immigration legislation was unlikely given the uncertain economic and political climate.717 
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ACIM and the Catholic Relief Services knew that unless Representative Walt r 
supported any pending immigration legislation, nothing could be accomplished.  Donanzan 
himself admitted as much, when he wrote to Joseph De Serto, the coordinator of the ACIM 
chapter in Chicago:  
I need not to tell you that Congressman Walter is the absolute, unchallenged boss of 
legislation on immigration and that, as Chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Immigration, he has control of life and death over immigration bills.718 
After receiving Representative Walter's negative response, Marchisio and Donanzan decided to 
appeal to Edward Kennedy to ask him to discuss the proposal that Marchisio and Swanstrom had 
outlined in their letter to Walter with President Kennedy and Attorney General K nnedy.  
Following up on his promise, Kennedy met with his brothers and, at the end of May, 1962, with 
Congressman Walter to suggest the possibility of proposing legislation to help Chinese refugees 
in Hong Kong and to address the family reunification problem.  Because Walter had aleady 
publicly declared that no new legislation would be introduced and passed in 1962, Kennedy 
agreed to work on the renewal of PL 86-363 to help fourth preference applicants who had filed in 
1954 instead.719  ACIM leaders would have preferred a definite solution rather than a "piecemeal 
legislative approach," but they realized that this was all for which they could hope.720   
Representative Francis Walter's bill and Senator John O. Pastore's companion bill in the 
Senate soon became the only chance to have any legislation passed.  The bill calld for the non-
quota admission of fourth-preference applicants—sons, daughters, brothers and sisters of U.S. 
citizens—with spouses and children whose applications had been filed by consular offici ls pr or 
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to December 31, 1954, and approved by the Attorney General by January 1, 1962.721  Despite 
ACIM and the Catholic Relief Services' incessant and urgent recommendations, Congress 
seriously began to consider this legislation only in late October.  The final version, which 
became PL 87-885, provided a cutoff date of December 31, 1954, and limited eligibility to 
applicants approved between January and March 1954.  Legislators estimated that approximately 
15,000 immigrants would benefit from the bill, the majority being Italians, Greeks, and 
Portuguese, but the legislation left many of those who had worked for its passage fru trated, 
particularly with its narrow eligibility requirements.  "The result," ACIM leadership commented, 
"was far from laudable.  It was tragic."722  More importantly, ACIM leaders felt that its 
experience with PL 87-885 had three important lessons that everybody involved with the 
organization needed to remember in future endeavors: 
1) The opposition to liberalize the U.S. immigration policies even for the benefit of close
relatives of U.S. citizens is obstinate and reflects the attitude of the majority of U.S. 
Congressmen, who, in turn, reflect the attitude of their constituents. 
2) There is no easy formula to break the grip that the opposition holds on immigration 
matters. 
3) A complete revision of our immigration laws remains our ultimate goal and should be 
attempted whenever there exists a favorable climate for it.  In the meanti we must 
settle for piecemeal legislation.723 
Ultimately, ACIM agreed with the New York Times that Congress began working on the 
legislation only "to permit its members to go home for some political fence-mending before the 
elections."724   
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In the case of the Jewish community, other issues absorbed their attention as the 
discussion over immigration reform reemerged with the new decade.  The beginning of the 
1960s saw American Jews engaged in debates on desegregation, church and state relations, civil 
rights, and discrimination.  Their involvement in these issues often attracted attacks against them 
and episodes of Anti-Semitism from people who opposed the recent developments in civil rights 
and church and state relations.725  Periodicals, pamphlets, flyers, and leaflets circulated 
alternatively accusing American Jews of being part of the Jewish-Communist-Zionist conspiracy 
to subvert the country and enslave the world; of scheming to mongrelize the South through their 
domination of government and the press; of controlling the UN; of conspiring to wage war 
through Zionism; and of exploiting welfare laws and programs, including mental health and 
water fluoridation, for conspiratorial ends.726 
Yet what concerned American Jews most at the time was the reaction to their support for 
the State of Israel.  Accusations and attacks against them came from two distinct fronts:  Arab 
propagandists and Americans who exploited the tensions in the Middle East to discredit 
American Jews.  The pro-Arab propaganda, as the American Jewish Committee labeled it, used 
literature, lectures, and Arab students at American institutions to discre t American Jews' 
involvement with Israel.  The main sources of Arab propaganda in the United States were the 
Arab League's Arab Information Center, the embassies and UN delegations of Arab League 
countries, the Organization of Arab Students, and the Palestine Arab Refugee Offic.727  In his 
analysis of the attacks against Jews from these groups, George Killman noted that they often 
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conflated Zionist and Jew and centered on one main argument, American Jews' disloyalty to the 
United States: 
Anti-Jewish activists maintained a volume of pro-Arab propaganda comparable to that of
the preceding period, equating Communism with Zionism and in that context leveling 
conspiracy charges against American Jews and Jewish groups.  Fund-raising appeals for 
Israel were characterized as sinister; dual-loyalty charges were frequent, as were 
depictions of alleged Jewish cruelty toward the Arabs.728 
The intensity of the attacks on American Jews during this period, coupled with the impasse in 
Congress over immigration legislation, persuaded American Jews to handle immigration 
restriction by continuing to rely on their own organizations, while trying to create a broader 
alliance with other groups to frame immigration reform as part of people's right to mobility.  
Thus, while they continued to support Jewish resettlement agencies like United HIAS Service to 
care for Jewish migrants and refugees in the United States and around the world, they also 
became a driving force behind the efforts of umbrella organizations to createa united front 
against restriction.   
 At the same time, American Jews continued to carry on local refugee programs.  These 
programs took over the resettlement of Jewish immigrants once United HIAS Service brought 
Jewish refugees to American shores.  Generally administered and financed by local Jewish 
family agencies, these programs provided economic aid and counseling to newly arrived Jews.  
The bulk of Jewish refugees continued to arrive from Europe, but substantial numbers also 
arrived from Egypt, Cuba, and the Middle East.  This change in the refugees' countries of origin 
later motivated American Jews to plead for immigration and refugee rightsfor non-European 
immigrants as well.  Despite United HIAS Service's efforts to encourage resettlement in other 
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communities in the United States where the prospects for adjustment might be better, well over 
half of the arriving refugees settled in New York City.  Jewish agencies in New York City thus 
bore the largest share of refugee costs.  The financial mobilization of the American Jewish 
community to support the New York Association for New Americans (NYANA), the major 
agency for refugee assistance in the city, was substantial.  Because its financing was considered a 
national responsibility, NYANA was a direct beneficiary of the United Jewish Appeal, whose 
funds came from welfare funds and contributions from smaller Jewish agencies from across the 
country.  The need for funding ebbed and flowed as refugee crises soared or quieted down.  In 
1957, as the Hungarian refugee crisis raged, NYANA received grants from the United Jewish 
Appeal for $1,291,000.  The grants progressively declined in the following years, and NYANA 
received $870,000 in 1958, $690,000 in 1959, $603,000 in 1960, and then went up again in 
1961, as a consequence of the 1959 Cuban Revolution, when the United Jewish Appeal gave 
NYANA $817,000.729  After a new upturn in 1962, NYANA's activities diminished again.730 
 Italian Americans continued to be concerned with the relocation of refugees as well.  In 
1960, the first World Refugee Year declared by the United Nations, ACIM Dispatch repeatedly 
published articles discussing the plight of refugees around the world and opinion pieces on th  
issue, often detailing the Catholic Church's position and its emphasis on migration as a natural 
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right.731  Moreover, the newsletters periodically published articles that described programs 
through which readers could help Italian refugees, including paying ten dollars a month to a 
refugee family, making a contribution to provide refugees with a care packet upon arrival, 
contributing a sum towards a resettlement grant fund, or donating a sewing machine, the single 
most requested item by Italian refugee families.732  Also in connection with the World Refugee 
Year, in February, 1960, ACIM was one of the twenty-five leading national Catholic 
organizations and nationality groups that met in New York City to discuss the expansion of their 
efforts to assist refugees and to urge the U.S. government to implement the programs to which it 
had committed under the auspices of the World Refugee Year.  For the first time, these 
organizations explicitly expressed their concern and their interest in helping non-Western 
refugees as well.  "In addition to being concerned with the needs of the refugees in the countries 
of Western Europe," wrote Monsignor Swanstrom in his letter to Representative Walter and 
President Eisenhower to inform them of the outcomes of the meeting, "we are especially 
concerned with the plight and the sufferings of refugees in Asia and the Far Eastern 
countries."733  The emergence of these concerns for non-European refugees among Italian 
Americans not only speaks to the influence that the Catholic Church's ecumenical vision of 
migration had on them and parallels American Jews' similar claims but also counteracts Mae 
Ngai's contention  that Euro-Americans mobilized only for white European migrants.734 
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One important factor behind ACIM's participation in the activities of the first World 
Refugee Year was its concern with the predicament of Italian refugees from Tunisia.  Similar to 
American Jews who took an interest in non-European migrants when they helped to resttle 
Jewish refugees from Egypt, Cuba, and the Middle East, Italian Americans' interest in non-
European refugees stemmed from their experience helping Italians in the region.  Their efforts to 
help Italian refugees from Tunisia broadened ACIM leaders' agenda.  From then on, they fought 
for legislation on behalf of Italian refugees outside of Europe and began to make a case for non-
European refugees as well.  The shift was in part due to the influence of the Catholic relief 
agencies with which ACIM collaborated and the Catholic Church's new mission with regard to 
immigration worldwide.  ACIM's broadening of its agenda was also the unexpected product of 
Italian decolonization.  Italian Americans' interest in Italian refug es from Tunisia was yet 
another example of their ethno-nationalism and of the special relationship they continued to 
maintain with Italy.   
In fact, the Italian government was particularly eager to get ACIM involved in the 
relocation process of Italian refugees from Tunisia.  The Comitato Italiano per l'Anno del 
Rifugiato (Italian Committee for World Refugee Year) invited ACIM national chairman 
Marchisio to visit refugee camps in Italy and Tunisia in his capacity as one of th directors of the 
U.S. Committee for Refugees.  The purpose of his three-week trip was to survey "the situation of 
Italians expropriated and dispossessed by virtue of the policy of nationalization now being 
carried on by the Tunisian government."735  Upon his return, Marchisio published an extensive 
report in the ACIM Dispatch on the dire conditions of Italian refugees in the camps.  The report 
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had the dual purpose of informing the newsletter readers of the plight of these refugees and of 
encouraging them to participate in any of the refugee programs that ACIM sponsored: 
Despite the fact that this is 'World Refugee Year,' the American public—even as the 
Italian—is completely unaware of the tragic situation of 51,702 Italian nationals in 
Tunisia.  More than two-thirds of this number (39,528) are second and third generation 
born Tunisians with, however, technical Italian citizenship.736 
The legal definition of their citizenship status represented the crux of what compli ated their 
refugee status, as they fell under the classification neither of refugee nor of expellee as defined 
by the existing programs of assistance administered by the United Nations or by immigration 
legislation in potential receiving countries.  Neither could they remain in Italy, Marchisio 
explained, because of its overburdened economy and high rate of unemployment.737  For many of 
these refugees, ACIM represented their last chance, as the several lett rs that Italians in Tunisia 
sent ACIM headquarters in New York City attested.738 
 In addition to informing the Italian American community, Marchisio and his 
collaborators sent a copy of his report to members in both houses of Congress.  In a letter 
accompanying his report, Marchisio asked congressmen to include Italians from Tunisia in the 
bill that Representative Francis Walter had proposed to allow a certain number of refugees to 
enter the United States with parolee status.  The law would represent the United States' 
contribution to world initiatives organized in connection with the World Refugee Year.  During 
the earlier House hearings for the bill, both the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for 
Foreign Service and the United States Committee for Refugees also requested that the bill's 
language be altered to include Italian nationals in Tunisia among its beneficiari s, but the House 
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rejected these recommendations before passing the bill.  Marchisio explain d his and his 
organization's disappointment in the bill, especially in view of the additional quotas that 
Congress had granted to other white migrants in non-Western countries in a similar ituation to 
Italians in Tunisia: 
These recommendations were not accepted even though there is the precedent that Dutch 
nationals from Indonesia—in exactly the same position as Italian nationals now find 
themselves in Tunisia—were the beneficiaries of a law which permitted the entry into 
this country of some of their number.739 
Marchisio's letter concluded with a plea to help resettle at least 5,000 Italian n tionals from 
Tunisia.  This move, he wrote, would confirm the United States' humanitarian interest in p ople 
forced to leave their country because of their nationality, help the overcrowded conditions in 
Italian refugee camps, and set the precedent for other 'countries of haven.'740  
 Marchisio's report attracted many congressmen's attention.  Several congressmen 
introduced bills to tackle the plight of Italian refugees from Tunisia.  Yet, as ACIM Dispatch 
noted in its June issue, action on these bills was not forthcoming.  Frustrated with the legislative 
inaction, ACIM leaders along with other groups interested in refugee legislation again contacted 
congressmen and urged them to act before the close of the July session and before the nd of the 
World Refugee Year on June 30, 1960.  They argued that inaction before that date left U.S. 
commitments with regard to its international program for the World Refugee Year unfulfilled.741  
Their pleas had a strong supporter in President Eisenhower, who twice in the spring of 1960
asked Congress to pass refugee legislation to admit 10,000 refugees a year befor  the end of the 
World Refugee Year and to consider the liberalization of American immigration lws in general 
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during the same spring session.742  Eisenhower's pleas notwithstanding, immigration reform 
advocates recognized that "only the proposal for refugees [had] any chance of favorable 
consideration and enactment by Congress before adjournment."743 
 The Fair Share Refugee Act of July 14, 1960, was Congress's response, but the act left 
many immigration reform advocates disappointed with the limitations of the act, as it facilitated 
the entry only of Europeans who fled from Iron Curtain nations.  The act also placed a ceiling on 
the number of admissions in relation to the resettlement activities of other nations nd 
established that the number of parolees should represent twenty-five per cent of th  total number 
of refugees resettled elsewhere.744  Many congressmen and organizations engaged in refugee 
relief work expressed frustration: 
At best, it is a token bill passed in order to permit some refugees to enter in observance of 
World Refugee Year.  But the plight of the vast number of refugees in parts of the world 
other than Europe has been completely ignored.745 
ACIM was particularly disappointed that the act excluded Italian refugees from Tunisia and "the 
other countless refugees who wait upon the good will of America to open its doors to them" and 
immediately encouraged "enlightened Americans" to contact their congressmen to encourage 
them to remedy the Fair Share Act's shortcomings.746   
By 1962, despite the frustration they generated, the several ad hoc laws that immigration 
advocacy groups and resettlement agencies had pushed Congress to pass had laid the 
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groundwork to change American immigration policy.747  As scholar Jethro Lieberman puts it, 
"Between 1952 and 1962 the national origins provisions had been so diluted that it was difficult 
to see what remained of them other than the honorific name."748  As statistics show, between 
1953 and 1964, fully 3,197,857 immigrants entered the country, but only 1,140,479 of them 
came in under the national origins system.  The remaining immigrants were eith r nonquota 
immigrants accounted for in the McCarran-Walter Act (1,681,285) or those who entered the 
country because of the ad hoc legislation that Congress passed in that period (376,093).  The case
of Italian immigrants is particularly illuminating.  Despite an annual quota of 5,666, 185,491 
Italian immigrants arrived in the United States between 1951 and 1960.  Similarly, during the 
same decade, China sent 9,567 Chinese against an annual quota of 105; 46,250 Japanese arrived 
against Japan's annual quota of 185; and 47,608 Greeks were admitted against Greece's annual 
quota of 308.749  More importantly, in conjunction with the end of the Cuban missile crisis and 
the shift of the administration's focus on civil rights reform domestically, the Kennedy 
administration finally showed signs that it was ready to turn its attention to immigration reform. 
 
"Winds of Change or Lulling Breeze?" The Final Push for an Imperfect Reform750 
The year 1963 began with new hope for immigration reform.  At the beginning of the 
year, the Department of Labor issued a positive report on the occupational distribution of the 
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3,500,000 immigrants who had arrived in the United States between 1947 and 1961.  According 
to Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, the report demonstrated the significa t role that 
immigrant workers played in the American labor force, mostly because they had been trained 
before their arrival for occupations that were in great demand in the United Stats.  "There can 
be no doubt," concluded Wirtz, "that by providing a haven for the oppressed, the nation has 
reaped great profits."751  Once again the blurred lines between refugees and immigrants helped 
immigration reformers advance their agenda, as the report dispelled images of unproductive and 
unassimilable refugees.  At the same time, however, the report's portrayal of the immigrants' 
prominence in the labor force provided labor unions with evidence to negotiate a stricter 
admission policy for immigrant workers once legislators began to consider an overhaul of the 
country's immigration policy later in the year.   
Another positive sign came in February 1963, when thirty-four Senators from twenty-
three different states cosponsored Senator Hart's immigration bill.  Hart's bill was the same bill 
the Senate had refused to consider the year before.  The bill proposed the revision of the national 
origins quota system following a two-part formula based on the population ratios and the pattern 
of actual immigration to the United States during the previous fifteen years.  Groups that had 
seen their immigration rise despite the quota system, including Italian Americans and American 
Jews, fully endorsed Hart’s bill, but more importantly these groups understood the symbolic 
significance that the reintroduction of the bill carried.  Hart merely reflected their sentiments 
when he commented on the need for Congress to consider his bill seriously: 
                                                




The continued [...] support for this legislation evidences, I believe, a growing public
awareness of the need for immigration reform, and a fast evolving consensus to the kind 
of reform that is needed.752 
In the same month, President Kennedy took a public stance in favor of immigration reform for 
the first time since his election, and during a press conference convened shortly after the 
beginning of the 88th Congress, he urged congressmen to consider the reallocation of unused 
quotas to low quota countries in order to accelerate family reunification among rece t
immigrants.753   
The most serious call for repeal of the McCarran-Walter Act came during P esident 
Kennedy's message to Congress on July 23, 1963.  In his speech, Kennedy called for the 
immediate elimination of the Asia-Pacific Triangle, the continuation of the non-quota status of 
the Western Hemisphere, and the discontinuation of the quota system over a five-year p riod.  
Kennedy's proposal suggested allotting unused quotas to oversubscribed countries during the 
transitional period and admitting immigrants who would satisfy all the necessary requirements 
on a first come first served basis once the quota system disappeared.  The available visas would 
be divided between immigrants with skills needed in the United States and people trying to 
reunite with close family members already in the country.  To assuage criticisms from 
Americans worried about a substantial increase in immigration, Kennedy proposed a global cap, 
excluding the Western Hemisphere, of 165,000 instead of the 158,000 of the McCarran-Walter 
Act with each country allowed no more than ten percent of the total.754   
Two other elements contributed to shift the debate on immigration and toward a candid 
conversation about the need for immigration reform.  The first pertained to the changes on the 
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congressional committees that dealt with immigration.  Representative Michael A. Feighan of 
Ohio replaced Representative Francis Walter as chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Immigration, and, despite his sharing many of his predecessor's ideas on matters of immigration, 
the predisposition in favor of immigration reform of the other representatives on the committee 
made it more difficult for him to resist too fervently the passage of new legislation.  The second 
factor was that many legislators who had once been reluctant to stand up to support immigrat on 
reform changed their minds under the pressure caused by the congestion that private immigration 
bills created for the congressional schedule.   
Kennedy's proposals and the new atmosphere of the immigration reform debate 
reenergized Italian Americans and American Jews.  Both groups hoped that the presid nt's bill 
would substantially increase the number of visas available to immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe, help more families reunite, allow more Jews and Italians with kills in demand 
in the United States to immigrate, and finally consider Jews from Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco 
as refugees.755  Both groups shared the cautious optimism that many of the organizations 
committed to immigration reform expressed about the outcome of the Kennedy administration's 
call for reform.  As Ann S. Petluck and James P. Rice of HIAS wrote: 
It is evident that the President's recommendations give new impetus and new hope to the 
proposals for revising our immigration legislation.  While it is true that […] it might not 
be possible to obtain early passage of this bill, there is nevertheless reason to believe that 
passage in the not-too-distant future will be possible.  This will require widespread 
support from communities throughout the United States.756 
 
As a token of appreciation for the administration's efforts to generate momntu  for reform, 
ACIM and the most prominent Jewish organizations all sent letters and telegrams to the White 
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House endorsing Kennedy's immigration proposal.757  Along with seventy-two other ethnic, 
labor, and civic organizations, they also signed a letter to President Kennedy, which was initiated 
by the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference.  The letter strongly endorsed the steps 
Kennedy had "have taken […] in calling for the elimination of the National Origins Quota 
System."758  
Yet, despite President Kennedy's call for reform, many congressmen's pr disposition to 
reform the country's immigration policy, and the overall weariness with the private immigration 
bills, Congress turned its attention to other pressing matters in the coming months, namely civil 
rights, tax reform, and the beginnings of the war against poverty.  Kennedy's assas ination in 
November brought any plan to overhaul immigration laws to a halt until January 13, 1964, when 
President Johnson urged Congress to pass President Kennedy's July immigration reform 
proposals.  To immigration reformers' satisfaction, the appeal spurred thirty-seven enators and 
sixty-four representatives to sponsor the administration's bill by June 1, "dramatizing the tide of 
Congressional sentiment for change in our immigration laws."759   
Despite Johnson's pleas to act swiftly, the House subcommittee did not begin to hold its 
hearings, the first in twelve years, until June.760  A feud between subcommittee Chairman 
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Feighan and Chairman Celler of the parent Judiciary Committee over who had the power to 
influence immigration policy changes caused the delay.  In an effort to postpone the h arings, 
Feighan launched a series of accusations to discredit immigration reformers' efforts to advance 
their agenda.761  Congressional squabbles notwithstanding, many immigration reformers hoped 
that the hearings represented a serious step towards reform.  Many shared ACIM's cautious 
optimism: 
The universal support and overwhelming bipartisan affirmation of the principles 
embodied in H.R. 7700 can no longer be ignored.  The majority's democratic right to vote 
for or against immigration reform can no longer be denied.  For the sake of millions of 
Americans, their close relatives and others living in countries allied with us, ACIM hopes 
that the hearings do not represent another lulling breeze.762 
In the meantime, the Supreme Court provided another positive sign when it ruled in Schneider v. 
Rusk that a Federal Statute that deprived naturalized Americans of their citizenship if they 
returned to their land of birth for three years was unconstitutional.  The ruling frther galvanized 
the immigration reform base, and according to the ACIM Dispatch, the decision demonstrated 
"the legal and moral fallacy of 'anti-foreigner' sentiment which, in its more militant forms, 
created our discriminatory immigration laws."763 
Taking advantage of the positive momentum, many of the groups committed to 
immigration reform immediately mobilized their grassroots base to influence the outcome of the 
hearings and the vote.  ACIM urged its readers and supporters to write their congressmen 
immediately to let them know how "you feel about this all important legislation for the benefit of 
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our own United States which has a lot to gain from such immigration."764  Donanzan and 
Marchisio also suggested to ACIM officers across the country that they organize a rally "to 
demonstrate to Congressmen from your area the desire and determination of people to see the 
Kennedy program enacted into law."  "An assembly of people," Donanzan explained in a letter to 
all ACIM officers, “ will inspire them [congressmen] to translate sentiments privately expressed 
into positive action in the halls of Congress."765  Many of the ACIM chapters located in areas 
whose representatives were either on the House or Senate immigration committees i mediately 
organized rallies and sent a copy of their resolution in favor of the pending legislation to 
members of both houses of Congress and to President Johnson.  Many congressmen replied to 
the letter sent by the Chicago chapter of ACIM after its rally by blaming the delay in passing 
legislation on the Democratic majority of the Judiciary Committees.  "In other words," wrote De 
Serto, "they intimate that they are not against the Bill, but that they don't have he power to get it 
out of Committee. […] The Republicans are making hay out of the delaying tactics of the 
Democrats who are supposed to favor legislation."766 
ACIM's activism had an impact on other ethnic groups involved in the debate on 
immigration reform as well.  The spring issue of the bi-monthly Greek American newspaper The 
Chicago Pnyx published ACIM leaders' appeal to its members along with an ACIM Dispatch 
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article analyzing the different proposals introduced to reform American immigration policy.  The 
Chicago Pnyx editors enjoined its readers to follow ACIM leaders' advice: 
This sound advice advocated by the editors of the ACIM Dispatch should also be 
followed by all citizens of Hellenic extraction.  Let us join hands with this progressive 
American group to bring about a complete revision of the present unjust and iniquitous 
immigration legislation.  Like the editors of ACIM we cannot too strongly advise you to 
sit down right NOW and write your congressman.767 
Perhaps more flattering than the commitment of another group to mobilize for Johnson's 
immigration proposal was the Greek Americans' acknowledgement of ACIM's preeminence in 
the struggle against restriction.  Anticipation for the hearings continued to build as Italian 
Americans, Greek Americans, and American Jews voiced their hope that they would lead to 
reform. 
The list of witnesses in favor of reform at the House Hearings included advocates from 
ethnic groups, voluntary agencies, and the Johnson administration.  Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk, during a testimony critics termed "an event of importance," urged the Houseto change the 
existing immigration laws as their use of quotas based on race and place of birth was 
"indefensible from a foreign policy point of view"768  Marchisio, once again following ACIM's 
pragmatic strategy of tackling one issue at time, presented a brief to the H us  Subcommittee on 
Immigration and Nationality that labeled the waste of unused quota numbers under the quota 
system a cruel cynicism and described the thousands of Italian families separated by immigration 
barriers as "unwanted children of misfortune."769  Similarly, Robert F. Kennedy and Secretary of 
Labor W. Willard Wirtz asked the House committee to revise the existing legislation to admit 
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more immigrants.  Wirtz once again reiterated his belief that immigrants help the American labor 
force.770   
President Johnson's pleas for action and grassroots mobilization, along with the criticisms 
against the McCarran-Walter Act during the House hearings, succeeded in k eping Congress's 
attention only until the 1964 presidential elections.  Even as the hearings took place, immigration 
leaders were already shifting their focus to the two parties' immigration planks.  After the 
Republican Party issued its immigration plank on July 15, 1964, vaguely promising immigration 
reform, thirty-five immigration agencies, including the major Italian and Jewish organizations, 
issued a statement against it to Republican presidential candidates, key party officials, and the 
press.  The agencies proclaimed the Republican plank "innocuous to the point of being 
meaningless," as it avoided confronting the basic problems of the existing immi ration policy.  
"We are appalled," read the statement, "at the failure of the 1964 convention at least to reaffirm 
the Republican Party pledge in the 1960 platform."771  The Democratic plank, on the other hand, 
received sweeping praise, as Johnson declared that the need for immigration reform was 
immediate and that he had immigration legislation ready for the next Congress.772  The media 
further contributed to raise consensus around the Kennedy-Johnson proposals.  The Wall Street 
Journal attacked the "cumbersome and inflexible" national origins system and defined the 
administration proposals as "eminently reasonable," as they sought to eliminate hardships on 
separated families.  Signaling a significant shift in Americans' attitude towards the issue, in a 
statement that would have been unthinkable only a year earlier, the editors stated, "We are 
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convinced that most Americans believe it's wrong to discriminate against someone simply 
because he was born in the wrong place."773   
As election day approached, Johnson met with some of the ethnic groups most involved 
in the campaign for immigration reform.  At a White House meeting with a group of prominent 
Italian Americans concerning the issuance of a postage stamp commemorating New York City's 
Verrazano Narrows Bridge, President Johnson decried the discrimination underlying the 
American immigration system and declared, to the attendees' elation, that "the s rength of our 
nation has been built from many groups from many lands.  No group has contributed more—few 
have contributed so much—as the sons and daughters of Italy."774 
Plans for immigration reform remained dormant until January 4, 1965, when Johnson 
returned to Washington with the greatest popular electoral margin in American history.  The 
election gave the Johnson administration a powerful mandate, but perhaps more importantly, it 
also sent many new Democratic congressmen to Washington, giving Johnson a two to one 
majority in both houses of Congress and a more sympathetic audience for immigration reform.  
Reflecting a significant shift, the new Congress included 107 congressmen who were Roman 
Catholics, effectively making them the leading group among the various denominations for the 
first time in Congress's history.775   ACIM supporters were elated, as they felt that the 1964 
presidential elections demonstrated for the first time that the immigration issue was more than a 
campaign promise revived every four years.  Johnson's 1964 victory was reason to hope, many 
believed, that immigration reform was near: 
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Toward the adjournment of the last Congress, the picture was indeed gloomy.  As of the 
present time, the outlook is probably brighter than it has ever been, due to the fact, that it 
now appears that we have finally won over many friends who now realize that the present 
immigration law of the land is one which is not compatible with the image of the United 
States as we would like the rest of the world to see it.776   
In his inaugural address on January 4, 1965, President Johnson again called for an immigration 
policy based "on the work a man can do not on where he was born or how he spells his name."  
On January 13, he sent his Special Message to Congress on Immigration, which specifically 
called for the repeal of the national origins quota system and presented them wi  a list of 
proposals very similar to those that President Kennedy had drafted in 1963, including his 
proposal to introduce a preferential system over a five-year period.777  In his message Johnson, 
like Kennedy, rejected the idea that men and women from some countries could become more 
desirable citizens than those from others and emphasized the damage that the quota system did to 
American foreign policy and to the country's image as a bastion of democracy.   
Johnson's inaugural address and his message to Congress also attempted to create ro m 
for negotiation with potential detractors of his proposals.  Aware that critics of mmigration 
reform would counteract efforts for reform with the claim that the abolition of the quota system 
would inevitably lead to an immigrant invasion, from this very first message, Johnson and his
administration insisted that the new immigrants would not threaten American workers' jobs or 
depress their wages and argued that the new law would mainly bring a higher numberof highly 
skilled, professional migrants.778  Moreover, from very early on, President Johnson made it clear 
that he would endorse a bill repealing the quota system in any form and that the Executive would 
back any bill containing that provision.  As many contemporaries agreed, Johnson's concession  
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set the stage for the watering down of his original proposals and gave an advantage to 
restrictionists favoring stringent regulations of the immigration flow t the United States in the 
new bill.779   
The reaction to the president's call for priority consideration was immediate.  The press 
widely publicized Johnson's speeches, and the New York Times considered the president's 
message to Congress necessary to "revive an issue that should trouble the American cons ience."  
Reflecting an important change in American society's perception of the presence of Italian 
Americans in the United States, the N w York Times editorial, after observing that the people of 
Dante and Michelangelo were limited to a quota of 5,666, wondered, "Is there not something 
terribly arrogant—and also absurd—in this self-righteous national posture?"780  Yet, immigration 
reformers were aware that mobilization was crucial for legislation to pass.  In a letter to all 
ACIM officers across the country sent less than ten days after President Johnson's message to 
Congress, Donanzan urged action: 
Administration sources assure us that a determined effort will be made to achieve passage 
of this legislation.  However, it was made quite clear at a meeting of Voluntary Agencies 
in Washington that much depends on the 'grass roots' support which the measure will 
receive across the nation.781 
In his letter, Donanzan provided detailed directions about how to mobilize for the 
administration's immigration proposal.  He told them to ask local newspapers, including 
newsletters of fraternal societies, political clubs, and religious organizations, to take a stand on 
the new immigration proposals and to feature informative articles on the legislation as well as 
personal stories.  He encouraged them to organize rallies, conferences, social gatherings, or fund-
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raising events to show support for the president's immigration reform agenda and told them that, 
if the events were large enough, the Department of State had indicated that it would arrange for 
speakers, including from the Cabinet if the event was likely to draw over a thousand people.  
Finally, he recommended that they enlist the aid of other civic, religious, political, and social 
organizations in their efforts to popularize the president's immigration agenda and rlly support 
for reform.  "Employ every feasible method and use every opportunity to keep the issue alive," 
Donanzan concluded, "we must not permit the matter to sink into oblivion as has happened in the 
past."782 
Many of the ACIM chapters immediately put Donanzan's advice into practice.  ACIM 
chapters in Los Angeles and Chicago organized one-day conferences to provide informat on 
about the need for a new immigration law and about the recently introduced Hart and Celler 
bills.  The Los Angeles chapter mobilized even before receiving Donanzan's letter and joined 
forces with ten other local ethnic and religious organizations for a one-day conference on 
January 18, 1965, in Los Angeles, the first such meeting organized after Johnson's inaugural 
address.  The eleven conference organizers welcomed 325 people, hosted panels on the impact of 
the pending bills on different immigrant groups, and distributed an action sheet urging all the 
participants to write letters and send telegrams to members of Congress.783  The conference 
brought together an eclectic coalition of ethnic organizations, religious organizatio s, labor 
unions, and professionals dealing with immigration issues.  The attendees passed a re olution 
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expressing "concern and distress with the present American legislation in he area of 
immigration," applauding President Johnson's message to Congress, and declaring support for 
the members of Congress determined to revise the existing immigration laws.784  Conference 
participants expressed four major concerns in their deliberations.  Each concern reflected the 
different constituencies of the local coalition for immigration reform, but the attendees felt that 
they were all interrelated.  Participants' primary concern was the entry of immigrants from the 
Western Hemisphere: 
Although natives of the Western Hemisphere are considered non-quota immigrants as  
matter of law, as a matter of practice the documentary requirements […] in effect create 
what amounts to a quota system.  As to the enactment of the proposed immigration law 
modifying the national origins quota system, close attention should be paid to the 
promulgation of regulations for the enforcement and administration of the new law.785 
Participants also worried about the rigid discriminatory provisions of the Asia-Pacific Triangle 
and the heavy backlog of visa applications both inside and outside the Triangle.  During his 
remarks at the conference, Frank F. Chuman, an attorney and past president of the Japanese 
American Citizens League, observed that some of the applications would not be evaluated before 
the year 2000, and some evaluations would run into perpetuity:  "Italy, for example, has an 
annual quota of 5,666 and has a waiting list of 263,878.  India has a quota of 100—a backlog of 
over 15,000."786   
 The ACIM chapter in Chicago participated in the organization of a Midwest conference 
on immigration with seventeen other local organizations.  As in Los Angeles, the coalition 
behind the conference reflected the composition of the local immigrant community.  In the
Chicago case, Jewish organizations by far outnumbered all other organizations.  In addition to 
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ACIM and eight local chapters of Jewish organizations, including the American Jewish 
Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, and the Jewish Labor Committee, other organizations 
that participated in the planning of the conference were the Chinese American Civic Council, the 
Japanese American Service Committee, the American Hellenic Educational Pr gressive 
Association (AHEPA), and religious organizations.787  The planning committee for the Chicago 
conference seemed particularly concerned with attracting national attention to the issue and 
making sure its roundtables would differ from the ones held at its previous conference in 1957.  
The impulse for the 1965 conference came from nationality groups interested in immigration 
reform, but it expanded to include religious organizations as a strategy to build a wider and more 
powerful support base.  Both Secretary of State Wirtz and Assistant Secretary for Consular 
Affairs Abba Schwartz agreed to speak at the event.788 
At the same time, Congress resumed its debate on immigration legislation.  Three major 
developments offered a positive signal that reform was under way.  Long-time im igration 
supporters in the Senate and the House, such as Philip A. Hart, Jacob K. Javits, and Emanuel 
Celler, introduced bills.  Forced to act, Representative Michael A. Feighan, chairman of the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality, and Senator James O. Eastland, 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and its Subcommittee on Immigration and 
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Naturalization, announced that hearings would commence at the beginning of February.789  More 
importantly, Senator Eastland decided not to attend the hearings, and Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy, a long-time advocate for reform, acted as unofficial chairman.  This latest development 
represented a particularly auspicious omen for immigration reform advocates.790 
Italian Americans, Jewish Americans, and other supporters of President Johnson's call to 
action on immigration welcomed Congress's immediate response and the positive reception in 
the press.  "ACIM leaders and other sponsors of President Johnson's proposals," reported ACIM 
Dispatch, "expressed guarded optimism about making a breakthrough in the obstacle-ridden fiel  
of immigration."791  ACIM leaders' reservations originated from their familiarity with the fate of 
previous bills that proposed similar sweeping changes, including the bill submitted by President 
Kennedy.  To many observers, however, the large Democratic majorities in Congress were an 
advantage, and the timing of the president's January message on immigration to Congress, issued 
between the education and foreign aid messages, indicated that the administration was 
committed to immigration reform.  Following the resumption of activities in Co gress, ACIM, 
reflecting a strategy that other organizations adopted as well, invited its r aders and its sponsors 
to act immediately to show their support for the president's proposals following three easy steps: 
1. Encourage your friends, members of your clubs and other organizations to send letters 
and wires to the President supporting his message on immigration. 2. Do the same with 
your Senators and Congressmen—tell them why you support the President's proposals. 3. 
Ask your local newspaper to comment editorially on the proposals; give the editor your 
reasons for supporting H.R. 2580 and S.500.792 
Supporters of the bill, including American Jews and Italian Americans, also began to work on 
their arguments to support reform.  They built their defense on three assertions.  They asserted 
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that the abolition of the quota system would improve foreign relations; they rejected the charge 
that the new bill would again bring to America uneducated and unskilled migrants who would 
take away jobs from American workers and depress American wages; and they maintained that 
the national origins quota system was discriminatory. 
Once the hearings began, immigration reform advocates found a powerful ally in the 
administration.  Johnson dispatched many of the key representatives working on immigration 
matters in his administration to testify in Congress to counter objections against an overhaul of 
the country's immigration reform.  Each of Johnson's lieutenants tackled a different criticism that 
the pending bill faced and used arguments that the American Jewish Committee, ACIM, United 
HIAS Service, and similar organizations had repeated for years.   
The most prominent witness to testify on the impact of the quota system on American 
foreign policy was Secretary of State Dean Rusk.  In his testimony, Rusk pointed t th  problems 
that the system created with the restricted countries who were American all es: 
We continue to be judged abroad by a basic provision of law which suggests that 
prospective immigrants are selected on the basis of their national origins. […] I have
been approached on a number of occasions by foreign ministers who expressed their 
belief that this principle discriminates against their countries where, although frequently 
ignored or overlooked or paid little attention in this country, it proves to be a point of 
high sensitivity among the other countries who are directly concerned.  They wer  not 
complaining about numbers but about the principle which they considered 
discriminatory.793 
Rusk's explanation and the testimony of Assistant Attorney General Norbert A. Schlei—one of 
the principal drafters of the administration bill—convinced many that the new legislation was not 
very radical after all.  The absence of any opposition to the inclusion of a numerical cap on 
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immigration also convinced many Congressmen that the president's proposal had the potential to 
counter criticisms of the American immigration policy without enacting sweeping changes.794  
 Similarly, Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz testified to address the argument that the 
quota system offered a safety net to American labor.795  Shifting the focus to family reunion, 
Wirtz reassured those who worried about American jobs that most of the immigrants who had 
entered the country between 1959 and 1962 were women, children, and other relatives who had 
come to reunite with their family members and who, more importantly, would not join the 
workforce: 
Under S 500 […] it is estimated that nearly 60 percent of increased admissions due to full 
use of the 165,800 quota will likewise be non-workers.  This means that an additional 
yearly number of about 23,900 quota immigrants would be expected to enter the labor 
force.  In a total force that is estimated to reach 86 million by 1970, the yearlyaddition of 
23,900 would have no appreciable impact.  Qualitatively, the increased immigration of 
persons of high education, specialized experience, exceptional ability or capable of filling 
labor shortages could be beneficial.796 
Both Wirtz and Rusk's testimonies received the full endorsement of immigration eform 
advocates, but one more witness proved to be a powerful advocate for their cause, New York 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy.  Kennedy was not the only congressman to take the stand to endorse 
the bill under consideration, but his testimony clearly reflected some of the major concerns that 
immigration reform advocates had had for years. 
In his testimony, Robert Kennedy focused on the perverse rationale that underlay th  
quota system and the Asia Pacific Triangle.  He criticized the absurdity of an immigration system 
that allowed some American citizens to bring over an unskilled worker from Northern Europe 
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fairly quickly but forced skilled immigrants from other parts of the world and relativ s of 
American citizens to wait years before they could arrive in the United States: 
Last year I noted a maid or an unskilled laborer from a northern European country can 
enter this country within a matter of weeks, while scientists or doctors or other hig ly
skilled persons from less favored countries wait for months and years. […] And others 
are waiting as well—American citizens, waiting for their parents and brothers and 
children. An American citizen whose mother is Greek must wait more than five years
before she can get a visa. An American citizen whose brother, or sister, or married son or 
daughter is Italian or Australian, Spanish or Portuguese, Japanese or Korean, Indian or 
Filipino, cannot expect a visa for them until Congress passes a special bill.797 
 
Echoing Kennedy's arguments, other witnesses testified that some immigrants from Japan and 
Turkey faced waiting periods of up to 322 years in 1965 only because of their country of origin. 
Still others pointed to the absurd predicament that some immigrants faced because of the 
idiosyncrasies of the system in place.798   
Building on the groundwork that these testimonies created for negotiations, voluntary 
agencies and nationality group organizations that, both together and on their own, favored
immigration reform continued to call for reform and keep the issue alive among the wider 
population.  The American Immigration Citizenship Conference repeatedly proclaimed its 
support for the president's proposal, while its member organizations sent witnesses to te tify for 
the bill and lobbied congressmen.  In their public appearances and statements, they incessantly 
echoed the administration's arguments about discrimination and the need to abandon the Asia-
Pacific Triangle and the national origins system.799  Finally, in Washington, DC, the National 
Committee for Immigration Reform came to life in early 1965 as an ad hoc pro-immigration 
lobbying group to rally support for the administration's proposals.  This organization consisted of 
individuals rather than organizations and included among its members former Presidents Truman 
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and Eisenhower.800  Based on the idea that prominent American leaders should take a stance and 
voice their opinion on the ongoing immigration debate, the organization eventually grew to 
include 400 leaders in American public life who signed a petition to reform American 
immigration policy.  During the House debates over the 1965 Immigration Bill, Representative 
Peter W. Rodino placed in the Congressional Record a copy of an advertisement that the 
National Committee for Immigration Reform published in the Washington Post titled "Leading 
Americans Speak Out for Immigration Reform Now" to support his case for reform.801 
More importantly, testimonies in the Senate and the demonstrations of public support for 
the bill persuaded Senator Sam J. Ervin from North Carolina, the staunchest defender of the 
quota system sitting on the Senate Committee, to change his mind about the bill.  When the bill 
reached the Senate floor, he became a key player in the compromise bill that eventually became 
law.802  During the Senate hearings, however, Senator Ervin invoked many of the arguments that 
restrictionists used to counter the repeal of the quota system and of the Asia-Pacific Triangle.  
Ervin adduced that the national origins system provided an equitable means to administer 
immigration as it selected immigrants depending upon the contributions that their predecessors 
had made to the United States.  Ervin argued that the abolition of the quota system would still 
discriminate against some groups:  
The reason I say this bill is discriminatory against those people is because it put them on 
exactly the same plane as the people of Ethiopia are put, where the people of Ethiopia 
have the same right to come to the United States under this bill as the people from 
England, the people of France, the people of Germany, the people of Holland, and I don't 
think—with all due respect to Ethiopia—I don't know of any contributions that Ethiopia 
has made to the making of America.803   
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Ervin believed that only if the new law set a numerical cap on the unregulated immigration f om 
the Western Hemisphere, could he bring himself to endorse it.804 
Senator Ervin's racist opposition to reform unleashed harsher criticisms of the Hart-Celler 
bill during the Senate hearings than during the House ones.  The most vocal restrictioni  groups 
that testified against repeal of the quota system included the American Legion, the Daughters of 
the American Revolution, the Jersey Coalition, the National Economic Council, Inc., the Atlanta 
Federation of Republican Women, the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, the League of 
Christian Women, the Baltimore Anti-Communist League in affiliation with the Catholic Anti-
Communist Committee of Baltimore, and the American Coalition of Patriotic S cieties.  Similar 
to groups in favor of immigration reform, groups who opposed immigration reform founded 
umbrella organizations to voice their opposition and send a unified message.  The two most 
prominent anti-immigration umbrella organizations were the American Committee on 
Immigration Policies founded in 1964 and the Liberty Lobby, established in 1965.805   
Most of the criticisms that restrictionist groups presented during the Senate hearings 
echoed the objections that restrictions had long employed against an open door immigration 
policy.  Many of the witnesses criticized immigrants' ingratitude in sending their money back 
home rather than spending it in the United States and objected that American immigration policy 
was not as outrageous as the Berlin Wall, the genocide in Tibet, or the prisons in Castro's uba.  
Reflecting Cold War preoccupations, others warned of communist infiltration as evidenced by 
the widespread support for the law among many communist organizations around the country.  
Still others argued that the use of the census to calculate the national quotas guaranteed 
objectivity and warned that, without the quota system, "hordes of Red Chinese, Indians, 
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Congolese cannibals" would destroy the nation's identity.  Echoing the dissatisfaction with the 
recent civil rights legislation, a few lamented that the administration bill only forced integration 
with the excuse of serving humanity and robbed white citizens of their rights.  A vocal minority 
still contended that the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon majority in the United States justified 
immigration restriction.806  This last contention struck a nerve within the Italian American 
community.  Reflecting the sentiments of many immigration reformers, an ACIM Chicago 
officer wrote to Senator Dirksen in protest: "I am ready to give the Anglo-Saxon Protestant their 
due credit, but I believe […] the many thousands of others who were not of Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant heritage all contributed to the greatness of my country.  We fought a terrible war and 
costly war to disprove the "master race" theory.  Let's keep it out of our boundaries."807   
The atmosphere during the House hearings was decidedly different from the Senat .  The 
committee began with a decisive advantage in favor of the Hart-Celler bill, but more importantly, 
the committee had chairman Feighan, who now sought to gain back the support he had lost 
during the past elections at home because of his failure to act on the national origins system the 
previous year.  A chastened Feighan decided to negotiate with the administration to change the 
country's immigration policy.  Feighan and the administration agreed on the abolition of the 
Asia-Pacific Triangle and the national origins quota system, but they disagreed on how to 
distribute the allotted yearly visas.  The administration's proposal gave first preference to 
immigrants with desirable skills and education and second preference to immigrants with family 
members in the United States.  Feighan reversed these preferences and ultimately won.  The final 
proposal reserved only two preferences for those with skills, education, and occupations needed 
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in the United States but contained four categories for those with relatives in the country.  
Refugees, with 6% of the total visas, had seventh and last preference.   
Ultimately, multiple conditions intersected to make possible the repeal of the national 
origins quota system.  In the eyes of many immigration reform advocates the major boost to 
change was President Johnson's strong endorsement of Kennedy's proposals.  Furthermore, 
pressure from his constituents, pleas from Congressman Celler, and the House leaders' decision 
to enlarge the membership of the subcommittee on immigration to secure a pro-reform majority 
all contributed to convince Representative Michael A. Feighan to change his positon n 
immigration reform.  Feighan's change of attitude in turn softened the resistance of some the 
traditionally anti-immigration organizations in the country.  However, few could question the 
importance of long-standing pro-immigration groups in the passage of the vote: 
The 1965 Act was, in fact, the product of a forty-year-long educational effort by 
religious, nationality, and other citizens' organizations, and of several independent a 
converging developments.808  
Starting at the end of the nineteenth century, Italian Americans and American Jews had 
consciously courted the party that appeared more inclined to carry out immigration reform.  The 
1964 two-to-one Democratic majority in both houses of Congress reflected the party's
acknowledgment of their political status and of their influence within American politics.  Italian 
Americans and American Jews had also carefully pursued an educational campaign to dispel the 
negative stereotypes that American mainstream had of them.  Within this framework, they 
contributed to the positive changes in the attitudes of the American people in the early 1960s on 
issues of race, ethnic origin, and civil rights.  Finally, they had worked successfully to secure 
                                                




support from organized labor, which in earlier decades had been vehemently opposed to 
immigration.809 
For many of the groups who had worked for decades for the repeal of the quota system, 
the passage of the Hart-Celler Act represented a counterintuitive climax.  Despite their 
satisfaction with their victory, they understood the limitations of their accomplishments 
immediately after Congress passed the new law.  They also openly recognizd what they had had 
to give up to see the quota system repealed.  The law's emphasis on family reunion rpresented a 
victory for ethnic groups, especially with the inclusion of parents along with spouses and 
children under 21 in the category of immediate relatives admitted outside the ceiling.  Yet, the 
reversal of priorities of family reunion and labor migrants supported by Feighan marked a clear 
triumph for organized labor, as the first preference received half of the allotted visas, and the rest 
were divided among the remaining three preferences.  Moreover, Congress amended the bill to 
accept another recommendation proposed by the AFL-CIO that further assuaged labor's fe rs of 
competition from immigrant workers.  The law required the Secretary of Labor to certify on an 
individual case basis that the aspiring immigrant would have a job that no available qualifi d 
American could take.  This provision was not easy to accept for many of the groups committed 
to immigration reform, but, as the American Jewish Committee admitted, they undrstood that 
they had few alternatives: 
Though pro-immigration groups were concerned from the outset about the restrictive 
impact of the new procedure, they did not protest vigorously, preferring to avoid 
endangering thereby the achievement of their overriding goal: repeal of the national 
origins system.810 
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As awareness of the significance of the labor clearance procedure sank in following the passage 
of the act, many reform advocates grew concerned and voiced publicly the fear that the new and 
administratively cumbersome procedure might paralyze the flow of skilled and unskilled 
workers.  They vowed to secure legislation that modified the new procedure on the grounds that 
it had been introduced without adequate consideration of its consequences.811 
Pro-immigration groups also realized that, in spite of tangible gains, the law had other 
limitations.  Pro-immigration groups, who had long supported a broader definition of the grounds 
to suspend deportation, achieved a victory with the amendment that expanded the criteria of 
eligibility for suspension of deportation from danger of "physical persecution" to danger of 
"persecution on ground of race, religion or political opinion."  Similarly, these groups applauded 
the law's new provision that allowed a waiver of the grounds of ineligibility based on mental 
retardation or previous evidence of insanity for immigrants who were immediate rel ives of 
United States citizens or resident aliens.  Previously, such persons had been excludable.  At the 
same time, the same groups realized that the absence of a provision to impose a statut of 
limitations on deportation and the failure of the new law to institute a visa-review board 
represented a defeat.  They also opposed the provision in the act that declared individuals from 
the Western Hemisphere ineligible for the procedure to adjust their status from non-immigrant to 
immigrant without leaving the country.812  Along with the administration, Senators Edward M. 
Kennedy, Philip A. Hart, and Jacob K. Javits, many of the pro-immigration groups also argued 
that the provision that placed a ceiling on immigration from the Western Hemisphere endangered 
                                                
811 Ibid. 
812 Before the passage of the Hart-Celler Act, only peopl  born in Canada, Mexico, and the islands adjacent to the 
United States had been ineligible for such adjustmen  of status. 
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the Good Neighbor Policy.813  Finally, the law's revised system of preferences placed refugees 
last, after family relationship and skills, defeating many of the pro-immigration groups’ efforts to 
secure more comprehensive legislation for refugees.  Moreover, reflecting the administration and 
Congress's exclusive concern with Cold War priorities, the law applied only to refugees from any 
Communist or Communist-dominated area or from any country in the Middle East.814 
 
Conclusion 
On October 3, 1965, seated under the Statue of Liberty in the presence of a large group of 
high government officials and citizens from all walks of life, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
signed the Hart-Celler bill into law.  Addressing a nationwide television audience, he stated that 
the new law repaired "a cruel and enduring wrong in the conduct of the American nation."  From 
that day forward, "those wishing to emigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their 
skills and their close relationship to those already here."815  In the same address, reflecting the 
emerging concerns of many immigration reform advocates, Johnson informed the people of 
Cuba that those who desired to seek refuge in the United States would find it.  He announced that 
he had asked the appropriate departments "to make the necessary arrangements to permit those in 
Cuba who seek freedom to make an orderly entry into the United States," and he appealed to all 
the American voluntary agencies for the "continuation and expansion of their magnificent work" 
to aid in this program.816  
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 Johnson's words poignantly reflected the changes for which Italian Americans and 
American Jews had pushed over the previous forty years.  For them, the elimination of the quota 
system depended upon winning acceptance for an immigration policy that privileged family 
reunion and migrants with skills needed in the United States.  At the same time, both groups 
continued to voice the need to integrate refugees into the country's immigration policy in rder to 
dispense with ad hoc legislation.  The American government and Congress would have hardly 
heard their concerns if the voluntary agencies they had founded had not played such an integral 
role in the resettlement of refugees after World War II.  By 1965, the United States could not do 
without these agencies to administer its immigration laws because of the large volume of 
immigrants and refugees trying to enter the country every year.  Another significant factor that 
helped Italian Americans and American Jews, along with the other ethnic groups intere ted in 
immigration reform, to succeed was American foreign policy interests.  Cold War geopolitical 
exigencies favored their agenda in spite of the persistent hostility towards immigration reform.  
 Italian Americans and American Jews also ascribed another, more personal mea ing to 
the passage of the law for their groups.  Commenting on the momentous implications of the 
abolition of the national origins quota system for their groups, Sydney Liskofsky wrote fo  the 
American Jewish Year Book that the Hart-Celler Act 
introduced a major reversal of a policy which had been in force since 1924, and which 
had antecedents in even earlier national policies and attitudes.  This policy, whih was 
rooted in concepts of racial and ethnic superiority and assimilability, in suspicion of alien 
'radicalism' and foreign labor competition, had survived decades of reform efforts.  These 
efforts, which did not avail the victims of Nazism during the 1930s and early 1940s, 
produced limited results after World War II in the form of temporary refugee legislation 
and minor revisions of the fundamental law.  However, the basic policy remained intact 
until October 3, 1965.817 
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Liskofsky's reference to the indifference towards Jewish refugees in the 1930s and during the 
war reflected yet another important change that the two groups had undergone since their fight 
against restriction had begun at the end of the nineteenth century.  By 1965, the two groups felt 
secure enough with their presence in American society that they felt comfortable criticizing it 
openly for its shortcomings without worrying about possible repercussions. 
 Upon his return from Johnson's signing of the bill on Liberty Island, Father Donanzan, 
ACIM's executive secretary, wrote a letter to all ACIM officers expr ssing the emotions of 
witnessing the culmination of ACIM's "thirteen-year-old crusade."  His words remarkably 
resembled Liskofsky's: 
My emotion was augmented by the feeling that I was, in that moment, the symbol of 
ACIM to which tens of thousands of Italians throughout the world, particularly in Italy,
looked to in prayerful confidence and expectation that its humanitarian and Christian 
program be crowned with victory—the victory of justice over the archaic and unjust 
immigration formula of the past 41 years, the victory of genuine democratic process ver 
the totalitarian rule prevailing elsewhere, the victory of rightful, even though belated, 
recognition of the contribution of all who made America great, the victory of charity over 
the egotism that permeated the now abolished 'national origins system.'818  
For both American Jews and Italian Americans, the passage of the Hart-Celle  Act sealed the end 
of an era that had marked them as undesirables.  It finally sanctioned their acceptan e as full 
members of American society, and recognized their contributions and their aci vements.  
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Conclusion:  "Are Americans Extinct?"819 
 A year after the ratification of the Hart-Celler Act, Sidney Liskof ky, a member of the 
American Jewish Committee, admitted that long-time immigration reform advoc tes viewed the 
passage of the law with pride.  Both American Jews and Italian Americans considered the new 
law as the crowning achievement of their forty years of lobbying efforts to overhaul the quota 
system.   Liskofsky also observed, however, that their work was far from over: 
Pro-immigration groups were generally satisfied with the new law, especially its 
thoroughgoing elimination of the national-origins and racist concepts.  But they wer  
greatly concerned about the hardships that would ensue. […]  Its operation was to be 
closely watched by the pro-immigration groups [...] and efforts would doubtless be made 
in the future to correct its remaining weaknesses.820  
Although the passage of the Hart-Celler Act was hailed as a victory for tolerati n at the time, 
Liskofsky, as many migration scholars have observed in recent years, was right to be concerned.  
While a remarkable achievement, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was hardly the 
apotheosis of postwar liberalism and cultural pluralism.  After decades of discrimination, the law 
finally abolished the Asia-Pacific Triangle, phased out the national origins quota system, and 
gave priority to family reunion over work visas.  Nonetheless, the law also created new forms of 
restriction.  Although these provisions secured the passage of the bill, the law's system of global 
and evenly distributed quotas (20,000 per country),  tight controls for immigrant workers, and 
ceiling on immigration from the Western Hemisphere paved the way for illegal immigration to 
become the central problem of American immigration policy in the late twentieth century.821   
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through the 1980s entered the United States as touri ts, overstayed their visas, and lived and worked as 
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 The final compromise bill reflected more the Johnson administration's desire to pass a
sweeping immigration bill than the limits of what pro-immigration groups could accomplish.  
Both Italian Americans and American Jews envisioned a more liberal immigration law than the 
one that ultimately passed, one that favored family reunion as much as labor migration and that 
eliminated any form of discrimination against immigrants upon their arrival.  M e Ngai argues 
that this agenda was hardly progressive and that Euro-Americans refused to further a truly liberal 
immigration policy to protect their standing in American society and preserve a system that 
centered on the importance of citizenship.822  Yet, as the last chapter has shown, both Italian and 
Jewish activists proposed an immigration reform agenda that, in line with the growin  a areness 
of the civil rights movement, proposed a more equitable immigration policy for all immigrant 
groups and not just for Southern and Eastern Europeans.  The absence of any objection to the 
retention of quotas attested more to their awareness that the United States would never hav  an 
open door immigration policy again.  Immersed in a climate of rampant nativism and 
Americanism, their early attempts to call for the repeal of the quotas had attr cted criticism and 
created additional obstacles to their efforts against restriction.  As this dissertation has 
demonstrated, as early as 1890, anti-restrictionists had to declare themselves in fa or of 
immigration regulation if they wanted to make their voices heard and limit the impact of the 
existing laws. 
They were not alone in this conviction.  Earlier in the century, Chinese and Japanese 
activists had reached similar conclusions.  After waging legal and diplomatic battles, both groups 
realized that Congress opposed any changes to the existing laws and preferred to focus on 
creating a transnational network that could help aspiring Chinese and Japanese immigrants reach 
                                                                                                                                                             
undocumented aliens."  Linda Dowling Almedia, Irish Immigrants in New York City, 1945-1995 (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 6. 
822 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, chapter 7. 
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the United States.823  By 1965, when Congress and the country seriously considered immigration 
reform, nobody ever proposed the repeal of an immigration ceiling.  
 Moreover, despite their accomplishments and their advancements in American society, 
Italian Americans and American Jews saw themselves as still fighting to fit in.  Nancy Foner has 
argued that the restrictive legislation of the 1920s reduced the fears of a deluge of "racial 
inferiors" and "facilitated assimilation by depriving Italians and Jews of constant, large-scale 
reinforcements." 824  Yet, as I have shown, the isolation that the Italian and Jewish communities 
experienced during the 1930s changed after World War II, when both communities lobbied to 
bring refugees, displaced persons, and more family members to the United States.  These new 
arrivals changed the dynamics and the configuration of both communities yet again and also 
attracted new criticisms against them.  The passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act 
only increased the new and continuous influx of arrivals, pushing both groups to examine their 
role in relation to the new arrivals.825  While the more recent immigrants brought a welcomed 
infusion of new blood, Italian Americans and American Jews worried that the newcomers' 
presence would attract new criticisms and reflect negatively on the communities as a whole.  
Although hostility towards Southern and Eastern Europeans was not nearly as virulent as it was 
earlier in the century, Italian Americans and American Jews made it a point of taking care of the 
new immigrants.  By then, thanks to decades of experience in the relocation and assistance of 
newly arrived immigrants, their organizations were much more efficient and effective, and the 
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transition was less traumatic than what German Jews had experienced at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, for example.   
Their concerns were not completely unfounded. The obstacles that both groups faced in 
pushing for legislation for refugees, displaced persons, and family members reflected the 
reluctance of Americans to welcome more Southern and Eastern Europeans.  As late as 1968, in 
fact, many Americans agreed with Walter Kerr when he complained that "the immigrants—
above all the Jewish immigrants—seem more American than [the WASP] does.  They are the 
faces and voices and inflections of thought that seem most familiar to us, literally s cond 
nature."826  He identified a clear moment and a group for the demise of the true American, the 
WASP:   
"Where did he go?" We remember him: pale, poised, neatly dressed, briskly sure of 
himself.  And we see him as an outsider, an outlander, a reasonably noble breed in the act 
of vanishing. […] He has stopped being representative, and we didn't notice it until this 
minute.  Not so emphatically, anyway.  What has happened since World War II is that the 
American sensibility has become part Jewish, perhaps as much Jewish as it is anything 
else […] The literate American mind has come in some measure to think Jewishly.  It has 
been taught to, and it was ready to.  After the entertainers and novelists came the Jewis  
critics, politicians, theologians. Critics and politicians and theologians are by profession 
molders; they form ways of seeing.827  
Kerr's remarks clearly echoed the backlash against the Civil Rights Movement and Kennedy and 
Johnson's liberal agendas, yet they nonetheless preoccupied Americans of Southern and Easter  
European descent.  Also in 1968, Jethro K. Liebermann published his Are Americans Extinct? in 
part to counter some of the persisting stereotypes against these groups.828  Ultimately, I contend, 
their integration was not complete until the primary origin of immigrants leaving for the United 
States tilted from Southern and Eastern Europe to Asia and the Western Hemisphere.   
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 In 1968, few predicted that the recently passed law would generate a new large 
immigration flow and shift the origins of immigrants from Europe to the third world.  In the first 
five years after the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act, Southern and Eastern European 
immigrants found out it easier to come to the United States.   As the law and the legislators had 
intended, the proportion of Europeans shifted from a majority from Northern and Western 
Europe to Southern and Eastern Europe.  While Italy, Greece, Portugal, and others sent more 
people to the United States, Northern and Western European countries sent fewer.  After 1965, 
twenty thousand Italians immigrated every year for a decade, and Greeks and Portuguese also 
arrived in considerable numbers.  The only country that did not benefit from the new law was 
Poland.  Before 1965, Poland was the only country in the Eastern block to allow any emigration, 
and many Poles chose to settle in the United States.  After 1965, Polish authorities st pp d the 
trend, as they did not want well-educated and skilled citizens to go to the United States, while the 
unskilled lacked the skills and the family connections to obtain a visa.  Once immigrants from 
Italy, Greece, and Portugal exhausted their family reunion options, the immigration pressure 
from Southern and Eastern Europe began to ease.  European migrants in search of work found it 
easier to relocate to other European countries that experienced labor shortage f llowing their 
economic recovery.  Many took advantage of guest workers programs that countries like 
Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium instituted to attract an unskilled labor force.829    
 American Jews and Italian Americans survived the addition of new Italians and Jews to 
their communities and criticisms like Kerr's because of what they had accomplished in the 
meantime.  By 1965, along with other groups that mobilized against immigration restriction and 
the exclusion they faced, American Jews and Italian Americans contributed to create a blueprint 
for ethnic politics that contemporary ethnic groups still use today.  Along with Chinese, 
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Japanese, and Mexican activists, Italian and Jewish reformers created a space and a voice for 
immigrant communities, set important legal precedents for future battles, and used mobilization  
strategies that later inspired other immigrant groups.  Moreover, together they re-framed the role 
that immigration policy played in the country's domestic and foreign policy.  Finally, they set an 
example of how older immigrants could assist, help relocate, and interact with neer 
immigrants.  
 At the same time, Italian Americans and American Jews' history of mobilization against 
immigration restriction provided two different trajectories in the politics of ethnic pressure for 
future immigrant communities.   While Eastern European Jews joined a well-established and 
well-connected German Jewish community, Italians were newcomers with no con ections and a 
complicated relationship with their homeland.  Moreover, while the great majority of Eastern 
European Jews arrived in the United States to settle permanently and maintained ties only with 
the Jewish communities in the countries from which they emigrated, Italians were birds of 
passage well into the beginning of the twentieth century and continued to travel regularly back 
and forth even after the ratification of the national-origins quotas.   
 Their different transnational status profoundly shaped their mobilization against 
restriction.  From very early on, their statelessness pushed American Jews to mobilize to protect 
their interests, to found organizations to further the advancement of their community, and  to 
command a high level of financial, political, and intellectual resources in pursuing their political 
aims and assisting Jews abroad.  The need for self-reliance helped German and Eastern European 
Jews in America bridge their cultural and religious differences to come tgether to fight for 
immigration reform.  Their unique status and their commitment to social justice and civil rights 
afforded Jewish organizations a vastly disproportionate effect on U.S. immigration policy.  With 
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all its shortcomings, the American Jewish Committee rapidly became a model in struggles for 
immigration reform for its "strong leadership [particularly Louis Marshall], internal cohesion, 
well-funded programs, sophisticated lobbying techniques, well-chosen non-Jewish allie , and 
good timing."830  Yet American Jews also perceived their statelessness as a source of 
vulnerability that motivated them to seek and collaborate with allies outside their communities 
and push for the decline of a homogenous Protestant culture in the United States.  This insecurity 
and their commitment to civil rights, in part, explain why all the major Jewish organizations that 
were involved in the battle against immigration in the first half of the twentieth century still exist 
today. 
 Italian Americans' transnational ties yielded different results.  The fate of ACIM after the 
ratification of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act represents a perfect example of the 
difference of approach to immigration restriction between Italian Americans and American Jews.  
Similarly to the American Jewish Committee, ACIM had built the resources, conta ts, prestige, 
and organizational efforts that had turned it into a powerful voice in the immigration reform 
debate in its thirteen years of activity.  Proud of their accomplishments, Donanzan and Marchisio 
began to discuss ACIM's future in a post-quotas era and felt confident about the role the 
organization could have:     
You will be interested in knowing that last year when the crowning of ACIM's campaign 
with the abolition of the National Origins System was favorably and authoritatively 
forecast for 1965, officials of our Government, of the Vatican and of the Italian 
Government were unanimous in urging that ACIM, the only Italo-American organization 
operating in the U.S.A. under Catholic auspices, be not disbanded but preserved and, 
possibly, expanded by adding to its program other projects.831   
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In October 1964, with the blessings of "well-informed Americans," they traveled to Italy to 
discuss the organization's future.  During their trip, they met with officials of the Secretariat of 
State and Pope Paul VI at the Vatican and held talks with officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry 
and the Foreign Affairs minister himself, Giuseppe Saragat.   
 Upon his return, Donanzan wrote to the members of the ACIM Board of Directors to 
discuss possible options.  In his letter, Donanzan detailed the alternatives that American, Italian, 
and Church authorities had considered as viable options.  They decided the organization should 
continue to provide information and assistance to Americans petitioning for the admission of 
their family members, to help Italian immigrants "in their assimilation in their new land of 
adoption," and to maintain its role as advocate for Italian Americans in immigration affairs with 
governmental agencies and members of Congress "lest the fruits of the victory be vi tually 
nullified by bureaucrats and other factors."  At the same time, ACIM's scope could expand and 
take on cultural and welfare programs for Italian American communities and international 
programs to help hard-pressed Italian communities in South American countries "i  the spirit of 
the Alliance for Progress launched by the late President Kennedy and endorsed by Pr sident 
Johnson."832  Yet ACIM interrupted most of its activities in 1968, after shepherding a myriad of 
Italian immigrants through the three-year phasing out of the quota system, assisting Italian 
American applicants sending for their families, and helping with their relocation to the United 
States.833 
 The meteoric history of ACIM reflects the pragmatic approach that Italian Americans had 
towards immigration restriction.  As they built their communities in the United States and 
entered the anti-restrictionist movement, they consciously chose to focus on immigration issues 
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that directly related to Italian migrants and Italian Americans.  Along the way, they created a 
immigration reform rhetoric that specifically tackled Italian American issues, learned to use the 
political process to attract both the Italian and American governments' attention, and worked to 
dismantle stereotypes against them.  Unlike American Jews, they pursued the collaboration with 
other groups only when it suited their goals.  It was this understanding that led them to accept the 
partnership of the Catholic Church that led to the creation of ACIM.  From this point of view, it 
was only natural that ACIM became less involved when it accomplished its main go ls. 
 Italian Americans' decision to be pragmatic in their mobilization strategies stemmed from 
an understanding of their position in American.  Significantly, as they grappled with the impact 
of the 1924 Immigration Act on their communities and the Italian immigrants barred from 
entering the country, they turned to the American Jewish community for inspiration.834  If the 
greater history of urban dwelling and initial higher financial and educational levels might in part 
explain the different strategies, Italian Americans' decision also stemmed from the different 
relationship they had with their ancestral home.  Italian Americans continued to travel between 
the United States and Italy, even after they settled permanently in the United States.  Moreover, 
especially after the rise of Mussolini to power, the Italian government carefully cultivated a 
strong relationship with Italians abroad to protect its international and economic interests.  This 
close relationship focused Italian Americans' interest in furthering Italy and Italians' interests, 
especially because they perceived that their success inevitably reflected on their standing in 
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American society.  The relationship tightened after World War II, after Italian Americans 
became the most powerful non-state actors Italy had in the United States.835   
 Ultimately, both strategies proved successful, and they both provided a model for 
mobilization that intersected with the battles of other immigrant groups.  As they learned from 
Chinese and Japanese immigrants' opposition against exclusion, they created new venues 
through which immigrants could voice their concerns and have an impact on the laws that 
affected them.  Along the way, they learned to negotiate their role in American politics and 
society, created an agenda that was responsive to American domestic and internatio al concerns, 
and reframed their presence in the their transnational community.  Finally, as they struggled to 
find the best strategy to push for change, they learned the value of collective action.836 
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